WEBVTT 00:00:00.080 --> 00:00:02.637 For the first time in history, the most 00:00:02.720 --> 00:00:04.157 innovative technology companies in 00:00:04.240 --> 00:00:08.237 America are largely not working with the 00:00:08.320 --> 00:00:11.197 United States military. That's truly unprecedented. There's never been a 00:00:11.280 --> 00:00:14.317 point in US history where that was the case. The most innovative technology has 00:00:14.400 --> 00:00:18.717 always been accessible to our military and the most valuable companies have 00:00:18.800 --> 00:00:21.917 always worked with our military. And I think that really gets to the core of 00:00:22.000 --> 00:00:26.317 why we're doing what we're doing. Uh Russia and China don't have these 00:00:26.400 --> 00:00:30.637 issues. Their best technology companies are working on defense challenges. Their 00:00:30.720 --> 00:00:33.837 best people are working on defense challenges. And so if we end up 00:00:33.920 --> 00:00:38.317 crippling ourselves by putting our best people to work on search engine 00:00:38.400 --> 00:00:42.637 optimization and ad delivery, how can we possibly expect to compete? And that 00:00:42.720 --> 00:00:46.077 that's what we're trying to build here is a defense products company, not a 00:00:46.160 --> 00:00:49.277 defense contractor, but a defense product company. 00:00:49.360 --> 00:00:52.957 >> Is that a sign of a decaying society that the best people won't even defend 00:00:53.040 --> 00:00:54.877 their own society or like what is it a 00:00:54.960 --> 00:00:58.157 sign of? Oh man, I I I like to think 00:00:58.240 --> 00:01:01.037 that it's actually just a it's like a 00:01:01.120 --> 00:01:05.357 specific trend of the of the modern time and strategic flows that are going after 00:01:05.440 --> 00:01:07.037 like this didn't happen by accident. I 00:01:07.120 --> 00:01:10.237 think China's done a very good job of 00:01:10.320 --> 00:01:15.197 making China does a great job of keeping the entire world corporate world on a 00:01:15.280 --> 00:01:18.237 hair trigger where they know that if they do anything that is going to upset 00:01:18.320 --> 00:01:21.597 China they won't get access to Chinese markets and they won't get access to 00:01:21.680 --> 00:01:24.717 Chinese capital. And we see this especially in the media with the film 00:01:24.800 --> 00:01:26.477 studios. You know that the idea of 00:01:26.560 --> 00:01:28.717 making an anti-China film in the modern 00:01:28.800 --> 00:01:32.237 day is unthinkable to most of these 00:01:32.320 --> 00:01:36.717 studios. And so uh I I think that it's not like a it's not just a sign of moral 00:01:36.800 --> 00:01:40.557 decay. In fact, I'd say probably eight out of 10 people working in the tech 00:01:40.640 --> 00:01:45.037 industry, if you ask them, do you want the United States to have the strongest 00:01:45.120 --> 00:01:50.077 military in the world? Eight out of 10 would give you a strong yes. the last 00:01:50.160 --> 00:01:52.877 you you know one of them that says they're not sure and one of them that 00:01:52.960 --> 00:01:56.077 would be against it. So most people in the tech industry I think do agree the 00:01:56.160 --> 00:01:57.997 problem is the corporate dynamics make 00:01:58.080 --> 00:02:00.557 it more profitable to keep China happy 00:02:00.640 --> 00:02:05.357 and to not piss off the media which is uh kind of disproportionately 00:02:05.440 --> 00:02:07.917 anti-defense. >> Fascinating. So in a sense you're like 00:02:08.000 --> 00:02:11.437 2020's version of a hippie who's overcoming the corporate interest to 00:02:11.520 --> 00:02:15.677 push what push what the common people want. I like I hadn't thought about it 00:02:15.760 --> 00:02:19.837 way that way, but it is it is actually really really similar and like in the 00:02:19.920 --> 00:02:23.277 same way that I think you had like people people complained that we had a 00:02:23.360 --> 00:02:26.477 disproportionately uh you know pro pro- 00:02:26.560 --> 00:02:30.637 uh corporate and pro- mililitary media and I think that really has flipped. I 00:02:30.720 --> 00:02:32.157 don't think anyone would argue that 00:02:32.240 --> 00:02:35.037 let's say the American tech press uh or 00:02:35.120 --> 00:02:38.157 even just the the press in general is 00:02:38.240 --> 00:02:40.957 too promilitary. I I think that idea you 00:02:41.040 --> 00:02:44.477 know went went away long long 100%. So 00:02:44.560 --> 00:02:45.917 let's I want to know more about Andre. 00:02:46.000 --> 00:02:50.157 So Andre Palmer like to me that you've hired like all this amazing talent. You 00:02:50.240 --> 00:02:53.037 have all these amazing projects you're doing. You're growing revenue faster 00:02:53.120 --> 00:02:56.477 than any defense company has in history as far as I know. A lot of people don't 00:02:56.560 --> 00:02:59.917 have this perspective. A lot of people they hear these big defense companies 00:03:00.000 --> 00:03:03.517 who are very threatened by you downplaying you talking about oh there's 00:03:03.600 --> 00:03:06.397 one or two products. It's not a real defense company. So there's a lot of 00:03:06.480 --> 00:03:09.677 people who are kind of who who want to tell a more negative story. I think it's 00:03:09.760 --> 00:03:10.877 because they're jealous and threatened. 00:03:10.960 --> 00:03:13.597 But give give us a sense of your success so far. give us a sense of what you're 00:03:13.680 --> 00:03:15.757 doing so people can hear it directly from you. 00:03:15.840 --> 00:03:17.037 >> Well, yeah. I think there are people who 00:03:17.120 --> 00:03:21.117 downplay us and then they also overplay their competition. You they say, "Oh, 00:03:21.200 --> 00:03:25.117 Adel is doing great AI stuff, but we have great AI, too. It's really, really 00:03:25.200 --> 00:03:29.917 good." And it's not. Uh, you know, but they It's really cheap to say words. You 00:03:30.000 --> 00:03:33.837 can just say, "We're as good as Anderol." And until you actually get to 00:03:33.920 --> 00:03:37.677 a real field trial, the words are as good as the actual 00:03:37.760 --> 00:03:39.037 >> that was the same experience with pounds 00:03:39.120 --> 00:03:42.157 here with me is that we are competing against a lot of innovation theater 00:03:42.240 --> 00:03:44.557 where they couldn't actually do it when they actually had to deploy it. It took 00:03:44.640 --> 00:03:47.277 years to deploy. It took billions of dollars and didn't actually work. 00:03:47.360 --> 00:03:50.477 >> Oh, I mean, you know, for people who don't know what innovation theater is, 00:03:50.560 --> 00:03:52.957 you know, there's there's all these people at DoD who have this job. 00:03:53.040 --> 00:03:56.317 Basically, their job is to generate things that look real enough to make a 00:03:56.400 --> 00:03:58.877 press release or to do a panel or to 00:03:58.960 --> 00:04:01.357 release a video or to talk to Congress. 00:04:01.440 --> 00:04:05.837 And none of it is actually real or useful or deployable. It's it's pretty 00:04:05.920 --> 00:04:09.037 wild. >> And so so so tell us about a few of your 00:04:09.120 --> 00:04:12.077 products. What are you guys actually doing? What that you could tell me about? 00:04:12.160 --> 00:04:13.597 >> Sure. So we're doing a few things. I 00:04:13.680 --> 00:04:16.397 mean the first product that we worked on 00:04:16.480 --> 00:04:20.237 is called a sentry tower. It is a solarp 00:04:20.320 --> 00:04:24.077 powered infrastructure independent AI surveillance tower uh that you can put 00:04:24.160 --> 00:04:27.357 basically anywhere. whether around a military base, a border, critical 00:04:27.440 --> 00:04:32.317 infrastructure like power plants, desalination sites, and it uses radar, 00:04:32.400 --> 00:04:35.357 thermal vision, visible spectrum imaging, and a few other sensors fed 00:04:35.440 --> 00:04:39.757 into a probability model running on a computer that allows you to detect all 00:04:39.840 --> 00:04:43.757 the people, all the vehicles, all the animals, all the drones that are a 00:04:43.840 --> 00:04:47.277 couple miles around it. And these things also mesh together. They talk to each 00:04:47.360 --> 00:04:51.037 other. So you can deploy, you know, strings of these things a couple miles 00:04:51.120 --> 00:04:55.757 apart and get really good awareness of everything that's going on around your 00:04:55.840 --> 00:04:59.677 base or around your airport or around your border, what whatever it is you're 00:04:59.760 --> 00:05:02.317 trying to understand. >> I remember when you were first building 00:05:02.400 --> 00:05:05.837 this and you had the thing that said like 97% horse because I don't think you 00:05:05.920 --> 00:05:09.197 entered a cow model yet, but that was that system, right? 00:05:09.280 --> 00:05:12.717 >> Yeah, we had some problems early on where Yeah, you're totally right. We had 00:05:12.800 --> 00:05:17.437 we only had one classifier for that type of animal. So, uh, you we're always 00:05:17.520 --> 00:05:20.317 getting the animals on. We're actually a lot better now, but usually we just 00:05:20.400 --> 00:05:23.917 report it as an animal. It's >> you don't bother telling them that's a 00:05:24.000 --> 00:05:27.117 what type of horse or donkey it is. You just say animal. 00:05:27.200 --> 00:05:31.117 >> Yeah. >> Yeah. Most of the time like it is the customers can set it up to be more 00:05:31.200 --> 00:05:34.557 specific in that, but generally they want fewer variables to sort. They don't 00:05:34.640 --> 00:05:37.997 want to have in their list of variables like uh, you know, all the types of 00:05:38.080 --> 00:05:40.557 horses and cows and donkeys and goats 00:05:40.640 --> 00:05:45.117 and then people. They just want to have animal like ignore animals. And you know 00:05:45.200 --> 00:05:48.397 that's that's generally the the right thing. It still keeps track of what went 00:05:48.480 --> 00:05:51.357 through, but they don't want to pay to attention to it in the moment. 00:05:51.440 --> 00:05:53.597 >> Um, >> and this is being used on a lot of the 00:05:53.680 --> 00:05:56.957 border. How much of the border is using this right now? How are they using it? 00:05:57.040 --> 00:05:59.837 >> I can't tell you, but I can tell you that there's hundreds of towers out 00:05:59.920 --> 00:06:04.797 there. Um, so, you know, just spread across a lot of different places. So, 00:06:04.880 --> 00:06:07.437 we've got a lot of these things out there. And one of the things we're 00:06:07.520 --> 00:06:12.077 really proud of is that we have over 97% uptime on these towers. uh which I think 00:06:12.160 --> 00:06:16.157 we can get better but most of that is down for like maintenance and upgrades. 00:06:16.240 --> 00:06:19.757 Compare that with our competition which is not AI powered requires people to be 00:06:19.840 --> 00:06:21.997 watching all the sensors. Like that's our cool thing. We have 00:06:22.080 --> 00:06:25.117 >> I heard that people were driving these pickup trucks where they would have a 00:06:25.200 --> 00:06:29.597 metal grate and then they'd look for footprints be the metal in the in the 00:06:29.680 --> 00:06:31.437 smoothed out dirt. I mean it was that bad, right? 00:06:31.520 --> 00:06:34.957 >> Yep. It's called cutting signs. They just drag stuff on the dirt to smooth it 00:06:35.040 --> 00:06:37.997 out and then they go back later look for footprints look at the direction and 00:06:38.080 --> 00:06:41.437 then they go and try to find them. I mean the the problem is that that's very 00:06:41.520 --> 00:06:45.357 labor intensive. You spend all of your time trying to understand what happened 00:06:45.440 --> 00:06:49.597 a while ago. And with our system, one person can understand everything that's 00:06:49.680 --> 00:06:53.437 happening across hundreds of square miles. That that's that's a total game 00:06:53.520 --> 00:06:56.877 changer when you're talking especially about military applications where people 00:06:56.960 --> 00:06:59.677 imagine you can just have an unlimited number of people, but it's not true. You 00:06:59.760 --> 00:07:01.917 can only have such a large footprint. 00:07:02.000 --> 00:07:04.637 You know, there's only so many people you can support at one of these forward 00:07:04.720 --> 00:07:08.477 operating bases. And so if you can take people off of useless tasks, put them to 00:07:08.560 --> 00:07:12.957 use on useful tasks, that's a that's a really big deal. Um, and then as far as 00:07:13.040 --> 00:07:15.597 other products, I think we we built a few things that kind of enhance the 00:07:15.680 --> 00:07:17.357 capabilities of our sentry to powers. 00:07:17.440 --> 00:07:21.757 Uh, one of them is Anvil, which is a counter drone interceptor that can knock 00:07:21.840 --> 00:07:23.677 other drones out of the sky. We built a 00:07:23.760 --> 00:07:25.917 lot of jamming technology and electronic 00:07:26.000 --> 00:07:29.037 warfare technology that can uh that can 00:07:29.120 --> 00:07:31.677 detect and destroy and jam a lot of 00:07:31.760 --> 00:07:36.477 different electronic systems, including drones. Uh we've built a small sensor. 00:07:36.560 --> 00:07:40.317 We can call it dust. It's basically a very small disposable sensor that you 00:07:40.400 --> 00:07:43.837 can carry a bunch of in a backpack. And it has a much shorter range than a 00:07:43.920 --> 00:07:47.437 tower, but it has a radar. It has a camera. It has a processor. It has a 00:07:47.520 --> 00:07:50.397 radio. And so you can basically just toss one of these things on the side of 00:07:50.480 --> 00:07:54.317 a tree, on the side of a hill. They you we have versions of them that look like 00:07:54.400 --> 00:07:59.037 like little rocks. And they're able to detect when people or vehicles are going 00:07:59.120 --> 00:08:01.837 by and immediately classify that and feed it. 00:08:01.920 --> 00:08:05.757 >> How how does a little rock work? Is it listening or is it watching or or what 00:08:05.840 --> 00:08:08.637 is it doing? >> So So it has a it has an onboard radar 00:08:08.720 --> 00:08:12.237 on that is putting out it's it's very low resolution radar. Basically think of 00:08:12.320 --> 00:08:15.037 as like a motion detection radar. It just detects when there things are 00:08:15.120 --> 00:08:18.957 moving when things are moving. It powers up the rest of the system and then takes 00:08:19.040 --> 00:08:22.317 pictures of it with thermal imagery and EO imagery. 00:08:22.400 --> 00:08:25.037 >> Oh, got it. So if a horse goes by, you'll get the picture of a horse, but 00:08:25.120 --> 00:08:27.437 if a cat if a car goes by, you'll get the picture of the car as well. 00:08:27.520 --> 00:08:30.317 >> Yep. And if it's a picture of a horse, it will usually just ignore it. Says, 00:08:30.400 --> 00:08:34.317 "Oh, that's fine. Turn back off." If it's a car, it remains on, continues 00:08:34.400 --> 00:08:38.877 watching it, and then starts a radio link back home. And uh it that that's a 00:08:38.960 --> 00:08:41.437 really useful tool where I don't think we'd be able to make money off of them 00:08:41.520 --> 00:08:43.517 if we were selling them on their own. 00:08:43.600 --> 00:08:47.117 But they make the rest of our product so much more valuable because like with 00:08:47.200 --> 00:08:50.957 sentry towers, you you have geometry problems. Like I can't see behind a 00:08:51.040 --> 00:08:55.517 hill. I can't see behind a building. But if you use dust plus sentry towers, you 00:08:55.600 --> 00:09:00.237 can take an install that was 95% coverage and turn it into 100% coverage, which is 00:09:00.320 --> 00:09:03.197 >> you might have towers and then you add some dust in different areas around and 00:09:03.280 --> 00:09:05.357 then you have all of a sudden you have everything going on. 00:09:05.440 --> 00:09:08.797 >> And then I think on the on the on the kind of airframe side, we've been doing 00:09:08.880 --> 00:09:12.957 a lot more aerial vehicles. Um our our main one that people know about is 00:09:13.040 --> 00:09:17.197 called Ghost. It is a man portable electric helicopter drone. You carry in 00:09:17.280 --> 00:09:22.077 a backpack, folds up into a carry case that's smaller than a uh than a uh than 00:09:22.160 --> 00:09:24.717 a typical DJI. >> Give me some give us some stats on 00:09:24.800 --> 00:09:28.157 Ghost. Like what how fast does this thing go? How long does it go for? 00:09:28.240 --> 00:09:30.557 >> Uh so it'll cruise at about 85 miles an 00:09:30.640 --> 00:09:33.357 hour. It can fly for up to two hours on 00:09:33.440 --> 00:09:37.597 a battery and up to six and a half hours on a hydrogen fuel cell. Uh which clips 00:09:37.680 --> 00:09:40.957 on in place of the battery. Uh the really cool thing about it is like the 00:09:41.040 --> 00:09:44.157 airframe is incredible. It can carry a ton of payload. It can fly for a very 00:09:44.240 --> 00:09:47.757 long time. It's also a we call it ghost because it's basically inaudible and 00:09:47.840 --> 00:09:50.397 almost invisible. At 100 meters, it is 00:09:50.480 --> 00:09:55.117 inaudible to the human ear. Wow. And at it because because it's a helicopter 00:09:55.200 --> 00:09:58.877 that's very very skinny and very very short and we stack everything all in a 00:09:58.960 --> 00:10:02.877 line. When you look at it dead on, it's like it's like this big. Like this is 00:10:02.960 --> 00:10:06.157 the front of the thing. So try looking at a square that's like, you know, three 00:10:06.240 --> 00:10:09.997 inches tall and three inches wide. 100 meters away. It's basically invisible. 00:10:10.080 --> 00:10:14.237 And if you get a few hundred meters, like let's say 300 meters, you you are 00:10:14.320 --> 00:10:16.877 invisible. >> Does it fly if if it wants to be 00:10:16.960 --> 00:10:19.997 stealth, it flies 300 meters high then and just like goes over and people don't 00:10:20.080 --> 00:10:22.717 see it. >> Exact. Well, not even 300 meters. We can 00:10:22.800 --> 00:10:26.157 actually we can track people at about a kilometer. So, you know, a thousand 00:10:26.240 --> 00:10:30.077 meters we can be out and we're following people, classifying people, and we don't 00:10:30.160 --> 00:10:32.397 have to and they just never hear the thing. 00:10:32.480 --> 00:10:35.437 >> They have no idea it's even watching them. Could you put weapons on this 00:10:35.520 --> 00:10:39.117 thing or that's not a thing you put weapons on? So, we do not put weapons on 00:10:39.200 --> 00:10:44.317 it yet. Uh, but you know, I I think that I I I mean, this this is another whole 00:10:44.400 --> 00:10:47.197 discussion, but I don't think there's a moral high ground in saying you refuse 00:10:47.280 --> 00:10:50.077 to put weapons on things. I've seen a few other drone companies doing this, 00:10:50.160 --> 00:10:53.117 like, oh, we would help with this, but we would never we would never help 00:10:53.200 --> 00:10:54.797 deploy a weapon system. It's like, look, 00:10:54.880 --> 00:10:57.757 the the the like the US Army is a 00:10:57.840 --> 00:11:00.397 weapon. The US Marine Corps is a weapon. 00:11:00.480 --> 00:11:03.917 There's no high ground in in say, "Oh, I'm just the guy that found the target, 00:11:04.000 --> 00:11:07.197 pointed a laser at the head, and then let something else go after the guy." 00:11:07.280 --> 00:11:12.157 Like, if if if you can make something that allows for more precision strike, 00:11:12.240 --> 00:11:16.077 less collateral damage, I think it'd be morally reprehensible to refuse to do it 00:11:16.160 --> 00:11:17.837 to try and keep your own hands. 00:11:17.920 --> 00:11:21.037 >> What's an example of something that would be a higher precision strike? 00:11:21.120 --> 00:11:24.797 What's an example of of a of a new technology for higher precision strike? 00:11:24.880 --> 00:11:28.557 You can give us something you think about >> like the easiest example is just things 00:11:28.640 --> 00:11:32.637 with smaller booms. I mean like you know a predator occurring a hellfire that's a 00:11:32.720 --> 00:11:36.077 that's a pretty pretty big piece of ordinance and you we've seen a lot of 00:11:36.160 --> 00:11:40.077 unfortunate situations where a strike has caused collateral damage uh because 00:11:40.160 --> 00:11:43.517 it was too close and you couldn't make something that just takes out one 00:11:43.600 --> 00:11:46.317 person. They they've actually been do actually one of the interesting things 00:11:46.400 --> 00:11:50.077 on the hellfire there's a new version of the hellfire that uh basically just runs 00:11:50.160 --> 00:11:53.997 into people. It doesn't even have explosives. It just runs into targets 00:11:54.080 --> 00:11:57.997 and is has very little collateral damage. Um, I think an example in the 00:11:58.080 --> 00:12:01.997 future would be like what if you could make that into like what what if you 00:12:02.080 --> 00:12:05.277 could say I'm going to have like right now a very low collateral damage strike 00:12:05.360 --> 00:12:08.237 would be like let's say a US Marine uh 00:12:08.320 --> 00:12:11.277 uh you know sniper pair and that guy can 00:12:11.360 --> 00:12:15.597 take out an individual person without anyone around them getting hurt. If you 00:12:15.680 --> 00:12:19.997 could take that capability and push that forward so that it could be done from a 00:12:20.080 --> 00:12:24.157 remotely operated platform that doesn't require putting a sniper team up on a 00:12:24.240 --> 00:12:26.557 hill where >> the obvious thing would be is if you had 00:12:26.640 --> 00:12:29.517 something very high above that could drop something or something like that. 00:12:29.600 --> 00:12:32.957 >> Exactly. I mean there's a there's a million ways to to imagine approaching 00:12:33.040 --> 00:12:35.597 the problem. But I think that that's what the future of warfare is going to 00:12:35.680 --> 00:12:39.117 look like. Does it does it does it scare you to imagine the bad guys were 00:12:39.200 --> 00:12:43.837 competing against getting tools like these and being able to drop things very 00:12:43.920 --> 00:12:46.717 precisely on us? Let's just say let's just say they had this and it was hard 00:12:46.800 --> 00:12:49.677 to trace and they cited the Palmer that you were a high value target and they 00:12:49.760 --> 00:12:52.797 wanted to take you out. It seems pretty scary to me. How do we like how do we 00:12:52.880 --> 00:12:56.957 prevent that from happening? >> I the thing is they're already doing this. So, 00:12:57.040 --> 00:12:59.677 >> but they haven't t they're not taking anyone any of us out yet so far. Like 00:12:59.760 --> 00:13:04.077 they're not taking highv value targets out in the US hopefully. Well, 00:13:04.160 --> 00:13:07.917 I mean, like there are armed drones attack, armed drone attacks that are 00:13:08.000 --> 00:13:11.437 going on. They're they're doing real damage. Um, I think that that not all of 00:13:11.520 --> 00:13:14.957 this is necessarily broadcast to the public in a really big way. Like, if you 00:13:15.040 --> 00:13:18.317 get attacked by drones and it's successful. You don't even want the guy 00:13:18.400 --> 00:13:20.637 who launched the drone to know that it was successful. You don't want to 00:13:20.720 --> 00:13:24.317 basically announce, hey, this is the tactic that works. They got us. We had 00:13:24.400 --> 00:13:26.077 no way to stop. >> You want to make it look like a heart 00:13:26.160 --> 00:13:28.557 attack, but that's hard to do from a drone. Unless you guess you shoot 00:13:28.640 --> 00:13:32.237 through shoot tiny thing and it gives them a heart attack, huh? I don't know. 00:13:32.320 --> 00:13:34.797 you who who knows. I mean, that that type of stuff is going to happen. But 00:13:34.880 --> 00:13:37.277 even if you can't give someone a heart attack with a little pin, you can 00:13:37.360 --> 00:13:41.597 definitely shoot them or, you know, blow up a little tiny high explosive charge. 00:13:41.680 --> 00:13:44.317 And we do have adversaries that are doing that right now. I think they're 00:13:44.400 --> 00:13:46.957 going to do it more and more. And the key is you have to build the defensive 00:13:47.040 --> 00:13:49.677 system. Like that's why we're building anvil. That's why we're building our 00:13:49.760 --> 00:13:53.917 counter UAS systems in general. Um, >> but but they're doing that right now in 00:13:54.000 --> 00:13:57.997 theaters of war like Syria and Iraq. Are they doing it other places too or you 00:13:58.080 --> 00:14:01.597 can't say? So, I can't say any specifics, but we have done combat 00:14:01.680 --> 00:14:05.277 validations where we've sent these things down range. Yeah. And I mean, 00:14:05.360 --> 00:14:09.037 that's that's one of the biggest threats that our troops are facing right now. 00:14:09.120 --> 00:14:13.917 Like it it is unmanned systems that are being weaponized and some of them are 00:14:14.000 --> 00:14:17.997 being done in a kind of halfhazard way like IEDs were uh you know during during 00:14:18.080 --> 00:14:22.157 the the war on terror. Uh but you are also having very sophisticated state 00:14:22.240 --> 00:14:25.677 actors. The Chinese in particular have a variety of companies that are building 00:14:25.760 --> 00:14:30.397 weaponized drones with, you know, really lethal systems on them and those are 00:14:30.480 --> 00:14:35.400 being sold to other countries like right now.