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For the first time in history, the most

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innovative technology companies in

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America are largely not working with the

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United States military. That's truly
unprecedented. There's never been a

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point in US history where that was the
case. The most innovative technology has

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always been accessible to our military
and the most valuable companies have

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always worked with our military. And I
think that really gets to the core of

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why we're doing what we're doing.
Uh Russia and China don't have these

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issues. Their best technology companies
are working on defense challenges. Their

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best people are working on defense
challenges. And so if we end up

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crippling ourselves by putting
our best people to work on search engine

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optimization and ad delivery, how can
we possibly expect to compete? And that

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that's what we're trying to build here
is a defense products company, not a

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defense contractor,
but a defense product company.

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>> Is that a sign of a decaying society
that the best people won't even defend

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their own society or like what is it a

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sign of? Oh man, I I I like to think

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that it's actually just a it's like a

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specific trend of the of the modern time
and strategic flows that are going after

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like this didn't happen by accident. I

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think China's done a very good job of

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making China does a great job of keeping
the entire world corporate world on a

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hair trigger where they know that if
they do anything that is going to upset

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China they won't get access to Chinese
markets and they won't get access to

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Chinese capital. And we see this
especially in the media with the film

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studios. You know that the idea of

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making an anti-China film in the modern

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day is unthinkable to most of these

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studios. And so uh I I think that it's
not like a it's not just a sign of moral

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decay. In fact, I'd say probably eight
out of 10 people working in the tech

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industry, if you ask them, do you want
the United States to have the strongest

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military in the world? Eight out of 10
would give you a strong yes. the last

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you you know one of them that says
they're not sure and one of them that

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would be against it. So most people
in the tech industry I think do agree the

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problem is the corporate dynamics make

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it more profitable to keep China happy

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and to not piss off the media which
is uh kind of disproportionately

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anti-defense. >> Fascinating.
So in a sense you're like

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2020's version of a hippie who's
overcoming the corporate interest to

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push what push what the common people
want. I like I hadn't thought about it

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way that way, but it is it is actually
really really similar and like in the

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same way that I think you had like
people people complained that we had a

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disproportionately uh you know pro pro-

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uh corporate and pro- mililitary media
and I think that really has flipped. I

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don't think anyone would argue that

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let's say the American tech press uh or

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even just the the press in general is

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too promilitary. I I think that idea you

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know went went away long long 100%. So

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let's I want to know more about Andre.

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So Andre Palmer like to me that you've
hired like all this amazing talent. You

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have all these amazing projects you're
doing. You're growing revenue faster

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than any defense company has in history
as far as I know. A lot of people don't

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have this perspective. A lot of people
they hear these big defense companies

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who are very threatened by you
downplaying you talking about oh there's

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one or two products. It's not a real
defense company. So there's a lot of

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people who are kind of who who want to
tell a more negative story. I think it's

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because they're jealous and threatened.

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But give give us a sense of your success
so far. give us a sense of what you're

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doing so people can hear
it directly from you.

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>> Well, yeah.
I think there are people who

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downplay us and then they also overplay
their competition. You they say, "Oh,

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Adel is doing great AI stuff, but we
have great AI, too. It's really, really

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good." And it's not. Uh, you know, but
they It's really cheap to say words. You

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can just say, "We're as good as Anderol."
And until you actually get to

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a real field trial,
the words are as good as the actual

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>> that was the same
experience with pounds

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here with me is that we are competing
against a lot of innovation theater

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where they couldn't actually do it when
they actually had to deploy it. It took

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years to deploy. It took billions
of dollars and didn't actually work.

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>> Oh, I mean, you know, for people who
don't know what innovation theater is,

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you know, there's there's all these
people at DoD who have this job.

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Basically, their job is to generate
things that look real enough to make a

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press release or to do a panel or to

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release a video or to talk to Congress.

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And none of it is actually real
or useful or deployable. It's it's pretty

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wild. >> And so so so
tell us about a few of your

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products. What are you guys actually
doing? What that you could tell me about?

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>> Sure. So we're doing a few things. I

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mean the first product that we worked on

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is called a sentry tower. It is a solarp

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powered infrastructure independent AI
surveillance tower uh that you can put

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basically anywhere. whether around
a military base, a border, critical

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infrastructure like power plants,
desalination sites, and it uses radar,

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thermal vision, visible spectrum
imaging, and a few other sensors fed

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into a probability model running on a
computer that allows you to detect all

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the people, all the vehicles,
all the animals, all the drones that are a

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couple miles around it. And these things
also mesh together. They talk to each

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other. So you can deploy, you know,
strings of these things a couple miles

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apart and get really good awareness
of everything that's going on around your

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base or around your airport or around
your border, what whatever it is you're

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trying to understand.
>> I remember when you were first building

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this and you had the thing that said
like 97% horse because I don't think you

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entered a cow model yet,
but that was that system, right?

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>> Yeah, we had some problems early on
where Yeah, you're totally right. We had

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we only had one classifier for that type
of animal. So, uh, you we're always

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getting the animals on. We're actually
a lot better now, but usually we just

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report it as an animal. It's >> you
don't bother telling them that's a

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what type of horse or donkey it is.
You just say animal.

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>> Yeah. >> Yeah. Most of the time like it
is the customers can set it up to be more

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specific in that, but generally they
want fewer variables to sort. They don't

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want to have in their list of variables
like uh, you know, all the types of

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horses and cows and donkeys and goats

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and then people. They just want to have
animal like ignore animals. And you know

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that's that's generally the the right
thing. It still keeps track of what went

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through, but they don't want to pay
to attention to it in the moment.

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>> Um, >> and this is being
used on a lot of the

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border. How much of the border is using
this right now? How are they using it?

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>> I can't tell you, but I can tell
you that there's hundreds of towers out

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there. Um, so, you know, just spread
across a lot of different places. So,

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we've got a lot of these things out there.
And one of the things we're

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really proud of is that we have over 97%
uptime on these towers. uh which I think

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we can get better but most of that is
down for like maintenance and upgrades.

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Compare that with our competition which
is not AI powered requires people to be

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watching all the sensors.
Like that's our cool thing. We have

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>> I heard that people were driving these
pickup trucks where they would have a

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metal grate and then they'd look
for footprints be the metal in the in the

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smoothed out dirt.
I mean it was that bad, right?

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>> Yep. It's called cutting signs. They
just drag stuff on the dirt to smooth it

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out and then they go back later look
for footprints look at the direction and

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then they go and try to find them.
I mean the the problem is that that's very

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labor intensive. You spend all of your
time trying to understand what happened

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a while ago. And with our system, one
person can understand everything that's

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happening across hundreds of square miles.
That that's that's a total game

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changer when you're talking especially
about military applications where people

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imagine you can just have an unlimited
number of people, but it's not true. You

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can only have such a large footprint.

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You know, there's only so many people
you can support at one of these forward

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operating bases. And so if you can take
people off of useless tasks, put them to

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use on useful tasks, that's a that's
a really big deal. Um, and then as far as

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other products, I think we we built
a few things that kind of enhance the

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capabilities of our sentry to powers.

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Uh, one of them is Anvil, which is a
counter drone interceptor that can knock

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other drones out of the sky. We built a

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lot of jamming technology and electronic

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warfare technology that can uh that can

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detect and destroy and jam a lot of

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different electronic systems, including
drones. Uh we've built a small sensor.

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We can call it dust. It's basically
a very small disposable sensor that you

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can carry a bunch of in a backpack.
And it has a much shorter range than a

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tower, but it has a radar. It has
a camera. It has a processor. It has a

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radio. And so you can basically just
toss one of these things on the side of

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a tree, on the side of a hill. They you
we have versions of them that look like

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like little rocks. And they're able to
detect when people or vehicles are going

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by and immediately
classify that and feed it.

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>> How how does a little rock work? Is it
listening or is it watching or or what

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is it doing? >> So So it
has a it has an onboard radar

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on that is putting out it's it's very
low resolution radar. Basically think of

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as like a motion detection radar.
It just detects when there things are

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moving when things are moving. It powers
up the rest of the system and then takes

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pictures of it with thermal
imagery and EO imagery.

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>> Oh, got it. So if a horse goes by,
you'll get the picture of a horse, but

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if a cat if a car goes by, you'll
get the picture of the car as well.

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>> Yep. And if it's a picture of a horse,
it will usually just ignore it. Says,

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"Oh, that's fine. Turn back off."
If it's a car, it remains on, continues

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watching it, and then starts a radio
link back home. And uh it that that's a

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really useful tool where I don't think
we'd be able to make money off of them

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if we were selling them on their own.

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But they make the rest of our product
so much more valuable because like with

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sentry towers, you you have geometry
problems. Like I can't see behind a

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hill. I can't see behind a building. But
if you use dust plus sentry towers, you

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can take an install that was 95% coverage
and turn it into 100% coverage, which is

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>> you might have towers and then you add
some dust in different areas around and

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then you have all of a sudden
you have everything going on.

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>> And then I think on the on the on the
kind of airframe side, we've been doing

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a lot more aerial vehicles. Um
our our main one that people know about is

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called Ghost. It is a man portable
electric helicopter drone. You carry in

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a backpack, folds up into a carry case
that's smaller than a uh than a uh than

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a typical DJI. >> Give me
some give us some stats on

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Ghost. Like what how fast does
this thing go? How long does it go for?

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>> Uh so it'll cruise at about 85 miles an

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hour. It can fly for up to two hours on

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a battery and up to six and a half hours
on a hydrogen fuel cell. Uh which clips

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on in place of the battery. Uh
the really cool thing about it is like the

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airframe is incredible. It can carry
a ton of payload. It can fly for a very

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long time. It's also a we call it ghost
because it's basically inaudible and

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almost invisible. At 100 meters, it is

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inaudible to the human ear. Wow. And
at it because because it's a helicopter

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that's very very skinny and very very
short and we stack everything all in a

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line. When you look at it dead on,
it's like it's like this big. Like this is

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the front of the thing. So try looking
at a square that's like, you know, three

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inches tall and three inches wide.
100 meters away. It's basically invisible.

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And if you get a few hundred meters,
like let's say 300 meters, you you are

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invisible. >> Does it
fly if if it wants to be

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stealth, it flies 300 meters high then
and just like goes over and people don't

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see it. >> Exact. Well,
not even 300 meters. We can

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actually we can track people at about
a kilometer. So, you know, a thousand

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meters we can be out and we're following
people, classifying people, and we don't

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have to and they just
never hear the thing.

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>> They have no idea it's even watching
them. Could you put weapons on this

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thing or that's not a thing you put
weapons on? So, we do not put weapons on

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it yet. Uh, but you know, I I think that I
I I mean, this this is another whole

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discussion, but I don't think there's
a moral high ground in saying you refuse

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to put weapons on things. I've seen
a few other drone companies doing this,

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like, oh, we would help with this,
but we would never we would never help

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deploy a weapon system. It's like, look,

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the the the like the US Army is a

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weapon. The US Marine Corps is a weapon.

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There's no high ground in in say, "Oh,
I'm just the guy that found the target,

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pointed a laser at the head, and then
let something else go after the guy."

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Like, if if if you can make something
that allows for more precision strike,

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less collateral damage, I think it'd be
morally reprehensible to refuse to do it

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to try and keep your own hands.

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>> What's an example of something
that would be a higher precision strike?

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What's an example of of a of a new
technology for higher precision strike?

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You can give us something you think about
>> like the easiest example is just things

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with smaller booms. I mean like you know
a predator occurring a hellfire that's a

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that's a pretty pretty big piece
of ordinance and you we've seen a lot of

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unfortunate situations where a strike
has caused collateral damage uh because

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it was too close and you couldn't
make something that just takes out one

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person. They they've actually been do
actually one of the interesting things

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on the hellfire there's a new version of
the hellfire that uh basically just runs

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into people. It doesn't even have
explosives. It just runs into targets

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and is has very little collateral damage.
Um, I think an example in the

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future would be like what if you could
make that into like what what if you

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could say I'm going to have like right
now a very low collateral damage strike

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would be like let's say a US Marine uh

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uh you know sniper pair and that guy can

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take out an individual person without
anyone around them getting hurt. If you

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could take that capability and push that
forward so that it could be done from a

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remotely operated platform that doesn't
require putting a sniper team up on a

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hill where >> the obvious
thing would be is if you had

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something very high above that could
drop something or something like that.

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>> Exactly. I mean there's a there's
a million ways to to imagine approaching

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the problem. But I think that that's
what the future of warfare is going to

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look like. Does it does it does it
scare you to imagine the bad guys were

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competing against getting tools like
these and being able to drop things very

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precisely on us? Let's just say let's
just say they had this and it was hard

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to trace and they cited the Palmer
that you were a high value target and they

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wanted to take you out. It seems pretty
scary to me. How do we like how do we

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prevent that from happening? >> I the
thing is they're already doing this. So,

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>> but they haven't t they're not taking
anyone any of us out yet so far. Like

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they're not taking highv value
targets out in the US hopefully. Well,

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I mean, like there are armed drones
attack, armed drone attacks that are

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going on. They're they're doing real
damage. Um, I think that that not all of

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this is necessarily broadcast to the
public in a really big way. Like, if you

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get attacked by drones and it's
successful. You don't even want the guy

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who launched the drone to know that it
was successful. You don't want to

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basically announce, hey, this is the
tactic that works. They got us. We had

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no way to stop. >> You want
to make it look like a heart

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attack, but that's hard to do from
a drone. Unless you guess you shoot

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through shoot tiny thing and it gives
them a heart attack, huh? I don't know.

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you who who knows. I mean, that that
type of stuff is going to happen. But

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even if you can't give someone a heart
attack with a little pin, you can

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definitely shoot them or, you know, blow
up a little tiny high explosive charge.

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And we do have adversaries that are
doing that right now. I think they're

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going to do it more and more. And the
key is you have to build the defensive

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system. Like that's why we're building
anvil. That's why we're building our

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counter UAS systems in general. Um,
>> but but they're doing that right now in

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theaters of war like Syria and Iraq.
Are they doing it other places too or you

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can't say? So, I can't say any
specifics, but we have done combat

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validations where we've sent these
things down range. Yeah. And I mean,

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that's that's one of the biggest threats
that our troops are facing right now.

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Like it it is unmanned systems that are
being weaponized and some of them are

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being done in a kind of halfhazard way
like IEDs were uh you know during during

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the the war on terror. Uh but you are
also having very sophisticated state

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actors. The Chinese in particular have
a variety of companies that are building

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weaponized drones with, you know, really
lethal systems on them and those are

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being sold to other
countries like right now.