WEBVTT

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What each of the top venture capitalists
of all time has in common is each of

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them missed almost all of the great
deals of their generation. And we see

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this a lot. We do performance reviews,
right? We do performance reviews. And so

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it's like, well, they've made 10
investments and, you know, one of them

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is this this just this huge success
and the other nine are like, you know,

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sucking wind. And it's like, okay,
is this a good venture capitalist or a bad

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venture capitalist? And it's like, well,
in any domain that's not probabilistic,

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you say this person's terrible, right?

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You know, it's batting average of like
a hundred, you know, out of a thousand.

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It's like, this person's awful. Um,
and and there's always the temptation to

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say, well, this one thing that's working
is it's like it's a fluke, right? And

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so, who knows whether they'll ever get
it again. And it's at that point where I

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put my head up and I say, we're in the
fluke business. The whole point of this

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is to get the flukes. You don't have
to score 100%. And and not having to score

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100% basically means you can take chances.

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[music]

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[music]

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>> [music] >> Welcome
to the Knowledge Project

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podcast. I'm your host, Shane Parish.

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The goal of this show is to master
the best of [music] what other people have

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already figured out so that you can
unlock your potential. We interview

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worldclass [music] doers and thinkers
so you can better analyze problems, seize

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opportunities, and live a more
meaningful life. Every episode is packed

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with lessons and insights that never
expire. If you're listening to this,

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you're missing out. If you'd like
special member onlyly episodes, access

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before [music] anyone else, transcripts,

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and other member onlyly content, you can

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join at fs.blog/membership.

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Check out the show notes for a link.

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Mark Andre is here today. Mark
is co-founder and general partner of the

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venture capital firm Andre [music]
Horowits. He's an innovator and creator

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and one of the few to pioneer an entire
software category used by more than a

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billion people [music] and one of the few
to establish multiple multi-billion

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dollar companies. Mark co-created
the highly influential Mosaic internet

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browser and co-founded [music] Netscape
which any of you over 30 will remember.

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I've been wanting to talk to Mark for a
long time [music] and this conversation

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does not disappoint. We explore why he
studies history to see the future. His

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optimistic and pessimistic [music] view

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of the future. How A16Z makes decisions
and specifically what Mark knows about

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decision-m that most [music] people miss.
Our largely dysfunctional

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education system, assessing the judgment

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of founders, and so much more. It's time

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to listen [music] and learn.

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What are you obsessed with right now?

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So there's a lot going on. So
the the full answer to that question would

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probably take [laughter] take the entire
podcast. But you know I would say

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probably two big buckets of things.
You know my my day job is you know being

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obsessed by all of the sort of changing
you know technologies. Um and then you

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know the the the sort of impact that all
all the all the new technologies are

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having on on the you know on on
different industries and on the world

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broadly. Um and then the other thing
I've just you know really I've gotten

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just sort of extremely curious about
I would describe you know like a lot of

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people um a lot of my assumptions about
how you know the world worked and about

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how the US worked and about how politics
worked and about how society worked were

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kind of upended you know kind
of sometime between 2008 and you know 2015

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um you know and then for sure heading
into the last five years um and and and

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so I've I've become somewhat obsessed
with kind of reading my way back and

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basically trying to figure
out essentially [laughter]

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what the hell is going on. Um, you know,
back to my my my kind of day job, which

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is as society changes and as technologies
change society, um, and as

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you know, frankly, also society changes

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technologies. Um, how much of what we

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experience as new is actually new, um,
versus how much is old, right? How many

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of the sort of behavior patterns
or societal changes do we, you know, do we

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kind of experience this brand new
that actually turn out to be quite old

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patterns? what what I find generally is if
I don't understand something, I I try

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to read backwards and and and kind
of the further back back I read, the more

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universal themes I find and the more
things that I think are kind of

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remarkable and unique to our era
actually turn out to be quite universal.

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Um and and I don't know, at least for me,
that's a calming experience. Um

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because it makes me feel less less like
the world is sort of spinning, you know,

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in a in a in a different direction
and more just that we're, you know, we're

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we're playing out patterns that are
kind of deeply rooted in in in humanity,

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which is what I mostly believe. So anyway,
that's the that's the current thing.

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>> Can you talk to me a little bit about
those patterns? What what comes to mind

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when you think of an example
that you're you're surprised by?

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>> I mean, you take almost anything, but I
mean, I'll just give you the the most

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basic one. So, the most basic one
is is societal reaction to new technology,

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right? Um, and so there are, you know,
there are these new technologies of our

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era. You know, we could go, you know,
make, you know, whatever list we want.

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Um, you know, and it could, you know,
everything from, you know, social media

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and internet to, you know, many other
things, automation, robots, uh, and so

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forth. And then there's, you know,
the sort of the societal reaction. There's

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sort of the, you know, the reaction
in the press, there's the reaction from

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politicians. Um, you know, there's
the reaction from different political

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movements. You know, political
candidates, right, are now, you know,

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taking, you know, kind of major stands
on these things. Um, you know, both in

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the US and around the world. You hear
it a lot like around the kid, like what

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technology does to kids, right? It's
sort of the go-to thing, which is, you

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know, that, you know, sort of this
technology is going to ruin the new

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generation of kids. And then you just
kind of, you know, ask yourself, well,

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is this the is this the first generation
of technology for which they have made

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those claims, right? or or in fact,
have those claims been made for basically

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prior generations of technology? And then
of course the the next question is

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like okay are were the claims different
in the past or were they actually the

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same claims? Right? And then to the
extent that they were the same claims,

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you could ask like okay are you know
how are they playing out differently this

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time? Um and and are they playing
out differently this time? And there's

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there's actually quite rich literature
both on the history of technology and on

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the sociology of technology. you know,
prior generations of sociologists who I

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think were actually more more kind of
interesting than the current generation,

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you know, actually grappled with these
questions a lot, right? Um, and um, I

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mean, even like Marxism itself is like,
you know, heavily based on the impact of

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technology on society or at least on
Marxist theories on it. Um, uh, and so I

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found this just like fantastic book that I
just really highly recommend. That's a

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great example of this. Uh, it's a book
written by an MIT professor 50 years a

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50-y year reissue of the book. So, it's
a book that it's very I can state very

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confidently it's a book written before
the internet [laughter] before any of

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the things people, you know, people
are mad about today, right? Um, and it's

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it's this great book with this great
kind of, you know, title from, you know,

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kind of the 1950s, 19 early 1960s called
it's called Men Machines and Modernity.

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I'll have to look it up, but it's Elton
Morrison is the uh is the title, but I

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think it's Men Machines and Modernity,
you know, but but it's this it's

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basically it's a short little book
and it goes through basically it goes

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through this history of like how new
technologies are sort of received. um in

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society and it it it just briefly
it proposes this basically three-step

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process um and sort of uh you know
step one is basically just like flatout

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ignore right new technologies are just
like dismissed all all the experts and

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all the people who are kind of in power
you know just kind of say okay this

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thing is not going to matter it's not
going to not going to be a thing step

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two is rational counterargument
right which is sort of the status quo

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assembles all of the different arguments
as to why this thing can't possibly work

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and won't possibly be important but like
they really get into the argument in

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step two and they really like try to try
to reason it through Um, and then he

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says step three is he says step three
is when the name calling begins, which is

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to say step three is when the status
quo basically goes bananas. Um, and gets

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like super emotional and super irate and
and kind of goes on tilt, right? And and

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and starts name calling and starts
accusing the sort of proponents of the

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new technology of sort of all these evil
kind of moral crimes. Um, and and and

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basically the reason he says it goes
through this three-step process is

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because he says what what people think
of as technological change is actually

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societal change. and specifically
societal change of the form of a of a

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reordering of the power and status
structure. Right? And so all of the

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people who have achieved positions
of power and authority in the world based

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on prior generations of technology are
inherently threatened by new technology

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because new technology will upend
the power and status structures and then a

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new set of people will you know come
to the foreground and and take the power.

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Um and and of course you know in in
in in human society power and status

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battles are the core battles like
that you know they are they are the most

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vicious fights. And so basically what
happens is a lot of technologists kind

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of start out by assuming that they've
built a better mousetrap and of course

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like you know people should appreciate
them for it and then they find out that

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everybody hates them for it and basically
that's the reason why and and

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that this is a persistent pattern through
history that this is in fact not new.

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>> Can you walk me through how you sort
of see some of these technological changes

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and how they'll impact sort of this

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social hierarchy or how people um get

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into positions of power? So, so the

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really big one is um uh is uh you know

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basically hierarchy versus network.
Um right or you could kind of say

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institutions versus network. Um and so
the and by the way for people interested

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in this um Neil Ferguson actually wrote
he [snorts] wrote a really interesting

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book called The Square in the Tower
that goes through this in some detail

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recently that's very you know kind
of historically informed. Another great

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source on this um I should say I agree
a lot with like the first twothirds of the

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book and then I kind of take the polar
opposite view of him on the last third

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of the book. [laughter] So,
it's funny. The last third of the

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book made me very mad. Um, and of course,
the reason it made me mad is

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because he mounts sort of a rising
defense of the old power structure.

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Sorry, rousing defense of the old power
structure, right? Whereas, of course,

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I'm I'm on the side of the new power
structure. So, of course, that would

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make me mad. It's kind of the reverse
of that, right? I'm mad by the resistance.

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And so, anyway, the big battle
is sort of you could call it kind of

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institutions versus versus networks. You
could call it kind of top down hierarchy

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versus sort of lateral, you know, kind
of network building. Um, and so start by

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saying top down institutions. So top
down institution building is kind of how

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the west you know and you know it's
a certain true of some other cultures as

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well but let's just you know I'm most
familiar with the west so I'll just

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focus on that is sort of how the west
was one was we got really good at

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building these basically these giant
hierarchies like we got really good and

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in particular right in the um you know
kind of in the in the late 19th early

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20th century you know we with the rise
of sort of the second industrial

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revolution you know we sort of had all
these masscale technologies of that era

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right so mass manufacturing right um
and then you know mass transportation and

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then mass media rather than mass
government. Um, and so we we got really

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good kind of between call it 1880 and 19,
you know, basically, you know, I

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don't know, 1939 or something. We got
really good at building, you know, giant

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industrial companies, right? You know,
General Motors and General Electric and,

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you know, all these companies. We got
really good at building um, you know,

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giant government, you know, the sort of,
you know, FDR, you know, the New Deal

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and sort of this massive expansion of
state power, you know, that kind of hit,

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you know, after after, you know, after
the 1930s that, you know, that that's

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only, you know, it's only accelerated
since. Um and then we got really good at

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like mass media, mass communication,
right? Radio and television and so

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forth. Um and then also right therefore,
you know, mass politics, right? So this

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kind of absolute dominance of these two,
you know, major political parties. Um

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and then of course, you know, even like
to the extent that you consider America,

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you know, kind of in that era kind of as,
you know, growing empire, we got

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really good at kind of building
the American empire, right? And and and of

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course the American empire kind of,
you know, continues to this day as, you

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know, not as a not as a literal empire
in the old sense, but as a as sort of a,

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you know, a modern empire, right?
which is to say, you know, cultural uh and

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intellectual, right? And and and a
societal empire, you know, that somehow,

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by the way, we still have 800 foreign
military bases, but you know, for the

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most part, sort of a soft soft power
empire. So, so we just we got really

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good at these giant kind of top down
things. And then we we lived in this

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world for 50 or 60 years in which
basically these giant top-down

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institutions just kind of ruled
everything and we just kind of got used

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to it. And you know there are these
famous books from that era you know the

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the organization man is probably you
know the key book kind of of that era

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that kind of described there's this great
line in the organization man where

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he says um you know the the you know in
sort of this era of all these these mass

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systems uh he said you know the route
to he said the route to power leaves you

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know inevitably uh leads through the

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conference room right it's like right
the the the the way that power has been

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exercised in our society kind of through
the through these decades of mass

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systems has been basically people in
conference rooms arguing with each other

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over control, you know, basically of
the of these mass mechanisms, right? Over

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control of what the ad campaign's going
to be, over control of what the, you

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know, the new car model is going to be
next year, over control of, you know,

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which which, you know, which candidate
is going to be the, you know, Democratic

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Republican presidential nominee or
whatever. You know, it's these people at

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the top of a hierarchy kind of battling
at conference rooms. Um, and and by the

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way, it's also right as a consequence,
it's like, you know, all these

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institutions over time kind of end up
run by lawyers, right, of one form or

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another, right? There's sort of, you know,
people who kind of deal in words,

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right? People who deal in kind of symbolic
manipulation at the at the word

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level. uh you know sort of the the sort
of non non-quantitative conceptual

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level. Um and and you know it looked
by the you know kind of 80s or 90s like

00:12:08.880 --> 00:12:10.637
that was just going to be how it was. Um

00:12:10.720 --> 00:12:13.357
and then you know this internet thing

00:12:13.440 --> 00:12:17.917
comes along. [snorts] Um and you know
the the core technological foundation of

00:12:18.000 --> 00:12:21.357
the internet of course is you know it's
a it's a it's not that right it's not a

00:12:21.440 --> 00:12:25.837
top- down institutional thing. It's a
by definition it's a lateral peer-to-peer

00:12:25.920 --> 00:12:27.997
right that you know the core
architecture right famously the internet

00:12:28.080 --> 00:12:28.957
has survived a nuclear strike.

00:12:29.040 --> 00:12:31.677
Therefore, there is no central node,
right? Therefore, you're able to route

00:12:31.760 --> 00:12:34.317
around damage, right? Therefore,
you're able to sort of expand the network

00:12:34.400 --> 00:12:37.517
laterally. Anybody can plug in. Anybody
can build whatever whatever app they

00:12:37.600 --> 00:12:40.557
want. Anybody can build whatever website
they want. They can, you know, put on

00:12:40.640 --> 00:12:44.797
any information they want. They can
organize any movement they want, right?

00:12:44.880 --> 00:12:48.157
Um, and so you have this introduction
of this like fundamentally disruptive

00:12:48.240 --> 00:12:51.917
lateral networkbased technology at sort
of the precise time when it looked like

00:12:52.000 --> 00:12:55.357
we were going to have sort of peak
centralization. Um, and so I think what

00:12:55.440 --> 00:12:58.237
we have now is kind of at the at the
sort of deepest level, what we have is

00:12:58.320 --> 00:13:01.277
kind of this big fight between
people who want to use the internet to

00:13:01.360 --> 00:13:05.517
basically reinforce top down power,
uh, versus people who want to use it to

00:13:05.600 --> 00:13:08.717
disrupt top down power. My analysis
is basically that's what's happened to our

00:13:08.800 --> 00:13:12.797
politics right on both the left and the
right which is the internet is both the

00:13:12.880 --> 00:13:15.677
enabler for traditional political
movements and parties to try to

00:13:15.760 --> 00:13:19.437
establish a right as sort of permanent
enduring advantage but it's also the

00:13:19.520 --> 00:13:22.317
enabling technology for disruptive
movements whether you know on the left

00:13:22.400 --> 00:13:25.437
in the form of whether it's democratic
socialism or you know these kind of more

00:13:25.520 --> 00:13:29.117
energetic you know kind of forms of
leftism or you know on the right the tea

00:13:29.200 --> 00:13:32.477
party and then the Trump movement
and you know mega and you know the the new

00:13:32.560 --> 00:13:35.037
right and all the all the sort of new
disruptive movements on the right and so

00:13:35.120 --> 00:13:37.277
there again you see the same you
you know, the same fundamental battle

00:13:37.360 --> 00:13:40.237
between basically
institutions and and networks.

00:13:40.320 --> 00:13:44.157
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[music] C terms. >> I think
that's fascinating. And one of

00:14:41.840 --> 00:14:45.917
the things that that I sort of see
is it's permissionless. I don't need

00:14:46.000 --> 00:14:49.117
anybody in the boardroom saying that I
can go talk to people now. I can just

00:14:49.200 --> 00:14:53.437
put my ideas out there and let other
people be the judge of those ideas.

00:14:53.520 --> 00:14:56.477
>> Yeah, that's right. And there's
this huge tension. So there's this thing.

00:14:56.560 --> 00:14:58.957
Well, so let's take mobile, you know,
because the smartphone is kind of the

00:14:59.040 --> 00:15:01.917
key revolutionary technology in terms of,
you know, sort of access to all this

00:15:02.000 --> 00:15:03.997
stuff. It was not that long ago. As

00:15:04.080 --> 00:15:05.997
recently as 2006, right, which was only

00:15:06.080 --> 00:15:11.117
15 years ago. Um, as recently as 2006,
exactly to your point, if I wanted to, I

00:15:11.200 --> 00:15:14.637
could actually build smartphone apps
in 2006. I could build an app that did

00:15:14.720 --> 00:15:16.797
whatever I wanted on a on a phone. But

00:15:16.880 --> 00:15:21.757
to get it distributed, um, uh, to get
it actually onto the phone for people to

00:15:21.840 --> 00:15:26.317
use, I literally had to go to the
headquarters of Verizon or AT&T, right,

00:15:26.400 --> 00:15:30.477
or one of the big telecom companies, um,
and I had to basically apply, right? And

00:15:30.560 --> 00:15:34.317
literally I had to go into a conference
room. Um you know >> you had a gatekeeper.

00:15:34.400 --> 00:15:37.677
>> Absolutely 100%. And if if and it was
it was famously the term in those days it

00:15:37.760 --> 00:15:40.637
was called the deck. And the deck
basically it was basically the home

00:15:40.720 --> 00:15:44.237
screen or like the UI on the phone. And if
if if you wanted your app in the deck

00:15:44.320 --> 00:15:47.757
um you went in and you started
negotiating in a conference room right

00:15:47.840 --> 00:15:51.677
with you know men in suits. Um and you
know the opening you know the opening

00:15:51.760 --> 00:15:56.237
you know the opening bid was you know
40 or 50% of your thing. Um and and then

00:15:56.320 --> 00:15:58.957
they could basically dictate like
if it does this or that like whatever

00:15:59.040 --> 00:16:02.397
whatever. And then by the way, you know,
to this day, like, you know, Apple, you

00:16:02.480 --> 00:16:04.957
know, opening up the iPhone and the App
Store was a big step forward, but of

00:16:05.040 --> 00:16:07.597
course, even Apple, right, continues
to exercise a fair amount of control. I

00:16:07.680 --> 00:16:10.557
mean, they're far more open than than
Verizon was in those days, you know, but

00:16:10.640 --> 00:16:13.357
even still, like, you know, Apple bans
entire categories of apps and of course,

00:16:13.440 --> 00:16:16.717
they extract their 30% economics. And so,
even still, like there's still kind

00:16:16.800 --> 00:16:20.957
of a legacy holdover of that level
of control. Um, right, but in but in stark

00:16:21.040 --> 00:16:24.077
contrast, right? And and I think this
is a good news story, right? In stark

00:16:24.160 --> 00:16:28.317
contrast, you know, the web like the web
has never had that property. uh the web

00:16:28.400 --> 00:16:29.597
didn't have that property on day one.

00:16:29.680 --> 00:16:32.077
The web didn't have that property
in 2006 and the web in fact doesn't have

00:16:32.160 --> 00:16:36.877
that property today. And you know it's
like you know you there's a compromise

00:16:36.960 --> 00:16:39.117
like especially on smartphones like
there's a compromise for building a

00:16:39.200 --> 00:16:42.237
mobile website versus building an app
and you know there are issues involved

00:16:42.320 --> 00:16:44.797
in that but the you know the fact
remains like you can still build

00:16:44.880 --> 00:16:47.837
whatever website you want. You can put
whatever information you want on it. Um

00:16:47.920 --> 00:16:52.397
and and just from a historical
standpoint that's just such a change. I

00:16:52.480 --> 00:16:55.277
mean the most dramatic the most dramatic
way of thinking about how big of a

00:16:55.360 --> 00:16:59.357
change that is as sort of a global kind
of macro level um is that you know the

00:16:59.440 --> 00:17:02.317
the Soviet Union you know there was this
there was this dissident movement inside

00:17:02.400 --> 00:17:06.077
the Soviet Union in the 1980s right and
you know they they didn't know that they

00:17:06.160 --> 00:17:08.957
were going to win like up until I think
the very last minute like they you know

00:17:09.040 --> 00:17:12.477
they didn't know the USSR would ever
fall u but you know they they tried and

00:17:12.560 --> 00:17:15.357
there were some very brave people behind
the iron curtain in in Russia and the

00:17:15.440 --> 00:17:17.677
other you know kind of east block
countries that you know that that

00:17:17.760 --> 00:17:21.597
battled for a long time and so they you
know they had this concept of samazdot

00:17:21.680 --> 00:17:24.317
right, which was was was basically
bas you know was basically you know

00:17:24.400 --> 00:17:28.237
information free information right
about like you know open criticism of the

00:17:28.320 --> 00:17:32.557
Soviet regime um and it was necessarily
an underground phenomenon because if you

00:17:32.640 --> 00:17:37.197
were caught with it right you would get
shot um and so they had uh and so then

00:17:37.280 --> 00:17:40.157
there's this sort of practical question
of like how do you produce samosat and

00:17:40.240 --> 00:17:44.957
the answer in those days was you produce
samosat by mimograph machine right which

00:17:45.040 --> 00:17:48.317
is sort of the you know the for for k
for kids listening to this this was

00:17:48.400 --> 00:17:51.997
photocopers before photocopers um you
know so these were sort you know, pretty

00:17:52.080 --> 00:17:55.197
expensive, complex kind of, you know,
basically basement. You put put one of

00:17:55.280 --> 00:17:57.437
these in your basement or your office
and you could do you make copies of

00:17:57.520 --> 00:18:01.037
paper, you know, kind of invaluable.
Um, and you know, sure enough, like there

00:18:01.120 --> 00:18:03.997
was like a whole thing involving
smuggling mimograph machines into Russia

00:18:04.080 --> 00:18:07.197
into so into the Soviet Union and then
if you were caught with a mimograph

00:18:07.280 --> 00:18:12.237
machine, you were shot. Um, and so just
the level of overhead involved in even

00:18:12.320 --> 00:18:15.037
getting, you know, information that
contradicted sort of centralized power

00:18:15.120 --> 00:18:19.677
out, you know, was still really hard,
you know, even at that point. Um, and

00:18:19.760 --> 00:18:21.917
then, you know, the internet kind
of popped. You know, it's kind of

00:18:22.000 --> 00:18:25.357
interesting. It's like, could you ever
have another Soviet Union, like in the

00:18:25.440 --> 00:18:28.157
era of the internet, um, you know, North

00:18:28.240 --> 00:18:32.477
Korea is doing their damnedest to try
to maintain that model, you know, but

00:18:32.560 --> 00:18:36.077
without going full North Korea, like I'm
not sure you can. I I mean, I guess I'm

00:18:36.160 --> 00:18:38.957
an optimist on this point. Like,
I tend to think open access to information

00:18:39.040 --> 00:18:40.877
basically makes a lot of these
historical things, you know,

00:18:40.960 --> 00:18:44.477
fundamentally impossible. not you know
not nec you know not not all centralized

00:18:44.560 --> 00:18:48.957
institutions get get torn down on day
one but like over time um if people are

00:18:49.040 --> 00:18:51.837
able to actually like debate things
people are actually able to see you know

00:18:51.920 --> 00:18:55.117
alternate viewpoints people are actually
able to point out flaws you know kind of

00:18:55.200 --> 00:18:58.157
in the systems that are ruling them
like o over time you know I don't think

00:18:58.240 --> 00:19:01.037
people will put up with the kind
of draconian kind of top down control that

00:19:01.120 --> 00:19:04.077
that that that you know that we used
to have to put up with you know before

00:19:04.160 --> 00:19:08.157
these technologies existed.
>> Can you give me both sides of the next

00:19:08.240 --> 00:19:11.997
10 years? So, I'm interested in hearing
your most optimistic scenario and your

00:19:12.080 --> 00:19:15.917
most pessimistic scenario.
>> Look, optimism is just like it's

00:19:16.000 --> 00:19:19.837
basically the Morrison book, right?
It's basically you have you have all these

00:19:19.920 --> 00:19:22.237
kits, right? So, you have kind of the
world as it is. You have the status quo,

00:19:22.320 --> 00:19:24.957
you have the power structures, you have
the hierarchies, and whatever. They work

00:19:25.040 --> 00:19:29.117
as well as they do and so forth. And then
you basically have all these kids.

00:19:29.200 --> 00:19:32.397
Um, and and this is kind of one of the
things in my day job that's just always

00:19:32.480 --> 00:19:34.957
so interesting is like because these
kids like walk in the door and they're

00:19:35.040 --> 00:19:37.917
just they're and they walk in the door
from all over the world, right? from

00:19:38.000 --> 00:19:41.677
every walk of life, from every possible
background. Um, and they walk in with,

00:19:41.760 --> 00:19:45.837
you know, an idea and a skill set.
And, you know, I would say the ideas are

00:19:45.920 --> 00:19:48.797
getting to be kind of increasingly,
I think, profound and the skill sets are

00:19:48.880 --> 00:19:51.917
getting increasingly advanced. And part
of it is, you know, kids now are growing

00:19:52.000 --> 00:19:54.717
up on on the internet in some
fundamental way. And so, you know, we we

00:19:54.800 --> 00:19:57.917
see kids now from all over the world
who walk in and they're they are like far

00:19:58.000 --> 00:20:01.517
more educated, right, and and skilled
already to be able to do, you know, a

00:20:01.600 --> 00:20:04.877
startup or or, you know, create new
software or do any of these things um,

00:20:04.960 --> 00:20:07.597
you know, than I was at their age.
uh because they've they've learned on the

00:20:07.680 --> 00:20:09.517
internet like they've gone online,
they've read, you know, they've read

00:20:09.600 --> 00:20:11.837
everything, they've they've watched
everything. They they you know, it's

00:20:11.920 --> 00:20:15.197
just kind of their their depth of sort
of technological knowledge and business

00:20:15.280 --> 00:20:18.237
knowledge and finance knowledge
and cultural knowledge is just like

00:20:18.320 --> 00:20:21.837
incredibly broad. And so these kids walk
in and they and you know like like kids

00:20:21.920 --> 00:20:24.317
you know like like like any you know
generation of kids they're they're

00:20:24.400 --> 00:20:27.197
idealists and they've got all these new
ideas and they kind of have an intuitive

00:20:27.280 --> 00:20:30.317
sense of how new technologies could be
harnessed to you know improve the world

00:20:30.400 --> 00:20:32.877
in some way and they actually have
the power to do it and then you know and

00:20:32.960 --> 00:20:35.517
then you know brag a little bit on us
you know we're in a position to be able

00:20:35.600 --> 00:20:36.637
to support them and help them do that.

00:20:36.720 --> 00:20:39.357
So there's you know there's a system
kind of waiting for them. you know,

00:20:39.440 --> 00:20:42.317
basically it's that we're just going
to see this sort and you see it now, but

00:20:42.400 --> 00:20:46.557
you're just going to see this sort of
continuous kind of movement um of all of

00:20:46.640 --> 00:20:49.597
these new ideas and all these new ways
of doing things. And you and you know,

00:20:49.680 --> 00:20:52.717
look it, you know, they're not all going
to work. It's a rebel alliance versus an

00:20:52.800 --> 00:20:57.357
empire. It's asymmetric, right? The the
the empire has to win 100% of the time,

00:20:57.440 --> 00:21:00.157
right? They have to defend against all
attackers, right? Whereas, you know, the

00:21:00.240 --> 00:21:02.317
attack, you know, so you can have many
different attackers who kind of keep

00:21:02.400 --> 00:21:07.277
coming. Um and so we're just going
to see in sector after sector just better

00:21:07.360 --> 00:21:10.717
and better ways of doing things, better
ways of organizing, better ways of of

00:21:10.800 --> 00:21:14.237
you know better ways of organizing the
economy and you know productive activity

00:21:14.320 --> 00:21:18.477
and creating you know job opportunities
for people and education and and um you

00:21:18.560 --> 00:21:21.757
know how the you know how you know just
like all aspects of how people live and

00:21:21.840 --> 00:21:24.877
work you know just like more and more
choice more and more options more and

00:21:24.960 --> 00:21:28.077
more better ways of doing things. Um
and you know the incumbents will you know

00:21:28.160 --> 00:21:30.557
they'll they'll go through the three
stages right every time and you you see

00:21:30.640 --> 00:21:33.597
it you know it's like I said it's either
denial it's sort of rational you know

00:21:33.680 --> 00:21:37.517
counterargument or it's name calling
I is that inherent to even the winners

00:21:37.600 --> 00:21:40.797
today like Google
is now an incumbent right

00:21:40.880 --> 00:21:44.317
>> so so this is one of the funny things
I talk a lot to our founders about um and

00:21:44.400 --> 00:21:47.197
this is not a you know what's what's so
useful I think of this view is this is

00:21:47.280 --> 00:21:50.397
not a criticism of any individual person
right or any criticism of any individual

00:21:50.480 --> 00:21:53.197
company this this is why I try to get
to the broader trends right because like

00:21:53.280 --> 00:21:56.557
the broader trends like are impersonal
in the sense of okay if If you see this

00:21:56.640 --> 00:21:59.917
pattern over and over again, then it's
not just you. Like when I, you know,

00:22:00.000 --> 00:22:02.557
when I tell somebody you're doing X,
it's not like a criticism of you're

00:22:02.640 --> 00:22:05.357
doing X. It's more an observation of,
you know, you're doing X just like

00:22:05.440 --> 00:22:09.277
everybody else who's ever been in your
situation has done X. And, you know, at

00:22:09.360 --> 00:22:11.837
the very least be aware of it, if not,
you know, decide to make a conscious

00:22:11.920 --> 00:22:15.277
choice not to be like that. You know,
if you don't like that. Um, but one of the

00:22:15.360 --> 00:22:17.677
things I talk to our founders about
all the time is it's actually funny. A

00:22:17.760 --> 00:22:22.077
successful company has about five years,
a successful startup has about five

00:22:22.160 --> 00:22:24.637
years until they become a new incumbent.

00:22:24.720 --> 00:22:27.677
um and and they actually start to behave
like an incumbent. That's rational. Like

00:22:27.760 --> 00:22:30.477
of course that's rational. Like they've
now built something worth defending,

00:22:30.560 --> 00:22:33.117
right? And they've like they've now
established power in the world, right?

00:22:33.200 --> 00:22:36.237
They've established a position
for themselves. Um you know, they've built

00:22:36.320 --> 00:22:39.117
something of value. Um and now they
have something worth protecting. And of

00:22:39.200 --> 00:22:41.677
course the next, you know, the next
thing comes along very quickly. You

00:22:41.760 --> 00:22:44.237
know, the next kid comes along five
years later. You know, and a lot of

00:22:44.320 --> 00:22:46.317
times it's really funny because it's like,
you know, the new incumbent's run

00:22:46.400 --> 00:22:49.537
by like a 26-y old, right? And then
and then the new disruptor is like a 21

00:22:49.620 --> 00:22:53.197
[laughter] year old, right? So it's
like you know it's sort of like one kid

00:22:53.280 --> 00:22:55.997
really mad about the other one [snorts]
and it's like yeah well you know that

00:22:56.080 --> 00:22:59.997
was you five years ago right like so you
know this is the way of the world and so

00:23:00.080 --> 00:23:03.517
yeah so yeah no look so this is actually
a really big question actually Peter you

00:23:03.600 --> 00:23:06.717
know my my friend Peter T has talked
a lot about this in public and he he's

00:23:06.800 --> 00:23:10.157
much more I would say kind of hardcore
on this than I am but Peter sort of

00:23:10.240 --> 00:23:13.597
characterizes Google as as no longer
a tech company Peter now just flat out

00:23:13.680 --> 00:23:17.357
calls them they're an anti-tech company
in his view it's an enemy of enemy of

00:23:17.440 --> 00:23:20.877
innovation like they're a blockade
of innovation they're no longer doing

00:23:20.960 --> 00:23:23.837
anything sort of you know disruptive.
Um instead what they've done is they've

00:23:23.920 --> 00:23:26.237
established you know a new monopoly
in search and they're using that monopoly

00:23:26.320 --> 00:23:29.357
in search to try to basically prevent
new you know new new new technologies

00:23:29.440 --> 00:23:32.797
from coming to market from from from you
know including new competitors but also

00:23:32.880 --> 00:23:35.677
just more generally you know a lot a lot
of new technologies and you know they

00:23:35.760 --> 00:23:38.317
become very you know draconian
and heavy-handed in terms of what goes in

00:23:38.400 --> 00:23:40.957
the search engine and they become very
sensorious and they ban a lot of things

00:23:41.040 --> 00:23:43.917
and you know a lot of people get kicked
off YouTube every day and so forth. So

00:23:44.000 --> 00:23:46.957
so they become kind of anti-change.
Now I would say that that's Peter's view

00:23:47.040 --> 00:23:49.277
it's a it's a very you know strong view.

00:23:49.360 --> 00:23:52.477
I I would I would not say that about
Google. I would just say more generally

00:23:52.560 --> 00:23:55.037
like that is the incumbent temptation.

00:23:55.120 --> 00:23:59.037
Um is is basically go is basically go
from attack mode to defend mode, right?

00:23:59.120 --> 00:24:02.077
Go from being the pirate to being
the navy. Go from being the you know rebel

00:24:02.160 --> 00:24:06.717
the the rebel to being the empire.
Um and so yeah, it it is a it is a thing

00:24:06.800 --> 00:24:09.517
that happens. I I think you know there
you could probably just fairly say

00:24:09.600 --> 00:24:12.157
companies like that are caught in some
sort of intermediate state, you know,

00:24:12.240 --> 00:24:13.837
where they still have elements of both.

00:24:13.920 --> 00:24:16.877
Um and um you know it's kind of probably
their lot in life to kind of figure out

00:24:16.960 --> 00:24:18.477
which side of that they want to follow.

00:24:18.560 --> 00:24:22.077
>> And what's sort of the most pessimistic
scenario you can come up with with how

00:24:22.160 --> 00:24:26.477
technology plays out? Do the incumbent
start using it to squash free speech?

00:24:26.560 --> 00:24:27.997
Like how do how do you think about this?

00:24:28.080 --> 00:24:31.037
>> Yeah, I think you could paint Yeah,
you could paint maybe two two pessimistic

00:24:31.120 --> 00:24:33.357
scenarios. So pessimistic scenario
number one would be the one you just

00:24:33.440 --> 00:24:36.157
alluded to and it basically is like okay

00:24:36.240 --> 00:24:40.557
um this technology had the potential uh
to be to be revolutionary and to kind of

00:24:40.640 --> 00:24:44.637
disrupt all these hierarchies
and institutions. Um but in fact it turned

00:24:44.720 --> 00:24:47.757
out that it was you know fundamentally
enabling technology for top down

00:24:47.840 --> 00:24:51.437
control. There's 1984 which basically
is the pessimistic view which is like

00:24:51.520 --> 00:24:55.357
technology is used by the state you know
kind of the full the full kind of you

00:24:55.440 --> 00:24:59.517
know I don't know what the Hegelian
like you know world state dominant like

00:24:59.600 --> 00:25:04.157
totalitarian regime Soviet Union kind of
thing. Um you know technology is used to

00:25:04.240 --> 00:25:07.597
basically control the populace in sort
of this very overt kind of top down way.

00:25:07.680 --> 00:25:11.997
Um there's this other really wonderful
book um called Orwell's Revenge written

00:25:12.080 --> 00:25:14.557
by this guy Peter Huber. Um, and in

00:25:14.640 --> 00:25:19.117
Orwell's Revenge, he actually does
a rewrite of 1984. Um, and he does a

00:25:19.200 --> 00:25:22.717
rewrite of 1984 through the optimistic
lens, you know, sort of your optimistic

00:25:22.800 --> 00:25:25.757
scenario. And and the optimistic lens,
the the twist that he puts in the plot

00:25:25.840 --> 00:25:28.637
of 1984 is he basically just makes
the telescreens, you know, the sort of

00:25:28.720 --> 00:25:31.837
technology 1984, these telescreens,
interactive sort of interactive TV

00:25:31.920 --> 00:25:36.157
thing. Um, he basically he makes the
telescreens two-way, you know, like like

00:25:36.240 --> 00:25:38.637
the internet. And of course, then he he
elaborates out kind of the implication

00:25:38.720 --> 00:25:42.317
of that in the story. And of course in
in Oral's Revenge, right, the the rebels

00:25:42.400 --> 00:25:45.437
win, right? that the totalitarian system
is overturned because, you know, because

00:25:45.520 --> 00:25:48.637
people are able to organize and and
and and and hear the truth and so forth

00:25:48.720 --> 00:25:51.757
through through the two-way system.
And so anyway, yeah, the pessimistic view

00:25:51.840 --> 00:25:56.877
would be the 1984 model um contra
the the the Orwell's revenge model that we

00:25:56.960 --> 00:25:59.837
kind of talked about earlier.
Um and then look, there there is another

00:25:59.920 --> 00:26:03.997
pessimistic view and this is the Martin
Guri view. Uh if you've read so his

00:26:04.080 --> 00:26:06.637
book, the is it the um was it the revolt

00:26:06.720 --> 00:26:11.357
to the public? The Martin Gur thesis
basically is yes. Um, and I can hear

00:26:11.440 --> 00:26:14.637
him, by the way, talking to me about
this right now in his in his in his

00:26:14.720 --> 00:26:18.557
wonderful Cuban accent. Um, you know,
yes, smart guy. Um, you know, the

00:26:18.640 --> 00:26:22.877
internet is very good at tearing down,
um, uh, you know, at tearing down these

00:26:22.960 --> 00:26:25.517
hierarchies. Um, but the internet has

00:26:25.600 --> 00:26:30.157
not yet proven its ability to build
governance systems, right? And so um it

00:26:30.240 --> 00:26:33.677
it has not it yes you can build these
new peer-to-p peer networks but can

00:26:33.760 --> 00:26:38.477
these peer-to-p peer networks actually
take power and actually serve the

00:26:38.560 --> 00:26:42.157
productive roles that the hierarchies
used to serve right and so can you

00:26:42.240 --> 00:26:46.397
actually have for example a functioning
democracy right if what you have

00:26:46.480 --> 00:26:49.597
basically is basically people arguing
with each other in this peer-to-p peer

00:26:49.680 --> 00:26:52.797
network like all the time right
and never basically forming instruments of

00:26:52.880 --> 00:26:56.957
state power um you know or if you have
you know this you know if if all of your

00:26:57.040 --> 00:26:59.197
finance goes peer-to-peer and you
don't have any banks anymore and there's

00:26:59.280 --> 00:27:01.837
nobody to call when your money goes away,
right? Or, you know, whatever the

00:27:01.920 --> 00:27:04.237
version of that might be, right?
That they're that they're basically that

00:27:04.320 --> 00:27:09.277
these networks are not in fact basically
um sufficient substitutes for for for

00:27:09.360 --> 00:27:13.277
the institutions that they're displacing.
Um, and he describes this as

00:27:13.360 --> 00:27:17.277
the scenario of sort of nihilism um
which is basically that the peer-to-p

00:27:17.360 --> 00:27:20.477
peer networks are good at destroying
um but they're not necessarily good at

00:27:20.560 --> 00:27:25.517
building. Um, and so he he's he's fairly
pessimistic and and I think this is why

00:27:25.600 --> 00:27:28.157
this is what Neil Ferguson also
is reacting to in his book, which is I

00:27:28.240 --> 00:27:30.637
think this is also kind of his
latent fear. He kind of describes it

00:27:30.720 --> 00:27:33.677
differently, but also his his kind
of late fear that if the institutions are

00:27:33.760 --> 00:27:37.037
torn down that that there's no guarantee
that productive things will be built on

00:27:37.120 --> 00:27:40.157
the other side. Um, so this probably
that that would be the other the other

00:27:40.240 --> 00:27:42.237
kind of really pessimistic scenario.

00:27:42.320 --> 00:27:44.237
>> A lot of people get
scar tissue. They're

00:27:44.320 --> 00:27:47.517
still sort of like fighting the last war.
You've been around the first

00:27:47.600 --> 00:27:51.757
internet uh big wave in the late 1990s
and the failures that happened there.

00:27:51.840 --> 00:27:56.477
How does that affect your thinking? Like
web van for example failed but the same

00:27:56.560 --> 00:27:58.637
thing today might be a resounding

00:27:58.720 --> 00:28:01.917
success. How do you switch your mind to

00:28:02.000 --> 00:28:06.077
um not getting burned? >> Yeah.
So this is really Yeah. So this is

00:28:06.160 --> 00:28:09.517
really fun. This is one of these things
again I've just realized is actually

00:28:09.600 --> 00:28:13.117
really fundamental to human nature. Um,
and by the way, why I think they're why

00:28:13.200 --> 00:28:15.997
I think you have to ask questions about
whether life extension technologies are

00:28:16.080 --> 00:28:19.837
actually going to be a good idea.
I think they are, but I think there's a

00:28:19.920 --> 00:28:22.957
real question about that from a from
a broader counterultural societal

00:28:23.040 --> 00:28:26.397
standpoint, which is right, it's
the most it's the to your point, it's the

00:28:26.480 --> 00:28:31.277
most natural thing in the world to try
to learn from experience, right? And so

00:28:31.360 --> 00:28:34.317
I, you know, we all go through this,
right? You touch the hot stove, it

00:28:34.400 --> 00:28:37.037
burns, we don't touch the hot stove
again, right? And that happens at like

00:28:37.120 --> 00:28:40.317
age three or whatever. And then like
from from then on basically like one way

00:28:40.400 --> 00:28:43.037
of just viewing like our trajectory
through life is it's just touching hot

00:28:43.120 --> 00:28:45.757
stove after hot stove after hot stove
and learning don't do that don't do that

00:28:45.840 --> 00:28:49.037
don't do that you know so it's or it's
like you know don't act out of work you

00:28:49.120 --> 00:28:51.917
know you know you learn all these things
and then one of the things you learn is

00:28:52.000 --> 00:28:55.517
like okay like you know what actually
what a lot of people learn is what what

00:28:55.600 --> 00:28:58.237
a lot of people learn is they they they
work at a startup the startup doesn't

00:28:58.320 --> 00:29:00.797
work you know the one that they're
in doesn't work and so the lesson is don't

00:29:00.880 --> 00:29:04.477
work at startups right um right or by
the way the other lesson right the other

00:29:04.560 --> 00:29:06.957
lesson is a lot of people went through
in the last 50 years this thing where

00:29:07.040 --> 00:29:09.517
they thought they had lifetime
employment, right, at some big company

00:29:09.600 --> 00:29:12.157
and then they got laid off at some point
and then they're and then they and then

00:29:12.240 --> 00:29:14.397
sort of the lesson is well don't work
at big companies because you can't trust

00:29:14.480 --> 00:29:16.637
them and they don't care about you and
they'll, you know, they'll lay you off.

00:29:16.720 --> 00:29:19.037
And so anyway, it's like it's like the
most natural thing in the world to like

00:29:19.120 --> 00:29:21.757
sort of sort of learn from these mistakes.
And so what happens is it's

00:29:21.840 --> 00:29:25.037
it's absolutely like scar tissue. What
happens is you just as you age, you just

00:29:25.120 --> 00:29:27.997
naturally build up all of this all of
this sort of psychic scar tissue and you

00:29:28.080 --> 00:29:30.877
have all these cautionary lessons
in your in your head all the time and you

00:29:30.960 --> 00:29:34.477
just and and therefore as a consequence,
right, your your aperture of what you're

00:29:34.560 --> 00:29:36.237
willing to explore as you get older just

00:29:36.320 --> 00:29:39.117
shrinks. Um, and it's just it's just an

00:29:39.200 --> 00:29:41.757
incredibly natural thing to have happen.

00:29:41.840 --> 00:29:45.277
Um, and so I so I would say the the the

00:29:45.360 --> 00:29:49.517
the the good news or you know kind of
the escape hatch for that is is being in

00:29:49.600 --> 00:29:52.957
my day job. My my day job is an
incredible teacher that that's a bad

00:29:53.040 --> 00:29:56.957
idea. U right? Because what happens
in my day job right is you know basically

00:29:57.040 --> 00:30:00.237
you know I've now been you know kind
of doing startups first as an entrepreneur

00:30:00.320 --> 00:30:04.077
for 15 years now as a VC coming up 15
years you know coming up 15 years. And

00:30:04.160 --> 00:30:06.877
basically what you see if you kind
of swim in in in you know in kind of this

00:30:06.960 --> 00:30:10.397
this pond for long enough is basically
you see you know your web van example

00:30:10.480 --> 00:30:14.317
you see example after example of startups
that tried something and failed

00:30:14.400 --> 00:30:18.157
and then you basically you know you draw
the experience from that. Okay well we

00:30:18.240 --> 00:30:22.237
know that's never going to work right
because it failed. Um and you see kind

00:30:22.320 --> 00:30:26.077
of a lot of people around you kind
of going through the same process. Um, and

00:30:26.160 --> 00:30:29.997
then you just see example after example
of basically what happens next, which is

00:30:30.080 --> 00:30:34.397
some kid shows up with that same idea
five or 10 or 15 or 20 years later and

00:30:34.480 --> 00:30:38.877
they take another swing at it and it
becomes a gigantic success, right? Um,

00:30:38.960 --> 00:30:43.117
and so, you know, exactly your point
like web van doesn't work and now we've

00:30:43.200 --> 00:30:46.477
now today you've got these just giant
successful companies in food delivery,

00:30:46.560 --> 00:30:50.077
right? Um, that are like huge successes
and so like that idea absolutely works.

00:30:50.160 --> 00:30:54.637
Let let's hone in on that just a little
bit more in the sense that the the wrong

00:30:54.720 --> 00:30:57.037
lesson to extract from that experience

00:30:57.120 --> 00:31:01.677
is this idea will never work. How is it
that we extract the right lesson from an

00:31:01.760 --> 00:31:05.677
experience? >> Yeah.
So let's let's say I I think this

00:31:05.760 --> 00:31:08.237
goes to I think you want to really

00:31:08.320 --> 00:31:09.837
understand the domain in which you're

00:31:09.920 --> 00:31:15.277
operating, right? So,
so the the domain that I'm talking about

00:31:15.360 --> 00:31:18.397
like the domain of startups
is representative of sort of a a domain

00:31:18.480 --> 00:31:23.517
that you might call sort of probabilistic
um it's a probabistic domain right so so

00:31:23.600 --> 00:31:26.637
you know it's sort of inherent to the
venture capital startup process which is

00:31:26.720 --> 00:31:29.837
you know basically I just give you
the numbers like for top-end venture right

00:31:29.920 --> 00:31:34.637
for top end venture back startups um
about half the companies in any given

00:31:34.720 --> 00:31:37.677
period work and sort of generate
positive returns and about half of them

00:31:37.760 --> 00:31:41.997
don't right and so so we we start out
like every new fund knowing that half

00:31:42.080 --> 00:31:44.877
the companies that we invest in are
probably going to fail, right? And and

00:31:44.960 --> 00:31:46.797
by the way, they're going to fail
for a bunch of reasons. Like a lot of the

00:31:46.880 --> 00:31:49.917
failures are idiosyncratic, right? That
you know, the team, you know, breaks up

00:31:50.000 --> 00:31:52.317
or whatever, you know, something, you
know, specific to the startup. But like

00:31:52.400 --> 00:31:54.477
in a lot of cases, it literally is like
they're going to fail because they're

00:31:54.560 --> 00:31:56.557
just like flat out too early, right?

00:31:56.640 --> 00:31:58.717
It's it's going to be, you know, it's
going to be the web van of its time, not

00:31:58.800 --> 00:32:03.357
you know, whatever, you know, what the
new companies. Um, and so a lot of it's

00:32:03.440 --> 00:32:04.797
just like just simply flatout timing.

00:32:04.880 --> 00:32:07.917
And so but but you can see what
I'm saying is like you're thinking

00:32:08.000 --> 00:32:11.837
probabilistically like you're right
we're not trying to score a 100 on the

00:32:11.920 --> 00:32:14.637
exam right and this is maybe a thing
that is like a big difference right

00:32:14.720 --> 00:32:17.757
between the education system and the
real world right is you know in the

00:32:17.840 --> 00:32:20.637
education system it's like we're
supposed to get 100 on every test right

00:32:20.720 --> 00:32:23.837
it's sort of this deterministic realm
right in which we're you know there is a

00:32:23.920 --> 00:32:26.317
way to kind of achieve perfection we're
kind of going for the 4.0 know, grade

00:32:26.400 --> 00:32:30.877
average or whatever. Um, you know, in
quote unquote real life, right, which is

00:32:30.960 --> 00:32:32.717
starting businesses or, you know,

00:32:32.800 --> 00:32:35.837
writing books, right, or composing music

00:32:35.920 --> 00:32:40.077
or playing basketball or playing poker,
right? Or basically doing anything

00:32:40.160 --> 00:32:43.437
interesting. We're in a probabilistic
domain, right? And in the probabilistic

00:32:43.520 --> 00:32:45.837
domain, it's just like we're not going
to we're not going to score 100%. We're

00:32:45.920 --> 00:32:48.717
going to score, you know, most of the
probabilistic domains we're going to

00:32:48.800 --> 00:32:53.437
score, you know, if world class is like
60%. Right? I don't know what the

00:32:53.520 --> 00:32:55.437
numbers are for basketball,
but it's like if you look at I don't know

00:32:55.520 --> 00:32:58.237
whatever it was like Kobe Bryant
or LeBron's like lifetime record and it's

00:32:58.320 --> 00:33:01.437
like they've scored all these baskets
and then the other fascinating thing to

00:33:01.520 --> 00:33:03.997
look at is just you know the the ranking
of the basketball players who have

00:33:04.080 --> 00:33:07.837
missed the most baskets, right? And it
turns out like it's the it's the same

00:33:07.920 --> 00:33:10.637
people. >> Yeah, >> right.
[laughter] Like Kobe's Kobe's

00:33:10.720 --> 00:33:13.917
Kobe might be number one on the list
of like total missed baskets. That is what

00:33:14.000 --> 00:33:18.157
it is, right? uh was it Annie Duke has
this great great term uh she she used

00:33:18.240 --> 00:33:21.037
brought up for the world of poker um
in her book thinking it best and she she

00:33:21.120 --> 00:33:24.637
calls this she says what a lot of people
do is is they basically when some when

00:33:24.720 --> 00:33:27.997
they're in a probabilistic listen if
they're in a deterministic domain and

00:33:28.080 --> 00:33:30.637
they get less than 100% then there's
then they can self-critique and they can

00:33:30.720 --> 00:33:34.157
say why didn't I get 100% I should have
gotten 100% and I did something wrong

00:33:34.240 --> 00:33:37.437
right and and that is a correct analysis
like you could have gotten 100% of that

00:33:37.520 --> 00:33:39.677
test you probably didn't you know you
didn't study hard enough you didn't read

00:33:39.760 --> 00:33:43.837
all the material or whatever right >>
in a probabilistic domain um I it didn't

00:33:43.920 --> 00:33:46.477
work Okay, it's again the scar tissue.

00:33:46.560 --> 00:33:49.357
It's now now I do what she calls
resulting, right? Which is basically now

00:33:49.440 --> 00:33:53.597
I now I need an explanation for the
result, right? And the explanation for

00:33:53.680 --> 00:33:55.917
the result is, you know, I don't know,
I should have this or that or I should

00:33:56.000 --> 00:33:58.637
have bluffed or not bluffed or done this
or done that or not started this company

00:33:58.720 --> 00:34:02.157
or waited five years or, you know,
whatever, whatever. Um, and and she's

00:34:02.240 --> 00:34:03.597
like, look, it's a probabistic domain.

00:34:03.680 --> 00:34:06.477
Like some percentage of them are simply
going to fail. If you if you try to

00:34:06.560 --> 00:34:09.597
explain what fundamentally is kind of
the result of randomness, right, through

00:34:09.680 --> 00:34:11.837
a narrative, like you're basically
fooling yourself like you're making

00:34:11.920 --> 00:34:14.637
you're making yourself, ironically,
you're making yourself miserable in a

00:34:14.720 --> 00:34:18.077
counterproductive way, right? And and
and the right thing to do, right, if in

00:34:18.160 --> 00:34:21.117
poker, the right thing to do is to like
play the next hand of poker, right? With

00:34:21.200 --> 00:34:23.677
the exact same way you play the previous
hand, right? Because you're you're

00:34:23.760 --> 00:34:26.397
operating in this in this domain
of probability. The right thing to do if

00:34:26.480 --> 00:34:29.757
you're Kobe Bryant is to is to shoot
the next, you know, the next basket. The

00:34:29.840 --> 00:34:32.637
right thing to do as an entrepreneur
is to start the next company, right? The

00:34:32.720 --> 00:34:35.597
right thing to do as a venture
capitalist is to fund the next to fund

00:34:35.680 --> 00:34:39.117
the next startup, right? Even in a space
where you've already tried and failed

00:34:39.200 --> 00:34:43.197
before and and then I I would apply
in tech. I would say I I believe in the

00:34:43.280 --> 00:34:46.397
strong version of this. I I used to kind
of say this to try to kind of exaggerate

00:34:46.480 --> 00:34:49.037
to make the point, but now I don't think
I'm exaggerating, which is I no longer

00:34:49.120 --> 00:34:52.957
think there are any bad ideas. I I no
longer think there are any qualified

00:34:53.040 --> 00:34:55.597
people starting tech companies that
actually have bad ideas. I think all the

00:34:55.680 --> 00:34:59.037
ideas are good ideas. Um I think it's
just a I think it's just a question of

00:34:59.120 --> 00:35:02.397
timing and execution. We we try really
hard to say, "Oh, this idea is stupid.

00:35:02.480 --> 00:35:05.837
This will never work." Right?
like we try really hard to never do that.

00:35:05.920 --> 00:35:09.917
Instead, we try to just say, "Okay, this
idea, if this is a smart enough person

00:35:10.000 --> 00:35:14.477
and they put enough work into it,
um then this idea is probably a good idea,

00:35:14.560 --> 00:35:17.597
it is likely to work at some point."
And then we just have a very specific

00:35:17.680 --> 00:35:20.557
question which is like, is this the right
person to bet on? Is now the right

00:35:20.640 --> 00:35:23.917
time to make the bet? And then and then
as as evidence of my strong view, I

00:35:24.000 --> 00:35:27.117
basically I basically say you can go
through the entire I think at this point

00:35:27.200 --> 00:35:31.517
catalog of all of the failed.com ideas
of the late 1990s and I believe they've

00:35:31.600 --> 00:35:35.517
now all worked. How do you assess
the judgment of founders? If you're not

00:35:35.600 --> 00:35:37.997
assessing the idea,
how do you assess the judgment?

00:35:38.080 --> 00:35:39.517
>> Yeah. So,
say there's two two categories

00:35:39.600 --> 00:35:42.317
of two categories of founders to two
two ways to do this. So, there's sort of,

00:35:42.400 --> 00:35:45.277
you know, there's sort of there's
the ones who've done it before, right? Um,

00:35:45.360 --> 00:35:48.237
and so the ones, you know, the ones
where this is their second or third or

00:35:48.320 --> 00:35:51.357
fourth time starting a company. Um,
you know, with them you have this just

00:35:51.440 --> 00:35:54.557
obviously enormous advantage which
is you can basically look at the work that

00:35:54.640 --> 00:35:56.637
they've done. You know, it's like
anybody else who's done, you know, who

00:35:56.720 --> 00:35:59.437
now has a track record. You can look at
the work that they've done. And again on

00:35:59.520 --> 00:36:02.157
this it's not that you're necessarily
looking for the track record of like the

00:36:02.240 --> 00:36:07.357
level of success per se, right? Although
you know as Nap was it Napoleon you'd

00:36:07.440 --> 00:36:10.797
rather you'd rather have a lucky general
than a smart general. So like you know

00:36:10.880 --> 00:36:13.757
somebody who's had a highly successful
company once right has has you know

00:36:13.840 --> 00:36:16.237
people has an enormous benefit of the
doubt when they walk in the door for for

00:36:16.320 --> 00:36:19.677
obvious reasons. Um but you know
but even people who haven't had a big

00:36:19.760 --> 00:36:23.437
success before it's like okay you can
look at kind of how they did the work

00:36:23.520 --> 00:36:26.397
right and so you can look at like you
know h you know how did they prosecute

00:36:26.480 --> 00:36:29.357
the opportunity you know the previous
time you know and you can talk to the

00:36:29.440 --> 00:36:32.077
people right who they worked with it's
like okay you know how were they under

00:36:32.160 --> 00:36:34.877
pressure how were they on in terms
of like inventiveness how were they in

00:36:34.960 --> 00:36:38.077
terms of you know you know persistence
you know how did how did they make the

00:36:38.160 --> 00:36:41.357
decision about when to give up right u
you know or when something just you know

00:36:41.440 --> 00:36:43.757
simply wasn't going to work and so forth
and so you you can kind of you know you

00:36:43.840 --> 00:36:46.557
can you can kind of learn from their
experience you know the harder one is

00:36:46.640 --> 00:36:49.037
somebody brand new, right? The harder
one is somebody shows up, you know,

00:36:49.120 --> 00:36:52.157
right out of college or something or,
you know, or or you know, these days,

00:36:52.240 --> 00:36:55.117
right, the ultimate golden credential
is they got admitted to a top end school

00:36:55.200 --> 00:36:59.997
and then dropped out after one day.
Um, right. [laughter] So, so um you know,

00:37:00.080 --> 00:37:02.877
it's sort of the kid, right? And of
course, you know, I say kid because I I

00:37:02.960 --> 00:37:05.437
you know, part I think of myself
because, you know, this was me at one

00:37:05.520 --> 00:37:09.037
point. And look, a lot of the real
breakthrough companies, the a lot of the

00:37:09.120 --> 00:37:12.477
big franchises, you know, Mark
Zuckerberg had not had a job before he

00:37:12.560 --> 00:37:16.077
started Facebook, right? like you know
the the Google guys came straight out of

00:37:16.160 --> 00:37:19.757
Stanford M you know Stanford the PhD
program and so forth and so on you know

00:37:19.840 --> 00:37:23.437
Bill Gates dropped out of college and um
and so you know a a lot of times these

00:37:23.520 --> 00:37:25.837
these big breakthrough companies are
people that you know they have no track

00:37:25.920 --> 00:37:28.477
record like their track record you know
you could ask for their high school to

00:37:28.560 --> 00:37:32.957
you know GPA or something but like there
there's no track record right and so

00:37:33.040 --> 00:37:36.877
there you're kind of you know evaluating
you know denovo and I think there what

00:37:36.960 --> 00:37:41.517
we do the the cliche is basically right
that it's you know some kid with some

00:37:41.600 --> 00:37:44.637
crazy idea and then some crazy VC goes
some money and you know some miracle

00:37:44.720 --> 00:37:48.077
happens and oh my god you know what
a weird you know non-reproducible thing or

00:37:48.160 --> 00:37:52.877
whatever. Um the reality is the kids
that make new things work from scratch

00:37:52.960 --> 00:37:56.557
it actually turns out that they actually
have been deep in the domain for a long

00:37:56.640 --> 00:37:59.837
time on almost every case they've been
thinking hard about the problem that

00:37:59.920 --> 00:38:04.637
they're trying to solve actually for
in a lot of cases for many years. Um and

00:38:04.720 --> 00:38:07.597
and and what that actually means you
know this is actually really kind of

00:38:07.680 --> 00:38:10.317
interesting and maybe software is kind
of this unique kind of area like this

00:38:10.400 --> 00:38:13.837
but you know as a consequence you like
in software you can have a 21-year-old

00:38:13.920 --> 00:38:18.077
who's basically been a professional level
programmer for 10 years right >> right

00:38:18.160 --> 00:38:21.197
>> because you know you can trace it back
and it's like well you we hear the story

00:38:21.280 --> 00:38:24.637
all the time it's like well the specific
story you hear all the time you know I

00:38:24.720 --> 00:38:29.037
really loved video games right um and so
therefore right when I was you know 11

00:38:29.120 --> 00:38:33.357
or 12 I you know learned how to code so
that I could figure out how to like make

00:38:33.440 --> 00:38:37.277
my own video games based on that.
I found it really interesting how, you

00:38:37.360 --> 00:38:41.517
know, for example, clans or tribes form
inside games. And so when I was in high

00:38:41.600 --> 00:38:44.797
school, I built this app that, you know,
did people matching for whatever World

00:38:44.880 --> 00:38:48.477
of Warcraft, you know, guilds
or whatever it is. Um, and then, you know,

00:38:48.560 --> 00:38:51.997
in college, I got a degree in computer
science and then I did this project

00:38:52.080 --> 00:38:56.077
which is to do this new kind of social
networking app. Um, and now I've been

00:38:56.160 --> 00:38:58.717
thinking about that and building that
for the last five years. And now here I

00:38:58.800 --> 00:39:01.837
am. And now you know after 10 years
of thinking about this now here's my new

00:39:01.920 --> 00:39:06.077
social networking idea right like
that this is not a rare thing and and

00:39:06.160 --> 00:39:08.637
literally they've been thinking about
this now for you know think about this

00:39:08.720 --> 00:39:11.917
specific thing for five years and the
general kind of pattern for category for

00:39:12.000 --> 00:39:15.357
like 10 years and of course you know
for things you know this of course is

00:39:15.440 --> 00:39:18.317
heavily biased towards domains in which
kids get to participate right and so

00:39:18.400 --> 00:39:21.517
that this is less true in you know
anything involving you know you know

00:39:21.600 --> 00:39:24.237
there's lots of areas you know there's
lots of areas of technology where you

00:39:24.320 --> 00:39:27.917
know 11 year olds are not working on it
but but there are areas increasingly

00:39:28.000 --> 00:39:32.637
where they Um and so and so basically
it's basically we call the idea mace. It's

00:39:32.720 --> 00:39:36.637
basically the backstory. Um it's what
have they done in the past to really

00:39:36.720 --> 00:39:39.997
kind of reason their way through
and and often and often you literally have

00:39:40.080 --> 00:39:41.997
people who have been like writing
prototypes and a lot of the time you

00:39:42.080 --> 00:39:45.197
actually people who have writing code at
that point right and then it's like okay

00:39:45.280 --> 00:39:48.077
now now you're dealing with somebody
where yes they're on the surface they're

00:39:48.160 --> 00:39:51.277
21 in reality they're already five or 10
years into the journey. Um and you're

00:39:51.360 --> 00:39:53.837
like okay now I get it. Now I have
somebody who's like a primal creative

00:39:53.920 --> 00:39:57.117
force who's actually like really thought
deeply about this. So it's a so so it's

00:39:57.200 --> 00:39:59.117
it's a it's a much
safer bet than it looks.

00:39:59.200 --> 00:40:03.197
>> Can you walk me through in detail
how you make those bets? Like what is the

00:40:03.280 --> 00:40:07.437
big capital allocation decision-making
process that you use at A16Z?

00:40:07.520 --> 00:40:10.077
>> So there's basically there's three
tiers. The way we operate is there's

00:40:10.160 --> 00:40:14.557
basically three tiers of bet um sort
of small, medium, large. And the small one

00:40:14.640 --> 00:40:16.637
is so-called, you know, seed funding.

00:40:16.720 --> 00:40:19.437
The medium one is soalled venture funding.
And then the large ones are

00:40:19.520 --> 00:40:24.957
growth funding. um you know the the seed
bets the small ones are you know two you

00:40:25.040 --> 00:40:28.717
know any I don't know anywhere two to5
million dollars on average um which you

00:40:28.800 --> 00:40:31.277
know is a lot of money absolutely
speaking but it's it's small in the

00:40:31.360 --> 00:40:34.557
context of you know the you know it's
small in the context of the global

00:40:34.640 --> 00:40:37.757
economy it's small in the context of
funding new businesses it's small in the

00:40:37.840 --> 00:40:39.677
context of our funds the the venture

00:40:39.760 --> 00:40:44.877
bets are much more serious the venture
bets are 10 plus uh million and then for

00:40:44.960 --> 00:40:47.357
the venture bets they're more serious
for us because that's when we get really

00:40:47.440 --> 00:40:50.077
involved in the companies like that's
when they form a board of directors

00:40:50.160 --> 00:40:52.797
and we have, you know, somebody who goes
on the board and we tend to really like

00:40:52.880 --> 00:40:55.677
work hard on the company. And so that
that's like a, you know, that's signing

00:40:55.760 --> 00:40:59.277
up from our standpoint to like a 10-year
journey with the company, including, you

00:40:59.360 --> 00:41:01.517
know, an obligation to put more money
in later rounds and so forth. So that

00:41:01.600 --> 00:41:05.437
that's a that's a more serious bet. It's
our sort of size 10 10 million and up.

00:41:05.520 --> 00:41:07.997
Um, and then the growth bets are
for companies that have kind of, you know,

00:41:08.080 --> 00:41:10.077
they kind of hit their stride and they
have a business that's working and

00:41:10.160 --> 00:41:12.957
they're growing and so it's like
expansion capital. So, you know, it's a

00:41:13.040 --> 00:41:15.517
different thing and and you know,
the check size there is sort of 50 and up

00:41:15.600 --> 00:41:18.957
and then, you know, on the high
side it's 100 or 200 or 300.

00:41:19.040 --> 00:41:21.197
million. So, you know, the amounts
of money get large, but at that point,

00:41:21.280 --> 00:41:23.517
you've got a business that's working
and you're you're trying to figure out how

00:41:23.600 --> 00:41:28.637
to scale it to, you know, to to kind
of to be a global global champion. Um, and

00:41:28.720 --> 00:41:30.557
then there's just there's there's
there's different criter, you know,

00:41:30.640 --> 00:41:32.797
there's sort of similarities of the three,
you know, we're trying to it's

00:41:32.880 --> 00:41:35.597
the same we're trying to back the same
kind of founders and the same kind of

00:41:35.680 --> 00:41:37.597
businesses across the three categories.

00:41:37.680 --> 00:41:40.637
Um, but, you know, there it's very
different decision-making process, very

00:41:40.720 --> 00:41:44.637
different criteria depending on the stage.
Um, on the seed side, it's almost

00:41:44.720 --> 00:41:47.917
100% a bet on the people. you know,
it's a little bit on the idea, but it's

00:41:48.000 --> 00:41:51.197
mostly the people and it's and basically
the way you evaluate the idea at that

00:41:51.280 --> 00:41:54.317
point is like you're basically
evaluating the idea as a lens to

00:41:54.400 --> 00:41:57.917
evaluate the people, right? So, it's like,
you know, it's like it's like it's

00:41:58.000 --> 00:41:59.997
like I was talking about like
the 21-year-old comes in with this like

00:42:00.080 --> 00:42:02.477
crazy idea, something they've been
thinking about working on. They have a

00:42:02.560 --> 00:42:05.437
college project or something and they
want to start a company. Um, and it's

00:42:05.520 --> 00:42:07.757
like you're you're evaluating the idea,
but really what you're doing is it's

00:42:07.840 --> 00:42:11.517
like, okay, is this person capable
of doing this kind of thing? and then

00:42:11.600 --> 00:42:14.157
you're evaluating the idea and the work
they've done so far to kind of just draw

00:42:14.240 --> 00:42:17.997
a beat on how good the person is as
opposed to saying oh you know we've been

00:42:18.080 --> 00:42:21.917
waiting to back this idea at the venture
stage there's the people component but

00:42:22.000 --> 00:42:24.797
there's also this other really important
thing which is you have to have some

00:42:24.880 --> 00:42:27.997
reason to believe that this thing is going
to be the one that wins um because

00:42:28.080 --> 00:42:30.637
we we sort of take on this sort
of formal conflict at that point we get

00:42:30.720 --> 00:42:33.197
very involved in these companies
and we you know we can't invest in in

00:42:33.280 --> 00:42:36.557
competitors after that in that category
and so then there's this thing of like

00:42:36.640 --> 00:42:40.157
okay out of all of the different teams
both current teams and future teams that

00:42:40.240 --> 00:42:43.437
might pursue this idea um you know,
is this really the one that

00:42:43.520 --> 00:42:47.757
has the best chance of going all the way
to victory? Um and so that's you know,

00:42:47.840 --> 00:42:50.797
trying to kind of dig in harder kind
of competitive advantage and and you know,

00:42:50.880 --> 00:42:54.317
capabilities at a deeper level. And then
at the growth side, it's a that you

00:42:54.400 --> 00:42:58.557
know, that's more of a of a of a of a
business analysis. The growth side is

00:42:58.640 --> 00:43:02.877
where you start get to start to make
the decisions based on numbers. Um, right.

00:43:02.960 --> 00:43:06.397
Um, and so you start to get to evaluate,
you know, revenue growth and and market

00:43:06.480 --> 00:43:10.237
size and, you know, profit margins
and and uh, you know, then and then by the

00:43:10.320 --> 00:43:12.717
way, but but also you're still
evaluating the people, you're still

00:43:12.800 --> 00:43:15.437
evaluating the idea, right? And then
you, by the way, at the growth stage,

00:43:15.520 --> 00:43:18.157
you're also still looking for new ideas,
right? Where you're you're looking for

00:43:18.240 --> 00:43:22.157
existing businesses that also have new
growth opportunities inside them. Um,

00:43:22.240 --> 00:43:26.157
and so you're looking for basically,
you know, does is this person so good that

00:43:26.240 --> 00:43:30.317
they have additional kind of venture
quality ideas that they haven't even

00:43:30.400 --> 00:43:33.197
gotten to yet? And so, you know,
the best case scenario is you make this

00:43:33.280 --> 00:43:35.997
investment in a company that's doing
X and then over the course of the next

00:43:36.080 --> 00:43:39.997
five or 10 years, they also do Y and Z
and A and B and C and they just keep

00:43:40.080 --> 00:43:42.797
layering in all these new things and then
you get this kind of multiplicative

00:43:42.880 --> 00:43:44.637
effect. >> Is there a challenge function

00:43:44.720 --> 00:43:47.437
internally? Like how do you decide in in

00:43:47.520 --> 00:43:50.797
terms of making the actual decision?

00:43:50.880 --> 00:43:54.957
>> Yeah. So, there's there's a there are
if you kind of pull top- end venture firms

00:43:55.040 --> 00:43:58.797
on this, you'll get actually every
possible answer. Um and so there there

00:43:58.880 --> 00:44:02.797
are some firms that run on a a unanimous
vote model um where they they literally

00:44:02.880 --> 00:44:05.037
need unonymity. Um you know there are

00:44:05.120 --> 00:44:09.997
other firms that have a um you know they
have a majority thing um or they need a

00:44:10.080 --> 00:44:12.957
certain number of people to get critical
mass. There are some firms that run a

00:44:13.040 --> 00:44:16.157
top down so-called investment committee
where you you know young the younger

00:44:16.240 --> 00:44:19.117
partners in the firm get to propose
ideas and then there's sort of a council

00:44:19.200 --> 00:44:23.117
of elders you know that either you know
does the does the glad gladiator wine

00:44:23.200 --> 00:44:24.717
phoenix thing you know thumb thumbs up

00:44:24.800 --> 00:44:28.157
or thumbs down. We have optimized very

00:44:28.240 --> 00:44:31.917
strongly towards what we consider to be
kind of the most aggressive and most you

00:44:32.000 --> 00:44:35.357
know you might say contrarian model.
So our model is what what we call single

00:44:35.440 --> 00:44:39.517
trigger puller. There's no vote. There's
no investment committee. There's no

00:44:39.600 --> 00:44:43.677
override. There's no like I don't you
know I formally sign off on you know Ben

00:44:43.760 --> 00:44:46.717
and I formally sign off on all
the investments but like I don't I don't

00:44:46.800 --> 00:44:50.237
like evaluate the investment proposal
and then basically do thumbs up thumbs

00:44:50.320 --> 00:44:53.997
down. Like that's not like I don't
do that at all. Um, instead what we do

00:44:54.080 --> 00:44:57.517
basically is we basically we basically
delegate budgets like so the the

00:44:57.600 --> 00:45:00.717
governance mechanism is is budgetary.
So we basically we raise a fund we have a

00:45:00.800 --> 00:45:01.917
certain number of investment partners.

00:45:02.000 --> 00:45:05.197
We we delegate the budget down to those
partners and then basically if you're a

00:45:05.280 --> 00:45:09.597
partner at our firm um within your budget
envelope you could make whatever

00:45:09.680 --> 00:45:12.797
investments you want. There are
expectations around how you're going to

00:45:12.880 --> 00:45:15.757
do that right and so there's
an expectation you're going to do the work

00:45:15.840 --> 00:45:18.637
right by which it's going to be like
you're going to go in like really deep.

00:45:18.720 --> 00:45:20.317
You're going to like you know talk
to all the people. You're going to really

00:45:20.400 --> 00:45:23.597
investigate everything. We don't mind an
investment that doesn't work. What we do

00:45:23.680 --> 00:45:27.117
mind is like we're we're in the wrong
one and the right one was out there.

00:45:27.200 --> 00:45:30.077
Like the winner in the category was out
there and we didn't even know about it.

00:45:30.160 --> 00:45:33.277
Like that that that in our firm is like
a big problem. And so you're expected to

00:45:33.360 --> 00:45:35.757
do the work and we you know we have we
have you know we have a whole kind of

00:45:35.840 --> 00:45:38.877
system for that. Um and then there you
know there is you're expected to like

00:45:38.960 --> 00:45:41.197
you have to communicate. Everybody has
to know what you're doing. There's no

00:45:41.280 --> 00:45:44.237
secret deals. Um, you have to, you know,
and you have to be willing to kind of

00:45:44.320 --> 00:45:47.117
describe it and you have to, you know,
be willing to kind of deal with, you

00:45:47.200 --> 00:45:49.517
know, we weigh, you know, everybody
weighs in on everybody else's things and

00:45:49.600 --> 00:45:52.717
so you have to be willing to kind of have
the conversation, you know, because

00:45:52.800 --> 00:45:55.757
you know that you get to make
the decision. You know, you are hopefully

00:45:55.840 --> 00:45:59.677
less defensive than you would normally
be when other people say things like,

00:45:59.760 --> 00:46:02.637
"This is really stupid. Why are you
doing it?" You know that the peer

00:46:02.720 --> 00:46:05.677
pressure basically doesn't turn into an
actual explicit veto. Like you can still

00:46:05.760 --> 00:46:08.237
do the deal and you know that you're at
a firm that really prizes that and wants

00:46:08.320 --> 00:46:10.477
wants us to do do investments like that.

00:46:10.560 --> 00:46:13.997
Um and so but but you know you do have
to you have to be willing to like sit in

00:46:14.080 --> 00:46:16.157
a room and describe what it is and you
have to be willing to like listen to

00:46:16.240 --> 00:46:19.357
people you know crap on it right without

00:46:19.440 --> 00:46:23.197
getting dissuaded. Um and then you know
there there is this thing this conflict

00:46:23.280 --> 00:46:26.717
thing right which is it's a big deal
for us internally which is is probably our

00:46:26.800 --> 00:46:29.597
biggest limiter our ability to do
business as we take on these conflicts.

00:46:29.680 --> 00:46:33.837
So, you know, the stickiest conversation
we'll have internally usually is like,

00:46:33.920 --> 00:46:37.757
boy, like it would be like between
teams, right? It's like, okay, if one

00:46:37.840 --> 00:46:41.277
team does or if one partner does this
investment, then it conflicts the entire

00:46:41.360 --> 00:46:43.437
firm out of the category going forward.

00:46:43.520 --> 00:46:47.357
Um, and so, you know, you can imagine
pretty vigorous arguments and debates

00:46:47.440 --> 00:46:51.117
around that. But the result of that is
basically it's like I think we're way

00:46:51.200 --> 00:46:53.997
out on the edge of being able to be,
you know, sort of creative in the

00:46:54.080 --> 00:46:57.357
investments. Um, we're able to back
the entrepreneurs that color outside the

00:46:57.440 --> 00:47:00.317
lines, right? that that basically come
in with ideas that sort of, you know,

00:47:00.400 --> 00:47:03.997
break the existing paradigm, you know,
that there's no precedent for, you know,

00:47:04.080 --> 00:47:07.277
that just where where at a more
structured or formal, you know, firm, it

00:47:07.360 --> 00:47:10.557
might be like, well, I don't even know
what box this goes in, right? Like it's

00:47:10.640 --> 00:47:14.077
just this is so weird and like offbeat,
like what how do we even classify this?

00:47:14.160 --> 00:47:16.797
And then, you know, if we have
to explain this to the council of elders,

00:47:16.880 --> 00:47:19.917
how are they going to ever understand it?
Right? And in our firm, it's like we

00:47:20.000 --> 00:47:22.957
can we can make all those bets and and
and the history of of venture and new

00:47:23.040 --> 00:47:25.837
technology is those are often the most
successful bets. So, that that's why we

00:47:25.920 --> 00:47:29.997
we've optimized that way. And you
also get speed. It sounds like a lot of

00:47:30.080 --> 00:47:32.717
velocity with how fast
you can make decisions.

00:47:32.800 --> 00:47:34.077
>> Yeah, we have a partner.
I won't I won't

00:47:34.160 --> 00:47:37.197
name names, but we have a partner where
he was in the he was in he was in the

00:47:37.280 --> 00:47:41.437
west coast office. Um it was in the Palo
Alto office of an East Coast firm. Um a

00:47:41.520 --> 00:47:43.597
firm that had historically grown up
in the East Coast, very successful

00:47:43.680 --> 00:47:47.677
investment firm. Um but you know,
he would have to fly to New York and

00:47:47.760 --> 00:47:50.957
present all of his investment ideas
to a group of five senior partners in New

00:47:51.040 --> 00:47:54.397
York. And and by the way, the five
senior partners in New York, incredibly

00:47:54.480 --> 00:47:58.077
like established, you know, legendary
investors like with incredible track

00:47:58.160 --> 00:48:01.677
records with like absolute moral
authority to be able to, you know, make

00:48:01.760 --> 00:48:05.197
such judgments. The problem, exactly
to your point, the problem is, yeah, speed

00:48:05.280 --> 00:48:09.517
and then just like, you know, this stuff
changes, right? Um, you know, the scar

00:48:09.600 --> 00:48:12.557
tissue thing, um, the scar tissue thing,
there's a specific form of the scar

00:48:12.640 --> 00:48:16.317
tissue thing that we see a lot. I I call
this sort of the the is it's like the

00:48:16.400 --> 00:48:19.837
idea event horizon or something which
is there there's a point a lot of people

00:48:19.920 --> 00:48:23.277
reach where they're just done with new
ideas. It's like the general version of

00:48:23.360 --> 00:48:26.317
the problem. It's just like okay like I

00:48:26.400 --> 00:48:28.797
got through the PC, I got through the

00:48:28.880 --> 00:48:31.437
internet. Um I got Facebook. All right,

00:48:31.520 --> 00:48:37.437
I got okay food delivery works
but like Tik Tok like really

00:48:37.520 --> 00:48:39.997
>> too much. Yeah, >> it's just
too much. is just like, okay,

00:48:40.080 --> 00:48:43.517
this is just at this point the world is
getting ridiculous and like I don't want

00:48:43.600 --> 00:48:46.877
to process this anymore. And like almost

00:48:46.960 --> 00:48:48.877
everybody hits that point at some point.

00:48:48.960 --> 00:48:53.357
Um and and so I I just think like
the the the the let's see, yeah, I I just

00:48:53.440 --> 00:48:56.717
think that the bad way to do venture um
is to have people who have reached that

00:48:56.800 --> 00:48:59.437
point doing sign off on the decisions
and and I hope Ben and I have not

00:48:59.520 --> 00:49:02.237
reached that point, but even if we do
reach that point at some point, we want

00:49:02.320 --> 00:49:04.637
the firm to continue to be able to make
the good investments. What have you

00:49:04.720 --> 00:49:08.877
learned over the years about making
exceptional decisions that most people

00:49:08.960 --> 00:49:11.277
miss? >> So quite honestly,
I think I think a lot

00:49:11.360 --> 00:49:15.037
of it is embracing the the probabilistic
nature of the domain. You know, a lot of

00:49:15.120 --> 00:49:17.997
these questions like venture teaches
you they're very direct versions of these

00:49:18.080 --> 00:49:21.677
lessons because it you know what is it
that the old submariner slogan is stupid

00:49:21.760 --> 00:49:24.797
will be punished. when when you pass
on enough companies that turn out to be

00:49:24.880 --> 00:49:27.837
these giant, you know, kind of global,
you know, kind of behemoths, you know,

00:49:27.920 --> 00:49:31.117
at some point you're just like, okay,
like obviously I'm not I'm not a super

00:49:31.200 --> 00:49:35.117
like I have to have some level
of epistic humility here because I'm not

00:49:35.200 --> 00:49:37.917
making all these decisions properly.
And and again, the nature of the domain is

00:49:38.000 --> 00:49:40.797
I'm not going to make all the decisions
properly. Like what what each of the top

00:49:40.880 --> 00:49:44.237
venture capital capitalists of all time
has in common is they they all each of

00:49:44.320 --> 00:49:47.597
them missed almost all of the great
deals of their generation. The the bad

00:49:47.680 --> 00:49:51.277
news is you're going to like make all
these mistakes. The the good news is you

00:49:51.360 --> 00:49:54.797
don't have to score 100% and and not
having to score 100% basically means you

00:49:54.880 --> 00:49:57.997
can take chances, right? And and
and and specifically the way that you

00:49:58.080 --> 00:50:00.877
instrumentalize that is it's basically
and this we talk about this a lot inside

00:50:00.960 --> 00:50:05.517
the firm is success or failure is not
at the unit of an individual investment,

00:50:05.600 --> 00:50:10.157
right? Success or failure is at the
level of a portfolio, right? And so um

00:50:10.240 --> 00:50:13.117
and and and we basically see these
portfolio effects everywhere in the

00:50:13.200 --> 00:50:16.077
business. So we see the portfolio
effect happens at the level of individ

00:50:16.160 --> 00:50:19.837
individual partner. It happens at the
level of a fund. It happens at the level

00:50:19.920 --> 00:50:22.957
of what we call a strategy which is like
a basket of investments, you know, in in

00:50:23.040 --> 00:50:26.317
the same theme, right? So, let's say
we're we're at our firm and we decide,

00:50:26.400 --> 00:50:28.717
well, I'll give you an example. We have
this big gaming push right now, right?

00:50:28.800 --> 00:50:31.357
Um, as we just brought up this this new
gaming partner we're very proud of and

00:50:31.440 --> 00:50:34.317
we got this big gaming push and we've
been you kind of investing in gaming now

00:50:34.400 --> 00:50:37.117
for a while and it's like, okay, so we
want to go out and make whatever, you

00:50:37.200 --> 00:50:39.677
know, we want to go out and make whatever,
you know, bets in in new game

00:50:39.760 --> 00:50:42.797
companies. And so we we we literally
have a strategy to like back new game

00:50:42.880 --> 00:50:45.997
studios, new new new game new new game
companies. And like we go out and we

00:50:46.080 --> 00:50:49.517
invest not in one of them, but we invest
in 10 of them, right? And you know, in

00:50:49.600 --> 00:50:50.877
making different kinds of games, right?

00:50:50.960 --> 00:50:53.997
You know, different different kinds
of approaches. Um and then we're going to

00:50:54.080 --> 00:50:57.357
evaluate the success of that program
not based on any of those individual

00:50:57.440 --> 00:51:00.637
investments, but based on that, you know,
the basket as a whole. And so when

00:51:00.720 --> 00:51:03.117
you liberate yourself away from I have

00:51:03.200 --> 00:51:05.517
to get this decision right to I have to

00:51:05.600 --> 00:51:08.157
execute a strategy that is going to

00:51:08.240 --> 00:51:10.957
result in a series of 10 bets um and

00:51:11.040 --> 00:51:15.197
then I'm going to be evaluated not
by you know any individual one and by the

00:51:15.280 --> 00:51:18.557
way I'm not even going to get evaluated
by the average outcome right I'm going

00:51:18.640 --> 00:51:20.237
to get evaluated by the total

00:51:20.320 --> 00:51:23.117
performance of the basket um and if one

00:51:23.200 --> 00:51:28.717
of those bets um accounts for 99% of the
profit of the basket that is a perfectly

00:51:28.800 --> 00:51:32.877
fine outcome Right? We see this a lot.
We do performance reviews, right? We do

00:51:32.960 --> 00:51:36.317
performance reviews. And so it's like,
okay, we we do performance reviews of a

00:51:36.400 --> 00:51:38.957
of an investment partner here. And it's
like, well, they've made 10 investments

00:51:39.040 --> 00:51:42.157
and, you know, one of them is this this
just this huge success and the other

00:51:42.240 --> 00:51:44.077
nine are like, you know, sucking wind.

00:51:44.160 --> 00:51:46.637
And it's like, okay, is this a good
venture capitalist or a bad venture

00:51:46.720 --> 00:51:49.997
capitalist? And it's like, well,
you know, in any domain that's not

00:51:50.080 --> 00:51:52.557
probabilistic, you say, this person
is terrible, right? You know, it's batting

00:51:52.640 --> 00:51:55.037
average of like a hundred, you know, out
of a thousand, it's like, this person's

00:51:55.120 --> 00:51:58.077
awful. Um, and and there's always
a temptation to say, well, this one thing

00:51:58.160 --> 00:52:00.637
that's working is it's like it's a fluke,
right? And so, who knows whether

00:52:00.720 --> 00:52:03.437
they'll ever get it again. And it's
at that point where I put my head up and I

00:52:03.520 --> 00:52:04.957
say, we're in the fluke business, right?

00:52:05.040 --> 00:52:08.637
Like the whole point of this is to get
the flukes. Um, and so, of course, that

00:52:08.720 --> 00:52:12.157
person should get full credit for the
fluke, right? And in fact, I hope they

00:52:12.240 --> 00:52:15.517
go make 10 more investments and get
another fluke. And so, anyway, it's it's

00:52:15.600 --> 00:52:18.797
basically like it's getting into
a domain in which you can basically make

00:52:18.880 --> 00:52:21.917
those risky bets in a way where you know
that you're not going to lose everything

00:52:22.000 --> 00:52:25.197
if you don't score 100%. Um and you know

00:52:25.280 --> 00:52:29.277
and look like you know like not all
domains are like this like you know the

00:52:29.360 --> 00:52:32.557
person running a nuclear power plant
doesn't get to live in this world right

00:52:32.640 --> 00:52:37.757
um but you know put it this way anybody
doing anything creative right does live

00:52:37.840 --> 00:52:41.037
in this world um and I you know I think
that the creative artists of all kinds

00:52:41.120 --> 00:52:43.997
you know basically live in this world
and and and the really good ones are are

00:52:44.080 --> 00:52:46.957
unafraid to take the bets you know
because of because because they know

00:52:47.040 --> 00:52:49.357
that this is the domain they operate in.

00:52:49.440 --> 00:52:52.957
We sort of talked about the the
probabilistic thinking in terms of the

00:52:53.040 --> 00:52:55.357
magnitude and test taking as it relates

00:52:55.440 --> 00:52:59.997
to the education system. To me,
I mean, from the outside looking in, the

00:53:00.080 --> 00:53:04.557
education system seems a bit
dysfunctional. Uh, you're a parent. What

00:53:04.640 --> 00:53:08.237
do you think is wrong with it? And how
do you go about navigating it? And what

00:53:08.320 --> 00:53:11.997
can we do to fix it? >> So,
it's completely unfixable. So, so

00:53:12.080 --> 00:53:15.037
it's it's it's it's like none of the
specific point things people are worried

00:53:15.120 --> 00:53:18.557
about are fixable because the whole
thing is built in a certain way. Uh so

00:53:18.640 --> 00:53:21.837
it it goes back to this this it goes
back to this historical thing we started

00:53:21.920 --> 00:53:26.237
with which is it's it's a it's a mass
education system right so it's a mass

00:53:26.320 --> 00:53:30.157
education system that was created in a
time and place um and it was created in

00:53:30.240 --> 00:53:32.157
a time and place and you know you
probably know the history of this it was

00:53:32.240 --> 00:53:35.197
created in a time and place you know
roughly 100 years ago 110 years ago and

00:53:35.280 --> 00:53:37.677
there were a set of you know
theoreticians and with names like you

00:53:37.760 --> 00:53:42.157
know John Dwey um and they you know
developed a you know a system and and at

00:53:42.240 --> 00:53:45.677
the time by the way at the time it was
like a huge advance right because it was

00:53:45.760 --> 00:53:47.917
like we were going from
like a nation of farmers

00:53:48.000 --> 00:53:50.957
right into this into you know this sort
of second industrial revolution and into

00:53:51.040 --> 00:53:54.317
the 20th century you know most kids
didn't have much education in the 19th

00:53:54.400 --> 00:53:58.157
century and you know um you know grew up
in farms or whatever and like they they

00:53:58.240 --> 00:54:01.677
knew the theoreticians the experts knew
like we need a system to educate all the

00:54:01.760 --> 00:54:05.677
kids um and then and then they built
a system the way that you built systems

00:54:05.760 --> 00:54:09.757
you know the way you built systems
in 1910 or 1920 um which is you built a

00:54:09.840 --> 00:54:13.277
mass manufacturing system right so you
you took all of the same methodologies

00:54:13.360 --> 00:54:17.197
that were being used to make the factory
for model T cars and all the same

00:54:17.280 --> 00:54:20.317
methodologies that were being used to do
you know radio you know RCA was doing to

00:54:20.400 --> 00:54:23.997
do radio broadcasting to the masses and
that the you know that General Motors or

00:54:24.080 --> 00:54:26.397
you know General Electric was using
to kind of you know build out the

00:54:26.480 --> 00:54:29.357
electrical grid for the country you know
these these it's a mass system you built

00:54:29.440 --> 00:54:34.077
mass a mass education system um and and
you built it like a factory right um and

00:54:34.160 --> 00:54:37.197
and that made sense because number one
that let you get to massive scale that

00:54:37.280 --> 00:54:40.557
solved the problem they had at that point
um but but the other thing was you

00:54:40.640 --> 00:54:43.437
knew that you were training kids
fundamentally for the industrial economy

00:54:43.520 --> 00:54:45.997
right and so you were training kids
at some fundamental level to work in

00:54:46.080 --> 00:54:49.677
factories right?
Or or by the way to work in

00:54:49.760 --> 00:54:53.117
offices and of course the offices
in those days were also factories, right?

00:54:53.200 --> 00:54:56.557
They were factories for knowledge work,
right? Um and so if you know know the

00:54:56.640 --> 00:54:58.957
history of mass manufacturing,
there were all these ideas like time and

00:54:59.040 --> 00:55:02.397
motion studies and all these guys like
was it Turner u you know who had these

00:55:02.480 --> 00:55:04.717
you know who optimized mass
manufacturing and basically all of the

00:55:04.800 --> 00:55:07.517
leading intellectuals of that era
basically said we use that that same

00:55:07.600 --> 00:55:10.237
battery of techniques we use for mass
manufacturing we're also going to use

00:55:10.320 --> 00:55:14.077
for mass media or we're else we' use
for mass education. Um, and so these are,

00:55:14.160 --> 00:55:17.517
you know, these are factories to these
are schools are factories to stamp out

00:55:17.600 --> 00:55:21.117
kids who are optimized to work in either,
you know, if they're blueco

00:55:21.200 --> 00:55:24.397
collar to work in a literal factory
or if they're white collar to look to work

00:55:24.480 --> 00:55:27.437
at General Motors or General Electric in
the, you know, in a conference room, you

00:55:27.520 --> 00:55:31.277
know, in a in a in a giant hierarchy,
you know, to to be an organization man.

00:55:31.360 --> 00:55:35.677
Um, and so we built that system and then
we set it on autopilot. Um, and it's

00:55:35.760 --> 00:55:39.277
been on autopilot for hundred years and
here we are and it doesn't fit at all to

00:55:39.360 --> 00:55:42.317
the world we live in today. Like not
even a little bit. And then of course it

00:55:42.400 --> 00:55:46.237
it it it has you know it has suffered
the fate of every institution that sort

00:55:46.320 --> 00:55:49.517
of goes across multiple generations
which is it has been taken over by a set

00:55:49.600 --> 00:55:52.717
of people right incentives right it has
been taken over by a set of people who

00:55:52.800 --> 00:55:56.477
have absolutely no intention to change
it right 100% they're not going to

00:55:56.560 --> 00:56:01.037
change it like the people who run
this system 100% of their power and status

00:56:01.120 --> 00:56:03.677
and authority in the world and their
income and everything else and their

00:56:03.760 --> 00:56:07.677
lifestyle it's 100% you know bought
and paid for by this legacy system and of

00:56:07.760 --> 00:56:08.637
course they're not going to change it.

00:56:08.720 --> 00:56:12.637
Um, and so it's not I'll tell you one
thing I don't believe in is reform. Like

00:56:12.720 --> 00:56:16.077
I have all these friends that work on
like, you know, school reform. God bless

00:56:16.160 --> 00:56:18.717
them. Like they're just the wonder most
wonderful, sweetest, well-intentioned

00:56:18.800 --> 00:56:21.757
people in the world and they're just
burning huge amounts of money at time on

00:56:21.840 --> 00:56:24.157
trying to reform the system that has
absolutely no intention of being

00:56:24.240 --> 00:56:27.117
reformed and and they're they're having
no impact whatsoever. Like it's not

00:56:27.200 --> 00:56:29.517
working at all. >> Of course,
like we have a biological

00:56:29.600 --> 00:56:33.517
tendency sort of to defend our territory,
right? So it it would be it

00:56:33.600 --> 00:56:37.277
would be hard especially with the
organized unions and all of this other

00:56:37.360 --> 00:56:40.397
stuff that's involved with the
education system to reform it.

00:56:40.480 --> 00:56:44.237
>> Well, it's like the tip off the tip
off if they just you know step back and

00:56:44.320 --> 00:56:46.557
think about it for a second. Like you
could be pro- union or anti-UN. You have

00:56:46.640 --> 00:56:48.797
whatever people have whatever views
and unions they want organized labor, you

00:56:48.880 --> 00:56:51.437
know, big debate for a long time.
You can have whatever views you want. But

00:56:51.520 --> 00:56:55.197
the idea of a unions the idea of unions

00:56:55.280 --> 00:56:57.677
of public sector employees,

00:56:57.760 --> 00:57:02.237
right? Like, so you now have
people, you have a double

00:57:02.320 --> 00:57:06.477
layer of civil service
protections and union protections,

00:57:06.560 --> 00:57:10.637
right? And you're going to reform
that system. Like, no, you're not like

00:57:10.720 --> 00:57:12.957
they're going to take your money,
laugh at you, and like nothing is going to

00:57:13.040 --> 00:57:17.437
happen. And so, yeah, there there is no
on this. There is no fix. There is only

00:57:17.520 --> 00:57:19.037
one thing to do in my my opinion.

00:57:19.120 --> 00:57:21.997
There's only one thing to do, right,
which is to build the new system, right?

00:57:22.080 --> 00:57:24.877
And the new system has to get built
from scratch. It has to get built the hard

00:57:24.960 --> 00:57:29.277
way, right? um it will probably not look
right or sound or smell like you know

00:57:29.360 --> 00:57:31.757
these it probably you know the new
system will probably not be a giant

00:57:31.840 --> 00:57:35.197
hierarchy it'll probably be something
else >> right it'll look like synthesis or

00:57:35.280 --> 00:57:37.277
something like that >> yeah
it'll be or it'll be like it'll be

00:57:37.360 --> 00:57:40.637
distributed you know it'll be uh you
know like this I'm just going to I'll

00:57:40.720 --> 00:57:44.397
paint a vague picture of what it might
be but it might be you know look the

00:57:44.480 --> 00:57:47.037
country clearly right now and I'm
actually we're actually living this with

00:57:47.120 --> 00:57:49.277
our six-year-old right now like there

00:57:49.360 --> 00:57:51.917
needs to be like a homeschooled network

00:57:52.000 --> 00:57:54.157
right there needs to be a whole like

00:57:54.240 --> 00:57:56.637
support structure right? And network um

00:57:56.720 --> 00:57:59.117
and knowledge flow and expertise flow

00:57:59.200 --> 00:58:02.877
and talent hiring pipeline, right? And

00:58:02.960 --> 00:58:05.277
you know, quality standards and and

00:58:05.360 --> 00:58:10.237
resources and activities, right? For for
homeschool kids, right? And and for the

00:58:10.320 --> 00:58:12.637
for these like micro schools that are
popping up all over the place, right?

00:58:12.720 --> 00:58:15.517
And and you know, and by the way, like
now is a perfect time to do that, right?

00:58:15.600 --> 00:58:18.237
Because then the postcoid, you know,
all the changes you're well aware of, but

00:58:18.320 --> 00:58:21.277
like you know, there's this massive
spike in homeschooling. um there's this

00:58:21.360 --> 00:58:24.077
massive spike in parents who are very
unsatisfied with with formal you know

00:58:24.160 --> 00:58:29.197
all are sort of say newly unsatisfied
with the the the legacy model um and so

00:58:29.280 --> 00:58:32.077
now is obviously the right time for this
and look there are lots of example there

00:58:32.160 --> 00:58:34.957
are lots of people working on this and
there are lots of early examples of this

00:58:35.040 --> 00:58:37.197
and so I hope something really takes here

00:58:37.280 --> 00:58:38.957
>> it's also interesting
when you look from

00:58:39.040 --> 00:58:42.957
the outside in that there's sort of like
no individual to blame right like I feel

00:58:43.040 --> 00:58:47.277
for the teachers in the classroom I feel
for the principles I feel for everybody

00:58:47.360 --> 00:58:51.597
involved in the system but the
end outcome is just terrible.

00:58:51.680 --> 00:58:55.437
>> Yeah. Charlie Mer has this great thing
I really like which he says look if if you

00:58:55.520 --> 00:58:58.477
often in the world this is a great
example you often have a system and the

00:58:58.560 --> 00:59:02.637
system has incentives and this and the
incentives result in terrible behavior

00:59:02.720 --> 00:59:05.757
and then you have a choice which is do
you blame the people who are exhibiting

00:59:05.840 --> 00:59:09.677
the terrible behavior or do you blame
the people who created the incentives

00:59:09.760 --> 00:59:13.037
right and and and he he believes and I
agree on this I I think 100% you blame

00:59:13.120 --> 00:59:15.437
the people who create the incentives
right I think I think you're right like

00:59:15.520 --> 00:59:17.917
I I think when you take human beings and
you put them in a system where they have

00:59:18.000 --> 00:59:21.117
bad incentives and you get bad results
like at at some level it's not their

00:59:21.200 --> 00:59:23.997
fault you know, you could say maybe they
should resign a principle or something

00:59:24.080 --> 00:59:26.477
like that, but like most people need
to live their lives and they need to like,

00:59:26.560 --> 00:59:29.197
you know, put food on the table for
their families and so forth. And so like

00:59:29.280 --> 00:59:32.877
I just don't have expectations
of like mass revolt um against people's

00:59:32.960 --> 00:59:36.157
self-interest. Um and so yeah, no, I I
totally agree with that and so therefore

00:59:36.240 --> 00:59:39.197
I think you have to look at incentives
um and then you have to look at the

00:59:39.280 --> 00:59:42.717
people who are putting the incentives
in place um and you and you have to judge

00:59:42.800 --> 00:59:46.237
them and and and that's the that's the
thing with this thing is like the people

00:59:46.320 --> 00:59:50.077
who put these incentives in place are
dead. Like they're gone, right? like we

00:59:50.160 --> 00:59:53.277
we can you know I can I can sit here
and yell at John Dewey all day long. It

00:59:53.360 --> 00:59:58.477
doesn't matter like he's you know he's
he's gone. Um and and the people who are

00:59:58.560 --> 01:00:01.597
running these institutions now are
just basically at some fundamental level

01:00:01.680 --> 01:00:05.357
executing scripts that were developed
100 years ago. And like it it to some

01:00:05.440 --> 01:00:08.797
extent it's like not their fault.
And then look, you know, there is

01:00:08.880 --> 01:00:11.997
corruption, right? I mean, like
the level to which a lot of these legacy

01:00:12.080 --> 01:00:14.877
systems are intertwined with the
political system, you know, up to the

01:00:14.960 --> 01:00:18.237
level of just overt corruption, like
at some point you're you're in this like

01:00:18.320 --> 01:00:22.157
really sleazy zone where, you know,
politicians have just be bought off to,

01:00:22.240 --> 01:00:24.477
you know, to basically preserve
a system that's obviously, you know,

01:00:24.560 --> 01:00:27.677
dysfunctional and corrosive. And so
anyway, you you can certainly, you know,

01:00:27.760 --> 01:00:30.877
I don't I don't mean to let everybody
off the hook, but but yeah, look, the

01:00:30.960 --> 01:00:35.437
the key thing at the core of it is yes,
how was the system constructed? Um, and

01:00:35.520 --> 01:00:38.317
then um and then and then what are
the what are the incentives for for its

01:00:38.400 --> 01:00:41.517
continuity? Um, and and again, that's
why I said like I'm not that's why I

01:00:41.600 --> 01:00:44.397
think reform is impossible. Like there's
no way at this point to go in and change

01:00:44.480 --> 01:00:47.357
the incentives inside one of these
systems. Like I it just there's too much

01:00:47.440 --> 01:00:48.957
vested interest. It just can't be done.

01:00:49.040 --> 01:00:53.597
>> What would a political policy platform
look like that encourages innovation?

01:00:53.680 --> 01:00:56.477
What are the sort of like
key variables that matter?

01:00:56.560 --> 01:00:59.357
>> I don't know if it's too I don't know
if it would work um because it's a little

01:00:59.440 --> 01:01:02.717
bit too abstract, but it it it is kind
of at the heart it's a little bit at the

01:01:02.800 --> 01:01:05.037
heart of populism. It's a little bit
at the heart of actually a lot of the

01:01:05.120 --> 01:01:09.277
leftwing critique um actually a business
also. So you you see you see it actually

01:01:09.360 --> 01:01:13.597
there's a critique from both the left
and the right and I think the critique

01:01:13.680 --> 01:01:16.717
the way the libertarians to say the
libertarians have the answer but the way

01:01:16.800 --> 01:01:20.077
the libertarians would put it is there's
a difference between being um pro

01:01:20.160 --> 01:01:23.677
business and pro market right um and so

01:01:23.760 --> 01:01:27.357
and what they mean by that basically
is it's like there's one concept of a

01:01:27.440 --> 01:01:30.557
business right or an entity of any kind
let's start with a business but we can

01:01:30.640 --> 01:01:34.637
apply the same thing to to other other
kinds of institutions down the road like

01:01:34.720 --> 01:01:38.237
um there's one form of business is like
actually forc forced to compete in a

01:01:38.320 --> 01:01:41.677
fully competitive market, right? So sort
of fully subject to market discipline,

01:01:41.760 --> 01:01:44.557
right? And so like if whatever, you know,
and I don't even say like the car

01:01:44.640 --> 01:01:47.517
industry works like this or something,
right? Which is or I don't actually the

01:01:47.600 --> 01:01:48.877
car industry gets repeatedly bailed out.

01:01:48.960 --> 01:01:51.677
So they're probably not the right example.
I don't know, soft drinks are

01:01:51.760 --> 01:01:54.637
something. It's like, you know, Coke and
Pepsi and Dr. Pepper and so forth. Like

01:01:54.720 --> 01:01:58.397
they, you know, every time you,
you know, buy a can a soft drink or, you

01:01:58.480 --> 01:02:01.917
know, any any, you know, I went to,
you know, was a gas station the other day

01:02:02.000 --> 01:02:04.717
and it's like, you know, there's like
400 different, you know, bottles and

01:02:04.800 --> 01:02:08.077
cans of drinks right on the shelves. you
know, those companies are like forced to

01:02:08.160 --> 01:02:12.077
compete every day, right, for for every
purchase. And so there there's a there's

01:02:12.160 --> 01:02:13.597
a standards bar that they have to hit.

01:02:13.680 --> 01:02:18.317
Um, and then there's as as and and sort
of libertarians are kind of classic free

01:02:18.400 --> 01:02:21.197
market economists are like that.
That's that's market economy. Like in the

01:02:21.280 --> 01:02:24.397
market economy, you you you don't want
businesses to kind of run untrable. What

01:02:24.480 --> 01:02:27.117
you want them is you want them subject
to market discipline. You want them

01:02:27.200 --> 01:02:30.717
forced to compete all the time. And and
that's how you you get quality control

01:02:30.800 --> 01:02:34.637
and innovation. Um, and then and then
there's there's pro business. And pro

01:02:34.720 --> 01:02:37.437
business basically the problem with pro
business is basically what happens is a

01:02:37.520 --> 01:02:41.197
lot of industries over time end up
not like that. They end up not being

01:02:41.280 --> 01:02:43.757
actually a fair and free market
with market discipline. They end up as

01:02:43.840 --> 01:02:47.277
something else. In the business world
what they end up with is either just you

01:02:47.360 --> 01:02:50.957
know one company with a follow-up
monopoly or more commonly they end up

01:02:51.040 --> 01:02:52.477
with what's called an oligopoly, right?

01:02:52.560 --> 01:02:55.837
They end up with a small number
of companies that sort of dominate the

01:02:55.920 --> 01:03:00.157
entire sector. Um and then what you get
and you know you see this over and over

01:03:00.240 --> 01:03:02.797
in the economy. It's like, you know,
three car companies, um, you know, for a

01:03:02.880 --> 01:03:05.677
very long time. It's, you know,
four movie studios. It's three accounting

01:03:05.760 --> 01:03:07.677
firms, you know, it's just, you go right

01:03:07.760 --> 01:03:09.357
down the list, right? Um, and it's just,

01:03:09.440 --> 01:03:13.117
you know, three big banks. Um, you know,

01:03:13.200 --> 01:03:16.797
um, and so, and these are oligopies and
oligopies are not monopolies. Like each

01:03:16.880 --> 01:03:19.117
company doesn't have to, you know,
there's no one company that has total

01:03:19.200 --> 01:03:21.917
control, but, you know, now you've
only got three companies. And are three

01:03:22.000 --> 01:03:25.197
companies really, is that sufficient
competition to really have market

01:03:25.280 --> 01:03:28.637
discipline or do they kind of end up
as sort of a cartel? And there's all these

01:03:28.720 --> 01:03:32.317
ways that they like signal to each other
to price fix and so forth that sometimes

01:03:32.400 --> 01:03:37.117
verges into overt price fixing.
Um and then what happens is the oligopies

01:03:37.200 --> 01:03:40.397
basically they get big and stalifying
and then what happens is they basically

01:03:40.480 --> 01:03:43.997
end up sort of colonizing politics right
and then this this leads to this concept

01:03:44.080 --> 01:03:47.517
of regulatory capture right where
basically the the you know the the

01:03:47.600 --> 01:03:51.197
companies end up basically essentially
occupying the government you know

01:03:51.280 --> 01:03:53.677
usually at the same time
the government's occupying the companies

01:03:53.760 --> 01:03:57.197
right and so you end up with these like
giant regulatory edififices you know

01:03:57.280 --> 01:04:00.237
DoddFrank and all these things u you
know you end up with you know these

01:04:00.320 --> 01:04:03.517
bailouts you end up with all these
you know intertwining this you know

01:04:03.600 --> 01:04:06.717
revolving more right where you've got
these regulators that all know that

01:04:06.800 --> 01:04:08.717
they're going to get you know these
really high paying jobs at these

01:04:08.800 --> 01:04:11.437
companies when they when they when they
step out of government service or you

01:04:11.520 --> 01:04:15.917
know or you know it's like you know
my friends at Goldman Sachs you know like

01:04:16.000 --> 01:04:18.637
the number of people who had like you
know Goldman Sachs their business card

01:04:18.720 --> 01:04:22.077
who now work for the federal government
is just incredible right like it's just

01:04:22.160 --> 01:04:25.597
this incredible talent flow right um
and so you end up with this sort of

01:04:25.680 --> 01:04:29.197
intertwining um of business
and government and then of course you know

01:04:29.280 --> 01:04:32.877
we experienced this in a very tangible
way which is okay then you know imagine

01:04:32.960 --> 01:04:36.477
being a startup Right? Imagine being
a new bank, right, or a new car company or

01:04:36.560 --> 01:04:39.037
a new movie studio or a new whatever
going up against, you know, these

01:04:39.120 --> 01:04:42.237
cartels and it's just, you know,
it's just like, oh my god, like, you know,

01:04:42.320 --> 01:04:44.637
it's like it's like a mountain that is,
you know, for at least for most

01:04:44.720 --> 01:04:47.917
entrepreneurs is almost impossible
to conceive of climbing, right? There was

01:04:48.000 --> 01:04:52.797
not a new car company in the US that
mattered for 80 years, you know, between

01:04:52.880 --> 01:04:55.437
the establishment of the of the oligopy
in the US and then and then the

01:04:55.520 --> 01:04:57.277
emergence of Tesla, right? So that's

01:04:57.360 --> 01:05:00.797
like a eight years is a long time. Um,

01:05:00.880 --> 01:05:02.957
and so, you know, what is that, right?

01:05:03.040 --> 01:05:06.237
It's it's certainly not a free market
economy, right? Um it's not company

01:05:06.320 --> 01:05:09.517
subject to market discipline. It's it
but but it's also not just like flatout

01:05:09.600 --> 01:05:11.597
top down socialism or communism, right?

01:05:11.680 --> 01:05:15.117
It's something else, right? It's
this it's this kind of hybrid mutant, you

01:05:15.200 --> 01:05:19.677
know, kind of entangled thing. Um
and then you can generalize this idea to,

01:05:19.760 --> 01:05:20.877
you know, many of these other topics.

01:05:20.960 --> 01:05:24.157
And so it's the same, you know, higher,
you know, education, education through

01:05:24.240 --> 01:05:26.317
that lens, education all of a sudden
starts to make a lot of sense because

01:05:26.400 --> 01:05:29.597
like what is education? K- through2 is
a monopoly, right? It's it's a government

01:05:29.680 --> 01:05:31.917
sponsored and run monopoly. And so,
of course, it's going to, you know, it's a

01:05:32.000 --> 01:05:34.717
Soviet it's a Soviet system, right?
It's going to it's going to it's it's run

01:05:34.800 --> 01:05:37.597
exactly the same way education was front
of the Soviet Union. Of course, it's

01:05:37.680 --> 01:05:40.797
going to generate the exact same results.
It's going to generate worse

01:05:40.880 --> 01:05:45.117
results because the Soviets were really
good at math and science. Um um and

01:05:45.200 --> 01:05:47.757
then, you know, higher ed is a cartel,

01:05:47.840 --> 01:05:52.157
right? It's it's quite literally a cartel.
And the universities form, you

01:05:52.240 --> 01:05:54.797
know, they have an industry group uh
they have these industry groups that

01:05:54.880 --> 01:05:58.717
they run then and then they have what's
called accreditation. Um, and they

01:05:58.800 --> 01:06:02.077
control the accreditation process and you
need to get accredited to get access

01:06:02.160 --> 01:06:04.717
to federal student lending and all
and federal research funding and all these

01:06:04.800 --> 01:06:09.997
other things, right? Um, and so it's
it's a it's a flat oligopolistic cartel.

01:06:10.080 --> 01:06:12.877
Um, and so of course it's going to be
non-innovative and of course prices are

01:06:12.960 --> 01:06:15.437
going to spiral like crazy and of course
there's going to be more more government

01:06:15.520 --> 01:06:18.077
subsidies over time and of course the
quality is going to collapse over time.

01:06:18.160 --> 01:06:20.637
The sort of intellectual version
of the platform would be sort of anti-

01:06:20.720 --> 01:06:24.557
monopoly, anti-oligopoly, anti-
concentrated power, anti-government, you

01:06:24.640 --> 01:06:28.877
know, in a government entwining itself
in the economy, right? Anti-regulatory

01:06:28.960 --> 01:06:31.757
capture, anti-leacy institutions
that are no longer being run by their

01:06:31.840 --> 01:06:36.877
founders, right? Um anti-systems for
which there's no competition, right? Um

01:06:36.960 --> 01:06:39.757
anti- anything that basically tries
to, you know, do what's called rent

01:06:39.840 --> 01:06:42.637
seeeking, you know, to kind of,
you know, extract, you know, basically

01:06:42.720 --> 01:06:46.477
economics from the broader society
without competitive alternatives. Like

01:06:46.560 --> 01:06:49.277
that would be the core of it. the the
right-wing populist version of that I

01:06:49.360 --> 01:06:51.917
think is sort of very straightforward
which is basically you know it's tea

01:06:52.000 --> 01:06:55.197
party right it's basically just like
how absurd is it that we have these huge

01:06:55.280 --> 01:06:58.877
things that just keep getting bailed out
like what the hell um and then you know

01:06:58.960 --> 01:07:01.677
and by the way you know sort of occupy
and tea party actually kind of had the

01:07:01.760 --> 01:07:04.237
same you know in a lot of ways the same
argument um you know from the different

01:07:04.320 --> 01:07:08.077
sides of the spectrum and then you know
the the modern form of that is you know

01:07:08.160 --> 01:07:11.757
the you know the leftwing version
of that is is you know you do hear it and

01:07:11.840 --> 01:07:14.157
and you know the left the left wing
people argue more directly for the

01:07:14.240 --> 01:07:17.357
government should just do all this but you
know they are on to something I with

01:07:17.440 --> 01:07:21.677
a critique of like look like are these
even companies, right? Is is this even

01:07:21.760 --> 01:07:24.557
capitalism, right? And and and is the
market actually delivering what the

01:07:24.640 --> 01:07:25.517
market is supposed to deliver?

01:07:25.600 --> 01:07:28.157
>> Well, you got my vote, man.
When are you running? [laughter]

01:07:28.240 --> 01:07:31.997
>> Never. Never under any circumstances.

01:07:32.080 --> 01:07:35.357
>> You once said that you had this little
I remember this interview. It was like

01:07:35.440 --> 01:07:38.797
several years ago. You had this little
mental model of Elon Musk on your

01:07:38.880 --> 01:07:41.837
shoulder. Is that true? And if so, why?

01:07:41.920 --> 01:07:46.077
And who else do you have mental models of?
And how do you use them to help you?

01:07:46.160 --> 01:07:48.717
You know, one of the things is you kind
of, you know, as you study kind of, you

01:07:48.800 --> 01:07:51.837
know, very very kind of smart people
and you people who have like done a lot of

01:07:51.920 --> 01:07:55.517
important things. It's like, you know,
they they all had some way of operating.

01:07:55.600 --> 01:07:57.997
You know, they all had some theory,
right? Some some some structure

01:07:58.080 --> 01:08:01.037
framework of the world and how it worked
and how how to cause things to happen.

01:08:01.120 --> 01:08:03.517
Um, and and there one of the things
that's interesting, you know, there

01:08:03.600 --> 01:08:07.277
there are many such frameworks. Even
even the same kind of person, you know,

01:08:07.360 --> 01:08:10.797
there many very of the most successful
investors generally each of them had

01:08:10.880 --> 01:08:14.157
some unique take on the world and they
and they weren't necessarily compatible

01:08:14.240 --> 01:08:17.997
takes, right? and they just they figured
out, you know, kind of a a way to do

01:08:18.080 --> 01:08:20.477
things. It's very different than the way
a lot of other people did things. And

01:08:20.560 --> 01:08:22.957
the same thing for CEOs and entrepreneurs
and, you know, by the way,

01:08:23.040 --> 01:08:25.517
same thing for artists and, you know,
any any other kind of, you know, these

01:08:25.600 --> 01:08:31.277
these sort of very sort of successful
people. Um, and so like I'm I'm pretty

01:08:31.360 --> 01:08:34.477
convinced there's no way to like
synthesize all of their kind of

01:08:34.560 --> 01:08:37.837
different approaches and views
and frameworks into a single model. Like

01:08:37.920 --> 01:08:41.117
it's just it's too complicated and it's
too contradictory and it it it kind it

01:08:41.200 --> 01:08:46.077
wouldn't really work. At least I I don't
think so. Um but what you can do right

01:08:46.160 --> 01:08:49.277
um you know when when you and then what
what you do is like you you know as you

01:08:49.360 --> 01:08:51.997
go through life you you know you talk
a lot about this in your work and we

01:08:52.080 --> 01:08:54.397
talked a lot about this today is you
do try to assemble your own kind of

01:08:54.480 --> 01:08:58.237
worldview and your own framework
and your own way of of of sort of uh of

01:08:58.320 --> 01:09:02.717
doing things. Um and and by default your
your your your kind of framework on that

01:09:02.800 --> 01:09:05.437
will get probably narrower over time
because you'll get kind of more locked

01:09:05.520 --> 01:09:10.237
more set in your ways um and you'll get
more resistant to new ideas. Um, and so

01:09:10.320 --> 01:09:13.917
like one of the ways to offset that is
to like quite literally have like have

01:09:14.000 --> 01:09:17.837
the mental model for how somebody else
would think about the same situation,

01:09:17.920 --> 01:09:21.277
right? And and in a way that's like not
threatening to you, right? Which is it's

01:09:21.360 --> 01:09:24.317
not like okay, this is like now I have
to have an argument with myself, but

01:09:24.400 --> 01:09:27.757
it's more just like okay like if you
know I take your pick of who you admire,

01:09:27.840 --> 01:09:31.677
but you know in my case it's like Elon
Musk or you know or Steve Jobs or you

01:09:31.760 --> 01:09:34.157
know Andy Grove or Peter Teal, you know

01:09:34.240 --> 01:09:38.797
we're in the room, right? Uh you know
what would they say? And you know and by

01:09:38.880 --> 01:09:41.117
and by the way this itself is a daunting
challenge because these people are

01:09:41.200 --> 01:09:43.997
incredibly smart and I I don't know
that I can even you know kind of replicate

01:09:44.080 --> 01:09:47.597
their thought process. Um but you know
I do know you know I I do know a fair

01:09:47.680 --> 01:09:51.757
amount about their thought process and
that you know they and you know it it so

01:09:51.840 --> 01:09:54.957
happens that I also have known them
but also like you know they they both have

01:09:55.040 --> 01:09:57.197
written they've all written and talked
a lot about kind of how they how they

01:09:57.280 --> 01:10:01.117
think about things. Um so then it's
like okay what what's my mental model for

01:10:01.200 --> 01:10:04.797
yeah how how would Elon think about this
right? And so and so I just get you know

01:10:04.880 --> 01:10:07.997
the simple one like the simple one for
this the simple one for Elon and Elon's

01:10:08.080 --> 01:10:11.037
very complex guy but the most simple
kind of form of Elon that's useful in

01:10:11.120 --> 01:10:14.797
this way is is what he calls first
principles thinking right which is it's

01:10:14.880 --> 01:10:19.037
like okay like basically in Elon's view
we all basically just like assume too

01:10:19.120 --> 01:10:22.237
many things from from the way things are
and the right thing to do is to kind of

01:10:22.320 --> 01:10:24.797
you know he kind of gets this from
physics because he was trained as a

01:10:24.880 --> 01:10:28.397
physicist originally u which is a very
different mentality than than the one

01:10:28.480 --> 01:10:32.237
that I come from um and it's basically
okay script things all the way down to

01:10:32.320 --> 01:10:35.197
basics again and start and basically
start the logical thought process over

01:10:35.280 --> 01:10:39.277
again, right? And so basically,
you know, go deeper into the idea to the

01:10:39.360 --> 01:10:42.877
very foundations and then build your way
back up. Um, and and you know, just

01:10:42.960 --> 01:10:46.077
going through that process is a way
to kind of really catalyze your thinking.

01:10:46.160 --> 01:10:48.957
you know, Peter's form, you know,
Peter's kind of core mental model that,

01:10:49.040 --> 01:10:51.837
you know, that I borrow that I've kind
of drawn from is, you know, his focus on

01:10:51.920 --> 01:10:55.517
this this philosopher Rene Gerard and,
you know, this idea of of sort of, you

01:10:55.600 --> 01:10:58.477
know, mimemetic dynamics and and,
you know, people copying, you know, people

01:10:58.560 --> 01:11:01.917
copying behavior between each other
and then also, you know, rivalries forming

01:11:02.000 --> 01:11:04.957
and and how that plays out, you know,
human dynamics and Gerard had this very

01:11:05.040 --> 01:11:08.157
kind of sweeping whole theory about how
that kind of determines how well society

01:11:08.240 --> 01:11:10.877
kind of functions and maybe that's
not completely true, but like there's

01:11:10.960 --> 01:11:14.557
there's clearly a lot to that. And then
of course there's this scapegoating

01:11:14.640 --> 01:11:19.437
cycle which which does seems to play out
every day especially when dealing with

01:11:19.520 --> 01:11:22.637
any of these internet things or systems
things networks you know it's a very

01:11:22.720 --> 01:11:25.677
useful framework and so you know being
able to kind of have an imaginary debate

01:11:25.760 --> 01:11:29.917
with Peter um and kind of say okay what
would the lens on that be um you know

01:11:30.000 --> 01:11:33.117
and then obviously we could go on length
but you know Jobs and Groven these guys

01:11:33.200 --> 01:11:36.477
had their own their own views of things
um and so it's just it's it's a way to

01:11:36.560 --> 01:11:40.477
kind of keep the actual um you know I
don't know keep keep ideas flowing and

01:11:40.560 --> 01:11:44.557
then sort of enable yourself or force
yourself to like basically stress test

01:11:44.640 --> 01:11:49.037
your own ideas uh through a lens that's
not just your preconceptions I think is

01:11:49.120 --> 01:11:51.597
quite helpful. >> I think you
get a different perspective,

01:11:51.680 --> 01:11:54.397
right? Like you see the problem through
the lens of somebody else which helps

01:11:54.480 --> 01:11:57.677
you actually understand the problem
a little bit better than you do just

01:11:57.760 --> 01:12:01.597
seeing it through your own lens because
we can't fully understand a system that

01:12:01.680 --> 01:12:06.077
we're part of. So by assuming somebody
else's persona, we get more detailed

01:12:06.160 --> 01:12:09.517
information about what we're missing
and we eliminate some of our blind spots.

01:12:09.600 --> 01:12:12.397
And then I also think it's also um I
also think a lot about it's like it's

01:12:12.480 --> 01:12:17.437
also keeping a high bar um for yourself
and for your work, right? And and and

01:12:17.520 --> 01:12:19.917
this maybe is also something this also
has to do another thing that happens

01:12:20.000 --> 01:12:23.357
with kind of age and success is and and we
see this actually with founders is

01:12:23.440 --> 01:12:25.837
like at some point there are some
founders where they start you know

01:12:25.920 --> 01:12:30.157
company three, four, five, six at some
point they get tired of doing the work

01:12:30.240 --> 01:12:33.757
like they get tired of going all the way
back to basics. Ben and I had this uh we

01:12:33.840 --> 01:12:36.957
had this we had this uh we talked
to Jeff Bezos about this at one point and

01:12:37.040 --> 01:12:40.957
um he asked us why we were starting
a venture capital from another company and

01:12:41.040 --> 01:12:44.717
another startup and and and and we asked
him well if if Amazon you know for some

01:12:44.800 --> 01:12:48.397
reason Amazon got sold or whatever um
and you were a free agent again like

01:12:48.480 --> 01:12:51.597
would you start you know would you start
another company and he laughed and he

01:12:51.680 --> 01:12:54.477
said you know not in your life he's like
you know he's like that would be going

01:12:54.560 --> 01:12:57.677
back to kindergarten and he's like
look don't get me wrong I really liked

01:12:57.760 --> 01:13:01.437
kindergarten >> right >> but like
you [laughter] know having

01:13:01.520 --> 01:13:03.677
built Amazon I'm not going back
to kindergarten, right? Um, you know,

01:13:03.760 --> 01:13:06.637
having to build Amazon. I'm not starting
a company again from scratch. And so,

01:13:06.720 --> 01:13:09.517
you know, and so there's this this like
where the first principles thinking

01:13:09.600 --> 01:13:13.517
comes in handy, which is it's like,
okay, like what's the bar, right? Like

01:13:13.600 --> 01:13:16.237
what's the bar that you're applying
to your own work and to your own thought

01:13:16.320 --> 01:13:19.837
process? And are you actually being as
rigorous as you, you know, are you being

01:13:19.920 --> 01:13:24.397
as rigorous at say 50 as you were when
you were 25? Um, and are you able to

01:13:24.480 --> 01:13:26.557
actually, you know, because when you're
25 or whatever, you're doing something

01:13:26.640 --> 01:13:29.197
new, like the world is judging you every
step of the way, and it's like a harsh,

01:13:29.280 --> 01:13:31.277
you know, it's a harsh environment and,
you know, the world corrects you

01:13:31.360 --> 01:13:36.157
quickly. H how do you keep that bar
rising, right? And not let success sort

01:13:36.240 --> 01:13:39.597
of turn into complacency.
>> You need you need some you need some

01:13:39.680 --> 01:13:43.597
forcing function, right? You need
a reason. This is why we always and the

01:13:43.680 --> 01:13:46.077
the smart the smart entrepreneurs
all know this, but this is why even

01:13:46.160 --> 01:13:49.037
entrepreneurs starting company number
four or five, six, you know, this is why

01:13:49.120 --> 01:13:51.197
they should have like a board of directors
and they should have people on

01:13:51.280 --> 01:13:54.237
their board who are actually like very
smart and strong willed who will argue

01:13:54.320 --> 01:13:57.197
with them, right? Um as opposed to just
them doing whatever it is they're going

01:13:57.280 --> 01:14:00.557
to do on their own is because like they
you need no matter how good you need

01:14:00.640 --> 01:14:04.237
some force. Mo most people need some
forcing function where they're they're

01:14:04.320 --> 01:14:07.517
sort of forced to fully think things
through. They're forced to do all the

01:14:07.600 --> 01:14:10.717
work and they're forced to be able
to defend it, right? And if to your point,

01:14:10.800 --> 01:14:13.917
like if they don't do that, it's it
turns into complacency and laziness and

01:14:14.000 --> 01:14:16.157
at some point it turns into arrogance
and it it just it becomes very

01:14:16.240 --> 01:14:19.117
destructive and then you stop being
effective. And so there be some forcing

01:14:19.200 --> 01:14:22.957
function. The the the the Peter Teal
on the shoulder thing is is a forcing

01:14:23.040 --> 01:14:26.317
function is how I use it. Um it's like
a forcing function of my own thought

01:14:26.400 --> 01:14:29.757
process. It's like, okay, if I were
explaining this to Peter or to Elon or

01:14:29.840 --> 01:14:32.717
whatever, like, would they be like, "Oh,
that's a good idea." Or they'd be like,

01:14:32.800 --> 01:14:36.157
"Mark, like Elon would say,
that's stupid." Peter would say, "I

01:14:36.240 --> 01:14:38.557
don't I don't think you fully thought
that through." And, you know, and then

01:14:38.640 --> 01:14:41.357
it's like, "Okay, now I know that I
have to go like, "If I'm going to do this

01:14:41.440 --> 01:14:44.077
work, now I know that I have to go back
and do it for real." Like, I I have to

01:14:44.160 --> 01:14:48.397
be able to justify this. Um, and and and
it's and it's an obligation to myself,

01:14:48.480 --> 01:14:50.877
you know, number one, because like why
am I wasting time on something if I'm

01:14:50.960 --> 01:14:53.837
not actually set up to do it right?
But then of course it's also an obligation

01:14:53.920 --> 01:14:56.477
for any of us in a position where other
people are going to make decisions based

01:14:56.560 --> 01:14:59.277
on what we do right people are going
to come to work for us right are going to

01:14:59.360 --> 01:15:02.237
participate in things that we're leading
you know then we have a real obligation

01:15:02.320 --> 01:15:05.997
right because like it's you know
imagine how unfair it is you know for an

01:15:06.080 --> 01:15:08.157
entrepreneur who gets lazy who doesn't
think things through who starts a

01:15:08.240 --> 01:15:11.197
company who hires a bunch of people like
that you know that's really unfair to

01:15:11.280 --> 01:15:15.277
those people um and so it's it's a self
you know this is the the surface level

01:15:15.360 --> 01:15:18.397
answer to your question but like it
has to be a self-imposed standard at a

01:15:18.480 --> 01:15:22.157
certain point um and people either
want to people say people either have a

01:15:22.240 --> 01:15:24.317
reason to impose that standard
on themselves or at some point they should

01:15:24.400 --> 01:15:26.157
stop trying to do the things
that they're doing.

01:15:26.240 --> 01:15:29.117
>> Uh last question.
What's the last book you reread?

01:15:29.200 --> 01:15:33.597
>> That's a really good question.
Um you know, I'll tell you one book I keep

01:15:33.680 --> 01:15:37.437
coming back to. I keep coming back to um
I keep coming back to the the Henrich

01:15:37.520 --> 01:15:41.597
the Joseph Henrich book. Um the weirdest
people in the world. Um another book

01:15:41.680 --> 01:15:45.437
that I keep coming back to is a book
called the Mack the Machavelians by this

01:15:45.520 --> 01:15:49.437
guy James Burnham. um which I think
is probably the best book on politics of

01:15:49.520 --> 01:15:52.557
the 20th century and has been like
incredibly helpful to understand what's

01:15:52.640 --> 01:15:54.877
happening right now. Um so those are two

01:15:54.960 --> 01:15:59.757
big ones. Martin Gur's book uh
the revolt of the public. We'll put all of

01:15:59.840 --> 01:16:03.197
these in the show notes on the website
to make it easy for people to get them.

01:16:03.280 --> 01:16:05.197
>> Oh, I'll give you a fourth one.
I'll give you a fourth one. We don't have

01:16:05.280 --> 01:16:08.797
time to talk about it now, but um
a fourth one that people haven't a lot of

01:16:08.880 --> 01:16:11.117
people haven't read, but it's had
a really big impact on how I think about

01:16:11.200 --> 01:16:16.397
things. Um uh it's a book called
The Ancient City and it's written by a uh

01:16:16.480 --> 01:16:20.317
it's a it's from the it's from the 1860s.
Um but it's a still a very

01:16:20.400 --> 01:16:23.197
relevant book because it's based
entirely on original classical sources,

01:16:23.280 --> 01:16:27.197
Roman and Greek sources. And it's sort
of a it's sort of and it the the history

01:16:27.280 --> 01:16:30.637
of it is holding up really well.
It's a reconstruction of basically human

01:16:30.720 --> 01:16:35.277
society kind of pre the Romans and Greeks
of what it was actually like and

01:16:35.360 --> 01:16:38.237
then sort of how that turned into Roman
Greece and then how that turned into our

01:16:38.320 --> 01:16:40.797
world. Um, and it's written by a French

01:16:40.880 --> 01:16:43.517
uh a prominent French academic 150 years

01:16:43.600 --> 01:16:47.917
ago. Um, but it's a it's a really
profound and striking book. Um, and if

01:16:48.000 --> 01:16:51.517
you read it, you're like, "Oh, this
explains a lot." It in particular, it's

01:16:51.600 --> 01:16:54.637
the best book I've ever found. It's the
best book I've ever found on sort of the

01:16:54.720 --> 01:16:57.597
creation of civilization, the sort
of prehistory of civilization. And then

01:16:57.680 --> 01:16:58.877
it's the best book I've ever read on

01:16:58.960 --> 01:17:02.077
like basically the role of the cult,

01:17:02.160 --> 01:17:07.357
right? So like why cults exist, um, what
they are, um, and what it feels like to

01:17:07.440 --> 01:17:10.557
be in one. Um, and of course,
you know, one way of

01:17:10.640 --> 01:17:12.877
looking at the world is the world
is just basically this, you know, sort of

01:17:12.960 --> 01:17:16.637
series of cults [laughter]
of one form or another. I

01:17:16.720 --> 01:17:19.437
don't know that I would even say that I
fully understand it yet, but um, it it

01:17:19.520 --> 01:17:22.397
is it's one of those books. I don't
know about you, but like when I there's

01:17:22.480 --> 01:17:25.037
something interesting in a book,
I I underline it and then if it's really

01:17:25.120 --> 01:17:29.997
interesting, I I do doggeear the the
page uh that it's on. Um, and then

01:17:30.080 --> 01:17:32.877
there's there's a few books that I've
read where it's like they they

01:17:32.960 --> 01:17:35.037
destabilize the piles of books because

01:17:35.120 --> 01:17:40.077
I've doggeared like every single page
and now the book is like crooked. Um,

01:17:40.160 --> 01:17:42.717
and the books on top of it will like tip
over at some point. And this is one of

01:17:42.800 --> 01:17:45.757
those books where like I just I've dogge
eared every single page. There's just

01:17:45.840 --> 01:17:48.477
stuff that just jumps right off the page
at you and just like bites you like

01:17:48.560 --> 01:17:51.117
right in the nose and it's like, okay,
this is like the world has not worked

01:17:51.200 --> 01:17:53.677
the way you thought it did. People are
not the way that you thought they were

01:17:53.760 --> 01:17:56.317
and here's all this, you know,
here's 4,000 years of history kind of

01:17:56.400 --> 01:17:59.117
explaining why. Um, and so anyway,
we maybe we'll talk about that one another

01:17:59.200 --> 01:18:01.907
time, but that one I keep coming back to.

01:18:01.990 --> 01:18:04.010
[music]

01:18:06.080 --> 01:18:08.397
>> Thank you so much
for taking the time today, Mark.

01:18:08.480 --> 01:18:10.877
>> Yeah, good chain. A real pleasure
and congratulations on everything you've

01:18:10.960 --> 01:18:15.800
been up to. It's it's I'm
a I'm a huge fan. [music]

01:18:19.120 --> 01:18:24.157
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