WEBVTT

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Please welcome Andrew Ross Sorkin and

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his guest, CEO and co-founder of

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Anthropic, Dario Amodei.

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Good afternoon, everybody.
I hope you guys all had a great lunch.

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We have a huge afternoon starting with

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Dario Amodei here. He is one of the most
consequential people here in the world

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of artificial intelligence. He's
the co-founder and CEO of Anthropic, of

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course, known for its Claude model.
Uh it's one of the fastest-growing

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technology companies in history and

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uniquely backed now by all three giants,

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uh tech giants, Amazon, Microsoft, and
Google. That's new, at least one of them.

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Uh and by the way, he has been at this uh
really longer than most. Uh he worked

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at Baidu, then Google, was an early

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employee at OpenAI where he led the

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development of uh ChatGPT-2 and 3. Uh

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and the reason that we wanted to speak
with him this year more than anything

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else is because he has singularly been
perhaps the most outspoken and candid

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person about AI when it comes to the way
he's been thinking about jobs and job

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losses and selling chips to China and

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politics in our country and where all of
this goes. So, welcome to you. Thank you

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for being here. >> Thank you
for having me. Um we got a lot

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to talk about, um including, by the way,
are we in an AI bubble? But I promise

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you we will get there. I I I'll
start here, though, um which is

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I mentioned you were a research

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scientist uh back at Baidu uh 2014.

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And if I had sat with you then

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and said, "We're going to sit together

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in 2025

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talking about AI." You would have
told me what? What would have been your

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expectation for what would have happened?
So, I'll tell you what I am

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surprised by and what what and what I'm

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not. Um I'm not surprised by the

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economic impacts of the technology, the

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the value that it's creating, you know,
the fact that, you know, I walk by any

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billboard in New York and, you know, it's
it's it's kind of everything about AI.

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>> that this would this would
be this would be real by now.

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In in some form that this would be real,
that it would be central to the economy,

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that it would be central to national
security. That it would be central to

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scientific research. I you know, I I I I

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don't think I imagined that I would
be leading one of the companies in the

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space, right? I think that I
think that would have been,

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you know, very surprising to me.
I didn't think of that as as kind of as

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kind of my role at the time. And the
exact way in which things happened, all

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of the, you know, all of the kind
of strange lingo we've developed around

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language models, all of the kind of
financialization of it, you know, if you

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think about it, if you think about
the implications of the models becoming as

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smart and as powerful as they are and
scaling in the way that they are, in the

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way that me and some of my colleagues
had predicted, it all makes sense. But I

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I don't think I would have derived it
from first principles. Okay, well, then

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let's go straight to the question
I said I'd ask at the beginning. Um

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because maybe this is the place thinking
about where this goes and the fact that

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I didn't think you would say, by the way,
that you thought that this is where

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we would be in in 2025 because
I think even people back then

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thought this would be a much
longer road. But if you're right,

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do you look at the amount of economic
uh muscle that's being put into this

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industry right now? I mean, it really
does represent potentially almost all of

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the growth in the United
States GDP right now, literally.

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>> Yes. That we are
in some form of a bubble.

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Are we overspending? Does the math of

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this make sense? So, this is really

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complicated and I want to separate out
the technological side of it from the

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economic side of it. On the technological
side of it, I feel really

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solid. I think I'm one of the most
bullish people around and I think it

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pencils out. On the economic side, you

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know, I I I have my concerns where
even if the technology is is, you know,

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really powerful and fulfills all its
promises, I think there may be players

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in the ecosystem who, if they just make
a timing error, if they just get it off

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by a little bit, bad things could happen.
So, let me go through both of

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them. On the technological side, the the

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reason that I'm not in honestly, by the
pure technology, not that surprised is

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myself and some of the people who
eventually became my my my co-founders,

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we were the first to document
the scaling laws of AI, which is you put

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more compute, you put more data into AI.

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With small modifications, we've seen
these things like reasoning models and

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test time compute. They're all tiny

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little tweaks. And I've been watching

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that trend for the last 12 years or so

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since I joined the field. And the thing

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that is most striking about all of it is

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as you train these models in this very
simple way, you know, with a few simple

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modifications, they get better and better
at every task under the sun. They

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get better at coding. They get better
at doing science. They get better at

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biomedicine. They get better at the law.

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They get better at finance. They get
better at at, you know, materials and

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manufacturing. And and that's just
that's just a listing of all the sources

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of of of of value of value in our

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economy. If I just take Anthropic

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itself, which, because we work so much

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in the enterprise side, I think we're
a good barometer, maybe a purer barometer

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than the others which kind of filter
through consumers, which kind of have

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their habits and their use cases. We

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look at our revenue. It's grown 10x a

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year every year for the last 3 years. 0

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to 100 million 2023, 100 million to

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billion 2024, 1 billion to it's going to
end somewhere between 8 and 10 at at the

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end of this year. Will it continue?
I don't know, but the technology is

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driving there and the economic value
is coming with it. I it will, you know,

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that that trend is going to slow down
for sure, but it's still going to be

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really fast. And so, I have this

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confidence that the the ult- eventually

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the economic value is the eventually the

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economic value is going to be there.
Um When you but let's just go to this

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because there are companies that are
spending 100 billion dollars a year

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more. You're going to be spending 50.

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You look at what Sam Altman, who
was here last year, plans to be spending.

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These are extraordinary numbers and this

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is all a bet, a big bet, that this is

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going to scale in this way. And and
my question is, is there a real way to

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pencil this out or is this more of a

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a gut feeling at this point? So, let me

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let Yeah, so that really gets to the

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second part of it. And and I I I I will

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describe as transparently as I can, I

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think there's a real dilemma

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deriving from uncertainty in how quickly
the economic value is going to grow and

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the lag times on building the data
centers that that drives it. So, I think

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there's genuine uncertainty. There's
genuine dilemma, which we as a company

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try to manage as responsibly as we can.

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And then I think there are some players
who, you know, who who are YOLOing, who

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who pull pull the risk dial
too far and I'm very concerned.

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>> Who is YOLOing? >> So,
I That's a question I'm not going to

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answer.

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Um uh uh So, on the first one,

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put yourself in the
position of of Anthropic.

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>> yourself >> Put put
yourself in in the position of

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of Anthropic. Put yourself in my position.

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You you you've seen this revenue curve
that goes up 10x a year for 3 years.

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You're like, "Okay, what's going
to happen next year?" If I'm really dumb

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and I extrapolate the pattern 10 to 100
billion. I don't believe that, just to

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be clear. I don't I don't believe that
at all. Even though it's happened in the

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last 3 years, just at this scale,
I don't believe it. But that's one of the

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outer bounds of, you know, the outer
limits of possibility. If I go in and

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I'm like, "This enterprise and that
enterprise and this use case and this is

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our go-to-market motion." If I try
and do it, you know, bottom-up, then, you

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know, maybe it's maybe it's 20 or 30
or something like that. So, there is well,

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what I've been calling internally this

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cone of uncertainty where I don't know

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if a year from now it's going to be 20
billion or, you know, it's it's going to

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be 50 or or like, you know, it's it's

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it's very uncertain. I try to plan in a

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conservative way, so I plan for the

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lower side of it. But but that is very

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disconcerting and you add to that the

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idea that building the data
centers has a long lag

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time. It's like a year or two. So, I

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have to decide now, literally now, or in

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some cases a few months ago, how how how

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much compute I need to buy in you know,

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early 2024 to serve the models in early

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2027 when I get to that revenue amount.

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And there's two couple dangers. One is
that if I if I don't buy enough compute,

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I won't be able to serve all the customers
I want. I'll have to turn them

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away and send them to to to my
competitors. If I buy too much compute,

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of course, I might not get enough
revenue to pay for that compute. And and

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and, you know, and and, you know, in the
extreme case, there's kind of the risk

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of going bankrupt. And how how much

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buffer there is in that in that cone,
um is basically determined by my margins.

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If I have 80% margins, I can buy 20
billion dollars of compute and it could

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serve a 100 billion dollar a 100 billion

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dollars of revenue. But because the cone

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is so wide, it's hard to avoid, you

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know, making a mistake on on

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on on one side on one side or the other.

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Now, we've been a relatively responsible

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company, um and I think because we focus
on enterprise, I think we have a better

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business model. I think we have better
margins. I think we're being responsible

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about it. But again, let's say you have
a different business model. Let's say

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you have a consumer business model. You
know, your your your your your your kind

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of the source of your revenue isn't
as good. Your margins aren't certain. And

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let's say you're a person who just kind
of like constitutionally just wants to

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YOLO things or just likes big numbers.

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Um then then you may turn that dial
pretty far. And so I think there's a

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real underlying risk. Whenever
there's uncertainty, there's a risk of

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overextension. We all face it. I face

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it. All the other companies face it.

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There's there's an inherent risk when

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when the timing of the economic value is

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is uncertain. There's inherent risk
of of under-reacting or overextension. And

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because the companies are competing with
each other and frankly we genuinely need

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to compete with you know
our authoritarian adversaries. Um

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there there's there's kind of a lot
of pressure to push things. So I think

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there's some amount of irreducible risk

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here and I absolutely don't want to deny

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this. But at the same time as that I
think there are some players who are not

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managing that risk well,
who are taking unwise risks.

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>> All right, let me let me ask you about
that with maybe you'll mention who that

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is. I think we all know who that is.

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Um You have said that you're
going to break even.

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Uh this is privately at least to your

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investors by 2028 even with the spending

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plans, I think. Uh Sam Altman who you

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worked with and for says
that he's going to do it by 2030.

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Uh I use his math,
not yours. He would have

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to go from a $74 billion loss in the
course of 2 years to be profitable 2

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years later. Does that make sense to you?
So look, I don't I don't know the internal

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financials of any other company. I
can't I can't say anything about what the

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economics of any other of of of of of

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any other company is. I will just go

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back to our own calculation and the cone

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of uncertainty where where where where
where where we basically say we want to

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buy enough compute that we're confident,
you know, even in the 10th percentile,

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you know, scenario like might be in a
bad position, but like we think we can

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pay for it. There's there's some end
of the curve where you know, things go so

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badly that you know, we can't pay that
that that there's all there's always a

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tail risk. There's not zero, but we're
trying to manage that risk well while

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also buying an amount an amount of compute
that allows us to be competitive

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with the other players. We're very
efficient training. We're very efficient

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in inference. We have good margins.
I think I you know, I think I think we can

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manage it. I think the odds are on our
side. What are we supposed to think of

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what I think people now describe
as circular deals. Back in the day we

00:12:39.080 --> 00:12:43.277
called this vendor financing. But in
this context, you have a situation where

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Nvidia in particular,
but others as well, effectively have

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been taking stakes in companies
and invariably those companies are using

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some of that money one way or the other
considering money's fungible and going

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to buy Nvidia chips. Yes. So I mean,

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we've done some of these deals, not not
at the same scale as as as some other

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players. But we've done
some of these deals and I

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can just I can just I can just I can
just I can just I can just kind of walk

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you through not a specific deal cuz I'm
not going to go into the details, but

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but but kind of like a stylized what
these deals often look like and kind of

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why they can make sense. So if you want
to buy a gigawatt of compute, right?

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That buying the chips and building the

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chips, building everything, that costs,

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you know, roughly let's say $50 billion

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of of capital expense to to kind of to

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kind of fund that. And you can think
of that as useful lifetime as people argue

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about it, but maybe it's 5 years.
So that's 10 10 billion dollars for basic

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basically for 5 years. And and so
if you're a company, you know, you're

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you're you're you're a company that's
making, you know, 8 10 billion dollars

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of revenue. You think that's growing.

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You don't know how fast it's growing.

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You have to make the decision right
now and you don't have $50 billion. You

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don't have $50 billion on you. So you
know, a thing you can do, a deal you can

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make with a large player who has an
incentive to to to to to do this because

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they're the one selling the chips
or providing the cloud is they'll say,

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"Okay, you know, I'll give you I
don't know, 20% of it. I'll invest $10

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billion." So that lets you pay for the
first year and then for and then for the

00:14:12.320 --> 00:14:16.037
other years you can kind of pay as you
go because I know you don't have $50

00:14:16.120 --> 00:14:20.157
billion now, but but you know,
looking at how things are are are are are

00:14:20.240 --> 00:14:24.237
growing, that isn't a crazy bet. We're
already almost we're already almost at

00:14:24.320 --> 00:14:28.797
at at we're already almost at the $10
billion of revenue. So it it kind of it

00:14:28.880 --> 00:14:31.917
you know, it takes a year to build
a data center. It's financed for a year.

00:14:32.000 --> 00:14:34.357
So you're you're you know, you're
basically saying I need to get $10

00:14:34.440 --> 00:14:37.357
billion of of revenue per year 2 years

00:14:37.440 --> 00:14:41.717
from now. Um so I don't think there's
anything wrong with that. One player has

00:14:41.800 --> 00:14:45.197
capital and has an interest because
they're selling the because they're

00:14:45.280 --> 00:14:49.477
selling the you know, they're selling
the chips and the other player is pretty

00:14:49.560 --> 00:14:51.877
confident they'll have they'll have
the revenue at the right time, but they

00:14:51.960 --> 00:14:55.197
don't have $50 billion at hand.
So I don't think there's anything

00:14:55.280 --> 00:14:57.037
inappropriate about that in principle.

00:14:57.120 --> 00:15:00.957
Now if you start stacking these where
they get to huge amounts of money and

00:15:01.040 --> 00:15:05.637
you're saying, you know, by by 2027 or
2028 I need to make $200 billion a year,

00:15:05.720 --> 00:15:09.477
then yeah, you can you you can you can
overextend yourself, of course. It's all

00:15:09.560 --> 00:15:12.117
a matter of the size. >> But I
think is one of the key questions

00:15:12.200 --> 00:15:15.917
behind the math of this entire industry
is what's called the depreciation

00:15:16.000 --> 00:15:18.517
schedule, if you will, for these chips.

00:15:18.600 --> 00:15:21.437
And there seems to be a big
debate about it. Meaning

00:15:21.520 --> 00:15:25.597
when you buy a new chip,
is that chip going to work for you

00:15:25.680 --> 00:15:29.317
effectively for three or four years
or is it going to work for you for six or

00:15:29.400 --> 00:15:31.597
seven or eight years or even 10 years?

00:15:31.680 --> 00:15:35.157
And depending on where you
think the math really lands,

00:15:35.240 --> 00:15:38.277
all of this pencils out or really doesn't.

00:15:38.360 --> 00:15:39.957
What do you think the schedule is?

00:15:40.040 --> 00:15:43.397
>> from from from from our point of view,
we make very conservative assumptions

00:15:43.480 --> 00:15:46.037
here. Um I don't think
there's a particular

00:15:46.120 --> 00:15:49.837
depreciation schedule, right? When
new chips come out, the issue isn't the

00:15:49.920 --> 00:15:53.437
lifetime of the chips. Chips chips keep
working for a long time. The issue is

00:15:53.520 --> 00:15:57.317
new chips come out that are faster
and cheaper and and and and and

00:15:57.400 --> 00:16:01.437
>> if your competitors have them. Yeah,
yeah. And so and so kind of the value of

00:16:01.520 --> 00:16:05.237
old chips goes down someone. In fact,
that that can happen you know, a year

00:16:05.320 --> 00:16:08.117
after you buy the chips because you know,
now there are multiple companies,

00:16:08.200 --> 00:16:12.837
TPUs, GPUs coming out with coming out
with new chips. So I think the way we

00:16:12.920 --> 00:16:15.997
think about it is we take into account
that you know, the old chips are going

00:16:16.080 --> 00:16:18.997
to be less valuable as as as time goes

00:16:19.080 --> 00:16:23.317
on. And you know, we assume
very aggressive, you know,

00:16:23.400 --> 00:16:27.157
kind of continuation of the of the chip
efficiency curve. And again, I can only

00:16:27.240 --> 00:16:30.877
speak for Anthropic. Like we make
conservative assumptions here and and we

00:16:30.960 --> 00:16:34.757
think we're going to be we think we're
going to be okay in basically almost all

00:16:34.840 --> 00:16:37.677
worlds. Can't be literally all worlds,
but we think we're going to be okay in

00:16:37.760 --> 00:16:41.877
almost all worlds. I can't speak
for other companies. Again, I can imagine

00:16:41.960 --> 00:16:44.957
that there may be other players
out there who are, you know, who are

00:16:45.040 --> 00:16:48.517
diluting themselves and and you know,
making making assumptions that are very

00:16:48.600 --> 00:16:52.717
far inflected on the optimistic So we're
clear, there's only two of you who are

00:16:52.800 --> 00:16:55.477
who are not >> I look,
I I I just don't know who you're

00:16:55.560 --> 00:16:58.357
talking about, okay?
I I just have no idea.

00:16:58.440 --> 00:17:02.957
Um Let me ask you this about
the models themselves and how you

00:17:03.040 --> 00:17:05.477
see the competition. So one of the things
that's happened literally in the

00:17:05.560 --> 00:17:10.557
last week and there has been a complete
sort of meltdown in the valley over

00:17:10.640 --> 00:17:15.077
what's happening here. And Sundar Pichai
was also here last year and it appears

00:17:15.160 --> 00:17:16.877
at least that his new model has gotten a

00:17:16.960 --> 00:17:22.157
lot of people excited about what he's
doing. And that Google, which I used to

00:17:22.240 --> 00:17:25.877
think from the beginning given all
of the data they have, should have been

00:17:25.960 --> 00:17:30.557
sort of the the winner by default. And you
have a memo that went out from Sam Altman

00:17:30.640 --> 00:17:34.117
saying that code red, everyone's got
to get back to their desks to figure out

00:17:34.200 --> 00:17:37.757
what the what the next thing is to break
the to get to the next place. How do you

00:17:37.840 --> 00:17:42.277
stack rank right now where these models
are and how important do you think it is

00:17:42.360 --> 00:17:46.997
in any given moment? Yeah. So this is
one of the cases where I'm just very

00:17:47.080 --> 00:17:51.357
grateful that Anthropic is taking
a different path. Right? On one hand

00:17:51.440 --> 00:17:54.917
>> being the enterprise doing The the path
being the enterprise, right? Both of the

00:17:55.000 --> 00:17:58.517
players that you that you mentioned,
right? Both of these other two players

00:17:58.600 --> 00:18:02.157
are, you know, primarily focused
on the consumer. They try and do some

00:18:02.240 --> 00:18:05.197
enterprise work, but they're they're
they're and and they're fighting in

00:18:05.280 --> 00:18:08.917
consumer. That is, you know, that is
that is the reason for kind of the code

00:18:09.000 --> 00:18:13.077
red, the intense fighting, right? It's,
you know, Google has a search monopoly

00:18:13.160 --> 00:18:16.557
that they're trying to defend. And the
center of what OpenAI is doing is in is

00:18:16.640 --> 00:18:20.517
in consumer. So those those two are
fighting it out. For both of them,

00:18:20.600 --> 00:18:24.997
serving businesses is secondary.
And so what we found is over time we've

00:18:25.080 --> 00:18:29.157
optimized our models more and more for
the needs of businesses. The one that's

00:18:29.240 --> 00:18:33.117
gone the fastest has been coding. You
know, I think that has really, you know,

00:18:33.200 --> 00:18:36.557
moved forward the quickest, but we're
starting to go beyond that to finance,

00:18:36.640 --> 00:18:38.997
biomedical, retail, you know, energy,

00:18:39.080 --> 00:18:41.957
manufac- all kind of all of that.

00:18:42.040 --> 00:18:46.597
And so and so and so what we find
is that these model wars, as much as our

00:18:46.680 --> 00:18:48.437
models are like really good, like, you

00:18:48.520 --> 00:18:53.717
know, the one released last week,
Opus 4.5, is hands down, I think almost

00:18:53.800 --> 00:18:56.477
everyone thinks, the best model
for coding. So I think that's it's very

00:18:56.560 --> 00:19:00.397
important that we continue to have
this this model superiority, but there's a

00:19:00.480 --> 00:19:03.677
way in which we're kind of going in a
different direction or or on a different

00:19:03.760 --> 00:19:07.877
dimension. And so we we kind of have to
worry less about this back and forth. We

00:19:07.960 --> 00:19:11.277
have a little bit of a privileged
position where we can just keep growing

00:19:11.360 --> 00:19:14.117
and just keep developing our models
and we don't have to do any code red.

00:19:14.200 --> 00:19:18.277
>> But what is the the moat
around any of these businesses?

00:19:18.360 --> 00:19:22.917
And and when I say that, I assume if
Google is success is as successful as it

00:19:23.000 --> 00:19:26.397
wants to be or OpenAI or any or or Meta,
right? Anybody else who's involved in

00:19:26.480 --> 00:19:29.077
this, that they think that one day if we

00:19:29.160 --> 00:19:34.357
ever get to AGI, that all these models
effectively will be able to do what

00:19:34.440 --> 00:19:37.757
either, you know, any of them do. And
whether it's, you know, is there a moat?

00:19:37.840 --> 00:19:39.757
Is it the persistent memory? So I'm I

00:19:39.840 --> 00:19:42.797
use ChatGPT for certain things. It knows

00:19:42.880 --> 00:19:46.997
me now because it's I've been,
you know, asking it different questions.

00:19:47.080 --> 00:19:50.837
Is Or do you think people just switch
back and forth, whoever's got the the

00:19:50.920 --> 00:19:54.917
latest thing? Yeah. So I you look, I can
only speak to the enterprise side. What

00:19:55.000 --> 00:19:57.677
I will say is is it is surprising how

00:19:57.760 --> 00:20:02.037
different the personality and capabilities
of the models are if you're

00:20:02.120 --> 00:20:04.997
building for businesses versus if you're
building for if you're building for

00:20:05.080 --> 00:20:08.557
consumers. Um, you just focus
on different things. You focus less on

00:20:08.640 --> 00:20:11.717
engagement, you focus more on coding,

00:20:11.800 --> 00:20:16.797
high intellectual activities, scientific
ability. Um, and you know, I don't think

00:20:16.880 --> 00:20:20.597
it's true that if we got AGI they
would all converge to the same place. Is

00:20:20.680 --> 00:20:23.357
everyone in this audience converge
to the same place? Is everyone in this

00:20:23.440 --> 00:20:27.397
audience a copy of everyone else because
we're all agent? No, we're we're all

00:20:27.480 --> 00:20:33.037
specialized. Specialization exists, you
know, in in in it exists alongside general

00:20:33.120 --> 00:20:35.597
intelligence. And then I think there's
all the standard enterprise stuff as

00:20:35.680 --> 00:20:39.677
well, which is that um, you know,
companies build relationships with you,

00:20:39.760 --> 00:20:42.237
they get used to using certain models.

00:20:42.320 --> 00:20:43.837
Uh, and and we're starting to see that.

00:20:43.920 --> 00:20:47.517
Like even our even our API business,
which is basically just selling the raw

00:20:47.600 --> 00:20:51.197
model, you wouldn't think that would
be very sticky. Companies have great

00:20:51.280 --> 00:20:54.997
difficulty switching from one model
to another because they have downstream

00:20:55.080 --> 00:20:58.317
customers who use the model and they
like the current model. And you prompt

00:20:58.400 --> 00:21:00.597
and interact with the models
in different ways and they have different

00:21:00.680 --> 00:21:04.677
personalities. It's actually quite hard
to switch. So so I think there really is

00:21:04.760 --> 00:21:08.237
a durable business here. Um,
one quick AGI question and it's a science

00:21:08.320 --> 00:21:12.557
question, which is do you think just
the way transformers work today and just

00:21:12.640 --> 00:21:17.317
compute power alone from a scalability
sense that that is what would get to AGI

00:21:17.400 --> 00:21:19.917
or do you think there's some other
ingredient and maybe there's a technical

00:21:20.000 --> 00:21:24.757
question, but I'm trying to keep it very
very easy that has that be included in

00:21:24.840 --> 00:21:28.197
this that gets you to some place where
this stuff is actually going to really

00:21:28.280 --> 00:21:30.837
think on its own? >> No,
I think I think scaling is going to

00:21:30.920 --> 00:21:34.077
get us there. Again, with small every
once in a while there'll be a small

00:21:34.160 --> 00:21:37.437
modification, you know, so small you
may not even read about it. It's just

00:21:37.520 --> 00:21:41.157
something going on in the lab. I have
been watching these scaling laws for for

00:21:41.240 --> 00:21:44.077
10 years. So what's your what's
your what's your timeline now?

00:21:44.160 --> 00:21:46.077
There's no one particular point, right?

00:21:46.160 --> 00:21:49.877
That this is what I've said over I've
never liked these terms AGI, artificial

00:21:49.960 --> 00:21:53.237
superintelligence. I don't know what it
means. There's just an exponential. Just

00:21:53.320 --> 00:21:57.477
like we had an exponential with Moore's
law, chips getting faster and faster

00:21:57.560 --> 00:22:01.317
until they could, you know, do any,
you know, simple calculation, you know,

00:22:01.400 --> 00:22:04.997
faster than faster faster than any human.
I think the models are just going

00:22:05.080 --> 00:22:07.717
to get more and more capable
at everything. Every few months we release

00:22:07.800 --> 00:22:12.117
a new model, gets better at coding,
it gets better at science, you know, now

00:22:12.200 --> 00:22:15.317
models are routinely winning, you know,
math high school math olympiads, they're

00:22:15.400 --> 00:22:18.757
moving on to college math olympiads,
they're starting to do new new new

00:22:18.840 --> 00:22:23.637
mathematics. For the first time I've
had internal people at Anthropic say, I

00:22:23.720 --> 00:22:26.757
don't write any code anymore. I don't
write I don't open up an editor and and

00:22:26.840 --> 00:22:28.837
and and write code. I just let Claude

00:22:28.920 --> 00:22:30.757
code write the first draft and and all I

00:22:30.840 --> 00:22:34.157
do is edit it. Um, we had never reached

00:22:34.240 --> 00:22:38.037
that point before and the drumbeat
is just going to continue. And and I I I I

00:22:38.120 --> 00:22:41.477
I I don't think there's any privileged
point around there's no point at which

00:22:41.560 --> 00:22:45.397
the models start to do something
different. What what we're going to see

00:22:45.480 --> 00:22:48.717
in the future is just like we've going
to we've seen in the past except more

00:22:48.800 --> 00:22:52.317
so. The models are just going to get
more and more intellectually capable

00:22:52.400 --> 00:22:55.957
and, you know, the the revenue
is going to keep adding zeros.

00:22:56.040 --> 00:23:00.477
Last couple policy questions. Um,
you have been outspoken. We we spoke to uh

00:23:00.560 --> 00:23:04.037
the president of Taiwan Yes. >> Um,

00:23:04.120 --> 00:23:07.517
you have been outspoken about the idea
that we should not be selling Nvidia

00:23:07.600 --> 00:23:11.317
chips, for example, the the most
advanced chips to China. By the way,

00:23:11.400 --> 00:23:14.397
it's interesting that you now have
a partnership with Nvidia. Uh, Jensen

00:23:14.480 --> 00:23:17.397
Huang, who's also been here, was not
so happy with you when you made those

00:23:17.480 --> 00:23:20.837
comments. Do you have
a new view on that? My my my

00:23:20.920 --> 00:23:24.277
view hasn't changed. So I I definitely
will say, and this has this has always

00:23:24.360 --> 00:23:27.877
been the case, you know, I have
an enormous amount of respect for Jensen

00:23:27.960 --> 00:23:31.597
and for Nvidia. You know, Jensen is an
immigrant who came to the the US with

00:23:31.680 --> 00:23:34.837
nothing. He built the most, you know,
the the most valuable company in the

00:23:34.920 --> 00:23:37.117
world. This this isn't personal. This is

00:23:37.200 --> 00:23:39.317
a policy question. This is a question of

00:23:39.400 --> 00:23:44.197
how to def how best to defend
our national security. And there my view

00:23:44.280 --> 00:23:47.877
hasn't changed. It's it's it's the
following, which is if we go back to my

00:23:47.960 --> 00:23:52.437
picture of the models getting smarter
and smarter as we continue to improve

00:23:52.520 --> 00:23:57.237
them. A phrase I've used in an essay
I wrote a year and a half ago was,

00:23:57.320 --> 00:24:00.197
eventually the models are going to get
to the point where they look like a

00:24:00.280 --> 00:24:02.557
country of geniuses in a data center.

00:24:02.640 --> 00:24:05.837
And so once we get to that point, think

00:24:05.920 --> 00:24:07.557
about what that country of geniuses in a

00:24:07.640 --> 00:24:10.597
data center can do and which existing

00:24:10.680 --> 00:24:13.077
country on earth it's plopped down in.

00:24:13.160 --> 00:24:17.877
Um, if it's plopped down in an
authoritarian country, I feel like they

00:24:17.960 --> 00:24:19.637
can outsmart us in every way.

00:24:19.720 --> 00:24:23.317
Intelligence, defense, economic value,

00:24:23.400 --> 00:24:27.317
R&D, you know, and I worry
that they'll be able to

00:24:27.400 --> 00:24:30.837
oppress their own people, that they'll
be able to have a perfect surveillance

00:24:30.920 --> 00:24:33.517
state. And so I have always felt that we

00:24:33.600 --> 00:24:37.957
need to have the advantage here.
And this is a national security issue.

00:24:38.040 --> 00:24:40.477
Right? Some people are saying this is an

00:24:40.560 --> 00:24:45.237
they they they they they say this is an
economic issue, that it's an analogy to

00:24:45.320 --> 00:24:49.357
like the internet or 5G. We need to
diffuse our stack like we needed to beat

00:24:49.440 --> 00:24:53.037
Huawei in in, you know,
in telecommunications.

00:24:53.120 --> 00:24:54.877
You know, I don't I don't see it that

00:24:54.960 --> 00:24:57.997
way. I think we're building a

00:24:58.080 --> 00:25:00.557
growing and singular capability that has

00:25:00.640 --> 00:25:03.357
singular national security implications

00:25:03.440 --> 00:25:06.237
and democracies need to get there first.

00:25:06.320 --> 00:25:09.237
It is absolutely it
is absolutely an imperative.

00:25:09.320 --> 00:25:09.757
>> Do you think it could happen?

00:25:09.840 --> 00:25:12.357
>> we if we sell these
chips to China, that

00:25:12.440 --> 00:25:16.037
just makes it more likely they will
get there first. It's common sense.

00:25:16.120 --> 00:25:17.477
>> Okay, but do you
think that could happen

00:25:17.560 --> 00:25:20.637
here? So we had Alex Karp here earlier

00:25:20.720 --> 00:25:23.717
and there has been lots of worries about

00:25:23.800 --> 00:25:25.397
surveillance here. Talk about it in a

00:25:25.480 --> 00:25:30.877
democracy, right? What what is your
concern there? Um, I should say by the

00:25:30.960 --> 00:25:33.597
way, there was a period of time where
you called the president, this was

00:25:33.680 --> 00:25:38.477
before he was the president,
a feudal warlord at one point. Um,

00:25:38.560 --> 00:25:42.637
so how do you think about the president
today, America today and this idea that

00:25:42.720 --> 00:25:44.957
AI and surveillance could come together?

00:25:45.040 --> 00:25:48.757
Yeah, so so look, I I want to I want
to say over and over again, the you know,

00:25:48.840 --> 00:25:53.157
that I I you know, I think that the the
tendency to drag this down into being

00:25:53.240 --> 00:25:57.397
about specific personalities and and,
you know, and and and and specific

00:25:57.480 --> 00:26:00.637
fights I think is not helpful here.
We should really think we should really

00:26:00.720 --> 00:26:05.037
think at a at a policy level here. And
it's not about one administration, it's

00:26:05.120 --> 00:26:08.997
not about another administration.
We should have principles here. And and I

00:26:09.080 --> 00:26:13.117
think that the principle I would
give that that I think is is is very

00:26:13.200 --> 00:26:14.757
important is actually it can happen

00:26:14.840 --> 00:26:18.077
anywhere, right? You know, a a we should

00:26:18.160 --> 00:26:22.597
we should worry about concentration
of power in democracies, not as much as we

00:26:22.680 --> 00:26:25.077
worry about it in authoritarian um, uh

00:26:25.160 --> 00:26:26.877
states, but you know, we we need to make

00:26:26.960 --> 00:26:30.037
sure that the technology is governed in

00:26:30.120 --> 00:26:34.637
in, you know, in a way that that allows
people to participate, that gives people

00:26:34.720 --> 00:26:38.357
basic rights. And so the formulation
I've always given when I think about how

00:26:38.440 --> 00:26:41.917
to apply these models for national
security is I think we should

00:26:42.000 --> 00:26:44.517
aggressively use them in in every

00:26:44.600 --> 00:26:47.637
possible way except in the ways that

00:26:47.720 --> 00:26:51.597
would make us more like
our authoritarian adversaries, right? We

00:26:51.680 --> 00:26:55.757
need to beat them, but we need to not do
the things that would cause us to become

00:26:55.840 --> 00:26:58.837
them. Um, that is the one
constraint we should observe.

00:26:58.920 --> 00:27:00.077
>> Okay, let me ask
you a separate question

00:27:00.160 --> 00:27:03.397
and maybe you'll say it's a fight,
but you can take it out of out of the the

00:27:03.480 --> 00:27:07.557
the person if you if you want, which
is you have been very vocal about your

00:27:07.640 --> 00:27:11.197
concerns about the chip
issue, but also what could

00:27:11.280 --> 00:27:15.877
happen to jobs, uh regulating reg-
regulating this technology so it doesn't

00:27:15.960 --> 00:27:17.877
do bad things or other things like that.

00:27:17.960 --> 00:27:20.957
Uh, David Sacks, uh who works as the AI

00:27:21.040 --> 00:27:23.117
czar at the White House, uh said this

00:27:23.200 --> 00:27:26.157
about you. He says that Anthropic is

00:27:26.240 --> 00:27:31.397
running a sophisticated regulatory
capture strategy based on fearmongering.

00:27:31.480 --> 00:27:32.997
It is principally responsible for the

00:27:33.080 --> 00:27:35.757
state regulatory frenzy that is damaging

00:27:35.840 --> 00:27:40.357
the startup ecosystem. Again, I don't
think this should be about specific

00:27:40.440 --> 00:27:44.397
individuals, right? This isn't about any
particular administration. This is about

00:27:44.480 --> 00:27:48.717
This is about policy questions. I mean,
you know, going all the way back to 20

00:27:48.800 --> 00:27:52.957
2016 I've written papers about AI right
before I even had a company, right?

00:27:53.040 --> 00:27:56.677
Before there there there even, you know,
could have been a plan around anything

00:27:56.760 --> 00:27:59.357
like regulatory capture. And and by the

00:27:59.440 --> 00:28:01.517
way, almost all the AI regulation that

00:28:01.600 --> 00:28:03.957
we've supported has has exemptions for

00:28:04.040 --> 00:28:06.677
small players, right? The main um, AI

00:28:06.760 --> 00:28:10.357
bill we supported, SB 53, um, you know,

00:28:10.440 --> 00:28:14.517
doesn't even apply at all to startups
with under $500 million in revenue. So

00:28:14.600 --> 00:28:18.717
we've been very careful about this. And
you know, if there's one point again, I

00:28:18.800 --> 00:28:22.357
want to say again, I think people should
focus on the policy. You can throw out

00:28:22.440 --> 00:28:26.117
these accusations and they don't match
reality at all. They don't match the

00:28:26.200 --> 00:28:29.997
reality of the bills we've actually
supported. They don't match the reality

00:28:30.080 --> 00:28:33.117
>> these two worlds right now, which is
by the way, you know, Andreessen Horowitz

00:28:33.200 --> 00:28:36.997
and and others are are have a have one
super PAC. You guys are building another

00:28:37.080 --> 00:28:40.557
super PAC to approach
regulation of this industry

00:28:40.640 --> 00:28:44.557
completely differently. And the question
is why? What do you see that they don't?

00:28:44.640 --> 00:28:47.317
>> So so I, you know, again, I I want to

00:28:47.400 --> 00:28:49.997
keep this at the policy level. What what

00:28:50.080 --> 00:28:55.477
how I see this technology, I I I am
concerned and I can understand where

00:28:55.560 --> 00:28:58.477
folks are coming from, but I am
concerned that there are some who see

00:28:58.560 --> 00:29:01.797
this technology as analogous to previous

00:29:01.880 --> 00:29:06.077
technological revolutions,
as being like the internet, as being like

00:29:06.160 --> 00:29:09.837
telecommunications where yes, there
are some issues, but, you know, the the

00:29:09.920 --> 00:29:13.677
market will figure it out, which I think
was maybe a more reasonable view in in

00:29:13.760 --> 00:29:17.597
these previous technological
revolutions. I think those who are

00:29:17.680 --> 00:29:20.557
closest to AI don't feel this way. If

00:29:20.640 --> 00:29:22.837
you pull the actual researchers who who

00:29:22.920 --> 00:29:26.397
work on AI, not investors who invest in

00:29:26.480 --> 00:29:31.717
some AI application companies, not
general tech commentators who, you know,

00:29:31.800 --> 00:29:35.037
think they know something about AI,
but the actual people who are building the

00:29:35.120 --> 00:29:38.717
technology, they're excited
about the potential, but

00:29:38.800 --> 00:29:42.037
they're also worried. They're worried
about the national security risks.

00:29:42.120 --> 00:29:45.477
They're worried about alignment
of the models. They're worried about the

00:29:45.560 --> 00:29:47.797
economic impacts of the models. And for

00:29:47.880 --> 00:29:52.717
example, the idea that we would put
a moratorium on all all all kind of

00:29:52.800 --> 00:29:56.837
regulation or all state regulation
without a federal, you know, with with

00:29:56.920 --> 00:30:02.157
that without without a federal framework
for 10 years, which, you know, was

00:30:02.240 --> 00:30:05.517
attempted in the summer and I think it
was just attempted this last week again

00:30:05.600 --> 00:30:09.237
and it failed because it was very
unpopular because even the average

00:30:09.320 --> 00:30:11.557
person understands that this is a new

00:30:11.640 --> 00:30:16.677
and and powerful technology. And so,
you know, I think we I I am more than any

00:30:16.760 --> 00:30:19.797
you know, I I am maybe
the most optimistic about the

00:30:19.880 --> 00:30:24.397
upsides, right? I wrote this whole essay
Machines of Loving Grace where I said AI

00:30:24.480 --> 00:30:26.357
is going to, you know, extend might even

00:30:26.440 --> 00:30:31.477
extend the human lifespan to 150 10
years after we get the the country of

00:30:31.560 --> 00:30:35.117
geniuses in the data center because
we'll have a virtual biologist that can

00:30:35.200 --> 00:30:38.717
make discoveries much faster than we can.
That that, you know, it could

00:30:38.800 --> 00:30:43.117
drive, you know, economic growth to,
you know, five or five or 10%. I'm

00:30:43.200 --> 00:30:46.477
incredibly optimistic about
the technology. Frankly, much more

00:30:46.560 --> 00:30:50.037
optimistic than some of people who
describe themselves as boosters of the

00:30:50.120 --> 00:30:53.317
technology. Um, but but nothing that

00:30:53.400 --> 00:30:55.997
powerful doesn't have a significant

00:30:56.080 --> 00:30:58.357
number of downsides. And and we as a

00:30:58.440 --> 00:31:01.397
society, as a polity, need to think

00:31:01.480 --> 00:31:05.837
ahead about those downsides. Saying
that for 10 years we won't regulate that

00:31:05.920 --> 00:31:09.277
technology, it's like it's like saying
I'm driving a car, I'm going to rip out

00:31:09.360 --> 00:31:12.837
the steering wheel because I don't need
to steer for 10 years. Okay, so here's

00:31:12.920 --> 00:31:14.677
the the question about the downside then.

00:31:14.760 --> 00:31:17.557
>> One of the downsides, beyond hacking
and everything else that I know you worry

00:31:17.640 --> 00:31:21.637
about, is jobs. You spoke about it on 60
Minutes recently. But I want to know not

00:31:21.720 --> 00:31:24.837
just that you you think
that there's a good chance

00:31:24.920 --> 00:31:27.757
and I don't want to put words in your
mouth that it could be, you know, half

00:31:27.840 --> 00:31:31.037
of all entry-level jobs get lost. I want
to know what you think should be done

00:31:31.120 --> 00:31:35.197
about it. Absolutely. So, you know,
I I I think at the end of the day I warn

00:31:35.280 --> 00:31:40.157
about these things not to be a prophet
of doom, but because warning about them

00:31:40.240 --> 00:31:42.037
is the first step towards solving them.

00:31:42.120 --> 00:31:45.797
And if we don't warn about them,
then we'll just uh, you know, we'll we'll

00:31:45.880 --> 00:31:49.877
we'll just kind of blindly walk into
a landmine and blow us up. Um, if we warn

00:31:49.960 --> 00:31:53.517
about them, if we see the landmine,
we can walk around it and we can avoid it.

00:31:53.600 --> 00:31:56.517
So, I have been thinking a lot about
these ideas. I've been thinking about

00:31:56.600 --> 00:31:59.917
them inside Anthropic where we where,
you know, Claude is starting to write a

00:32:00.000 --> 00:32:03.397
lot of our code and we're thinking about
how the jobs change. So, I think there's

00:32:03.480 --> 00:32:07.757
several levels of it that maybe go from
short-term to long-term or or just kind

00:32:07.840 --> 00:32:11.877
of requiring more and more of the
resources of society to happen. I think

00:32:11.960 --> 00:32:15.677
some of it can happen in the private
sector and even in our relationships

00:32:15.760 --> 00:32:17.997
with customers. Every customer we work

00:32:18.080 --> 00:32:19.877
with has the following trade-off and

00:32:19.960 --> 00:32:23.037
it's not either-or. They can, um, you

00:32:23.120 --> 00:32:28.117
know, they can increase efficiency by
basically having AIs do what what humans

00:32:28.200 --> 00:32:29.437
used to do. And there's plenty of that.

00:32:29.520 --> 00:32:33.517
Things like, you know, insurance claims
processing or know your customer, whole

00:32:33.600 --> 00:32:37.357
workflows that can just be done
end-to-end via AI and I think we'll need

00:32:37.440 --> 00:32:41.317
a lot less humans for them. It it will
increase efficiency, it'll save costs,

00:32:41.400 --> 00:32:45.717
do the same thing for lower cost
and much less people needed. But you can

00:32:45.800 --> 00:32:49.437
also do things where you can create
a lot of new value. And even in cases

00:32:49.520 --> 00:32:54.357
where AI does 90% of the job, not 100%
but 90%, the humans can be 10 times more

00:32:54.440 --> 00:32:57.917
leverage and sometimes you need 10 times
more of them to do 100 times what you

00:32:58.000 --> 00:33:02.317
did before because it's so efficient
and valuable. And so encouraging companies

00:33:02.400 --> 00:33:05.797
to do as much of the second relative
to the first. We know they're going to do

00:33:05.880 --> 00:33:08.037
the first. We're not trying to stop them
from doing the first, but if they can do

00:33:08.120 --> 00:33:11.917
more of the second than the first, maybe
more jobs can be created than than get

00:33:12.000 --> 00:33:13.997
lost. >> mean we need government
incentives? Is that a policy

00:33:14.080 --> 00:33:18.117
>> So so uh again, that's that's that's
level one. Level two is the involvement

00:33:18.200 --> 00:33:21.917
of the government. I don't see
retraining programs as a panacea, but I

00:33:22.000 --> 00:33:25.117
think we're going to need to do some
form of that. Companies are going to do

00:33:25.200 --> 00:33:28.917
it, companies are going to have to work
with governments to do it. And I but I I

00:33:29.000 --> 00:33:33.157
I do think fiscally at some point the
government is going to need to step in.

00:33:33.240 --> 00:33:35.637
I don't know if that's tax policy, but

00:33:35.720 --> 00:33:40.317
but this world of fast growth, right?
We did this report where we said even

00:33:40.400 --> 00:33:45.557
current models it looks like they
will increase productivity by 1.6%

00:33:45.640 --> 00:33:48.837
a year. That's almost, you know,
almost a doubling of productivity. And the

00:33:48.920 --> 00:33:52.077
models are getting better and better.
So I think we're going to get up to five

00:33:52.160 --> 00:33:54.717
five percent a year, maybe 10% a year.

00:33:54.800 --> 00:33:57.397
That's a big pie. That's a big pie that

00:33:57.480 --> 00:34:01.757
we can we can give out to the people
who are who are not such fortunate

00:34:01.840 --> 00:34:05.597
beneficiaries, right? If the wealth
concentrates, there there there there

00:34:05.680 --> 00:34:08.677
there really is a big pie here. So I
think the government is going to need to

00:34:08.760 --> 00:34:11.237
have some role here. That's level two

00:34:11.320 --> 00:34:13.757
and I think level three is over the long

00:34:13.840 --> 00:34:16.637
run the structure of a society that has

00:34:16.720 --> 00:34:21.597
built powerful AI is just going to have
to be different. If we if we go back to

00:34:21.680 --> 00:34:25.317
John Maynard Keynes, right? Economic
possibilities for our grandchildren,

00:34:25.400 --> 00:34:28.997
right? He invented this idea of
technological unemployment. He suggested

00:34:29.080 --> 00:34:33.397
that maybe his grandchildren would
only have to work 15 or 20 hours hours a

00:34:33.480 --> 00:34:36.917
week, right? That's like a different way
of structuring the society. Some people

00:34:37.000 --> 00:34:41.517
will always want to work, you know,
as hard as possible. Um, you know, there

00:34:41.600 --> 00:34:45.517
there always be segments of society who
who want to do that. But, you know, can

00:34:45.600 --> 00:34:50.117
can can we have a world where work
doesn't for many people doesn't need to

00:34:50.200 --> 00:34:53.757
have the centrality that it does that
that people find their their locus of

00:34:53.840 --> 00:34:56.797
meaning elsewhere or work is about is

00:34:56.880 --> 00:34:58.997
about different things. It's more about

00:34:59.080 --> 00:35:01.837
fulfillment than it is about economic

00:35:01.920 --> 00:35:04.717
economic survival. Um, there there's so

00:35:04.800 --> 00:35:06.997
many possibilities here. I think society

00:35:07.080 --> 00:35:10.317
is flexible and and society can I'm not

00:35:10.400 --> 00:35:14.837
suggesting anything top-down. I think
society needs to restructure itself. We

00:35:14.920 --> 00:35:19.237
all need to figure out how to operate
in the in in the post in the post-AGI age.

00:35:19.320 --> 00:35:23.597
So I think those three levels will go
from fast and and easy for it for, you

00:35:23.680 --> 00:35:27.437
know, individual companies to do to
requiring a lot of consensus and and and

00:35:27.520 --> 00:35:31.077
very slow to do. But over the years
we're we're going to need to do all

00:35:31.160 --> 00:35:34.357
three of these things. Uh, Dario,
I hope you come back so we can have a

00:35:34.440 --> 00:35:38.197
conversation as we have to do all
of those things to figure out what comes

00:35:38.280 --> 00:35:41.557
next. Want to thank you for a fantastic
conversation. Thank you, Andrew. Thank

00:35:41.640 --> 00:35:44.840
you. Thank you so much. Appreciate it.
