WEBVTT

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- I would definitely
build nuclear weapons.

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I would build fission weapons.

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I would build fusion weapons.

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- Do you think your bluntness
comes across as rude or off-putting?

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- I think to certain
people it definitely does.

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The next war-fighting domain, before it's
the moon, is the subterranean domain."

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- Is it subterranean, then the moon?

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- Yeah, subterranean, then the moon.

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- Palmer Luckey, good to see you again,
and welcome to the "Axios Show."

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- Thank you for having us on.
- Thank you for having us on.

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- You are the founder
and figurehead of Anduril Industries,

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among the splashiest,
fastest growing, most pro-autonomy

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and polarizing defense contractors
on the planet, I would hazard?

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- Wow, seven descriptors.
- Yes, I'm big on adjectives.

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You have your haters
and you have your hot takes,

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so I would like to lean
into both if you're game.

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- I am always game to lean into
the things that make me polarizing.

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- Fantastic.

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Describe for me Anduril in one
sentence, one quick sentence.

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Anduril is a defense product
company that spends its own money

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designing, developing, and shipping
tools that will save taxpayers

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hundreds of billions of dollars a year

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as we make tens of billions
of dollars a year, someday.

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- Someday. - We're not there yet.

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- Describe to me the culture in one word.

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- Effective.

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- Why?

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- Almost everything that we have here
is oriented around what type of competence

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will lead to actually delivering things
that actually work with the customer

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on a timeline that is relevant.

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we need to build tools that are effective.

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And sometimes something needs to come
now rather than later to be effective.

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Sometimes it needs to be higher
capability to be effective or not.

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Sometimes, if it's not cheap
enough to buy in scale that matters,

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then it's not effective.
We're about 20% veterans here.

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People are very close to the customers.

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They're very close to the deployments,
and they understand,

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I think, a lot better than
a lot of other companies,

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how the military is truly using our tools.

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We have people who are forward deployed.

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We have people who are overseas
in the Middle East right now.

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We've had people who are in Ukraine
since the second week of the war.

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And so I think we have
a very good understanding

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of what it takes to be
effective with our customers.

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And if we don't, we develop it.

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If we go and we learn
that we are screwing it up,

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we put our own resources into fixing it.

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- To zoom out on effective, where
in the world have you been effective?

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Is that Ukraine with drones?
Is that Australia with Ghost Shark?

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Is that the Middle East?
- So we've been effective in,

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we've been effective in a lot of places.

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And, of course, we've had
bouts where it was ineffective.

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You know, like I'd say we've been very
effective in the Middle East right now.

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We've also had challenges in the past,
and then we've surged resources

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to get that fixed, which is one of the
reasons that things are working now.

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But I think we've been
effective in Ukraine.

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Australia, we're really just
beginning to deliver there, right?

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We've built a factory there.
We've hired a large team there.

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We've developed this Ghost Shark program
with them building robotic submarines

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at a very large scale, very quickly.

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We delivered the first submarine
a year ahead of schedule.

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I don't know if I would say
that's like effective yet,

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because Australia's not
fighting anybody right now.

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And I think they hope to keep it that way.

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So it's hard to prove,

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but I think Ukraine, Taiwan,
certainly the United States,

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we've proven that we are
effective a number of times.

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Your competition in the
defense contracting world

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includes the entrenched primes,
the Lockheeds, - Sure.

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- The Northrops, the Boeings.
If I'm a Pentagon buyer,

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why do I buy Anduril versus those guys?

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- So it depends on what you're doing.

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But, in general, the sense that a
lot of people have in the Pentagon

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is that Anduril is a company that
is going to move very, very quickly.

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We're gonna bring a lot of our own
resources to bear on the project,

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and that even when programs
have run into political problems,

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because we're willing to spend
our own money as a product company

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continuing to keep things going,
there's a number of programs

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that have survived political
breaks that would've killed

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a lot of traditional cost-plus programs.

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And so I think a lot of the people
in the program offices in the Pentagon

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that are making decisions,
whether they're selecting Anduril

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or, let's say, keeping Anduril in the mix.

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You know, it's not always,
"We're gonna award to Anduril,"

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it's we're gonna select two
or three companies to work on this.

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I think the reason we stay in that basket
is they know that we'll move quickly.

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They know we'll put our own money in.

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They know that even when we
run into political challenges,

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we're not gonna do a stop-work order.

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We're not gonna just shut down our lines.

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We're gonna keep moving and hope
that we come out the other side.

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- You, Alex Karp at Palantir, Elon Musk,

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you all have a distinct
style, a distinct tact.

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And you have said, you've described it
in the past as a bit of a caricature.

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Do you need to be a bit of a caricature
to run a successful defense company

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these days? - No. No. Some of the most
successful defense companies I know

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are run by very competent operators.

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They're the most straight-laced
guys you've ever seen.

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If you set us side by side,
we'd look like a Japanese comedy duo,

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the straight man and the funny
man playing off of each other.

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I don't think you need to be
a larger-than-life character.

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I think that what you see
is the larger-than-life characters

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are the ones that get the retweets
or the Re-Truths. (chuckles)

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And the straight players typically don't.

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But that's also not what
makes a company successful.

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the marketing that you get,
that you see like on Twitter,

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it's primarily a recruiting engine.

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Like I'm not marketing to necessarily
the guy who's buying my system.

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Like he's not the one who's,
you know, checking out the hot takes.

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But for recruiting, it's helpful.

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Like Anduril being out there
and having a position, for example,

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on who should have the final call
on how to use autonomous weapons

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or being out there and having an opinion
on what good manufacturing looks like,

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we are attracting the right people,
and, I think, repelling the wrong people.

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Our company probably wouldn't have
gotten a lot of our best talent

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if we weren't out there in that way.

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- What's the most badass
thing Anduril has built?

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- I'm supposed to love
all my children equally.

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- Everyone has a favorite child.

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- Everyone, everyone. It's true.

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The science bears it out.

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I think the coolest thing, you know,
there's a bit of recency bias here,

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but I think that the coolest thing that
we've built in my mind right now is Fury.

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It's an autonomous fighter jet
for the United States Air Force.

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You know, we were competing
with a lot of the big guys.

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And to go toe to toe with them
and then get selected by the Air Force

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to deliver these prototypes to them
was just the coolest thing ever.

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Only about half
of our products are public,

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which is another thing
that makes this difficult.

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But Fury was one where we went
toe-to-toe with the big guys

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for their bread and butter, not like a
side thing that they're not interested in,

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and we won. And that,
to me, was very gratifying,

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for me, for the team
working on the product,

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for all the other teams
building mission systems

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and support stuff that went on the
product, the people building the buildings

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that are being used to build the product.

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I think that that is one

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that everyone's still riding
a bit of an emotional high on.

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- What won't you build?
What's your red line?

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- What wouldn't I build?

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That's an interesting one.
- Nuclear weapons.

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- I would definitely
build nuclear weapons.

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I would build fission weapons.

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I would build fusion weapons.
I think that nuclear weapons

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have been one of the most
stabilizing forces in history ever.

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It's never been like that in history
where total war is off the table.

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So fission weapons, fusion weapons,
absolutely I would build them.

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I would probably not build,

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I would not build biological weapons.

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- Chemical weapons?
- Chemical weapons I would build,

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but in a very specific vertical.

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And this is a very controversial
thing, and please don't clip,

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"Yes, I would build chemical
weapons," and put it on the Axios-

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- So I wanna be very,
very specific about this.

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And so if you guys post it,
you know, please include this as well.

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I'll give you an example. Pepper spray is
illegal for most non-military police units

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to use in the military.
So like certain MPs can use pepper spray.

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We are not able to use
pepper spray, tear gas

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as part of our conventional
offensive military tactics.

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I think that's a huge mistake.

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It falls under a lot of these
chemical weapon prohibitions.

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And I understand the worries about
fear of escalation or a slippery slope.

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I think we understand
chemical weapons enough

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to know there's no real slippery
slope from literally hot pepper juice

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to, you know, nerve, nerve
agents that are going to kill you.

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- Do you think the Pentagon overstepped
labeling the company a supply-chain risk?

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- I am of the mind that no.

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If anything, I think I may have been
even more forceful in this rejection.

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And let me tell you why. The only
reason you have not seen, I think,

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a larger defection from other companies

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that are worried about,
you know, similar problems

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is because of the forceful
reaction of the Department.

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The Department is saying, "We are
not gonna let you slippery slope this.

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We're not gonna let one company
get their special provisions,

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and then we're gonna have a different
debate with a different company,

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a different debate
with a different entity."

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Because these companies do
have different values, right?

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They're not gonna all
simultaneously agree,

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you know, "Anthropic's version
of their limits is our version."

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What you end up with very quickly
is a patchwork of different regulations

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across all these different companies.

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And the Department now has to ask, is
this operation, is this planning element,

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is this tool compliant with these
five different companies versions

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of what their limit is? And by the way,
that version changes over time.

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They now have to weigh these things.

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Let's set aside the,
you know, Anthropic was saying

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it's about offensive autonomous
weapons with no human in the loop

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or about mass surveillance.
There's a lot of questions there.

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Like, okay, what defines offensive?

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What defines no human in the loop?

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What defines weapon?
What defines use, right?

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And I know this sounds a little bit like,
you know, Bill Clinton, you know,

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depends on what the definition of is is
thing, but these things really do matter.

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Imagine if it was something
even more simple.

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A tech company said, "Department of War,
I'll do anything that you want.

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We will not turn it off unless
you target innocent civilians.

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We want it in paper that we can turn it
off if you target innocent civilians."

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Well, what is targeting? Like,
is it inadvertent versus explicit?

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What is innocence?
Is it determined by the courts?

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Is it determined by the Hague?

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Is it determined by people in Brussels?

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Is it determined by Dario?
What is a civilian?

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And who decides? What if there's
civilian mixed in with other things?

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You run into these problems
where, if you agree to this,

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you are giving more power
to private companies,

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executives making billions off taxpayers
than the president of the United States.

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They could just unilaterally,
you know, pull the keys on stuff

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in a way that not even
the commander-in-chief can do.

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I don't think that that's correct.

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I think that our military
has to be accountable

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to our civilian elected leadership,
not to corporations.

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- Do you think this is more a battle
of policies or personalities?

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- Hmm. It's all, I mean, it's both, right?

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I mean, that's what politics is.

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I think that there are
people who know how to, like,

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I bet there is somebody in the tech
world, I don't know if it's me,

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somebody probably could have gotten

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something equivalent
to those policies through

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by talking about it in exactly the right
way, writing exactly the same thing,

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and making sure to not rub
the wrong people the wrong way.

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Like there, there's a way where you
could talk people through these things.

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Maybe you could say, "Oh,
you know, we're gonna do this

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in a way that it's not taking
authority away from you."

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Maybe it would be something like,
instead of in our contract

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it says you can't do these things,
it would say, you know,

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"We're handing this
language over to Congress

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and should they ratify it,
this is how it would go.

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But of course we want your input
on what these things would be."

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So look, personalities
always enter into it.

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So look, personalities
always enter into it.

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I'd be naive to say otherwise.

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- And I think probably
the personalities in this case

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did not approach this in the most
collaborative way that they could,

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but in the end, I give
the win to the Department,

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because they're the one
that has to make sure

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that use of force and responsibility
for force lies in the chain of command

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that is accountable
to the people that we elect.

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- Another hot topic, Iran. - Sure.

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- Does does that require boots
on the ground from the US to solve this?

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- Geez, I hope not. I mean,
I don't think the United States

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has the political will to do it,
whether it's good or bad.

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I've been saying this for years.

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I think after our adventures in the
Middle East of the last couple decades

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have robbed America of its ability
to sustain a boots-on-the-ground campaign.

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I think that what Trump's doing, like, you
know, whether it's in Venezuela or Iran,

00:12:59.070 --> 00:13:01.987
it's a totally new type of warfare,

00:13:02.070 --> 00:13:04.077
but I think it's born
of strategic realities, right?

00:13:04.160 --> 00:13:07.997
Like we do not have it in us to do
this, for good reasons or bad.

00:13:08.080 --> 00:13:09.827
I don't think that we're
ready to go fight,

00:13:09.910 --> 00:13:13.297
let's say World War II
for the right reasons,

00:13:13.380 --> 00:13:16.630
much less reasons that not
everyone agrees with.

00:13:16.880 --> 00:13:19.967
I think that we don't have
another D-Day in us right now,

00:13:20.050 --> 00:13:22.677
and I think that's
actually a bit of a problem.

00:13:22.760 --> 00:13:26.017
I think that it means that even in a very
important fight, we might not show up,

00:13:26.100 --> 00:13:27.557
but it's one of the
reasons I've been saying

00:13:27.640 --> 00:13:30.307
the United States probably needs
to transition from being the world police

00:13:30.390 --> 00:13:33.857
to being the world gun store. We need
to give the people that work with us,

00:13:33.940 --> 00:13:36.817
who have a stronger stake
in these interests than even we do,

00:13:36.900 --> 00:13:38.857
the tools that they
need to defend themselves

00:13:38.940 --> 00:13:41.237
and hopefully align with US interests.

00:13:41.320 --> 00:13:43.577
I don't think it's gonna
go to boots on the ground.

00:13:43.660 --> 00:13:47.287
Maybe I'll be eating my words in a week,
but I don't think that we have it in us.

00:13:47.370 --> 00:13:50.747
- So Trump ran as a bit of an
anti-war president, some in MAGA-

00:13:50.830 --> 00:13:52.957
- And he and he did
that even in the first one.

00:13:53.040 --> 00:13:54.837
You know, remember when
Hillary Clinton was running

00:13:54.920 --> 00:13:57.417
and saying she would enforce
a no-fly zone in Syria.

00:13:57.500 --> 00:14:00.547
And you had Trump saying, they'd say,
"Well, well what would you do, you know,

00:14:00.630 --> 00:14:03.797
if you were president?" He said,
"Well, I wouldn't start World War III."

00:14:03.880 --> 00:14:06.807
And, I have to admit,
that resonated with me.

00:14:06.890 --> 00:14:09.807
I was like, you know what,
that's probably the right attitude

00:14:09.890 --> 00:14:12.397
in terms of not starting wars needlessly,

00:14:12.480 --> 00:14:15.017
not expending munitions
and arms and industrial capacity

00:14:15.100 --> 00:14:18.147
that we need to fight more important
wars than that particular issue.

00:14:18.230 --> 00:14:19.987
- Is the Iran war an important one?

00:14:20.070 --> 00:14:21.947
- Here's the thing,
I'm not in the Gang of Eight.

00:14:22.030 --> 00:14:24.450
I haven't seen the briefing
that people saw.

00:14:25.870 --> 00:14:31.287
So far you've had people saying,
and you know, whether it's Secretary Rubio

00:14:31.370 --> 00:14:33.957
or other people
in Congress who were briefed

00:14:34.040 --> 00:14:36.997
that there was an imminent
threat to the United States

00:14:37.080 --> 00:14:40.167
to, not just servicemen,
but also civilians.

00:14:40.250 --> 00:14:42.757
It seems to be, this is not
necessarily based on the briefing,

00:14:42.840 --> 00:14:43.587
but things have leaked out

00:14:43.670 --> 00:14:48.057
is we now know that Israel
was planning a preemptive strike

00:14:48.140 --> 00:14:49.967
because they believed
that if they did not,

00:14:50.050 --> 00:14:53.937
there was going to be
a large-scale attack on Israel.

00:14:54.020 --> 00:14:55.557
And so it becomes one of those things

00:14:55.640 --> 00:14:57.980
where I don't have
enough information to say.

00:14:59.060 --> 00:15:01.567
I think that probably we'll
find out in the long run

00:15:01.650 --> 00:15:06.530
if this is as justified as it
seems to the administration.

00:15:10.580 --> 00:15:14.000
- Who is emerging
as influential at the Pentagon?

00:15:15.710 --> 00:15:17.247
When they call you, you pick up.

00:15:17.330 --> 00:15:19.757
Is that Pete Hegseth?
Is that Steve Feinberg?

00:15:19.840 --> 00:15:20.890
Is that someone else?

00:15:21.750 --> 00:15:24.047
If Steve wants to talk
to me, I talk with him.

00:15:24.130 --> 00:15:26.677
If Emil wants to talk
with me, I talk with him.

00:15:26.760 --> 00:15:28.557
If Hegseth calls me, I talk to him.

00:15:28.640 --> 00:15:31.677
I have actually myself- -
Have they all called you?

00:15:31.760 --> 00:15:36.477
- Let me think about that. I mean, maybe
this is too much to talk about publicly,

00:15:36.560 --> 00:15:38.187
but I don't think they'll mind.

00:15:38.270 --> 00:15:41.187
I've, of course, met and had
meetings with all of them.

00:15:41.270 --> 00:15:45.157
In terms of an actual phone call
from them, I've had calls from Pete.

00:15:45.240 --> 00:15:50.740
I've had calls from Emil. I have not yet
had a call out of the blue from Steve,

00:15:51.990 --> 00:15:54.157
but, look, these guys,
I don't know if I would say

00:15:54.240 --> 00:15:56.957
they're, like, emerging as influential
so much as they were appointed

00:15:57.040 --> 00:15:58.997
into these extremely influential roles.

00:15:59.080 --> 00:16:01.707
And so, of course,
of course they're influential.

00:16:01.790 --> 00:16:04.967
They're the ones who are tasked
with making these decisions.

00:16:05.050 --> 00:16:06.427
From what I understand,

00:16:06.510 --> 00:16:09.887
they're running this whole
organization a little differently

00:16:09.970 --> 00:16:11.017
than people have run in the past.

00:16:11.100 --> 00:16:13.767
It's not just me getting the call,
I guess would be my point. - Yeah.

00:16:13.850 --> 00:16:15.937
- I think that they're calling
up lots of other people.

00:16:16.020 --> 00:16:18.147
And by the way,
the calls are not necessarily,

00:16:18.230 --> 00:16:20.057
"Hey, I've got good news for you."

00:16:20.140 --> 00:16:23.647
There's also a lot of, "Hey,
you need to fix your shit

00:16:23.730 --> 00:16:26.777
on X, Y, and Z. - Like the RTX
tweet we saw from the President.

00:16:26.860 --> 00:16:30.617
I think that that is exactly how this
whole department is being run right now.

00:16:30.700 --> 00:16:32.697
Like that's the president doing
it in public. - By Twitter or by?

00:16:32.780 --> 00:16:34.197
- That's the president doing it in public.

00:16:34.280 --> 00:16:37.037
But I think that you have a lot of this
pressure from the department as well.

00:16:37.120 --> 00:16:38.830
They're learning that the best way

00:16:40.420 --> 00:16:44.707
to fix these problems is to be very,
very honest and open about it

00:16:44.790 --> 00:16:46.507
and not filter it through, you know,

00:16:46.590 --> 00:16:49.927
let's say, a program review
that comes out months later

00:16:50.010 --> 00:16:53.217
that concludes with like,
"Performance unsatisfactory."

00:16:53.300 --> 00:16:55.977
You want to put pressure
on people early enough

00:16:56.060 --> 00:16:58.347
that they can actually
course correct and adapt.

00:16:58.430 --> 00:17:00.767
And so I very much appreciate all of this.

00:17:00.850 --> 00:17:04.277
To be honest, even talking with my,
I wanna say competitors,

00:17:04.360 --> 00:17:05.947
but remember we also collaborate

00:17:06.030 --> 00:17:07.947
with companies like Raytheon
and Northrop and Lockheed.

00:17:08.030 --> 00:17:09.737
In fact, we're teamed
up on certain programs.

00:17:09.820 --> 00:17:13.827
So I guess my colleagues. In my
conversations with my colleagues there,

00:17:13.910 --> 00:17:15.657
they actually appreciate this as well.

00:17:15.740 --> 00:17:21.037
They probably don't like being slammed in
the press, you know, or on Truth Social,

00:17:21.120 --> 00:17:24.087
but they do appreciate the early feedback

00:17:24.170 --> 00:17:26.127
from senior leaders on what
they're getting wrong

00:17:26.210 --> 00:17:30.007
and what they're getting right, because
they have the ability to course correct.

00:17:30.090 --> 00:17:34.057
You mentioned before we started,
Gavin Newsom saved Anduril.

00:17:34.140 --> 00:17:38.850
- Oh, yes, that's right. And I said,
"I think he did it without even knowing."

00:17:40.430 --> 00:17:42.477
This is not to say that Gavin did this,

00:17:42.560 --> 00:17:43.767
because he wasn't even
thinking of Anduril.

00:17:43.850 --> 00:17:47.697
I suspect he was not at all. But the
California state legislature passed a bill

00:17:47.780 --> 00:17:49.897
that was regulating AI.
So it made it through the house

00:17:49.980 --> 00:17:51.680
and it made it through the Senate,

00:17:52.740 --> 00:17:57.157
not with a super majority. So it
was not a bill that could not be vetoed.

00:17:57.240 --> 00:17:59.957
And one of the provisions
in the bill said that it was illegal

00:18:00.040 --> 00:18:05.037
for companies to build products
with AI that cause harm to humans,

00:18:05.120 --> 00:18:08.667
in fact, that could cause
physical harm to humans.

00:18:08.750 --> 00:18:12.837
This would've been a total prohibition on
using artificial intelligence on weapons

00:18:12.920 --> 00:18:14.427
for the United States military.

00:18:14.510 --> 00:18:16.387
And I think that this is a terrible thing.

00:18:16.470 --> 00:18:20.937
Gavin vetoed the bill,
and I'm very, very glad that he did.

00:18:21.020 --> 00:18:22.597
I think, look- - Have you told him this?

00:18:22.680 --> 00:18:27.277
0 I have not told him this. If I have the
chance, I probably will mention it to him.

00:18:27.360 --> 00:18:29.737
Look, me and Gavin,
we disagree on a lot of things.

00:18:29.820 --> 00:18:34.117
There's plenty of things that I
could criticize Gavin Newsom on.

00:18:34.200 --> 00:18:38.787
But I will say, on the balance,
he is not one of the crazy people, right?

00:18:38.870 --> 00:18:41.617
You can disagree with him very
easily, but he is not someone

00:18:41.700 --> 00:18:44.957
who wants to tear down capital markets.

00:18:45.040 --> 00:18:51.047
He does not want our military to be
the weakest military in the world.

00:18:51.130 --> 00:18:53.967
Like he's generally a sane guy

00:18:54.050 --> 00:18:59.890
and apparently more sane than most of
our legislators who voted for that bill.

00:19:03.350 --> 00:19:05.647
- What needs to happen
before Anduril goes public?

00:19:05.730 --> 00:19:08.897
Word on the street is that you're
raising 4 billion at 60 billion.

00:19:08.980 --> 00:19:11.237
We reported that the other day.

00:19:11.320 --> 00:19:13.907
- I can tell you that
that's not quite right.

00:19:13.990 --> 00:19:18.077
But I will tell you also that we
are basically continuously raising,

00:19:18.160 --> 00:19:21.077
talking to investors.
As long as there are things

00:19:21.160 --> 00:19:25.037
that we think we could private capital
to work on, building better tools,

00:19:25.120 --> 00:19:26.127
building better capacity,
we're gonna do it.

00:19:26.210 --> 00:19:30.167
Like our last round, we raised,
how much did we raise?

00:19:30.250 --> 00:19:32.127
It was quite a bit of money.
I forget. - It was, yeah, billions.

00:19:32.210 --> 00:19:36.337
- It was billions of dollars. We put most
of that money into building Arsenal-1,

00:19:36.420 --> 00:19:38.717
which is this 5-million-square-foot
production facility

00:19:38.800 --> 00:19:43.097
to build missiles, fighter
jets, air defense systems,

00:19:43.180 --> 00:19:45.470
all kinds of things at this huge facility.

00:19:46.560 --> 00:19:48.107
And if we were raising right now,

00:19:48.190 --> 00:19:50.147
we'd be putting into basically
exactly the same thing.

00:19:50.230 --> 00:19:53.567
So we need to massively
scale up our capability.

00:19:53.650 --> 00:19:56.907
There's a huge number of things that we're
making that are extremely relevant.

00:19:56.990 --> 00:20:01.157
And I cannot wait for the government
to come, give me an order, give me money,

00:20:01.240 --> 00:20:02.867
then start building the factory,

00:20:02.950 --> 00:20:05.327
then train the people to build
it and then start building.

00:20:05.410 --> 00:20:08.667
- On Arsenal-1, y'all said
the production lines could go hot

00:20:08.750 --> 00:20:11.840
as soon as this July,
a few months from now.

00:20:12.880 --> 00:20:14.837
- Actually, they're going
live in a matter of weeks.

00:20:14.920 --> 00:20:17.257
We're ahead of schedule.
So I just came back from Ohio,

00:20:17.340 --> 00:20:19.097
we were doing our final site survey.

00:20:19.180 --> 00:20:21.260
We have our first main building.

00:20:22.260 --> 00:20:25.307
We have our first main building done,
about a million square feet,

00:20:25.390 --> 00:20:28.977
and we have the exterior work
done on the second building.

00:20:29.060 --> 00:20:32.317
So that first line is actually gonna
be coming online in a matter of weeks.

00:20:32.400 --> 00:20:33.950
- What's rolling off that line?

00:20:34.980 --> 00:20:41.367
- We are making a variety of aircraft
and missiles and other stuff.

00:20:41.450 --> 00:20:46.247
- So like Barracuda and Fury?
- Barracuda is there, Fury is there.

00:20:46.330 --> 00:20:50.207
There's another aircraft that we're
making there as well for a different.

00:20:50.290 --> 00:20:54.717
Look, this facility is making things for
SOCOM, for the Army, for the Marine Corps,

00:20:54.800 --> 00:20:57.717
for the Air Force, and one other customer.

00:20:57.800 --> 00:21:03.177
I mean, like we already have the space
all allocated to make all of these things.

00:21:03.260 --> 00:21:06.847
You know, it's more slanted
towards one customer than another

00:21:06.930 --> 00:21:08.387
in terms of square footage right now.

00:21:08.470 --> 00:21:10.977
But yeah, that's coming
online in a matter of weeks.

00:21:11.060 --> 00:21:15.310
And we should be at full
scale with that by,

00:21:18.280 --> 00:21:21.030
it'll probably be Q2 next year.

00:21:25.080 --> 00:21:28.040
who's ahead in the AI race? US, China?

00:21:29.700 --> 00:21:32.247
- The United States
is ahead in the AI race.

00:21:32.330 --> 00:21:34.837
- How big is the gap?
- It's extremely small,

00:21:34.920 --> 00:21:36.547
because China's been doing a very good job

00:21:36.630 --> 00:21:39.837
of distilling our models,
copying a lot of our technology,

00:21:39.920 --> 00:21:45.267
leveraging open-source AI advancements and
getting those advancements into fielding,

00:21:45.350 --> 00:21:49.267
not just with the military, but also their
police state, their surveillance apparatus

00:21:49.350 --> 00:21:51.227
much, much faster than
the United States has.

00:21:51.310 --> 00:21:54.267
I'm not saying we need to build a,
you know, police state,

00:21:54.350 --> 00:21:56.857
a surveillance apparatus.
I'm just recognizing

00:21:56.940 --> 00:22:00.737
that China has the will at the top

00:22:00.820 --> 00:22:03.157
to push these things out much
faster than the United States.

00:22:03.240 --> 00:22:07.407
And you can criticize authoritarian
regimes while still recognizing

00:22:07.490 --> 00:22:09.867
that certain structural advantages exist,

00:22:09.950 --> 00:22:13.787
and China is maximizing
those structural advantages

00:22:13.870 --> 00:22:17.967
to push AI into their entire
government and its fingers,

00:22:18.050 --> 00:22:19.587
I think, faster than the United States.

00:22:19.670 --> 00:22:21.047
Like I would say the Department of War

00:22:21.130 --> 00:22:24.547
is the furthest along in pushing
AI into a lot of these.

00:22:24.630 --> 00:22:29.017
I mean, like they're using AI right now
in this Iran operation to great effect.

00:22:29.100 --> 00:22:32.227
Try to name another part of government
that is leveraging AI that effectively.

00:22:32.310 --> 00:22:35.187
Yeah, like the Department
of War, and I think probably

00:22:35.270 --> 00:22:38.897
because you have personalities
like Emil, you know, in the lead,

00:22:38.980 --> 00:22:41.277
that's why they're
leveraging it so quickly.

00:22:41.360 --> 00:22:43.777
You know, I'm not putting
down Trump's other appointees

00:22:43.860 --> 00:22:46.867
of the other departments, but you,
in the bureaucracies particularly,

00:22:46.950 --> 00:22:48.997
you are not seeing Department
of Agriculture using AI

00:22:49.080 --> 00:22:50.497
as effectively as the Department of War.

00:22:50.580 --> 00:22:54.327
You're certainly not seeing
the Department of Education

00:22:54.410 --> 00:22:55.707
using it as effectively as they could.

00:22:55.790 --> 00:22:59.047
It's probably like Department of War
then maybe Department of Energy

00:22:59.130 --> 00:23:01.830
are probably the two that I
would say are in the lead.

00:23:05.130 --> 00:23:07.387
- You had subterranean on your website.

00:23:07.470 --> 00:23:09.677
- That's right. - You went a bit
viral the other week or month

00:23:09.760 --> 00:23:12.347
for talking about
subterranean capabilities.

00:23:12.430 --> 00:23:14.307
What are you guys planning?
What are up to?

00:23:14.390 --> 00:23:17.057
- Anduril has working prototypes
of subterranean systems

00:23:17.140 --> 00:23:20.987
that can deliver a variety of kinetic,
electronic, and other effects.

00:23:21.070 --> 00:23:23.777
I've been talking about it
louder and louder and louder,

00:23:23.860 --> 00:23:26.027
because, first, when I
started talking about it

00:23:26.110 --> 00:23:28.577
before we had built anything years ago,
everyone thought that I was crazy.

00:23:28.660 --> 00:23:30.077
And to be clear, the thing
people thought was crazy

00:23:30.160 --> 00:23:30.287
is I said, "I think
the next war-fighting domain,

00:23:30.370 --> 00:23:32.957
is I said, "I think
the next war-fighting domain,

00:23:33.040 --> 00:23:35.207
before it's the moon,
is the subterranean domain."

00:23:35.290 --> 00:23:37.037
- Is it subterranean, then the moon?

00:23:37.120 --> 00:23:38.417
- Yeah, subterranean, then the moon.

00:23:38.500 --> 00:23:42.047
The moon's just gonna take longer
to become an actual war-fighting domain.

00:23:42.130 --> 00:23:45.297
And I'd say it's not a domain when
it's like a special weirdo little place

00:23:45.380 --> 00:23:46.427
where a few people might live.

00:23:46.510 --> 00:23:48.547
Like it needs to be larger than that.

00:23:48.630 --> 00:23:51.477
Look, the United States and the Soviet
Union both believed during the Cold War

00:23:51.560 --> 00:23:54.137
that the crust of the earth
would turn into a battle space,

00:23:54.220 --> 00:23:58.517
and that you would move
people and machines and effects

00:23:58.600 --> 00:24:01.937
through fire and logistics chains
using the crust of the earth

00:24:02.020 --> 00:24:05.147
the same way that a submarine
moves through the ocean.

00:24:05.230 --> 00:24:07.107
And I think that the thing
that killed that dream

00:24:07.190 --> 00:24:09.737
isn't that we decided
that it was impossible,

00:24:09.820 --> 00:24:12.947
it was that we won the Cold
War and we turned the spigot off

00:24:13.030 --> 00:24:15.117
on a lot of very, very interesting things.

00:24:15.200 --> 00:24:17.497
The difference now is that
with the power of autonomy,

00:24:17.580 --> 00:24:21.540
you can now build these things much more
cheaply, much, much, much lower risk.

00:24:21.840 --> 00:24:24.167
I've been talking louder
and louder about this,

00:24:24.250 --> 00:24:26.257
because when I talk about these things,

00:24:26.340 --> 00:24:29.717
it acts as a lighthouse
that attracts all of the people.

00:24:29.800 --> 00:24:31.597
They say, "Wait, what's that over there?

00:24:31.680 --> 00:24:32.597
There's a guy who's doing this."

00:24:32.680 --> 00:24:35.937
And so I'm talking about it loudly
to attract all the right people,

00:24:36.020 --> 00:24:37.687
the people who wanna
work on these problems,

00:24:37.770 --> 00:24:40.057
the people in government who
need to solve these problems.

00:24:40.140 --> 00:24:45.440
And it's moving along slower than I
would like, because it seems so crazy.

00:24:46.280 --> 00:24:48.197
It isn't. - Palmer, thanks for the time.

00:24:48.280 --> 00:24:49.280
- Thank you so much.

00:24:53.530 --> 00:24:55.577
- Lightning round? - Let's do it. - Okay.

00:24:55.660 --> 00:24:57.560
How long does it take to do your hair?

00:25:00.330 --> 00:25:02.627
You and me both. (chuckling) - That's it.

00:25:02.710 --> 00:25:06.047
- You unveiled EagleEye
at AUSA in October.

00:25:06.130 --> 00:25:08.877
Does it have cat ears? - I have
seen the rumors, and I have to admit,

00:25:08.960 --> 00:25:11.347
there may have definitely
been some consideration.

00:25:11.430 --> 00:25:13.267
Internally, we actually
call them wolf ears.

00:25:13.350 --> 00:25:17.187
- Okay. - Last question,
might be your favorite,

00:25:17.270 --> 00:25:20.730
is Yoko Taro the right
person to reboot Evangelion?

00:25:21.730 --> 00:25:25.397
- I have a lot of trust
in Hideaki Anno and his judgment

00:25:25.480 --> 00:25:27.317
when it comes to the franchise.

00:25:27.400 --> 00:25:29.607
And if he believes it is the right choice,

00:25:29.690 --> 00:25:33.947
and he is, you know, notoriously
protective of that intellectual property.

00:25:34.030 --> 00:25:38.207
All the licenses of Evangelion have
to be personally approved by him.

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I think that if he is okay
with it, then so too must I.

00:25:42.870 --> 00:25:43.750
- You a NieR fan?

00:25:45.500 --> 00:25:46.500
- No, not really.
