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>> Alex Wang, welcome to the show, man.

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>> Yeah, thanks for having me.
I'm excited.

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>> So am I. I like I was telling you
at breakfast, I don't I don't know a whole

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lot about tech, but ever since Joe came
on, I've been trying to wrap my head

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around it all, and it's just fascinating
subject. I I love talking about this

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subject now. So, thank you for coming.

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Well, it's becoming so critical to
national security and all the stuff that

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you're very passionate about. So,
I mean, I think I think fundamentally tech

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is like we got to get it right.

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Otherwise, stuff gets really dangerous.

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>> Yeah. Yeah. Scares the [__] out of me.

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In fact, we were just having a

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conversation downstairs about about you

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having kids and you were waiting and and

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and Neurolink came up and I had to I
had to I had to pause the conversation.

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Dude, I'm like I'm worried about
Neurolink, but it sounds like you're

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pretty gung-ho about it. >> So,
yeah, a few things. So, yeah. I I

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mean, what I mention is basically I want

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to wait to have kids until we figure out

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how Neurolink or other it's called brain

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computer interfaces. So, other ways for

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brains to interlink with with a with a

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computer um until they start working. Uh

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because so there's a few reasons for

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this. First is in your first like seven

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years of life, your brain is more

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neuroplastic than at any other point in

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your life like by by an order of

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magnitude. So there have been examples

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where you know for example if somebody
if a kid is born like you have a newborn

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that has let's say they have cataracts
in their eyes so they so they can't see

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through um uh the cataracts and then
they live their first seven life seven

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years of their life with those cataracts
and then you have them removed when

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they're like eight or nine then even

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with those removed they're not going to

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learn how to see because they're it's so

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important in those first seven years
of your development that you're able to

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you're you're able to see that your
brain can like learn how to read the

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signals coming off of your eyes. And if
you if that's not if you don't have that

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until you're like eight or nine, then
you won't learn how to see. So because

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it's so important that your neuroplast
your your neuroplasticity is so high in

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that early stage of life. I think when
we get neural link and we get these

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other technologies kids who are born

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with them are going to learn how to use

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them in like crazy crazy ways like it'll

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be a actually like a part of their brain
in a way that it'll never be true for an

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adult who gets like a neural link
or whatever hooked into their hooked into

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their brain. Um, so that's why to wait.

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Now, Neurolink as a as a concept or like

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taking hooking your brain up to a

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computer. Um, I kind of take a a

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pragmatic view on this, which is,
you know, my day job, I work on AI. I

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believe a lot in AI. I think AI
is going to continue becoming smarter and

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smarter, more and more capable, more
and more powerful. Um, AI is going to is

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going to continue being able to do more
and more and more and more. We're going

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to have robots. we're going to have
other forms for that AI to take over

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time. And so, and humans, we're only

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evolving at a certain rate. Like humans

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are, you know, we are, humans will get
smarter over time. It's just on the time

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scale of like millions of years because
natural selection and evolution is

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really slow. >> I don't know.
Are we getting smarter?

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[laughter] >> I don't know
about recently, but uh a

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little setback. >> Yeah.
A little a little blip. Um, so if

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you play this forward, right, like
you're going to have AIs that are going

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to continue getting smarter, continue

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improving, like they're going to keep

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improving really quickly. And, you know,

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biology is going to improve only so

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fast. And so what what we need at some

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point is the ability to tap into AI

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ourselves. It's like we're going to need

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to bring biological life uh alongside

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all of the siliconbased or artificial

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intelligence and we're going to want to

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be able to tap into that for for our own

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sake, for humanity's sake. And so

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eventually I think we're going to need

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some interlink or hookup between our

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brains directly to AI and the internet

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and all these things. Um, and it's
a it is potentially dangerous and it's

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potentially, you know, to your point,
terrifying and scary, but we just are

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going to have to do it. Like AI is going
to go like this. Humans are going to

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improve at a much slower rate and we're
going to need to hook into that

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capability. >> I mean, what

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you know that I've already expressed
fear in this and and so I'm I'm curing

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my own fears, I'm just curious like what

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what in your mind what could go wrong?
I mean the there's like the obvious thing

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is that some corporation hacks your brain.
Well, it's a corporation hacks

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your brain which even that's pretty bad,
but that'll be like what they'll like

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they'll like send ads directly to your
brain or they'll like make it so you

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want to buy their products or whatnot.

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But then even worse, obviously a you

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know foreign actor, a terrorist, an

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adversary, a state actor you know hacks
into your brain and um and takes your

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memories or takes you know like
manipulates you or all these things. I

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mean that is that's obviously pretty

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bad. [laughter]

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Yeah. Um and I think that's I to like

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it's definitely a huge risk. I mean for

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sure if you have a direct link into

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someone's brain um and you have
the ability to like read their memories,

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control their thoughts, read their
thoughts, like um you know that's pretty

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bad. Uh I've I've talked to a lot
of scientists in this space and a lot of

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people working on this stuff including

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the folks at Nurling and um you know

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mind reading and mind control are like

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those are the that is where the

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technology will go over time right and

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so um it is like it's something that we

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have to you know like any advanced

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technology we have to not [__] that up

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um but it's going to be pretty critical

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if we want if we want humans to remain

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relevant as AI keeps getting better.

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>> I mean, I interviewed um Andrew
Huberman. Do you know who that is?

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>> Yeah. Yeah. Yeah. >> And and um
and talked to Ben Car Dr. Ben

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Carson about it too as a kind of a

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follow-on discussion. But what humorin

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was telling me is that cuz this whole

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thing is it sounds like it's it's I
don't know a whole lot about neural link

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but from what I've gathered it's it's

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going to help the blind see and it

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sounds like it helps with some um

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connectivity in your joints and bones
and stuff for people that are paralyzed.

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But something that Huberman brought up

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is that I was like, well, if if it could

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is going to help the blind see, then

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could they project a total false reality

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into your head? Meaning, you're seeing

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who knows what [__] in the skies
everywhere? Sounds like they could

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recreate an entire false reality. He said,
"Yes, they will have that ability,

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but not only will they have that ability,
they can they can manipulate

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every one of your senses. touch, smell,

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taste,

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uh, insert emotions into your into your

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brain, fear, what, whatever it is. And I

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was like, "Holy shit." Like, they they
could manipulate your entire reality

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into a false reality. I mean, you think
that's And then I asked Dr. Ben Carson

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about it and he said, you know, who's
a a worldrenowned neurosurgeon, he said,

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"Yes, absolutely." They he goes, "Or,
you know, they could use it for good."

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But he goes, "What?" [laughter] He
was he kind of put it on me. He's like,

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"Well, what do you think would happen?"

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And and like would it be used for good
eventually? Uh or would it be used for

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evil? And I mean, what are your what are
your thoughts on that? You think that's a

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real possibility? >> I mean,
yeah. So, first of all, like we

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don't understand the brain too much
today, but eventually we will. Like,

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we're like science is going to solve
this problem, right? And um everything

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you just mentioned is ultimately going

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to be on the table, you know? um

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manipulating your emotions, manipulating
your senses. The senses thing is already

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happening where I think in monkeys

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they've shown that like um they can,
you know, they don't know what it's like

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from the monkeykey's perspective, but

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they're able to project like on a grid

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of a monkey and get them to like like

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click on the right button really reliably.
Wow. So they they somehow they

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hook into basically the neural circuits
that are doing the visual processing

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visual like image processing in the

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brain and they're able to project like

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things into their into their vision such
that the monkey will like always click

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the button that you want it to collect
to to click. Um and then you know you

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give it you know a treat or something.

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>> Damn. And so yeah manipulating vision,

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manipulating your senses, manipulating

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your emotions. Um uh this is this will

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be longer term but like leveraging your

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memories um manipulating your memories,

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manipulating like uh those are that

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stuff is on the table. The other stuff

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that is I think more exciting is like

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being able to hook into AI and like all

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of a sudden I have encyclopedic

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knowledge about everything and just like

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you know chat or other AI systems do. I

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can like think at superhuman speeds. I

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can um all of a sudden I can like uh I

241
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have like way more information I can
process like I can like understand

242
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everything that's going on in the world
and process that instantaneously. Like I

243
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think there's there's an element here

244
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where it'll legitimately turn us

245
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superhuman um from a just cognitive

246
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standpoint. But then to your point, like

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the the flip side of that is the um is

248
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the risk the other way, which is that

249
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you're going to have uh it's a huge

250
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attack vector. Um, yeah. I mean, in

251
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like I [clears throat] said, I'm not I'm
not super tech, but your company Scale

252
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AI, you basically, correct me if I'm

253
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wrong, Scale Scale AI is basically the

254
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the database that the AI uses to come up

255
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with its answers and answer your
prompts and all of that. Correct.

256
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>> Yeah. So, we do we do a few things. So

257
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we help large companies and governments

258
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uh deploy safe and secure advanced AI
systems. Um we help with basically every

259
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step of the process. But the first thing
that we were known for and we've done

260
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very well is exactly what you're saying

261
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which is creating largecale data sets

262
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and creating data foundry is what we
call it but creating the large scale

263
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data production that goes into fueling
every single one of the major AI models.

264
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And you know if you ask questions
in chat GPT you know that question uh you

265
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know it's able to answer a lot of those
questions well because of data that

266
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we're able to provide it. And as AI gets
more and more advanced you know we're

267
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continually fueling more advanced

268
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scientific advanced information and data

269
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into those models. And then we also work

270
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with you know the largest you know

271
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enterprises and and governments like the

272
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DoD and and other agencies in the US to

273
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deploy and build full AI systems

274
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leveraging their own data. And our
strategy as a company has been you know

275
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how do we focus on we have how do we
focus on a small number of customers who

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where we can have like a really big
impact. So we work with the number one

277
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bank, we work with the number one
pharma company, the number one healthcare

278
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system, the number one telco, um the

279
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number one country, America. Uh and uh

280
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and we work with all of them to like how

281
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can you no kidding take how you are

282
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operating today and take sort of the
workflows that you're doing today or the

283
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operations that you have today and use
AI to fundamentally transform them. So

284
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if you're like the largest health care
system in the world, how do you and you

285
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have to, you know, provide care to all
of these patients, you know, millions of

286
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patients, how do you do so in the most
effective manner? How do you do it

287
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logistically better? How do you improve
your diagnosis? How do you improve the

288
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the overall health outcomes of all
of your patients? Like that's a problem

289
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that we help solve with them. or for the

290
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DoD, you know, there's so much that we

291
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can do to operate more efficiently and

292
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uh and ultimately in a more automated way.
I mean, you'll know this, I think,

293
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better than anyone. And so, how do
you how do you start implementing those

294
00:16:00,080 --> 00:16:03,997
systems with AI? >> Mhm.
We we'll dive way more in the weeds

295
00:16:04,080 --> 00:16:05,517
of that later in the interview. kind of

296
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where I was going with this was if so if

297
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originally it was it was feeding the AI

298
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you're given the data center you're

299
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giving the data to the AI to you come up

300
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with the answers and and and and answer

301
00:16:22,160 --> 00:16:25,357
the prompts and so where I was going is

302
00:16:25,440 --> 00:16:27,597
if if [clears throat] you have Neurolink

303
00:16:27,680 --> 00:16:30,717
in your head and it's accessing your

304
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data centers how easy would it be to

305
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just feed [__] into the data center

306
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that then feeds all everybody that has a

307
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neural link in their head. So it could

308
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be I mean it could be anything. I mean

309
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here here's an example. I'm a Christian.

310
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A lot of people think that AI is going
to manipulate the Bible and change a lot

311
00:16:53,120 --> 00:16:55,997
of things. And so how easy would it be

312
00:16:56,080 --> 00:16:58,797
to just feed that into the AI data

313
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center and then

314
00:17:01,600 --> 00:17:05,997
that's that's the new whatever you feed
it that becomes the new truth because

315
00:17:06,080 --> 00:17:08,157
that's what everybody's accessing is

316
00:17:08,240 --> 00:17:13,357
that specific data. >> Yeah.
I mean I think a yes for sure

317
00:17:13,440 --> 00:17:17,357
that's a huge risk and this is one
of the reasons why I think it's really

318
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important that US or other democratic

319
00:17:20,400 --> 00:17:23,197
countries lead on AI versus the CCP like

320
00:17:23,280 --> 00:17:25,597
the Chinese Communist Party or other or

321
00:17:25,680 --> 00:17:27,997
Russia or other autocratic countries

322
00:17:28,080 --> 00:17:32,237
because the potential to utilize even AI

323
00:17:32,320 --> 00:17:36,077
today by the way you can use it
to propagandize to a dramatic degree but

324
00:17:36,160 --> 00:17:37,997
yeah once you get towards you know you

325
00:17:38,080 --> 00:17:39,917
have neural link or other brain computer

326
00:17:40,000 --> 00:17:43,677
interfaces that are that can directly,

327
00:17:43,760 --> 00:17:46,717
you know, um insert thoughts into into

328
00:17:46,800 --> 00:17:49,597
people's brains. I mean, it's it's

329
00:17:49,680 --> 00:17:52,317
extreme power that has never existed

330
00:17:52,400 --> 00:17:55,677
before. And so, who governs that power?

331
00:17:55,760 --> 00:17:57,757
Who governs that technology? Who makes

332
00:17:57,840 --> 00:17:59,677
sure that, you know, it's used for the

333
00:17:59,760 --> 00:18:03,037
right purposes? Um those are like some

334
00:18:03,120 --> 00:18:07,357
of the most important societal questions
that we'll have to deal with. Man, I

335
00:18:07,440 --> 00:18:09,357
mean, where do you even where do you

336
00:18:09,440 --> 00:18:12,477
even start with that? Who do you trust

337
00:18:12,560 --> 00:18:15,747
to control your [__] mind?

338
00:18:15,830 --> 00:18:20,317
[clears throat] >> Yeah.
I mean, I think Well, it's

339
00:18:20,400 --> 00:18:25,277
interesting. I think the one thing
that I think has been um I think a lot of

340
00:18:25,360 --> 00:18:28,317
people kind of understand it now and we
were talking a little bit about this at

341
00:18:28,400 --> 00:18:30,157
breakfast is like even the degree to

342
00:18:30,240 --> 00:18:34,397
which even just general media today kind

343
00:18:34,480 --> 00:18:38,237
of controls your mind or controls
the like opinions you have or the beliefs

344
00:18:38,320 --> 00:18:41,277
you have. And you know, um, you know, we

345
00:18:41,360 --> 00:18:44,957
were talking about like, you know, is

346
00:18:45,040 --> 00:18:49,357
does does the media prop up certain
military forces to make them seem far

347
00:18:49,440 --> 00:18:50,877
more fearsome than they actually are?

348
00:18:50,960 --> 00:18:52,957
And like, you know, there's like some

349
00:18:53,040 --> 00:18:54,877
lowgrade you can kind of view like some

350
00:18:54,960 --> 00:18:59,437
lowgrade um forms of like, you know, um,

351
00:18:59,520 --> 00:19:02,557
>> propaganda, >> propaganda,
manipulation, all that stuff

352
00:19:02,640 --> 00:19:04,957
is like happening like let's say like on

353
00:19:05,040 --> 00:19:09,757
a scale of 1 to 10 at the one or two
level today. And then once you have

354
00:19:09,840 --> 00:19:11,277
Neuralink or other devices, it's going

355
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to be like a nine or a 10. And um and I

356
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think it's really hard. I mean, I think

357
00:19:17,440 --> 00:19:19,997
I don't think

358
00:19:20,080 --> 00:19:23,677
any country is prepared to govern

359
00:19:23,760 --> 00:19:27,437
technology as powerful as a technology
that we're going to be developing over

360
00:19:27,520 --> 00:19:32,877
the next few decades. Like AI,
I don't know if we're prepared. Um brain

361
00:19:32,960 --> 00:19:35,517
computer interfaces, I don't know if
we're prepared. Large scale robotics, I

362
00:19:35,600 --> 00:19:39,677
don't know if we're prepared. Like these
are technologies that are just so much

363
00:19:39,760 --> 00:19:41,357
more powerful than anything that has

364
00:19:41,440 --> 00:19:43,997
come before. Sometimes people will say

365
00:19:44,080 --> 00:19:47,997
like, you know, AI is the new mobile.

366
00:19:48,080 --> 00:19:49,917
It'll be as big as mobile phones and

367
00:19:50,000 --> 00:19:52,717
it's just no, it's going to be like a

368
00:19:52,800 --> 00:19:58,157
thousand times bigger and more important
and like more impactful. Um, and it's

369
00:19:58,240 --> 00:20:01,837
not clear that we did the best job
regulating mobile phones even. So, um,

370
00:20:01,920 --> 00:20:04,317
there's it's going to be uh it's going

371
00:20:04,400 --> 00:20:09,597
to be really important that we get it
right. Yeah. I mean, [sighs and gasps]

372
00:20:09,680 --> 00:20:12,397
everybody that gets one, I mean,
you could you could basically

373
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instantaneously have your have an entire

374
00:20:15,680 --> 00:20:20,317
army, an entire nation that's linked
into your thoughts, your way of

375
00:20:20,400 --> 00:20:24,797
thinking, and manipulate that entire
population to do who the hell knows

376
00:20:24,880 --> 00:20:29,517
what. Hopefully something for good,
but you know how things wind how things

377
00:20:29,600 --> 00:20:31,357
generally wind up going. But you're

378
00:20:31,440 --> 00:20:33,117
gung-ho about this stuff. Would you put

379
00:20:33,200 --> 00:20:37,677
it in? I would I would put it in, but I

380
00:20:37,760 --> 00:20:40,077
would I would be, you know, I there's a

381
00:20:40,160 --> 00:20:41,677
few things that need to happen before I'

382
00:20:41,760 --> 00:20:44,957
I'd be willing to put it in. First, I

383
00:20:45,040 --> 00:20:49,037
would need to really feel good about the

384
00:20:49,120 --> 00:20:52,157
cyber offense defense posture. Like, I

385
00:20:52,240 --> 00:20:57,197
need to have really good confidence
that I would be able to defend from uh any

386
00:20:57,280 --> 00:20:59,117
attacks like any sort of cyber attacks

387
00:20:59,200 --> 00:21:02,637
into, you know, my brain interface. Um

388
00:21:02,720 --> 00:21:05,997
uh and that's like that's one big bar.

389
00:21:06,080 --> 00:21:09,437
Um and then I would need to feel pretty

390
00:21:09,520 --> 00:21:10,557
confident. I would need to feel

391
00:21:10,640 --> 00:21:15,437
confident that there were um that uh it

392
00:21:15,520 --> 00:21:20,077
wouldn't deeply alter my consciousness
in any major way like and that I think

393
00:21:20,160 --> 00:21:23,677
you would see from data of other people
who like use it and you you know you'd

394
00:21:23,760 --> 00:21:27,597
kind of get a sense just from like other
people adopting it. Um those would be

395
00:21:27,680 --> 00:21:31,837
the two things I would need to like
feel really really confident about.

396
00:21:31,920 --> 00:21:34,077
It's a bad thing. It's a bad thing.

397
00:21:34,160 --> 00:21:36,877
>> Well, the last thing, you know, and
then we should talk about other stuff, but

398
00:21:36,960 --> 00:21:40,557
the last thing about this is um

399
00:21:40,640 --> 00:21:44,877
uh you know, one of the things that you
know, people are there's a lot of talk

400
00:21:44,960 --> 00:21:48,317
right now about how humans will live
forever, right? Or like can humans live

401
00:21:48,400 --> 00:21:50,957
forever? How do you not die? And a lot

402
00:21:51,040 --> 00:21:53,517
of that's a lot of that's focused on

403
00:21:53,600 --> 00:21:56,077
keeping our human bodies healthy and

404
00:21:56,160 --> 00:22:00,717
keeping our, you know, how do you like
how do you take care of yourself? How do

405
00:22:00,800 --> 00:22:04,877
you take care of your human body?
How do we cure diseases um such that like

406
00:22:04,960 --> 00:22:07,197
humans can live to hundreds and hundreds

407
00:22:07,280 --> 00:22:12,557
of years? But I think what's the the
actual endgame is that we figure out how

408
00:22:12,640 --> 00:22:14,077
to

409
00:22:14,160 --> 00:22:16,317
upload our consciousnesses

410
00:22:16,400 --> 00:22:19,837
from our from our meat brains into a

411
00:22:19,920 --> 00:22:24,637
computer. And I kind of think about um

412
00:22:24,720 --> 00:22:28,317
Neuralink or other like other bridges

413
00:22:28,400 --> 00:22:31,997
between your brain and and computers
as like the first step there.

414
00:22:32,080 --> 00:22:34,237
>> Well, hold on. What? There's a whole

415
00:22:34,320 --> 00:22:36,557
another rabbit hole we can So, you're

416
00:22:36,640 --> 00:22:39,837
saying that we we we should be able to

417
00:22:39,920 --> 00:22:45,277
upload our consciousness or you want to be
able to upload our consciousness into

418
00:22:45,360 --> 00:22:48,397
whatever. >> Yeah,
I think I mean now we're like

419
00:22:48,480 --> 00:22:50,957
we're on like deep end of sci-fi, but um

420
00:22:51,040 --> 00:22:53,197
but yeah, I mean I think I think there

421
00:22:53,280 --> 00:22:56,797
will over time be

422
00:22:56,880 --> 00:23:00,237
uh there. So, one I think the technology

423
00:23:00,320 --> 00:23:05,037
will exist at some point. We're we're
not close today, right? We barely have

424
00:23:05,120 --> 00:23:08,237
neural link, you know, kind of working,
right? So, we're not close, but the

425
00:23:08,320 --> 00:23:13,437
technology will exist to upload
your consciousness onto a computer.

426
00:23:13,520 --> 00:23:17,437
>> Holy [__] >> And then,
okay, let's say, let's say

427
00:23:17,520 --> 00:23:19,917
we're sitting here, you know, it's like

428
00:23:20,000 --> 00:23:22,157
50 years from now, this technology

429
00:23:22,240 --> 00:23:25,277
exists. Um, and you're asking the

430
00:23:25,360 --> 00:23:29,197
question, uh, you know, are people going

431
00:23:29,280 --> 00:23:33,437
to upload their consciousness? Well,
first off, there's a lot of people who

432
00:23:33,520 --> 00:23:35,277
who naturally would like people with

433
00:23:35,360 --> 00:23:38,317
terminal illnesses, um people near

434
00:23:38,400 --> 00:23:43,037
death, um you know, uh people who are
like very fringe and you know, like

435
00:23:43,120 --> 00:23:45,997
experimenting with this new technology,
there will be a class of people who will

436
00:23:46,080 --> 00:23:47,197
just initially do it.

437
00:23:47,280 --> 00:23:50,877
>> Mhm. And then um
and then as that starts

438
00:23:50,960 --> 00:23:53,837
to happen and they upload their

439
00:23:53,920 --> 00:23:56,797
consciousness like the if you have a

440
00:23:56,880 --> 00:23:59,197
digital you have these sort of like

441
00:23:59,280 --> 00:24:04,397
digital intelligences um
they're uh you know that's true

442
00:24:04,480 --> 00:24:05,757
immortality. That's the closest thing

443
00:24:05,840 --> 00:24:08,717
you'll get to to true immortality. Um

444
00:24:08,800 --> 00:24:13,437
and so the uh I think it's going to become

445
00:24:13,520 --> 00:24:16,957
like once the technology exists,
you know, when it exists, it's going to

446
00:24:17,040 --> 00:24:21,517
become quite uh uh it's probably going
to become a very natural path for most

447
00:24:21,600 --> 00:24:24,077
humans to go down. >> So what
do you what do you think what do

448
00:24:24,160 --> 00:24:27,837
you think happens if you get your
consciousness uploaded and what would it

449
00:24:27,920 --> 00:24:30,557
even be uploaded into
like a cloud or something?

450
00:24:30,640 --> 00:24:32,477
>> Yeah, it' be uploaded to a cloud.

451
00:24:32,560 --> 00:24:37,117
>> What do you think? Do you think that
you can experience life by uploading your

452
00:24:37,200 --> 00:24:39,437
consciousness to a cloud?

453
00:24:39,520 --> 00:24:44,397
>> Yeah. So, so uh yeah, this is uh few

454
00:24:44,480 --> 00:24:47,757
things. So, first um I'm a big believer

455
00:24:47,840 --> 00:24:51,837
in robotics. I think we're basically at

456
00:24:51,920 --> 00:24:55,277
the start of a robotics revolution. Um

457
00:24:55,360 --> 00:24:59,437
and we're in the very early innings
of it, but people are starting to make

458
00:24:59,520 --> 00:25:02,797
humanoid robots. They're going to get
really, really good. people are starting

459
00:25:02,880 --> 00:25:06,957
to apply them to manufacturing and
industrialization and other contexts. Um

460
00:25:07,040 --> 00:25:11,837
I think the costs are going to come down
dramatically and so eventually yeah if

461
00:25:11,920 --> 00:25:13,917
you you would believe that if you upload

462
00:25:14,000 --> 00:25:16,397
it and then you could download or down

463
00:25:16,480 --> 00:25:19,437
link down to a down to a humanoid robot

464
00:25:19,520 --> 00:25:22,557
then you would kind of experience the

465
00:25:22,640 --> 00:25:26,877
real world like any other world. Um, or

466
00:25:26,960 --> 00:25:30,077
you would you could continue in some

467
00:25:30,160 --> 00:25:35,197
kind of like simulated universe in uh
you could almost like play a video game

468
00:25:35,280 --> 00:25:38,877
in the cloud kind of thing and that
could be like the other alternative.

469
00:25:38,960 --> 00:25:41,357
>> Wow. What do what do you think happens

470
00:25:41,440 --> 00:25:46,760
when you die? uh

471
00:25:47,440 --> 00:25:51,517
you know the as AI has gotten

472
00:25:51,600 --> 00:25:55,037
so um so Elon always talks about how

473
00:25:55,120 --> 00:25:57,757
we're in a we live in a simulation right

474
00:25:57,840 --> 00:26:01,277
>> um uh and I remember when I first heard

475
00:26:01,360 --> 00:26:04,877
him talk about this I was like ah no
this is like I don't believe that I

476
00:26:04,960 --> 00:26:07,117
don't believe we're in a simulation but

477
00:26:07,200 --> 00:26:09,757
um but as AI has gotten better and

478
00:26:09,840 --> 00:26:13,357
better at simulating the world like I

479
00:26:13,440 --> 00:26:15,757
don't know if you've seen these AI video

480
00:26:15,840 --> 00:26:19,917
um generation models like uh Sora or VO

481
00:26:20,000 --> 00:26:22,877
or some of these models but you know

482
00:26:22,960 --> 00:26:26,717
they can produce videos that are totally

483
00:26:26,800 --> 00:26:31,117
realistic um you would most people could
not tell the difference between AI well

484
00:26:31,200 --> 00:26:36,157
we're seeing this AI generated video
and uh and and real video and as that's

485
00:26:36,240 --> 00:26:41,517
happening it's making me think more and
more that we probably live in a simulation

486
00:26:41,600 --> 00:26:44,957
>> no [__] it. >> Yeah.
>> How do you just This is already

487
00:26:45,040 --> 00:26:48,477
fascinating. We haven't even got
to the interview yet. How How do you think

488
00:26:48,560 --> 00:26:50,797
we're living in a simulation? I mean, I

489
00:26:50,880 --> 00:26:53,597
know they they say they they cannot

490
00:26:53,680 --> 00:26:56,717
disprove it. Yeah. You can't like It's

491
00:26:56,800 --> 00:27:01,757
kind of one of these things. There's
there's no way to prove or disprove

492
00:27:01,840 --> 00:27:03,677
that that you live in a simulation. And

493
00:27:03,760 --> 00:27:08,877
so, but it's like it's like it's like
any, you know, afterlife thought or

494
00:27:08,960 --> 00:27:12,957
religious thought like all these things
that are like fundamentally unprovable.

495
00:27:13,040 --> 00:27:15,517
But the reason I think it's the case is

496
00:27:15,600 --> 00:27:18,717
I think in our lifetime we are going to

497
00:27:18,800 --> 00:27:22,637
be able to create simulations of reality

498
00:27:22,720 --> 00:27:26,157
that will be hyper realistic. Like I

499
00:27:26,240 --> 00:27:30,237
think we are gonna create the ability to

500
00:27:30,320 --> 00:27:33,277
um simulate different versions of our

501
00:27:33,360 --> 00:27:37,677
world with hyperrealistic accuracy. Um

502
00:27:37,760 --> 00:27:42,957
and uh and that will happen over the next
few decades. And if if we can like

503
00:27:43,040 --> 00:27:44,477
it's kind of like that Rick and Morty

504
00:27:44,560 --> 00:27:48,637
episode where if we have the ability as

505
00:27:48,720 --> 00:27:51,037
an intelligent race to produce, you

506
00:27:51,120 --> 00:27:54,957
know, millions of simulated worlds, um

507
00:27:55,040 --> 00:27:58,877
then the likelihood is that we're, you

508
00:27:58,960 --> 00:28:01,037
know, we're probably also the simulation

509
00:28:01,120 --> 00:28:05,917
of some other uh more intelligent
or more capable species.

510
00:28:06,000 --> 00:28:09,757
>> Where do you think consciousness
goes right now when you die?

511
00:28:09,840 --> 00:28:11,597
Uh,

512
00:28:11,680 --> 00:28:16,477
>> what if we are what if we are the super

513
00:28:16,560 --> 00:28:21,197
advanced robotics? >> Yeah, I think um

514
00:28:21,280 --> 00:28:22,637
>> and your consciousness just gets

515
00:28:22,720 --> 00:28:27,277
downloaded into another body generation.

516
00:28:27,360 --> 00:28:31,837
Yeah, that's true. That would be that's
that's something like one way to think

517
00:28:31,920 --> 00:28:36,077
about it which is like yeah it's all
this big simulation that's running and

518
00:28:36,160 --> 00:28:38,797
as soon as like you know you get you get

519
00:28:38,880 --> 00:28:43,677
kind of like downloaded or like taken
off or like decommissioned from you know

520
00:28:43,760 --> 00:28:47,117
one entity you get like you know
uploaded to another entity kind of

521
00:28:47,200 --> 00:28:50,397
thing. Um it's kind of that that's

522
00:28:50,480 --> 00:28:52,397
plausible. I think there's another world

523
00:28:52,480 --> 00:28:57,197
where like consciousness is like is

524
00:28:57,280 --> 00:29:00,637
consciousness may not like be that big a

525
00:29:00,720 --> 00:29:05,357
deal so to speak. like it could be
the case that you know I definitely as as

526
00:29:05,440 --> 00:29:07,517
the models have gotten better and better

527
00:29:07,600 --> 00:29:09,037
as the AI models have gotten better and

528
00:29:09,120 --> 00:29:13,597
better um you look at them and uh

529
00:29:13,680 --> 00:29:16,557
you know you definitely wonder if
at some point you're just going to have

530
00:29:16,640 --> 00:29:21,597
models that are properly conscious
and it may just be the fact that like you

531
00:29:21,680 --> 00:29:24,637
know it's something that can be
engineered and if it's something that

532
00:29:24,720 --> 00:29:28,797
can be engineered then um
then all bets are off I think

533
00:29:28,880 --> 00:29:31,917
>> damn it's pretty wild to think about.

534
00:29:32,000 --> 00:29:35,917
>> Yeah. Yeah. >> But uh well,
let's move into the interview. You ready?

535
00:29:36,000 --> 00:29:38,237
>> Yeah. >> All right.
Everybody starts off with an

536
00:29:38,320 --> 00:29:44,477
introduction here. So,
[clears throat] here we go.

537
00:29:44,560 --> 00:29:47,517
Alex Wang, founder and CEO of Scale AI,

538
00:29:47,600 --> 00:29:51,997
a company that's backbone of the AI
revolution, providing the data and

539
00:29:52,080 --> 00:29:53,917
infrastructure that powers the AI

540
00:29:54,000 --> 00:29:56,397
revolution. Child prodigy who grew up in

541
00:29:56,480 --> 00:29:59,357
Los Alamos, New Mexico, surrounded by

542
00:29:59,440 --> 00:30:01,357
scientists with parents who were

543
00:30:01,440 --> 00:30:04,237
physicists working on military projects.

544
00:30:04,320 --> 00:30:07,357
Coding wizard who by age 15 was already

545
00:30:07,440 --> 00:30:09,997
solving AI problems at Kora that stumped

546
00:30:10,080 --> 00:30:13,357
P PhDs. Visionary entrepreneur who

547
00:30:13,440 --> 00:30:16,397
dropped out of MIT at 19, turning a Y

548
00:30:16,480 --> 00:30:18,477
combinator startup into a national

549
00:30:18,560 --> 00:30:20,877
security powerhouse that's helping the

550
00:30:20,960 --> 00:30:23,997
US stay ahead in the global AI race.

551
00:30:24,080 --> 00:30:25,997
Youngest self-made billionaire in the

552
00:30:26,080 --> 00:30:29,437
world by age 24 built a company valued

553
00:30:29,520 --> 00:30:33,037
at nearly 25 billion while staying laser

554
00:30:33,120 --> 00:30:37,117
focused on solving the biggest
bottleneck in AI highquality data.

555
00:30:37,200 --> 00:30:39,597
Unafraid to call the US China AI

556
00:30:39,680 --> 00:30:44,717
competition and AI warning that the
Chinese startups like Deepseek are

557
00:30:44,800 --> 00:30:46,397
closing the gap faster than most

558
00:30:46,480 --> 00:30:49,517
realize. guided by your mission to build

559
00:30:49,600 --> 00:30:52,157
future where AI drives progress,

560
00:30:52,240 --> 00:30:56,397
security, and opportunity. And so

561
00:30:56,480 --> 00:31:00,877
there's a big question right
now that everybody's that

562
00:31:00,960 --> 00:31:03,117
everybody's thinking about. Is AI the

563
00:31:03,200 --> 00:31:05,437
next oil?

564
00:31:05,520 --> 00:31:10,717
Yeah, I think uh few thoughts there. Um

565
00:31:10,800 --> 00:31:13,837
in some ways, yes, in some ways no. So

566
00:31:13,920 --> 00:31:18,957
uh AI is definitely the next um some

567
00:31:19,040 --> 00:31:20,957
ways in which it's it is the next oil.

568
00:31:21,040 --> 00:31:23,917
AI will fundamentally

569
00:31:24,000 --> 00:31:28,397
be the lifeblood of any future economy,

570
00:31:28,480 --> 00:31:30,397
any future military, any future

571
00:31:30,480 --> 00:31:33,357
government. Like if you play it out,

572
00:31:33,440 --> 00:31:36,637
you're like the degree to which a

573
00:31:36,720 --> 00:31:39,357
country or economy is able to utilize AI

574
00:31:39,440 --> 00:31:41,837
to make its economy more efficient, to

575
00:31:41,920 --> 00:31:46,797
automate parts of its economy, um to do
automated research and development,

576
00:31:46,880 --> 00:31:51,277
automate R&D, like you know, push
forward in science um using AI. All that

577
00:31:51,360 --> 00:31:53,277
stuff is going to mean that countries

578
00:31:53,360 --> 00:31:55,597
that adopt AI effectively will have

579
00:31:55,680 --> 00:32:00,717
like, you know, nearly infinite GDP
growth and countries that don't adopt it

580
00:32:00,800 --> 00:32:02,077
are going to get are going to get left

581
00:32:02,160 --> 00:32:05,997
behind. Um, so it is it is sort of the

582
00:32:06,080 --> 00:32:10,157
the fuel that will power the future of

583
00:32:10,240 --> 00:32:13,997
of every country. And by the way,
I think the same is true of of hard power.

584
00:32:14,080 --> 00:32:16,317
Like if you look at what the militaries

585
00:32:16,400 --> 00:32:18,797
of the future are going to be like or or

586
00:32:18,880 --> 00:32:21,837
what war looks like in the future, AI is

587
00:32:21,920 --> 00:32:25,837
at the at the core of of what that is
going to look like. I'm sure we'll get

588
00:32:25,920 --> 00:32:28,637
into that. Um and then the ways that

589
00:32:28,720 --> 00:32:33,357
it's not like oil is, you know, oil is

590
00:32:33,440 --> 00:32:37,437
this finite resource. you know, we we

591
00:32:37,520 --> 00:32:42,397
you know, countries that stumble upon
large oil reserves, they they have that

592
00:32:42,480 --> 00:32:45,837
large oil reserve. At some point,
it's going to run out. Like in Norway, you

593
00:32:45,920 --> 00:32:49,037
know, it runs out at some point. And um

594
00:32:49,120 --> 00:32:52,557
and so it it lends the country power and

595
00:32:52,640 --> 00:32:55,917
economic riches for a time period. Um

596
00:32:56,000 --> 00:32:59,597
and then you exhaust it and then you're
looking for more oil. Whereas AI is

597
00:32:59,680 --> 00:33:01,917
going to be a technology that will just

598
00:33:02,000 --> 00:33:04,637
keep compounding upon itself and will

599
00:33:04,720 --> 00:33:10,237
keep, you know, um the smarter AI, the
more economic power you're going to get,

600
00:33:10,320 --> 00:33:12,317
which means you're going to build
smarter AIs, which means you have more

601
00:33:12,400 --> 00:33:14,157
economic power and so on and so forth.

602
00:33:14,240 --> 00:33:15,437
And so it's going to there's going to be

603
00:33:15,520 --> 00:33:18,637
a flywheel that keeps going on AI, which

604
00:33:18,720 --> 00:33:22,717
means that um it's not going to be a

605
00:33:22,800 --> 00:33:26,957
timebased a time limited
resource, let's say. It's

606
00:33:27,040 --> 00:33:32,077
going to be something that that will
just continue racing and accelerating

607
00:33:32,160 --> 00:33:37,197
for >> the entire per perpetuity >>
and and data is part of that. Data is a

608
00:33:37,280 --> 00:33:39,037
big part of that.
>> Data is the core part of it. Yeah. So,

609
00:33:39,120 --> 00:33:42,397
so a lot of times actually um uh I like

610
00:33:42,480 --> 00:33:45,277
to compare data to oil versus AI.

611
00:33:45,360 --> 00:33:49,197
>> That's actually what I meant.
I [__] that up. I meant to say data.

612
00:33:49,280 --> 00:33:51,197
>> Yeah. Yeah. Well, I mean I think that's

613
00:33:51,280 --> 00:33:56,877
totally true. like data. If you think
about AI, it boils down to like how do

614
00:33:56,960 --> 00:34:01,277
you make AI? Well, there's like three
pieces. There's um the algorithms like

615
00:34:01,360 --> 00:34:03,757
the actual code that goes into the the

616
00:34:03,840 --> 00:34:08,477
AI systems that you know really smart
people have to write. Um I used to you

617
00:34:08,560 --> 00:34:13,997
know write some of these algorithms um
back in the day. Uh then there's the um

618
00:34:14,080 --> 00:34:17,757
then there's the compute the
computational power which boils down to

619
00:34:17,840 --> 00:34:21,677
large scale data centers. you know,
do you have the power to fuel them? Do you

620
00:34:21,760 --> 00:34:23,837
have the chips um to go inside them?

621
00:34:23,920 --> 00:34:25,197
Like that's like a large scale

622
00:34:25,280 --> 00:34:28,717
industrial project in question. And then

623
00:34:28,800 --> 00:34:31,917
um and then data. Do you have all of the

624
00:34:32,000 --> 00:34:35,997
the lifeblood or do you have all
the data that feeds into these algorithms

625
00:34:36,080 --> 00:34:40,077
that they learn off of? And it's really
kind of like the raw material for a lot

626
00:34:40,160 --> 00:34:42,717
of this intelligence. And and so that's

627
00:34:42,800 --> 00:34:45,517
why I think data is is the closest thing

628
00:34:45,600 --> 00:34:48,077
to oil because it is what what gets fed

629
00:34:48,160 --> 00:34:50,237
into these algorithms fed into the chips

630
00:34:50,320 --> 00:34:53,677
to make AI so powerful. Um and

631
00:34:53,760 --> 00:34:55,997
everything we know about AI is that you

632
00:34:56,080 --> 00:34:58,797
know the better you are at all three of

633
00:34:58,880 --> 00:35:03,677
these things algorithms computational
power data the better your AI get. And

634
00:35:03,760 --> 00:35:05,437
it's just all about racing ahead on all

635
00:35:05,520 --> 00:35:08,477
three of these. So when when we see like

636
00:35:08,560 --> 00:35:11,917
chat GPT gro these types of things are

637
00:35:12,000 --> 00:35:15,037
they sharing a data center or are they

638
00:35:15,120 --> 00:35:16,877
all are they completely separate data

639
00:35:16,960 --> 00:35:20,237
centers? They all use they they all have

640
00:35:20,320 --> 00:35:23,037
separate data centers. Um this is

641
00:35:23,120 --> 00:35:27,037
actually one of the one of the major

642
00:35:27,120 --> 00:35:29,757
uh lanes of competition between the

643
00:35:29,840 --> 00:35:33,037
companies is who has the ability to

644
00:35:33,120 --> 00:35:36,077
secure more power and build bigger data

645
00:35:36,160 --> 00:35:40,397
centers um because ultimately

646
00:35:40,480 --> 00:35:42,077
you know as AI gets more and more

647
00:35:42,160 --> 00:35:44,877
powerful the question then becomes how

648
00:35:44,960 --> 00:35:48,317
many AIs can you run so let's say for a

649
00:35:48,400 --> 00:35:50,077
second that we get to you know a really

650
00:35:50,160 --> 00:35:54,557
powerful AI that can do automated cyber

651
00:35:54,640 --> 00:35:58,157
hacking. So it can do like it can log

652
00:35:58,240 --> 00:36:01,117
into any kind of server or log into

653
00:36:01,200 --> 00:36:03,597
another you know or or try to hack some

654
00:36:03,680 --> 00:36:05,837
website or try to hack some other um try

655
00:36:05,920 --> 00:36:09,597
to hack some some system. Um then then

656
00:36:09,680 --> 00:36:13,997
the question is just okay if I have that
how many of those can I run? Can I run

657
00:36:14,080 --> 00:36:18,077
a,000 copies of that? Can I run 10,000
copies of that? Can I run a 100 million

658
00:36:18,160 --> 00:36:22,317
copies of that? >> Wow.
And that all just boils down to how

659
00:36:22,400 --> 00:36:25,357
many data centers do you have up
and running. And that then that boils down

660
00:36:25,440 --> 00:36:29,357
to okay, how much power do you have
to fuel those data centers? How many chips

661
00:36:29,440 --> 00:36:32,797
do you have to run in those data
centers? And how do you keep those

662
00:36:32,880 --> 00:36:35,597
online for as long as possible? And what

663
00:36:35,680 --> 00:36:39,837
data is constantly fueling those models
to keep getting them to become better

664
00:36:39,920 --> 00:36:42,397
and better and better. And so this is

665
00:36:42,480 --> 00:36:47,117
one of the reasons why one of the major
ways that the AI companies compete, you

666
00:36:47,200 --> 00:36:48,957
know, between

667
00:36:49,040 --> 00:36:52,237
XAI, Elon's company, and OpenAI and um

668
00:36:52,320 --> 00:36:55,437
and Google and Amazon and and Meta and

669
00:36:55,520 --> 00:36:56,877
all these companies. One of the major

670
00:36:56,960 --> 00:37:00,157
ways they compete is just who right now

671
00:37:00,240 --> 00:37:03,997
is securing more power and more real

672
00:37:04,080 --> 00:37:06,557
estate for data centers 5 years from now

673
00:37:06,640 --> 00:37:09,757
and six years from now. Um, and so the

674
00:37:09,840 --> 00:37:11,997
the battles five, six years down the

675
00:37:12,080 --> 00:37:14,317
line are being fought literally today.

676
00:37:14,400 --> 00:37:17,677
>> Wow, man. That's fascinating stuff.

677
00:37:17,760 --> 00:37:22,317
Well, couple more things before we get
into your life story here. Got you a gift.

678
00:37:22,400 --> 00:37:25,277
>> Oh, man. >> Everybody gets one.

679
00:37:25,360 --> 00:37:28,237
>> Love it.
>> Vigilance Elite Gummy Bears.

680
00:37:28,320 --> 00:37:31,917
>> There you go.
>> Legal in all 50 states.

681
00:37:32,000 --> 00:37:35,197
No funny business, just candy.
Made here in the USA.

682
00:37:35,280 --> 00:37:40,317
>> Yeah. And um and then one other
thing, got a Patreon account. It's a

683
00:37:40,400 --> 00:37:44,877
subscription account. It's turned into
quite the community. And um they've been

684
00:37:44,960 --> 00:37:48,157
here with me since the beginning when I
was running this thing out of my attic.

685
00:37:48,240 --> 00:37:51,517
And then we moved here. And now we're
moving to a new studio. And the team's

686
00:37:51,600 --> 00:37:56,957
10 times bigger than what it was, which
was just me and my wife. But um it's all

687
00:37:57,040 --> 00:38:00,557
because of them. And so they're the reason
I get to sit here with you today.

688
00:38:00,640 --> 00:38:04,877
And uh so one of the things I do is I
offer them the opportunity to ask every

689
00:38:04,960 --> 00:38:07,037
guest a question.

690
00:38:07,120 --> 00:38:10,317
This is from Kevin Omali.

691
00:38:10,400 --> 00:38:12,957
With AI now able to essentially

692
00:38:13,040 --> 00:38:15,437
replicate so many facets in our of our

693
00:38:15,520 --> 00:38:18,237
reality, do you see a future where all

694
00:38:18,320 --> 00:38:20,717
video or photographic evidence presented

695
00:38:20,800 --> 00:38:25,997
in trials become suspect based
on the ability for any of it to have been

696
00:38:26,080 --> 00:38:29,757
replicated through
artificial intelligence tools?

697
00:38:29,840 --> 00:38:31,677
Uh yeah, so this goes back to what we're

698
00:38:31,760 --> 00:38:33,197
just talking about. I do think AI is

699
00:38:33,280 --> 00:38:37,037
going to enable you to do crazy levels

700
00:38:37,120 --> 00:38:40,477
of simulation and um I don't think our

701
00:38:40,560 --> 00:38:42,957
courts are ready for it. I think that

702
00:38:43,040 --> 00:38:46,797
like the like like Kevin was saying, AI

703
00:38:46,880 --> 00:38:49,197
will be able to generate very convincing

704
00:38:49,280 --> 00:38:53,597
video, very convincing images um in a

705
00:38:53,680 --> 00:38:56,957
way at a like we we're not even really
at that point yet. Like right now, you

706
00:38:57,040 --> 00:39:00,077
can still tell when these videos or images
are AI generated. That's going to

707
00:39:00,160 --> 00:39:04,317
keep getting better and it's going
to be indistinguishable um from from real

708
00:39:04,400 --> 00:39:04,877
video. So,

709
00:39:04,960 --> 00:39:06,797
>> how the hell are we going to discern

710
00:39:06,880 --> 00:39:11,517
what's real and what's AI generated?

711
00:39:11,600 --> 00:39:14,237
>> I think that there's
two things. I think

712
00:39:14,320 --> 00:39:20,567
first people are going to need
really good [__] detectors, like

713
00:39:20,650 --> 00:39:25,517
[laughter] like insanely good.
And I think um I

714
00:39:25,600 --> 00:39:28,797
think kids today, by the way,
already have much better [__] detectors

715
00:39:28,880 --> 00:39:32,237
because they grow up on the internet
where there's just so much there's so

716
00:39:32,320 --> 00:39:35,997
much of everything that they have they
they already kind of like learn to have

717
00:39:36,080 --> 00:39:38,557
better and better um [__] detectors.

718
00:39:38,640 --> 00:39:42,237
Um but uh so that's one. And then the

719
00:39:42,320 --> 00:39:47,357
second is I mean I think there's going
to be um there this is an area where I I

720
00:39:47,440 --> 00:39:51,037
know there's a lot of push for for
various forms of policy and regulation

721
00:39:51,120 --> 00:39:54,157
but um this is going to I mean it's

722
00:39:54,240 --> 00:39:56,317
going to be a major question like hey if

723
00:39:56,400 --> 00:40:00,877
if there's fabricated video or um or

724
00:40:00,960 --> 00:40:03,757
imagery used in a trial and it's

725
00:40:03,840 --> 00:40:06,477
discovered that it was fabricated like

726
00:40:06,560 --> 00:40:10,797
you know what what are the what are
the consequences of that and I think it's

727
00:40:10,880 --> 00:40:13,037
about tuning that such that if you

728
00:40:13,120 --> 00:40:14,797
fabricate evidence or you fabricate

729
00:40:14,880 --> 00:40:20,077
things then um then you know that's
maybe a worst defense then maybe that's

730
00:40:20,160 --> 00:40:23,997
the worst offense of all >> uh
then I think people would then you

731
00:40:24,080 --> 00:40:28,717
deter a lot of usage of those tools then
if if you set up the incentives in the

732
00:40:28,800 --> 00:40:31,437
right way. [snorts] >> Yeah.
I mean what you know first thing

733
00:40:31,520 --> 00:40:35,037
that goes to my mind is the US government.
I mean, just showing you

734
00:40:35,120 --> 00:40:39,037
around the studio and stuff talking
about, hey, this is what the what the

735
00:40:39,120 --> 00:40:42,317
government did to those Blackwater guys
I was telling you about. They deleted

736
00:40:42,400 --> 00:40:44,317
the evidence. Well, instead of deleting

737
00:40:44,400 --> 00:40:45,517
the evidence,

738
00:40:45,600 --> 00:40:49,357
>> they could make new evidence that is a

739
00:40:49,440 --> 00:40:51,597
fake gunfight in the source square,

740
00:40:51,680 --> 00:40:54,557
Baghdad, that proves they're guilty. And

741
00:40:54,640 --> 00:40:57,277
and then it's the government behind it.

742
00:40:57,360 --> 00:40:59,357
You know, we've seen it with Brad Giri.

743
00:40:59,440 --> 00:41:00,877
We've seen it with Eddie Gallagher.

744
00:41:00,960 --> 00:41:02,797
We've seen it with the Blackwater guys.

745
00:41:02,880 --> 00:41:05,357
We've seen it a ton just just in my

746
00:41:05,440 --> 00:41:09,277
small network circle and I could I mean

747
00:41:09,360 --> 00:41:10,637
you see what's going on with the

748
00:41:10,720 --> 00:41:12,557
elections all over Europe. They they

749
00:41:12,640 --> 00:41:17,117
they pulled Georgescu calling him uh

750
00:41:17,200 --> 00:41:20,077
what was it? I don't know some under

751
00:41:20,160 --> 00:41:23,597
Russian influence Marie Le Pen in France

752
00:41:23,680 --> 00:41:26,397
done. I mean, they were talking about

753
00:41:26,480 --> 00:41:28,397
pulling somebody in Germany not too

754
00:41:28,480 --> 00:41:30,717
long, maybe about 6 months ago, and it's

755
00:41:30,800 --> 00:41:33,917
it's just, man, it's [__] crazy, you

756
00:41:34,000 --> 00:41:36,877
know, and and um scares the hell out of

757
00:41:36,960 --> 00:41:41,037
me. Scares the hell out of me because
then they can just frame anybody they

758
00:41:41,120 --> 00:41:45,517
want. >> Yeah. I think uh

759
00:41:45,600 --> 00:41:47,517
definitely one of the one of the

760
00:41:47,600 --> 00:41:50,877
outcomes of AI is that institutions that

761
00:41:50,960 --> 00:41:54,877
have power today will gain way more power.

762
00:41:54,960 --> 00:41:58,717
>> Yeah. >> Um it will it's not naturally

763
00:41:58,800 --> 00:42:00,957
democratizing. It's a centralizing um

764
00:42:01,040 --> 00:42:05,597
kind of technology and so uh

765
00:42:05,680 --> 00:42:08,957
and so yeah we need to build mechanisms
so that we can trust those institutions

766
00:42:09,040 --> 00:42:11,517
otherwise um it doesn't end well.

767
00:42:11,600 --> 00:42:13,757
>> Yeah. Well, let's get to your story.

768
00:42:13,840 --> 00:42:17,197
>> Well, I I have gifts, too.
Do I do I love gifts? Okay, great.

769
00:42:17,280 --> 00:42:20,477
>> Um, so a few things I mean, we're going
to talk about this, but I grew up in Los

770
00:42:20,560 --> 00:42:23,997
Alamos, New Mexico. So, my uh my parents

771
00:42:24,080 --> 00:42:28,077
were both physicists who worked on the n
at the national lab there. This is the

772
00:42:28,160 --> 00:42:31,837
birthplace of the atomic bomb. Um,
I don't know if you saw Oppenheimer, but

773
00:42:31,920 --> 00:42:33,757
uh half of that movie set in Los Alamos,

774
00:42:33,840 --> 00:42:36,397
where I'm from. So, we got a Los Alamos

775
00:42:36,480 --> 00:42:41,117
hat. Uh, Los Alamos
National Laboratory hat.

776
00:42:41,200 --> 00:42:42,877
Dude, >> it's uh

777
00:42:42,960 --> 00:42:48,877
>> very cool.
>> We have some Los Alamos coins.

778
00:42:48,960 --> 00:42:51,837
>> So, >> oh man, >> about
the there's one about the atom

779
00:42:51,920 --> 00:42:54,477
bomb. Uh one about the the Norris

780
00:42:54,560 --> 00:42:57,037
Bradberry who's a lab director. Um and

781
00:42:57,120 --> 00:42:59,677
then uh and then also coin about the you

782
00:42:59,760 --> 00:43:02,397
know the father of the atomic bomb. We

783
00:43:02,480 --> 00:43:07,197
go. We have a uh

784
00:43:07,280 --> 00:43:10,237
a like a copy like a basically a copy of

785
00:43:10,320 --> 00:43:15,117
all the the manual that they that they
gave to the scientists uh that got

786
00:43:15,200 --> 00:43:16,717
declassified

787
00:43:16,800 --> 00:43:18,157
um

788
00:43:18,240 --> 00:43:22,397
>> uh from the from the uh actual uh from

789
00:43:22,480 --> 00:43:26,077
the actual Manhattan project. >> Wow.

790
00:43:26,160 --> 00:43:28,237
>> And this is cool as [__]

791
00:43:28,320 --> 00:43:33,517
>> And uh this one's just a fun one. It's
a uh it's a rocket kit for you and your

792
00:43:33,600 --> 00:43:35,517
kids. >> Oh, man.
They're going to love that.

793
00:43:35,600 --> 00:43:37,997
>> Yeah. Thank you,

794
00:43:38,080 --> 00:43:42,717
>> dude. Thank you. This is going
to look awesome in the studio.

795
00:43:42,800 --> 00:43:43,917
>> That's very cool.

796
00:43:44,000 --> 00:43:46,717
>> Yeah, it's been
kind of surreal. I mean,

797
00:43:46,800 --> 00:43:50,717
everybody calls uh AI the the next

798
00:43:50,800 --> 00:43:55,197
Manhattan Project. And so, it's been uh
it's been funny cuz that's where I grew

799
00:43:55,280 --> 00:43:58,237
up. Uh it's like I don't know.
Feels weird.

800
00:43:58,320 --> 00:44:02,237
>> I'll bet it does. Yeah, >> I'll
bet it does. So, what were you into

801
00:44:02,320 --> 00:44:05,437
as a kid? >> So,

802
00:44:05,520 --> 00:44:07,837
uh, yeah. So, again, both my parents are

803
00:44:07,920 --> 00:44:11,597
physicists and my and my dad's dad was a

804
00:44:11,680 --> 00:44:14,477
physicist as well. So, I grew up in this

805
00:44:14,560 --> 00:44:16,077
like

806
00:44:16,160 --> 00:44:20,157
pure physics family. Um, so science,

807
00:44:20,240 --> 00:44:24,877
technology, physics, math, these were
uh these were the things I was like I was

808
00:44:24,960 --> 00:44:27,037
like I was really excited about as a

809
00:44:27,120 --> 00:44:32,237
kid. Um, and uh I remember like around

810
00:44:32,320 --> 00:44:33,757
the dinner table we would talk about

811
00:44:33,840 --> 00:44:37,037
black holes and wormholes and you know

812
00:44:37,120 --> 00:44:40,797
alien life and uh supernova and you know

813
00:44:40,880 --> 00:44:42,717
far away galaxies and all that stuff.

814
00:44:42,800 --> 00:44:44,237
That stuff was all very captivating to

815
00:44:44,320 --> 00:44:47,677
me. I was thinking about kind of like

816
00:44:47,760 --> 00:44:50,877
basically like you know understanding

817
00:44:50,960 --> 00:44:52,877
the universe so for lack of a better

818
00:44:52,960 --> 00:44:57,117
term. Um, and then I I really like math

819
00:44:57,200 --> 00:44:59,917
and uh I realized

820
00:45:00,000 --> 00:45:02,397
kind of, you know, in about four in

821
00:45:02,480 --> 00:45:05,277
fourth grade I entered my very first

822
00:45:05,360 --> 00:45:07,197
math competition,

823
00:45:07,280 --> 00:45:11,997
which is a thing. Uh uh and I I like uh

824
00:45:12,080 --> 00:45:13,357
it was in it was in the whole state of

825
00:45:13,440 --> 00:45:16,557
of New Mexico. Uh and I scored the best

826
00:45:16,640 --> 00:45:19,597
out of any fourth grader in New Mexico.

827
00:45:19,680 --> 00:45:23,997
Um which uh and then that like activated

828
00:45:24,080 --> 00:45:27,117
this like competitive gene in me and

829
00:45:27,200 --> 00:45:32,317
then I just started like you know I got
consumed by math competitions, science

830
00:45:32,400 --> 00:45:33,917
competitions, physics competitions.

831
00:45:34,000 --> 00:45:36,877
>> What kind of math are
you doing in fourth grade?

832
00:45:36,960 --> 00:45:39,277
>> You math are you doing?

833
00:45:39,360 --> 00:45:41,917
>> Yeah. Yeah. fourth.
I remember let's see

834
00:45:42,000 --> 00:45:45,357
my parents taught me algebra

835
00:45:45,440 --> 00:45:51,117
in I want to say it was second grade
maybe between >> Are you serious?

836
00:45:51,200 --> 00:45:54,237
>> Yeah. >> You mastered
algebra in second grade?

837
00:45:54,320 --> 00:45:58,717
>> I don't know if I mastered it but I was
Yeah, I was playing around with algebra.

838
00:45:58,800 --> 00:46:01,517
They they taught me the basics
of algebra and I would just like spend all

839
00:46:01,600 --> 00:46:03,037
time thinking about it in second grade.

840
00:46:03,120 --> 00:46:05,517
>> It's like seven 8 years old, right?

841
00:46:05,600 --> 00:46:07,597
>> Yeah. Like eight eight. Yeah.

842
00:46:07,680 --> 00:46:12,237
>> Holy [__] Um and then and so by the

843
00:46:12,320 --> 00:46:14,477
time I was by the time I was in fourth

844
00:46:14,560 --> 00:46:16,557
grade, I could do kind of like I could

845
00:46:16,640 --> 00:46:19,997
do some basic algebra. I could do um

846
00:46:20,080 --> 00:46:22,557
some basic geometry stuff like that. And

847
00:46:22,640 --> 00:46:26,237
then uh let's see where where did I do

848
00:46:26,320 --> 00:46:28,877
from there? By the time I was in middle

849
00:46:28,960 --> 00:46:31,437
school, I was doing calculus

850
00:46:31,520 --> 00:46:37,037
and then um and I was and then I
was doing college level math in middle

851
00:46:37,120 --> 00:46:40,077
school as well. So, those are the two
things I was doing in middle school. And

852
00:46:40,160 --> 00:46:43,677
then, um, in high school, I just became

853
00:46:43,760 --> 00:46:46,397
obsessed with computers and I just spent

854
00:46:46,480 --> 00:46:50,477
all day programming. Um, and I realized

855
00:46:50,560 --> 00:46:54,077
like science and math are cool, but um,

856
00:46:54,160 --> 00:46:58,157
but with computers and programming, you
could actually make stuff. Uh, and that

857
00:46:58,240 --> 00:47:01,677
was that ended up, you know,
becoming the the major obsession.

858
00:47:01,760 --> 00:47:03,837
>> Back to the dinner table conversations.

859
00:47:03,920 --> 00:47:05,997
>> Yeah. I mean,
Los Alamos, there's like a

860
00:47:06,080 --> 00:47:09,997
lot of conspiracies and all kinds of

861
00:47:10,080 --> 00:47:12,237
stuff going on about that place. Remote

862
00:47:12,320 --> 00:47:15,597
viewing, all all this stuff come seems

863
00:47:15,680 --> 00:47:21,400
to stem to Los Alamos. But

864
00:47:21,680 --> 00:47:24,957
>> I have two parents that are physicists
in Los Alamos. You guys are talking

865
00:47:25,040 --> 00:47:28,317
about black holes and aliens and [__]
What do you think? Are we are there

866
00:47:28,400 --> 00:47:32,557
aliens? Uh so there's there's this famous

867
00:47:32,640 --> 00:47:35,117
paradox the Fermy paradox which is you

868
00:47:35,200 --> 00:47:37,597
know what are the odds that we live in

869
00:47:37,680 --> 00:47:42,237
this like vast vast vast universe and uh

870
00:47:42,320 --> 00:47:45,437
and there's like you know there's

871
00:47:45,520 --> 00:47:47,997
there's billions hundreds of billions

872
00:47:48,080 --> 00:47:52,477
trillions of other of other stars
and planets and um you know what are the

873
00:47:52,560 --> 00:47:57,117
chances that like none of them have
intelligent life I mean I think like

874
00:47:57,200 --> 00:48:01,517
definitely somewhere else in our universe
there has to be intelligent life.

875
00:48:01,600 --> 00:48:05,117
>> I think so. >> For sure.
The the but the benefit or I

876
00:48:05,200 --> 00:48:08,557
don't know if the benefit but the
but like part of the issue is if we're

877
00:48:08,640 --> 00:48:12,797
really really really far apart like like
millions of light years apart, hundreds

878
00:48:12,880 --> 00:48:15,277
of millions of light years apart,
there's no way we're ever going to

879
00:48:15,360 --> 00:48:18,317
communicate with each other. Like we're
just like super duper far away from each

880
00:48:18,400 --> 00:48:18,957
other.

881
00:48:19,040 --> 00:48:21,597
>> Um so I think that's
plausible. And then

882
00:48:21,680 --> 00:48:26,237
the there's the um you know uh there's

883
00:48:26,320 --> 00:48:30,637
the what's called the dark forest
hypothesis. Um I think this is one of

884
00:48:30,720 --> 00:48:32,637
the things I I actually believe the most

885
00:48:32,720 --> 00:48:35,597
in probably. So you have the firmy

886
00:48:35,680 --> 00:48:38,557
paradox that says basically like hey

887
00:48:38,640 --> 00:48:41,117
what are what are the odds that there's

888
00:48:41,200 --> 00:48:45,597
no intelligent life out there in the
universe? Um there h it's probably zero.

889
00:48:45,680 --> 00:48:48,557
There has to be some intelligent life
somewhere else in the universe. And then

890
00:48:48,640 --> 00:48:51,597
the question is like why aren't we
seeing any like why aren't we seeing any

891
00:48:51,680 --> 00:48:55,517
aliens? Why aren't we like coming into
contact with them? And so then there's

892
00:48:55,600 --> 00:49:00,557
all these like how do you explain why
that is? And there was this um there's

893
00:49:00,640 --> 00:49:04,957
this hypothesis called the dark forest
hypothesis which originally came out of

894
00:49:05,040 --> 00:49:09,197
a sci-fi novel actually uh but is the
one that like jives the most with my

895
00:49:09,280 --> 00:49:11,917
thoughts which is um the reason you

896
00:49:12,000 --> 00:49:15,677
don't run into other intelligent life is

897
00:49:15,760 --> 00:49:18,957
uh if you play the game theory out

898
00:49:19,040 --> 00:49:20,877
uh if you're an intelligent life you

899
00:49:20,960 --> 00:49:24,477
don't actually want to be like blaring

900
00:49:24,560 --> 00:49:26,397
to every other intelligent life that you

901
00:49:26,480 --> 00:49:29,997
exist because if If you do that, then

902
00:49:30,080 --> 00:49:33,677
they're just going to come and take you
out. Like you're basically like a you

903
00:49:33,760 --> 00:49:38,797
become like a huge target for other
forms of intelligent life. And there,

904
00:49:38,880 --> 00:49:41,197
you know, some intelligent lives out
there are going to be hyperaggressive

905
00:49:41,280 --> 00:49:44,317
and are going to want to take out,
you know, other uh other forms of

906
00:49:44,400 --> 00:49:46,237
intelligent life. So the dark forest

907
00:49:46,320 --> 00:49:49,837
hypothesis is that once you become an

908
00:49:49,920 --> 00:49:53,277
intelligent life form and you become
a multiplanary species and all that, you

909
00:49:53,360 --> 00:49:55,677
realize that you're kind of best off

910
00:49:55,760 --> 00:50:00,317
minding your own business and not, you
know, sending all these sorts of signals

911
00:50:00,400 --> 00:50:04,157
and trying to like make contact with
other life because um it's higher risk

912
00:50:04,240 --> 00:50:08,957
to do that than to just kind of like,
you know, stay isolated. And so there is

913
00:50:09,040 --> 00:50:12,077
intelligent life out there. There
are aliens out there, but everybody's

914
00:50:12,160 --> 00:50:14,317
incentive is just to stay isolated.

915
00:50:14,400 --> 00:50:19,037
Interesting. I don't know.
I used to believe in it.

916
00:50:19,120 --> 00:50:22,317
Then I interviewed a bunch of guys.
I don't know. I don't know. I think all

917
00:50:22,400 --> 00:50:25,997
this shit's a big distraction
to be honest with you. Yeah, there's

918
00:50:26,080 --> 00:50:28,637
definitely I mean there's definitely the

919
00:50:28,720 --> 00:50:31,037
the other portion of this which is you

920
00:50:31,120 --> 00:50:35,117
know um UFOs are a conspiracy such that

921
00:50:35,200 --> 00:50:39,837
you know the military can do all sorts
of airborne testing and uh and it gets

922
00:50:39,920 --> 00:50:41,437
discredited because you know people say

923
00:50:41,520 --> 00:50:44,637
it's UFOs and then uh and then nobody

924
00:50:44,720 --> 00:50:48,877
believes it. Like there's just no I I'm
of all the people I've talked to there's

925
00:50:48,960 --> 00:50:53,277
just no hard evidence and then
and then and then it's the well that's

926
00:50:53,360 --> 00:50:55,517
classified. It's like I mean is it

927
00:50:55,600 --> 00:51:00,117
you're on a podcast tour you know but

928
00:51:00,200 --> 00:51:03,837
[clears throat] I don't know sometimes
I think you know this is like all I watch

929
00:51:03,920 --> 00:51:07,037
is the expanding you all the black holes

930
00:51:07,120 --> 00:51:09,117
all the this is what I fall asleep to at

931
00:51:09,200 --> 00:51:11,997
night and uh I don't know I mean they

932
00:51:12,080 --> 00:51:16,637
they found what like Saturn's rings are
all water they think they may have found

933
00:51:16,720 --> 00:51:18,397
you know there's a possibility of life

934
00:51:18,480 --> 00:51:20,797
on some of the moons on Saturn that

935
00:51:20,880 --> 00:51:24,797
would Neptune I think it's made of is

936
00:51:24,880 --> 00:51:29,837
meant is it Neptune that's made of water
like a lot of oceans that are frozen and

937
00:51:29,920 --> 00:51:33,437
so there may have once been life
then there's a they think they found a

938
00:51:33,520 --> 00:51:35,197
pyramid on Mars or something I don't

939
00:51:35,280 --> 00:51:38,797
know I sometimes I think maybe

940
00:51:38,880 --> 00:51:43,277
maybe at any at any one given at any

941
00:51:43,360 --> 00:51:46,637
particular given point in time there

942
00:51:46,720 --> 00:51:51,437
there is only one planet that holds life

943
00:51:51,520 --> 00:51:54,397
as we know at a time and then maybe when

944
00:51:54,480 --> 00:51:58,157
that planet, you know, becomes obsolete,

945
00:51:58,240 --> 00:52:00,557
everything goes extinct, maybe it moves,

946
00:52:00,640 --> 00:52:03,277
you know, maybe it was Mars, I don't

947
00:52:03,360 --> 00:52:05,597
know, 5 billion years ago and that's

948
00:52:05,680 --> 00:52:08,717
where life was and then somehow, you

949
00:52:08,800 --> 00:52:12,717
know, [__] changed and then it developed
on Earth. I don't I don't know. That's

950
00:52:12,800 --> 00:52:16,477
that's that's where I'm at right now. I go
back and forth on this [__] all the time.

951
00:52:16,560 --> 00:52:18,157
>> Yeah, totally.
Well, cuz the because our

952
00:52:18,240 --> 00:52:20,797
star has a life cycle, right? And as it

953
00:52:20,880 --> 00:52:25,997
goes through that life cycle, different
points of our solar system become

954
00:52:26,080 --> 00:52:28,877
different temperatures, have different
conditions, you know, all that kind of

955
00:52:28,960 --> 00:52:31,677
stuff. And so, um, that's a plausible

956
00:52:31,760 --> 00:52:36,397
theory. I mean, I think, uh, I think
it's I mean, I think both that and what

957
00:52:36,480 --> 00:52:38,797
we were talking about before in terms
of like consciousness in the afterlife,

958
00:52:38,880 --> 00:52:42,397
these are like some of the some of the
great questions because you just, you

959
00:52:42,480 --> 00:52:44,077
know, we'll probably
never know the answers.

960
00:52:44,160 --> 00:52:48,797
>> Yep. Yep. What what
were your parents working on

961
00:52:48,880 --> 00:52:53,517
at Los Alamos? >> They were
um Are they still working

962
00:52:53,600 --> 00:52:56,157
there? >> Yeah, my mom
still's working. Uh my my

963
00:52:56,240 --> 00:52:57,837
dad's not working, but uh but my mom's

964
00:52:57,920 --> 00:53:01,357
still working. And so they were part of

965
00:53:01,440 --> 00:53:04,477
uh of the divisions in Los Alamos

966
00:53:04,560 --> 00:53:08,877
National Lab that were that worked
on classified work. Um that uh they were

967
00:53:08,960 --> 00:53:11,037
they had clearance. Uh my mom sells

968
00:53:11,120 --> 00:53:15,517
clearance um with the DOE. Uh, and I

969
00:53:15,600 --> 00:53:19,837
actually remember like when I grew up, I

970
00:53:19,920 --> 00:53:23,197
just assumed they were working on cool

971
00:53:23,280 --> 00:53:26,957
physics research because I was like a

972
00:53:27,040 --> 00:53:32,157
kid and I I didn't put two and two
together. Um and so I I remember when I

973
00:53:32,240 --> 00:53:33,597
grew up I thought the Los Alamos

974
00:53:33,680 --> 00:53:36,557
National Lab like used to be the place

975
00:53:36,640 --> 00:53:39,997
where the atomic bomb was built and then

976
00:53:40,080 --> 00:53:42,717
uh decades later is just like this like

977
00:53:42,800 --> 00:53:45,597
advanced scientific research area where

978
00:53:45,680 --> 00:53:48,557
they're doing research into you know all

979
00:53:48,640 --> 00:53:51,037
of the you know the frontier of human

980
00:53:51,120 --> 00:53:52,637
knowledge and it's just this like great

981
00:53:52,720 --> 00:53:56,477
scientific research area and then um and

982
00:53:56,560 --> 00:54:00,077
it wasn't until I I it
wasn't until I literally

983
00:54:00,160 --> 00:54:02,557
got to college where I was talking to a

984
00:54:02,640 --> 00:54:05,117
friend about it and it like dawned on me

985
00:54:05,200 --> 00:54:08,397
that oh wait, Los Alam's probably still

986
00:54:08,480 --> 00:54:12,820
mostly weapons research. [laughter]

987
00:54:13,200 --> 00:54:17,037
Um and uh and oh that's why you would

988
00:54:17,120 --> 00:54:20,157
need a clearance to [laughter]

989
00:54:20,240 --> 00:54:23,037
stuff in New Mexico. And then uh since I

990
00:54:23,120 --> 00:54:26,237
left they actually restarted um they

991
00:54:26,320 --> 00:54:30,477
restarted uh uh what's called nuclear
pit production but they restarted

992
00:54:30,560 --> 00:54:33,117
basically manufacturing the cores of of

993
00:54:33,200 --> 00:54:36,397
nuclear weapons. Um this was this must

994
00:54:36,480 --> 00:54:38,477
have been like 2018

995
00:54:38,560 --> 00:54:41,917
2019 in Los Alamos. Um, and then I was

996
00:54:42,000 --> 00:54:44,717
like, "Oh, yeah, no, it's it's mostly a

997
00:54:44,800 --> 00:54:47,517
research facility to to

998
00:54:47,600 --> 00:54:50,717
research new nuclear warheads and new

999
00:54:50,800 --> 00:54:55,997
new nucle new nuclear weapons." Um,
uh, and so that dawned on me that didn't

1000
00:54:56,080 --> 00:54:59,277
dawn on me until I was like all
the way in college, but yeah.

1001
00:54:59,360 --> 00:55:03,437
>> Wow. >> So, I my guess is my parents
worked on that, but uh, >> probably.

1002
00:55:03,520 --> 00:55:08,317
>> Yeah. >> Damn, that's crazy. Wow.

1003
00:55:08,400 --> 00:55:09,997
What else were you into as a kid other

1004
00:55:10,080 --> 00:55:12,637
than other than mathematics?

1005
00:55:12,720 --> 00:55:15,517
>> I loved math. I loved I loved coding. I

1006
00:55:15,600 --> 00:55:17,197
loved science. I loved all that stuff.

1007
00:55:17,280 --> 00:55:22,637
Um I uh I uh was really into violin. I

1008
00:55:22,720 --> 00:55:25,757
was really into to um I uh I would like

1009
00:55:25,840 --> 00:55:27,437
I would practice like you know an hour

1010
00:55:27,520 --> 00:55:30,957
of violin a day. Um, a lot of that was

1011
00:55:31,040 --> 00:55:33,837
because there was sort of like uh, you

1012
00:55:33,920 --> 00:55:36,557
know, in some in some, you know, fields

1013
00:55:36,640 --> 00:55:42,157
or some areas there's like there's
just a real beauty to perfection.

1014
00:55:42,240 --> 00:55:45,117
>> Mhm. >> Um, and I think
this is true in like a

1015
00:55:45,200 --> 00:55:48,397
lot of arts, um, a lot of music, a lot

1016
00:55:48,480 --> 00:55:50,877
of a lot of frankly everything. I mean,

1017
00:55:50,960 --> 00:55:52,877
I see it even in my current life, in my

1018
00:55:52,960 --> 00:55:55,517
current day-to-day job, but um but there

1019
00:55:55,600 --> 00:55:58,237
was just like, hey, if you could if you

1020
00:55:58,320 --> 00:56:01,997
practice enough to get to play a piece

1021
00:56:02,080 --> 00:56:04,077
perfectly, then it would like it would

1022
00:56:04,160 --> 00:56:07,197
be beautiful. And if you like along the

1023
00:56:07,280 --> 00:56:12,477
way, it's like total dog [__] until you
get to the point of like perfection. Um

1024
00:56:12,560 --> 00:56:16,317
there's kind there's a lot of beauty
to that concept to me, which is like, you

1025
00:56:16,400 --> 00:56:20,877
know, once you get something totally
perfect, it becomes beautiful. Um that

1026
00:56:20,960 --> 00:56:23,037
was that was captivating
when I was a when I was a kid.

1027
00:56:23,120 --> 00:56:26,877
>> So you were a perfectionist from a
young age and you're still a perfectionist

1028
00:56:26,960 --> 00:56:28,237
today.

1029
00:56:28,320 --> 00:56:32,077
>> Yeah. I see a lot of beauty in like you

1030
00:56:32,160 --> 00:56:36,557
know now I would say I I don't think
I don't think we have the luxury to be

1031
00:56:36,640 --> 00:56:38,397
perfectionists. I'm much more pragmatic

1032
00:56:38,480 --> 00:56:42,077
now. Like, you know,

1033
00:56:42,160 --> 00:56:43,597
like we were talking about, the world is

1034
00:56:43,680 --> 00:56:46,957
extremely messy. Like, like the the

1035
00:56:47,040 --> 00:56:50,237
reality is, you know, stuff is super

1036
00:56:50,320 --> 00:56:53,037
chaotic. There's a lot of bad [__] going

1037
00:56:53,120 --> 00:56:54,957
on constantly. Um, there's a lot of good

1038
00:56:55,040 --> 00:56:57,357
[__] going on constantly, but perfection

1039
00:56:57,440 --> 00:57:01,677
is not really a like plausible

1040
00:57:01,760 --> 00:57:05,997
objective. Like, we're never going
to get perfection. Um, so I'm a lot more

1041
00:57:06,080 --> 00:57:08,797
pragmatic now, but I do see
a lot of beauty and perfection.

1042
00:57:08,880 --> 00:57:11,757
>> I mean, I I'm also a perfectionist. I

1043
00:57:11,840 --> 00:57:17,917
battle it every [__] day. Like I it

1044
00:57:18,000 --> 00:57:21,277
I'm OCD. I did it. But, you know, and

1045
00:57:21,360 --> 00:57:24,637
I've I've read about it. I've watched

1046
00:57:24,720 --> 00:57:29,357
talks about it. It's And I came to the
conclusion, which I hate saying this

1047
00:57:29,440 --> 00:57:31,517
because I am a perfectionist at heart.

1048
00:57:31,600 --> 00:57:36,077
you know that perfectionism can get in
the way of success. Did you find that? I

1049
00:57:36,160 --> 00:57:40,237
mean, it sounds it sounds weird even
like asking you the [__] question

1050
00:57:40,320 --> 00:57:42,317
because you're the youngest billionaire

1051
00:57:42,400 --> 00:57:46,157
in the world at age 24 and I mean you're

1052
00:57:46,240 --> 00:57:49,117
28 years old now. So it sounds weird

1053
00:57:49,200 --> 00:57:51,597
saying did perfectionism hold you back

1054
00:57:51,680 --> 00:57:56,637
but did it? I think um yeah, at some

1055
00:57:56,720 --> 00:57:59,437
point I just like I I like some bit

1056
00:57:59,520 --> 00:58:02,477
flipped and I realized like you got to

1057
00:58:02,560 --> 00:58:07,517
just do the 8020 lots of times. Like you
got to do 20% of the effort. That's 80%

1058
00:58:07,600 --> 00:58:09,837
as good and you just
have to be okay with that.

1059
00:58:09,920 --> 00:58:12,637
>> Mhm. >> Um and you just
have to do that over and

1060
00:58:12,720 --> 00:58:17,357
over and over again. Um so at some point
I internalize that and it's like it's

1061
00:58:17,440 --> 00:58:21,597
like anathema to perfectionism.
It's like the exact opposite. And so now I

1062
00:58:21,680 --> 00:58:24,717
think about as like hey there's some
things where perfectionism really is the

1063
00:58:24,800 --> 00:58:27,917
right answer and there's some things
where you just got to you just got to

1064
00:58:28,000 --> 00:58:30,077
like be okay with imperfection and just

1065
00:58:30,160 --> 00:58:32,237
like speed is the objective

1066
00:58:32,320 --> 00:58:36,077
>> versus perfection is the objective. Um

1067
00:58:36,160 --> 00:58:39,197
>> so and yeah I would say now honestly I

1068
00:58:39,280 --> 00:58:43,837
think more things like most things
are speed is the objective not not

1069
00:58:43,920 --> 00:58:47,917
perfection. Um so yeah I would say I've
kind of had like a whole journey with it.

1070
00:58:48,000 --> 00:58:50,717
>> What what was it that flipped you?

1071
00:58:50,800 --> 00:58:53,677
I think what like uh

1072
00:58:53,760 --> 00:58:56,557
so um

1073
00:58:56,640 --> 00:59:01,117
there's this thing that um Elon says to

1074
00:59:01,200 --> 00:59:02,797
uh people at his company when they're in

1075
00:59:02,880 --> 00:59:04,317
like when they're like a crisis

1076
00:59:04,400 --> 00:59:09,357
situation um and he says like uh

1077
00:59:09,440 --> 00:59:12,877
hey like you know let's say you're
in a crisis situation like people are like

1078
00:59:12,960 --> 00:59:14,557
not figuring out how to deal with it and

1079
00:59:14,640 --> 00:59:17,117
then he asked like imagine there was a

1080
00:59:17,200 --> 00:59:20,557
bomb strapped to your body that will go

1081
00:59:20,640 --> 00:59:23,357
off if you don't come up with a solution

1082
00:59:23,440 --> 00:59:26,477
to this problem. Like then what are you

1083
00:59:26,560 --> 00:59:30,397
going to do? Um and then you know most
time when people actually like think

1084
00:59:30,480 --> 00:59:33,997
through that scenario they like focus
and they get their act together and like

1085
00:59:34,080 --> 00:59:37,357
figure out um like like something to do.

1086
00:59:37,440 --> 00:59:42,397
Um and I think a lot of times startups
are like that. like you're like there's

1087
00:59:42,480 --> 00:59:47,197
so many moments that are so life
and death and so high pressure that um

1088
00:59:47,280 --> 00:59:51,197
you're just in these situations all
the time where you're like you have to act

1089
00:59:51,280 --> 00:59:54,797
and you have to like do something
otherwise you're toast and you just have

1090
00:59:54,880 --> 00:59:58,397
to like figure out what the best plan
of action is and the best course of action

1091
00:59:58,480 --> 00:59:59,677
and just do it.

1092
00:59:59,760 --> 01:00:04,477
>> Um so I think that
that the realities of

1093
01:00:04,560 --> 01:00:06,877
you know having to operate quickly I

1094
01:00:06,960 --> 01:00:10,637
think just over time remolded my brain.

1095
01:00:10,720 --> 01:00:14,797
Interesting. [snorts] Do you have any
brothers? Do you have any siblings?

1096
01:00:14,880 --> 01:00:20,237
>> Yeah, I have two brothers. Two older
brothers. Um they uh they're both I

1097
01:00:20,320 --> 01:00:21,597
dropped out of college and both my

1098
01:00:21,680 --> 01:00:26,637
brothers have PhDs. So um uh uh but my

1099
01:00:26,720 --> 01:00:29,277
my oldest brother is an economist. Um

1100
01:00:29,360 --> 01:00:34,637
and my my uh my other brother
is PhD in neuroscience. So they're uh

1101
01:00:34,720 --> 01:00:37,037
>> Jeez, >> they're smart.
Yeah, they're smart guys.

1102
01:00:37,120 --> 01:00:39,837
>> Whole lineage of geniuses, huh?

1103
01:00:39,920 --> 01:00:44,637
Yeah, I think uh my uh yeah, I think my

1104
01:00:44,720 --> 01:00:49,517
parents are are are uh are probably
still a little a little myiffed that

1105
01:00:49,600 --> 01:00:53,690
none of us became physicists,
but [laughter]

1106
01:00:53,920 --> 01:00:58,957
Oh, man. Well, I'm I'm sure they're
they got to be happy with how everything

1107
01:00:59,040 --> 01:01:03,277
turned out. I mean, wow. >> Yeah.
Yeah. No, I think I my uh my

1108
01:01:03,360 --> 01:01:04,317
parents are super proud of me.

1109
01:01:04,400 --> 01:01:05,757
>> So, where do you go to where did you go

1110
01:01:05,840 --> 01:01:08,397
to school? I mean, where do you were you

1111
01:01:08,480 --> 01:01:12,157
homeschooled? I went to uh Los Alamos uh

1112
01:01:12,240 --> 01:01:13,757
public high school. Los Alamos public

1113
01:01:13,840 --> 01:01:15,757
middle school. There's there's like the

1114
01:01:15,840 --> 01:01:19,677
town is 10,000 or so people. Um now it's

1115
01:01:19,760 --> 01:01:22,877
more cuz they do pit they do

1116
01:01:22,960 --> 01:01:27,117
manufacturing of these like nuclear cores.
So now there's a lot more people

1117
01:01:27,200 --> 01:01:28,477
there. But when I was growing up there

1118
01:01:28,560 --> 01:01:30,157
was like 10 to 15,000 people. So pretty

1119
01:01:30,240 --> 01:01:34,317
small town. And um and there's like one

1120
01:01:34,400 --> 01:01:35,757
public middle school, one public high

1121
01:01:35,840 --> 01:01:39,837
school, a few elementary schools, and uh

1122
01:01:39,920 --> 01:01:42,557
and yeah, that's the you know, I went to

1123
01:01:42,640 --> 01:01:45,997
I went to public school. Um I was lucky

1124
01:01:46,080 --> 01:01:49,677
like I I think those are those are
amazing public schools. Uh but it's like

1125
01:01:49,760 --> 01:01:50,957
it is public school like any other

1126
01:01:51,040 --> 01:01:52,717
public school. And then I would just get

1127
01:01:52,800 --> 01:01:57,597
home every day and um and effectively

1128
01:01:57,680 --> 01:02:03,000
like do math and science like every day.

1129
01:02:04,080 --> 01:02:06,077
What

1130
01:02:06,160 --> 01:02:10,317
like what how do you go what what is the

1131
01:02:10,400 --> 01:02:12,957
average second grader? I mean you said

1132
01:02:13,040 --> 01:02:15,997
you had learned algebra in second grade.

1133
01:02:16,080 --> 01:02:19,517
What what is an average? It's been
a long time since I've been in second

1134
01:02:19,600 --> 01:02:23,917
grade. things may have changed,
but I'm pretty sure it's basic addition.

1135
01:02:24,000 --> 01:02:27,277
>> Yeah, I think it's like addition. Maybe
you get to your times tables. Not sure.

1136
01:02:27,360 --> 01:02:29,277
>> Yeah, maybe some multiplication tables.

1137
01:02:29,360 --> 01:02:33,037
>> Yeah. Yeah. >> I mean, so how do you

1138
01:02:33,120 --> 01:02:36,237
Dude, what's what is that like to go to

1139
01:02:36,320 --> 01:02:38,877
go from the night before studying

1140
01:02:38,960 --> 01:02:41,917
algebra to

1141
01:02:42,000 --> 01:02:44,397
2 plus 2 is four?

1142
01:02:44,480 --> 01:02:47,597
>> Yeah. I uh

1143
01:02:47,680 --> 01:02:53,037
I like M I definitely remember in school

1144
01:02:53,120 --> 01:02:56,317
like I think like a lot of a lot of kids

1145
01:02:56,400 --> 01:02:59,357
in general just sort of like

1146
01:02:59,440 --> 01:03:03,277
generally kind of um buying out of the

1147
01:03:03,360 --> 01:03:08,077
whole thing if that makes sense like
like kind of just um tuning out and

1148
01:03:08,160 --> 01:03:10,237
daydreaming and just kind of like

1149
01:03:10,320 --> 01:03:12,957
ignoring what was happening in classes.

1150
01:03:13,040 --> 01:03:17,597
Um uh that definitely that definitely
started happening and then I what you

1151
01:03:17,680 --> 01:03:21,197
know what what I would actually do
or focus on is like go back and then do

1152
01:03:21,280 --> 01:03:25,677
math at home. I mean you're more
you're more advanced than the teacher.

1153
01:03:25,760 --> 01:03:27,997
>> There were I remember
one time there was

1154
01:03:28,080 --> 01:03:31,677
like uh there was the good thing about

1155
01:03:31,760 --> 01:03:33,517
what you know this the school of the I

1156
01:03:33,600 --> 01:03:36,237
went to is like the teachers

1157
01:03:36,320 --> 01:03:39,757
were really like also invested in my

1158
01:03:39,840 --> 01:03:43,037
education. like I think they um many of

1159
01:03:43,120 --> 01:03:45,837
my teachers wanted to see me like thrive

1160
01:03:45,920 --> 01:03:50,477
and continue learning and um and that
was that was awesome. Like I could I can

1161
01:03:50,560 --> 01:03:52,877
imagine a totally separate
school where it's like

1162
01:03:52,960 --> 01:03:57,757
>> the teachers don't
care because you know >> um

1163
01:03:57,840 --> 01:04:01,277
you know it's just like their lives are
chaotic, the classroom's chaotic, all

1164
01:04:01,360 --> 01:04:04,317
that kind of stuff. But but I'd lucky
to have teachers who really cared.

1165
01:04:04,400 --> 01:04:07,917
>> Yeah. I mean

1166
01:04:08,000 --> 01:04:10,877
seems like it worked out well. I mean,

1167
01:04:10,960 --> 01:04:12,717
for all the success that you have

1168
01:04:12,800 --> 01:04:17,997
amassed in 28 years, I mean, you're
a very grounded person, and I never really

1169
01:04:18,080 --> 01:04:22,397
know what I'm going to get with you guys.
At breakfast, I'm I'm I was super

1170
01:04:22,480 --> 01:04:26,957
impressed. I'm like, "Wow, this guy's
like really grounded person." And seems

1171
01:04:27,040 --> 01:04:29,277
like a really good person.
So, >> Oh, too nice.

1172
01:04:29,360 --> 01:04:31,037
>> Kudos to you, man.

1173
01:04:31,120 --> 01:04:37,720
>> But hey, let's take a quick break.
When we come back, we'll get into MIT.

1174
01:04:50,160 --> 01:04:53,277
All right, Alex, we're back from the
break. We're getting ready to move into

1175
01:04:53,360 --> 01:04:56,717
you going to college. So,
you you started at MIT, correct?

1176
01:04:56,800 --> 01:04:58,717
>> Yep. >> How did that go?

1177
01:04:58,800 --> 01:05:03,277
>> Yeah. So, let's see. I was uh so I'll

1178
01:05:03,360 --> 01:05:05,037
say the first the few years before that.

1179
01:05:05,120 --> 01:05:07,517
So, I dropped out
of of high school, actually.

1180
01:05:07,600 --> 01:05:08,957
>> Oh, you dropped out of high school?

1181
01:05:09,040 --> 01:05:11,437
>> Yeah. Yeah, I dropped
out of high school. Um,

1182
01:05:11,520 --> 01:05:13,917
>> why not? Why was wasn't challenging

1183
01:05:14,000 --> 01:05:15,837
enough for you?

1184
01:05:15,920 --> 01:05:19,517
>> Uh, I dropped out a year early to to go

1185
01:05:19,600 --> 01:05:22,877
work at uh Quora at this tech company.

1186
01:05:22,960 --> 01:05:24,957
Um, I think a lot of people run into

1187
01:05:25,040 --> 01:05:27,037
Quora, like the question answer website.

1188
01:05:27,120 --> 01:05:29,917
Uh, but uh but I went to go work at a

1189
01:05:30,000 --> 01:05:33,597
tech company for a year. Um and uh and

1190
01:05:33,680 --> 01:05:37,277
then after a year of that I decided okay
it's time to go to college. So I went to

1191
01:05:37,360 --> 01:05:42,237
I I went to MIT. >> Yeah.
15 your stump in PhDs.

1192
01:05:42,320 --> 01:05:44,237
>> It was maybe not quite that maybe not

1193
01:05:44,320 --> 01:05:46,397
quite that early but uh but yeah like by

1194
01:05:46,480 --> 01:05:50,317
16 17. Um yeah was uh I was more I was

1195
01:05:50,400 --> 01:05:51,997
more competent by that point.

1196
01:05:52,080 --> 01:05:54,157
>> What are you stumping these guys on?

1197
01:05:54,240 --> 01:05:58,717
>> So um well at that point that was like

1198
01:05:58,800 --> 01:06:02,157
early early AI. It wasn't even called
AI yet. It was called machine learning.

1199
01:06:02,240 --> 01:06:05,197
That was like the more popular term. Um

1200
01:06:05,280 --> 01:06:07,037
and it was about training different

1201
01:06:07,120 --> 01:06:11,277
algorithms that would you know uh rerank

1202
01:06:11,360 --> 01:06:13,837
content. It was just like all the like

1203
01:06:13,920 --> 01:06:15,837
um all the algorithms for like these

1204
01:06:15,920 --> 01:06:18,797
social media style um style things and

1205
01:06:18,880 --> 01:06:23,677
it's like okay what algorithm creates
the most engagement or what algorithm

1206
01:06:23,760 --> 01:06:28,237
like gets people you know the most
hooked on on these feeds. That's what I

1207
01:06:28,320 --> 01:06:29,757
that's what I was working on back then.

1208
01:06:29,840 --> 01:06:33,997
>> Gotcha. Um, and so, uh, so I went, so I

1209
01:06:34,080 --> 01:06:36,557
I worked I worked for a bit and then I

1210
01:06:36,640 --> 01:06:40,317
went to MIT and, um, when

1211
01:06:40,400 --> 01:06:42,797
>> what are you,
sorry to interrupt, couple

1212
01:06:42,880 --> 01:06:44,877
more questions.

1213
01:06:44,960 --> 01:06:49,437
What is it like for you to be 16, 17

1214
01:06:49,520 --> 01:06:53,917
years old stumping PhDs?

1215
01:06:54,000 --> 01:06:57,997
I mean, is that is that just
like normal life for you?

1216
01:06:58,080 --> 01:06:59,597
I mean, you you know what I mean? like

1217
01:06:59,680 --> 01:07:02,717
does it does it set in like holy [__]

1218
01:07:02,800 --> 01:07:07,277
I'm really [__] smart you know or

1219
01:07:07,360 --> 01:07:10,717
>> I think um I think something that I

1220
01:07:10,800 --> 01:07:16,477
internalized pretty early on was that um

1221
01:07:16,560 --> 01:07:19,757
was that focus was really really

1222
01:07:19,840 --> 01:07:21,837
critical and so I didn't think

1223
01:07:21,920 --> 01:07:25,357
necessarily I mean like I think a lot of

1224
01:07:25,440 --> 01:07:29,837
people are really smart and I don't
know if necessarily I'm like way smarter

1225
01:07:29,920 --> 01:07:31,517
fundamentally than a lot of these other

1226
01:07:31,600 --> 01:07:34,957
people, but I was like hyperfocused on

1227
01:07:35,040 --> 01:07:38,317
math as a kid and then hyperfocused on

1228
01:07:38,400 --> 01:07:40,157
phys physics and then in high school

1229
01:07:40,240 --> 01:07:42,237
just hyperfocused on programming and

1230
01:07:42,320 --> 01:07:46,157
then um and so if you if you're like

1231
01:07:46,240 --> 01:07:49,437
hyperfocused and you're
just like you like really

1232
01:07:49,520 --> 01:07:52,637
invest the time and the effort you can

1233
01:07:52,720 --> 01:07:55,037
make really really fast progress. Mhm.

1234
01:07:55,120 --> 01:07:58,157
>> So, one of the things
that I always like

1235
01:07:58,240 --> 01:08:00,797
I I've believed in for a long time is

1236
01:08:00,880 --> 01:08:05,517
that if you if you overdo things, like

1237
01:08:05,600 --> 01:08:08,557
you like really like invest lots of

1238
01:08:08,640 --> 01:08:12,557
time, lots of effort, you go the extra
mile, you go the extra 10 miles, and

1239
01:08:12,640 --> 01:08:14,797
you're like constantly overdoing things,

1240
01:08:14,880 --> 01:08:19,277
then you will improve faster than

1241
01:08:19,360 --> 01:08:24,157
anybody else by many times. Um, and a lot
of other people, maybe they're just

1242
01:08:24,240 --> 01:08:26,877
not going the extra mile or maybe
they're just not as focused or, you

1243
01:08:26,960 --> 01:08:28,717
know, they're like meandering a bit

1244
01:08:28,800 --> 01:08:32,317
more. And so that's really like I I

1245
01:08:32,400 --> 01:08:35,757
definitely like for me, I think a lot of

1246
01:08:35,840 --> 01:08:38,797
a lot of what I attribute um being able

1247
01:08:38,880 --> 01:08:42,077
to accomplish so much to is really about

1248
01:08:42,160 --> 01:08:45,437
focus and and overdoing it, going the

1249
01:08:45,520 --> 01:08:50,157
extra mile. Um, that's that's what I
think it boils down to. What did your

1250
01:08:50,240 --> 01:08:52,797
parents think when you
dropped out of school?

1251
01:08:52,880 --> 01:08:56,877
>> Um, you know, they my parents I think

1252
01:08:56,960 --> 01:08:58,637
still probably really want me to get a

1253
01:08:58,720 --> 01:09:02,637
PhD and and do scientific research. So,

1254
01:09:02,720 --> 01:09:05,757
um, uh, they

1255
01:09:05,840 --> 01:09:08,957
I think they view and I respect this

1256
01:09:09,040 --> 01:09:11,917
belief uh, you know, I think they view

1257
01:09:12,000 --> 01:09:13,597
the pursuit of science, the pursuit of

1258
01:09:13,680 --> 01:09:18,397
knowledge as above all else. Um and and

1259
01:09:18,480 --> 01:09:22,077
so I would always tell them, hey,
I'm just, you know, this is like a little

1260
01:09:22,160 --> 01:09:26,077
detour, but ultimately I'm going to come
back and, you know, finish my degree and

1261
01:09:26,160 --> 01:09:28,797
finish my, you know, get a PhD and I'll

1262
01:09:28,880 --> 01:09:33,357
be on the straight and narrow. Um uh so
that's what I always what I was always

1263
01:09:33,440 --> 01:09:37,357
tell them, but uh and then at some point
it just didn't be it wasn't believable,

1264
01:09:37,440 --> 01:09:40,237
so [laughter] I just
stopped telling them that.

1265
01:09:40,320 --> 01:09:43,197
>> Why did you decide to go to school? I

1266
01:09:43,280 --> 01:09:46,797
went to school because um

1267
01:09:46,880 --> 01:09:50,557
uh well there were two things. One was

1268
01:09:50,640 --> 01:09:53,517
like genuinely I wanted to learn a lot

1269
01:09:53,600 --> 01:09:57,277
about AI very quickly and I knew I could

1270
01:09:57,360 --> 01:10:00,477
kind of do that while working maybe but

1271
01:10:00,560 --> 01:10:02,157
um the best thing to do really would be

1272
01:10:02,240 --> 01:10:05,597
to like go to school like invest all my

1273
01:10:05,680 --> 01:10:08,717
time into it and and uh and try to learn

1274
01:10:08,800 --> 01:10:11,517
learn very very quickly. Um and then the

1275
01:10:11,600 --> 01:10:14,397
second thing was like you know almost

1276
01:10:14,480 --> 01:10:17,197
anyone you'll not anyone but like many

1277
01:10:17,280 --> 01:10:21,757
many people if you ask them like what
were the best years of your life like a

1278
01:10:21,840 --> 01:10:27,437
lot of people will say their college
years and so I was like [__] I can't I'm

1279
01:10:27,520 --> 01:10:28,637
not going to sacrifice the college

1280
01:10:28,720 --> 01:10:33,597
years. Um so so uh yeah I went to school

1281
01:10:33,680 --> 01:10:36,957
I like I decided to just go really

1282
01:10:37,040 --> 01:10:39,437
really deep into AI. I took all of the

1283
01:10:39,520 --> 01:10:42,077
AI courses I could um uh while I was at

1284
01:10:42,160 --> 01:10:44,877
MIT. I was only there for a year, but I

1285
01:10:44,960 --> 01:10:48,397
I started out I remember I took a um I

1286
01:10:48,480 --> 01:10:50,477
wanted to take the the sort of like

1287
01:10:50,560 --> 01:10:55,597
hardest machine learning course
the first semester I got there and the my

1288
01:10:55,680 --> 01:10:59,357
freshman adviser, the person who was like
I get all my courses approved with

1289
01:10:59,440 --> 01:11:03,357
was the professor of that course. Um,
this just like happened to be the case.

1290
01:11:03,440 --> 01:11:05,677
And uh, I like signed up for her course

1291
01:11:05,760 --> 01:11:10,397
and then she she said like, "You're
a freshman. You're you're not going to,

1292
01:11:10,480 --> 01:11:13,117
you know, this is going to be this is
going to be too much for you." And I was

1293
01:11:13,200 --> 01:11:16,317
like, "Ah, just give me a chance.
Like, you know, I I I just want to try it.

1294
01:11:16,400 --> 01:11:19,597
Like, I'm really passionate about
the topic." And she's like, "Okay, well,

1295
01:11:19,680 --> 01:11:23,517
we'll let you uh we'll let you go till
the first, you know, for the first few

1296
01:11:23,600 --> 01:11:25,837
weeks and see how you do." And so then I

1297
01:11:25,920 --> 01:11:29,517
get in and then uh I remember I was like

1298
01:11:29,600 --> 01:11:33,437
I felt uh I felt like the stakes were
really high cuz like I wanted to like

1299
01:11:33,520 --> 01:11:35,357
prove that I could do this. And so the

1300
01:11:35,440 --> 01:11:39,437
first test rolls around and uh I think

1301
01:11:39,520 --> 01:11:43,517
by like sheer luck it just happened
to mostly be about things that like like

1302
01:11:43,600 --> 01:11:45,517
there were a lot of things in the course
I didn't understand but happened to be

1303
01:11:45,600 --> 01:11:49,917
about stuff that I did understand in the
course pretty well and I got like one of

1304
01:11:50,000 --> 01:11:52,397
the top marks in that course and there
were like hundreds of people in this

1305
01:11:52,480 --> 01:11:57,117
class. Um, and so then after that point,
the professor let me do whatever I

1306
01:11:57,200 --> 01:11:58,877
wanted. And then

1307
01:11:58,960 --> 01:12:01,837
>> uh, and so then I did all of these I I

1308
01:12:01,920 --> 01:12:04,157
was I went really deep into AI and all

1309
01:12:04,240 --> 01:12:06,797
the and all the AI course work at MIT.

1310
01:12:06,880 --> 01:12:10,717
Um, and then this was the year when uh,

1311
01:12:10,800 --> 01:12:13,197
DeepMind, the this like AI company out

1312
01:12:13,280 --> 01:12:15,917
of London, came out with Alph Go, which

1313
01:12:16,000 --> 01:12:19,677
was the first AI that beat um, the best

1314
01:12:19,760 --> 01:12:23,757
Go players in the world, which
was viewed at that point as like probably

1315
01:12:23,840 --> 01:12:27,757
the hardest strategy game or the hardest
sort of like um, yeah, the hardest

1316
01:12:27,840 --> 01:12:29,997
strategy game for AIs to beat. And that

1317
01:12:30,080 --> 01:12:32,957
was a big deal. And then I started

1318
01:12:33,040 --> 01:12:37,597
tinkering with AI on my own. So, I built
I wanted to build like a camera inside

1319
01:12:37,680 --> 01:12:41,607
my fridge that would tell me when
my roommates were stealing my food.

1320
01:12:41,690 --> 01:12:46,477
[laughter] And uh and and so
I started tinkering

1321
01:12:46,560 --> 01:12:52,077
with it. And then I pretty quickly
realized um uh kind of what we're just

1322
01:12:52,160 --> 01:12:56,717
what we were talking about earlier
that data was going to be like that

1323
01:12:56,800 --> 01:12:58,477
everything was going to be blocked on

1324
01:12:58,560 --> 01:13:01,597
data. like if we no matter what you

1325
01:13:01,680 --> 01:13:04,397
wanted AI to do that was that was going

1326
01:13:04,480 --> 01:13:09,517
to rely on data to make the AI do those
things. Um and so I and I looked around

1327
01:13:09,600 --> 01:13:12,557
I was like nobody's working on this
problem. You know you have plenty of

1328
01:13:12,640 --> 01:13:15,437
guys working on building great algorithms.
You have plenty of people

1329
01:13:15,520 --> 01:13:17,597
working on building the chips and the

1330
01:13:17,680 --> 01:13:20,317
computational capacity and and um and

1331
01:13:20,400 --> 01:13:25,917
all that. Nobody working on data. So I
was you know I was impatient. [snorts]

1332
01:13:26,000 --> 01:13:28,237
You know I was 19 years old. I was kind
of impatient. And I was like, "Well, if

1333
01:13:28,320 --> 01:13:32,077
nobody's going to do it, I might
as well do it." Dropped out, started the

1334
01:13:32,160 --> 01:13:34,877
company, and was off to the races. Um,

1335
01:13:34,960 --> 01:13:39,677
>> Damn. So, did you uh perfect the
the refrigerator AI to tell you if your

1336
01:13:39,760 --> 01:13:41,357
roommates are stealing your food?

1337
01:13:41,440 --> 01:13:43,597
>> I uh that was part
of the problem. I was

1338
01:13:43,680 --> 01:13:48,477
like I was I I was trying to build
it and then I realized I didn't have

1339
01:13:48,560 --> 01:13:52,397
anywhere near enough data. So, it always
like fire incorrectly and always have

1340
01:13:52,480 --> 01:13:54,317
false positives, false negatives, etc.

1341
01:13:54,400 --> 01:13:59,197
And then um and I realized like uh then

1342
01:13:59,280 --> 01:14:01,997
that was like the light bulb moment.
I was like, "Oh [__] if I really want to

1343
01:14:02,080 --> 01:14:05,357
make this, I need like like a million

1344
01:14:05,440 --> 01:14:09,437
times more data than I have now."
And that's going to be true for like every

1345
01:14:09,520 --> 01:14:12,157
AI thing that anyone ever wants to build.

1346
01:14:12,240 --> 01:14:16,797
>> Um and so that was kind of the
the genesis of the >> the idea really.

1347
01:14:16,880 --> 01:14:18,557
>> So you left MIT.

1348
01:14:18,640 --> 01:14:22,397
>> Left MIT. I remember I moved I I flew

1349
01:14:22,480 --> 01:14:27,037
straight from Boston to San Francisco

1350
01:14:27,120 --> 01:14:30,957
um to start the company. Uh and um

1351
01:14:31,040 --> 01:14:34,717
basically immediately went
from like at 19 years old

1352
01:14:34,800 --> 01:14:37,357
>> 19 years old. Yeah. I immediately left

1353
01:14:37,440 --> 01:14:40,477
and then I started coding [laughter] um

1354
01:14:40,560 --> 01:14:42,717
in San Francisco and I was part of this

1355
01:14:42,800 --> 01:14:44,877
uh this like accelerator like I was part

1356
01:14:44,960 --> 01:14:47,677
of this program called Y Combinator and

1357
01:14:47,760 --> 01:14:49,757
um and it's kind of like the Hunger

1358
01:14:49,840 --> 01:14:54,077
Games for startups. Um so there's like

1359
01:14:54,160 --> 01:14:58,477
there's like it starts out there's a 100
startups at the start of the summer and

1360
01:14:58,560 --> 01:15:02,717
you're all like grinding away. You're
all working. you're all trying to like

1361
01:15:02,800 --> 01:15:05,277
show milestones and show progress and

1362
01:15:05,360 --> 01:15:08,637
then it culminates at the end of at the

1363
01:15:08,720 --> 01:15:12,237
end of the uh of of Y Com at the end of

1364
01:15:12,320 --> 01:15:16,317
it all there's a demo day where
everybody presents their companies,

1365
01:15:16,400 --> 01:15:20,957
presents their progress and tries to get
investment and uh and it so it literally

1366
01:15:21,040 --> 01:15:22,317
it quite literally is the Hunger Games.

1367
01:15:22,400 --> 01:15:25,037
It's like you go through this whole
thing at the end if you get investment

1368
01:15:25,120 --> 01:15:27,037
you get money you've won. If you didn't

1369
01:15:27,120 --> 01:15:30,877
um you've lost. Uh and uh and so that

1370
01:15:30,960 --> 01:15:34,317
was like that was that was the beginning
of the company. We ended up getting good

1371
01:15:34,400 --> 01:15:37,277
investment. >> What what did you do?

1372
01:15:37,360 --> 01:15:40,237
>> Uh well at that time we were we were it

1373
01:15:40,320 --> 01:15:41,997
was it was around data for AI. So it was

1374
01:15:42,080 --> 01:15:45,197
all around like uh how do we fuel data

1375
01:15:45,280 --> 01:15:47,997
for for um what people want to build

1376
01:15:48,080 --> 01:15:52,797
with AI. But at that time it was like
so early that like the use cases were

1377
01:15:52,880 --> 01:15:54,877
pretty stupid. Like [clears throat] we

1378
01:15:54,960 --> 01:15:59,597
were helping one company try to detect

1379
01:15:59,680 --> 01:16:03,357
like it was like a t-shirt company.
They made like custom t-shirt designs and

1380
01:16:03,440 --> 01:16:04,957
we're trying to help them detect when

1381
01:16:05,040 --> 01:16:08,477
people um were like like used a t-shirt

1382
01:16:08,560 --> 01:16:11,757
design that was like that was like um

1383
01:16:11,840 --> 01:16:15,117
like uh that was like unfit for to print

1384
01:16:15,200 --> 01:16:17,757
like you know it had like gore or or

1385
01:16:17,840 --> 01:16:20,877
like um you know you all sorts of like

1386
01:16:20,960 --> 01:16:24,797
illegal stuff like if basically like
identifying illegal t-shirt designs.

1387
01:16:24,880 --> 01:16:28,157
It's kind of like stupid now they say it.
And then we're helping another

1388
01:16:28,240 --> 01:16:31,117
company um it was like a furniture

1389
01:16:31,200 --> 01:16:33,597
marketplace. We're helping them like

1390
01:16:33,680 --> 01:16:36,237
improve their search algorithm with AI.

1391
01:16:36,320 --> 01:16:38,637
And then maybe a few months in maybe 3

1392
01:16:38,720 --> 01:16:41,677
months in we started working with

1393
01:16:41,760 --> 01:16:43,677
autonomous vehicle companies and

1394
01:16:43,760 --> 01:16:46,957
self-driving companies. Um and then that

1395
01:16:47,040 --> 01:16:50,877
and that ended up being like the real uh

1396
01:16:50,960 --> 01:16:52,877
the real meat behind our effort for the

1397
01:16:52,960 --> 01:16:55,917
first 3 4 years. So, we worked with, you

1398
01:16:56,000 --> 01:17:01,597
know, General Motors and Toyota and um
Whimo and, you know, all of the major

1399
01:17:01,680 --> 01:17:05,277
automakers. Wow. >> In helping
them build self-driving cars.

1400
01:17:05,360 --> 01:17:08,077
>> How many people are
you competing against?

1401
01:17:08,160 --> 01:17:11,597
>> I mean, um I think
in anything you do in

1402
01:17:11,680 --> 01:17:16,717
startup plan like you have like tens
of competitors. Um you know, and and there

1403
01:17:16,800 --> 01:17:21,997
were there were definitely tens
of competitors at that time. Um and uh and

1404
01:17:22,080 --> 01:17:23,037
so it's like you know these are

1405
01:17:23,120 --> 01:17:28,237
competitive spaces but um where uh as we

1406
01:17:28,320 --> 01:17:30,467
described I don't mind competition

1407
01:17:30,550 --> 01:17:35,437
[laughter] um from math competition days
and so um and so we we were just like

1408
01:17:35,520 --> 01:17:38,557
really focused on the problem really
focused on how do you what are the best

1409
01:17:38,640 --> 01:17:40,797
possible data sets um for these

1410
01:17:40,880 --> 01:17:43,117
self-drivening cars a lot of that had to

1411
01:17:43,200 --> 01:17:46,397
do with it's called sensor fusion so you

1412
01:17:46,480 --> 01:17:47,997
know there's so many different kinds of

1413
01:17:48,080 --> 01:17:51,037
sensors And how do you combine all these

1414
01:17:51,120 --> 01:17:54,797
different sensors to get, you know, one

1415
01:17:54,880 --> 01:17:58,877
output? So like if multiple sensors
sense a person, how do you like collect

1416
01:17:58,960 --> 01:18:02,237
all that together to say that's one
person right there and that's one car

1417
01:18:02,320 --> 01:18:04,317
right there and that's one, you know,

1418
01:18:04,400 --> 01:18:06,557
bicycle over there. Um, so that was kind

1419
01:18:06,640 --> 01:18:10,637
of our specialty as a company. And then

1420
01:18:10,720 --> 01:18:12,397
um then we're kind of off to the races

1421
01:18:12,480 --> 01:18:18,077
just on that. We we grew the company
to like 100 or so people. Let's go back

1422
01:18:18,160 --> 01:18:22,477
just a little bit. >> Okay.
>> So, you you go to San Francisco by

1423
01:18:22,560 --> 01:18:24,637
yourself as a 19-year-old kid who had

1424
01:18:24,720 --> 01:18:29,757
just dropped out of MIT. How do you

1425
01:18:29,840 --> 01:18:34,157
mean you're immature at that point? And

1426
01:18:34,240 --> 01:18:36,397
so, how do you develop leadership

1427
01:18:36,480 --> 01:18:39,357
skills? And I mean, how do you have how

1428
01:18:39,440 --> 01:18:42,477
do you have the knowhow and make the

1429
01:18:42,560 --> 01:18:44,637
connections to build a company as a

1430
01:18:44,720 --> 01:18:47,517
19-year-old kid?

1431
01:18:47,600 --> 01:18:51,197
Yeah, you so um

1432
01:18:51,280 --> 01:18:53,837
let's see what happened. So basically

1433
01:18:53,920 --> 01:18:57,517
early on like um it's about who you get

1434
01:18:57,600 --> 01:19:01,517
investment from. And so if you get >>
So it was just you with the competition.

1435
01:19:01,600 --> 01:19:02,877
There was no team.

1436
01:19:02,960 --> 01:19:07,357
>> No team. No team. And then um and so I

1437
01:19:07,440 --> 01:19:10,077
and I was coding every day. And then I

1438
01:19:10,160 --> 01:19:13,917
got um we got Y Cominator to invest in

1439
01:19:14,000 --> 01:19:18,717
us. And then we got um this this
investment firm called Excel which was

1440
01:19:18,800 --> 01:19:20,317
who were one of the early investors into

1441
01:19:20,400 --> 01:19:24,397
Facebook to invest. And so we got um

1442
01:19:24,480 --> 01:19:28,717
some some good investors and then they

1443
01:19:28,800 --> 01:19:31,757
helped me build the team like find

1444
01:19:31,840 --> 01:19:36,557
people to hire. I also hired you know
what actually happened is I mostly hired

1445
01:19:36,640 --> 01:19:38,317
people I knew from school. >> Really?

1446
01:19:38,400 --> 01:19:42,957
>> Yeah. So like >> cuz you
could trust them. I think more

1447
01:19:43,040 --> 01:19:44,317
that they could trust me because I think

1448
01:19:44,400 --> 01:19:48,477
if like at the time if I went to like a

1449
01:19:48,560 --> 01:19:53,917
a 25-year-old engineer in San Francisco
and I was like, "Hey, we should we

1450
01:19:54,000 --> 01:19:58,077
should work together." I had no
credibility. Like um I remember I w I

1451
01:19:58,160 --> 01:20:00,477
like I would get coffee with these
people and I would say like, "Yeah, this

1452
01:20:00,560 --> 01:20:01,677
is what we're working on. It's super

1453
01:20:01,760 --> 01:20:03,517
cool. You should join us." And then they

1454
01:20:03,600 --> 01:20:08,157
would all just be like, "Okay, um cool.

1455
01:20:08,240 --> 01:20:12,157
I guess I'm going to go back
to my job now. [laughter]

1456
01:20:12,240 --> 01:20:14,557
Um, so early on I had no credibility

1457
01:20:14,640 --> 01:20:17,197
except for with people I went to uh

1458
01:20:17,280 --> 01:20:20,237
college with uh who we were just like

1459
01:20:20,320 --> 01:20:24,397
friends and we liked each other and so I
managed to recruit a bunch of them over.

1460
01:20:24,480 --> 01:20:26,797
Um, and >> they dropped out too.

1461
01:20:26,880 --> 01:20:29,517
>> Some of them dropped out.
Some [clears throat] of them just happened

1462
01:20:29,600 --> 01:20:32,717
to, you know, were like seniors
or whatever, finished school and then

1463
01:20:32,800 --> 01:20:35,357
joined. Um, it was like a mix. It was a

1464
01:20:35,440 --> 01:20:39,037
mix. Um and uh and that was like the

1465
01:20:39,120 --> 01:20:42,797
early nucleus of the team, the early

1466
01:20:42,880 --> 01:20:47,837
sort of like cohort of the team.
And then um and then we started picking up

1467
01:20:47,920 --> 01:20:51,597
momentum because we're starting to work
with large automotive companies. We're

1468
01:20:51,680 --> 01:20:56,237
starting to work with you know these very
futuristic autonomous driving companies.

1469
01:20:56,320 --> 01:21:00,397
>> And then as momentum started to pick
up like you know we were able to grow and

1470
01:21:00,480 --> 01:21:04,157
build out the team over time. I mean, so
so where did you get your business sense

1471
01:21:04,240 --> 01:21:05,917
or did you hire somebody to run all of

1472
01:21:06,000 --> 01:21:07,597
that? You were you were the mastermind

1473
01:21:07,680 --> 01:21:12,877
behind everything? Um I uh maybe about a

1474
01:21:12,960 --> 01:21:14,957
year in I hired somebody literally with

1475
01:21:15,040 --> 01:21:19,277
the title head of business. Um but uh

1476
01:21:19,360 --> 01:21:22,557
but until then I was just kind of like I

1477
01:21:22,640 --> 01:21:24,317
was just trying to like learn it all.

1478
01:21:24,400 --> 01:21:26,797
>> How did you get the product out there?

1479
01:21:26,880 --> 01:21:31,517
Uh I uh I just coded it all up and then

1480
01:21:31,600 --> 01:21:35,677
there like I like put it out on one
of these there's all these like websites

1481
01:21:35,760 --> 01:21:37,677
where you can launch startups and I put

1482
01:21:37,760 --> 01:21:39,437
it out on we put it out on one of those

1483
01:21:39,520 --> 01:21:44,077
websites and uh it went like microviral

1484
01:21:44,160 --> 01:21:49,677
you know um like viral among like people

1485
01:21:49,760 --> 01:21:53,037
who were on Twitter to look for new

1486
01:21:53,120 --> 01:21:55,917
startup ideas. Um, and then it was kind

1487
01:21:56,000 --> 01:22:00,557
of that was like the early seed
that just that ended up uh enabling

1488
01:22:00,640 --> 01:22:05,197
everything to grow. But it was like I mean

1489
01:22:05,280 --> 01:22:09,757
at the time it was I mean it was it
was tough going, you know? You you're like

1490
01:22:09,840 --> 01:22:13,677
like I would just like I would just
spend all my time coding. Then every

1491
01:22:13,760 --> 01:22:16,637
once in a while I would like post

1492
01:22:16,720 --> 01:22:20,877
something to the internet and just like
and then I would beg all of my friends.

1493
01:22:20,960 --> 01:22:24,237
I was like I would say like please go
upote this, please go like this, like

1494
01:22:24,320 --> 01:22:27,757
please like you know give me some ounce

1495
01:22:27,840 --> 01:22:31,437
of traction and uh yeah
that was the early days.

1496
01:22:31,520 --> 01:22:34,157
>> Damn. Was it scale AI at the beginning?

1497
01:22:34,240 --> 01:22:36,957
>> Yeah, scale AI
actually it was called it

1498
01:22:37,040 --> 01:22:40,797
was uh it was scale API at first and

1499
01:22:40,880 --> 01:22:44,317
then because that was just like that
website was available and then it became

1500
01:22:44,400 --> 01:22:47,757
scale AI like a year and a half later.

1501
01:22:47,840 --> 01:22:52,237
Um but uh yeah so so the whole the whole

1502
01:22:52,320 --> 01:22:56,877
I mean early startups are so gnarly.
Um it's I mean it's really crazy if you

1503
01:22:56,960 --> 01:22:59,597
look at like all these big companies and
you like you know think about what they

1504
01:22:59,680 --> 01:23:01,437
were like in the early days. They're all

1505
01:23:01,520 --> 01:23:03,757
they're all pretty pretty uh pretty

1506
01:23:03,840 --> 01:23:07,037
rough and tumble. Um but but the coolest

1507
01:23:07,120 --> 01:23:09,117
thing like we cuz we started working

1508
01:23:09,200 --> 01:23:12,317
with all these automotive companies and

1509
01:23:12,400 --> 01:23:15,437
working on self-driving. Um

1510
01:23:15,520 --> 01:23:18,237
uh it quickly became

1511
01:23:18,320 --> 01:23:19,997
hyperinteresting [snorts]

1512
01:23:20,080 --> 01:23:22,717
um because you know this was like one of

1513
01:23:22,800 --> 01:23:25,997
the great scientific and and and

1514
01:23:26,080 --> 01:23:29,037
engineering challenges of the time um

1515
01:23:29,120 --> 01:23:31,837
and uh and we ultimately ended up being

1516
01:23:31,920 --> 01:23:33,997
successful like Whimo one of our

1517
01:23:34,080 --> 01:23:38,557
customers is now launched and driving um

1518
01:23:38,640 --> 01:23:43,677
large scale robo taxi services in you
know San Francisco, LA, Phoenix, they're

1519
01:23:43,760 --> 01:23:45,437
launching in more cities. Like, >> wow.

1520
01:23:45,520 --> 01:23:47,197
>> Um, it's pretty amazing.

1521
01:23:47,280 --> 01:23:51,037
>> Wow. Damn. And the company grew how

1522
01:23:51,120 --> 01:23:55,757
fast? >> So, let's see.
I think the numbers are

1523
01:23:55,840 --> 01:23:59,837
something like >> 5 years.
You are the youngest 5 years

1524
01:23:59,920 --> 01:24:01,997
from when you started it. You become the

1525
01:24:02,080 --> 01:24:04,477
youngest billionaire in the world.

1526
01:24:04,560 --> 01:24:08,637
>> Yeah, that's crazy to think about. That
did not feel obvious. The first year it

1527
01:24:08,720 --> 01:24:11,197
was like it was like

1528
01:24:11,280 --> 01:24:17,037
for the first ye first
12 months it was like

1529
01:24:17,120 --> 01:24:21,517
one to three people like it was like it
was like almost nobody. It was like me

1530
01:24:21,600 --> 01:24:24,637
and like one or two other people
working on it for the first year.

1531
01:24:24,720 --> 01:24:26,717
>> That's it for the first one year.

1532
01:24:26,800 --> 01:24:30,237
>> And then after the second year we go

1533
01:24:30,320 --> 01:24:32,477
from that like

1534
01:24:32,560 --> 01:24:35,757
one to three people and we start hiring

1535
01:24:35,840 --> 01:24:39,597
more people. we get to maybe I think

1536
01:24:39,680 --> 01:24:42,157
like like 15 or so people

1537
01:24:42,240 --> 01:24:47,197
and then that third year we went from 15

1538
01:24:47,280 --> 01:24:52,237
or so people to like maybe 100

1539
01:24:52,320 --> 01:24:53,677
and then we were kind of off the then it

1540
01:24:53,760 --> 01:24:55,437
was like 100 and then we and then we

1541
01:24:55,520 --> 01:24:59,837
were like 200 and then 500 and then we

1542
01:24:59,920 --> 01:25:01,917
kept growing and now we're up to like,00

1543
01:25:02,000 --> 01:25:05,117
people um but the f it was like really

1544
01:25:05,200 --> 01:25:09,917
slow going at first and um

1545
01:25:10,000 --> 01:25:12,637
yeah and we we we

1546
01:25:12,720 --> 01:25:15,997
uh we focused on first it was autonomous

1547
01:25:16,080 --> 01:25:17,517
driving

1548
01:25:17,600 --> 01:25:22,477
and then and then starting um starting

1549
01:25:22,560 --> 01:25:26,477
about 3 years in we
started focusing on defense

1550
01:25:26,560 --> 01:25:28,157
um and working with the DoD.

1551
01:25:28,240 --> 01:25:30,717
>> What are you guys doing in defense?

1552
01:25:30,800 --> 01:25:35,037
>> So uh we do we do a few things. So, one

1553
01:25:35,120 --> 01:25:38,317
of the the first things we did was help

1554
01:25:38,400 --> 01:25:42,717
the DoD with its its own data problem to

1555
01:25:42,800 --> 01:25:46,317
help them be able to train AI systems.

1556
01:25:46,400 --> 01:25:49,277
So, um you know, one of the first things

1557
01:25:49,360 --> 01:25:51,037
that we worked on was like, you know,

1558
01:25:51,120 --> 01:25:53,757
they wanted to the DoD wanted to do

1559
01:25:53,840 --> 01:25:57,277
image recognition on satellite imagery,

1560
01:25:57,360 --> 01:26:02,397
SAR imagery, you know, other like all
forms of overhead imagery. But they had

1561
01:26:02,480 --> 01:26:07,517
this huge data problem, you know, just
like me with the fridge. Um they had the

1562
01:26:07,600 --> 01:26:10,717
same problem like how, you know, they
need to be able to have data that lets

1563
01:26:10,800 --> 01:26:13,197
them detect things and all this imagery.

1564
01:26:13,280 --> 01:26:15,677
And so we the first thing we did was

1565
01:26:15,760 --> 01:26:18,557
fuel um the data sets and data

1566
01:26:18,640 --> 01:26:21,037
capabilities for the DoD. That was true

1567
01:26:21,120 --> 01:26:24,157
for the first few years. And then um

1568
01:26:24,240 --> 01:26:28,877
more recently, we've been working
with them to do large scale fielding of AI

1569
01:26:28,960 --> 01:26:30,877
capabilities. what what what what kind

1570
01:26:30,960 --> 01:26:34,637
of stuff is DoD looking for in imagery?

1571
01:26:34,720 --> 01:26:36,637
>> Uh so I mean

1572
01:26:36,720 --> 01:26:41,987
>> so let me let me let me also so
basically the way I understand this is

1573
01:26:42,070 --> 01:26:45,677
[clears throat] >> you
don't need a human to detect

1574
01:26:45,760 --> 01:26:48,317
something maybe like a nuclear reactor.

1575
01:26:48,400 --> 01:26:50,957
Is that is it am I
on the right track here?

1576
01:26:51,040 --> 01:26:55,517
>> So they look >> or a missile
silo or Yeah. And so AI is

1577
01:26:55,600 --> 01:26:57,757
detecting all these which drastically

1578
01:26:57,840 --> 01:27:00,077
reduces human error, human manpower, all

1579
01:27:00,160 --> 01:27:03,277
that kind of stuff. It's more accurate.

1580
01:27:03,360 --> 01:27:05,037
>> Yeah. And it's and I mean mostly it's

1581
01:27:05,120 --> 01:27:08,637
it's scalable. Like I mean that we we

1582
01:27:08,720 --> 01:27:10,397
the number of satellites in space has

1583
01:27:10,480 --> 01:27:13,037
like exploded. So we have so much more

1584
01:27:13,120 --> 01:27:16,397
sensing um today. Like way more imagery,

1585
01:27:16,480 --> 01:27:20,157
way more sensing today than it's even
like feasible for humans to to work

1586
01:27:20,240 --> 01:27:24,797
their way through. >> Wow.
Um so that was yeah that was like

1587
01:27:24,880 --> 01:27:27,837
the first problem. >> How do you fuel it?

1588
01:27:27,920 --> 01:27:31,597
>> You well you have to build so there's

1589
01:27:31,680 --> 01:27:36,477
there's two parts. So first you have
to build effectively like a data foundry.

1590
01:27:36,560 --> 01:27:38,077
You have to build a a mechanism by which

1591
01:27:38,160 --> 01:27:40,317
you're able to generate lots and lots of

1592
01:27:40,400 --> 01:27:44,397
data to fuel these algorithms. um a lot

1593
01:27:44,480 --> 01:27:48,317
of it synthetically so using
the algorithms themselves to generate the

1594
01:27:48,400 --> 01:27:53,837
data but then a lot of it you still need
humans to validate and verify. So one of

1595
01:27:53,920 --> 01:27:55,197
the things we did actually for this

1596
01:27:55,280 --> 01:27:58,317
whole project is um we created a

1597
01:27:58,400 --> 01:28:02,397
facility in St. Louis, Missouri, next to

1598
01:28:02,480 --> 01:28:04,477
uh NGA, the National Geospatial

1599
01:28:04,560 --> 01:28:07,917
Intelligence Agency. And we produced a

1600
01:28:08,000 --> 01:28:12,157
center for AI data processing where we

1601
01:28:12,240 --> 01:28:15,277
uh hired up uh imagery analysts to be

1602
01:28:15,360 --> 01:28:17,757
able to validate the outputs coming out

1603
01:28:17,840 --> 01:28:22,637
of the AI systems to ensure that um
we were getting the correct, you know,

1604
01:28:22,720 --> 01:28:27,197
we're getting accurate and high integrity
data to feed back into the AI systems.

1605
01:28:27,280 --> 01:28:32,557
>> Wow. Wow. Damn.

1606
01:28:32,640 --> 01:28:36,397
Where do we go from here? >> Yeah.
So then, so we were doing, so we

1607
01:28:36,480 --> 01:28:38,637
were doing um lots of stuff around

1608
01:28:38,720 --> 01:28:43,037
imagery and computer vision and then um

1609
01:28:43,120 --> 01:28:44,957
uh and then we started working with the

1610
01:28:45,040 --> 01:28:50,317
DoD on, you know, more ambitious and
larger scale AI projects. So one of the

1611
01:28:50,400 --> 01:28:51,677
things we're working with them now is

1612
01:28:51,760 --> 01:28:53,917
this program called Thunderforge which

1613
01:28:54,000 --> 01:28:57,997
is using AI for um military planning and

1614
01:28:58,080 --> 01:29:02,237
operational planning. So um more broadly

1615
01:29:02,320 --> 01:29:04,237
so so the basic idea here is can you use

1616
01:29:04,320 --> 01:29:08,317
AI to effectively like automate major

1617
01:29:08,400 --> 01:29:13,037
parts of the military planning process
so that you're able to plan within hours

1618
01:29:13,120 --> 01:29:17,997
versus taking many days. >> This
sounds like Palunteer. It's um yeah

1619
01:29:18,080 --> 01:29:20,957
they target different parts of the problem
and we target different parts of

1620
01:29:21,040 --> 01:29:22,157
the problem and ultimately we work

1621
01:29:22,240 --> 01:29:24,717
together pretty well but the this is

1622
01:29:24,800 --> 01:29:28,157
part of a broader concept that we have

1623
01:29:28,240 --> 01:29:30,237
around agent what we call agentic

1624
01:29:30,320 --> 01:29:33,997
warfare. So the use of AI and AI agents

1625
01:29:34,080 --> 01:29:37,597
in warfare and the basic idea is can you

1626
01:29:37,680 --> 01:29:40,957
go from these current processes where

1627
01:29:41,040 --> 01:29:46,157
humans are the loop to humans being
on the loop. And so can you go from you

1628
01:29:46,240 --> 01:29:49,517
know situations where you know these
workflows have to go from a person has

1629
01:29:49,600 --> 01:29:51,917
to do a bunch of work then pass the next
person they have to do a bunch of work

1630
01:29:52,000 --> 01:29:55,037
pass the next person to the AI agents

1631
01:29:55,120 --> 01:29:57,037
are just doing a lot of that work and

1632
01:29:57,120 --> 01:29:58,957
humans are just checking and verifying

1633
01:29:59,040 --> 01:30:02,397
along the way. Um and it's it's a big

1634
01:30:02,480 --> 01:30:05,117
change. So going from you know you know

1635
01:30:05,200 --> 01:30:07,597
if you compare both set setups side by

1636
01:30:07,680 --> 01:30:10,157
side here you have individuals humans

1637
01:30:10,240 --> 01:30:14,877
with decades of single domain experience
who are doing each step step of this

1638
01:30:14,960 --> 01:30:19,277
process. And then if you have the AI
agents doing it, ideally you have AI

1639
01:30:19,360 --> 01:30:21,597
agents who have, you know, thousands of

1640
01:30:21,680 --> 01:30:24,397
years of of knowledge, all domain

1641
01:30:24,480 --> 01:30:28,477
knowledge and are are, you know, a

1642
01:30:28,560 --> 01:30:30,957
thousand times faster at under at doing

1643
01:30:31,040 --> 01:30:33,597
the actual tasks. And so it's all about

1644
01:30:33,680 --> 01:30:36,397
taking and this exists at many many

1645
01:30:36,480 --> 01:30:41,037
different levels. So you know there's
you can think about this for the sensing

1646
01:30:41,120 --> 01:30:44,717
and intel portion that we're talking
about before. So you know can you

1647
01:30:44,800 --> 01:30:48,637
accelerate the intelligence gathering
you know the process by which we take

1648
01:30:48,720 --> 01:30:52,797
all the sensor data and turn that into
insight. You can think about it for the

1649
01:30:52,880 --> 01:30:54,797
operational planning process like how

1650
01:30:54,880 --> 01:30:57,437
can you accelerate that uh that entire

1651
01:30:57,520 --> 01:31:02,077
flow. You can think about it in terms of
um you know on the tactical side, how do

1652
01:31:02,160 --> 01:31:03,837
you accelerate tactical decision-

1653
01:31:03,920 --> 01:31:07,917
making? Um so it you bleeds into every

1654
01:31:08,000 --> 01:31:09,757
sort of like level of warfare, every or

1655
01:31:09,840 --> 01:31:12,397
every component, but at its core, how do

1656
01:31:12,480 --> 01:31:18,557
you use AI agents to be faster,
more adaptive, and have humans just check

1657
01:31:18,640 --> 01:31:21,117
their work? >> So when
you're talking about it helps

1658
01:31:21,200 --> 01:31:23,357
with mission planning, especially in a

1659
01:31:23,440 --> 01:31:24,957
tactical environment, cuz that's where I

1660
01:31:25,040 --> 01:31:29,037
come from. I mean what what is it could

1661
01:31:29,120 --> 01:31:31,357
be any example but g can you give me an

1662
01:31:31,440 --> 01:31:36,317
example of how it speeds up the mission
planning process in a tactical

1663
01:31:36,400 --> 01:31:40,877
environment. >> Yeah. So,
so let's say that. So, this

1664
01:31:40,960 --> 01:31:43,197
thing that we have, by the way,
you know, we're working on it with

1665
01:31:43,280 --> 01:31:46,157
Indopaccom and Yukcom right now. And and

1666
01:31:46,240 --> 01:31:49,677
um we'll deploy more broadly, but um

1667
01:31:49,760 --> 01:31:53,917
let's say that there's um a uh what's a

1668
01:31:54,000 --> 01:31:57,997
good what's a good example? Um let's say
there's some kind of alert that pops up,

1669
01:31:58,080 --> 01:32:02,397
like there's something that um we didn't
expect that we need to figure out how

1670
01:32:02,480 --> 01:32:06,717
we're going to respond to. Um >>
like like what kind of an alert? So I

1671
01:32:06,800 --> 01:32:11,757
mean let's say there was like uh you
know um there's like I mean you can

1672
01:32:11,840 --> 01:32:14,477
imagine at different levels but let's
say there's like a ship that popped up

1673
01:32:14,560 --> 01:32:17,277
that we didn't expect
>> as a simple example.

1674
01:32:17,360 --> 01:32:20,877
>> So then that alert
flows into a bunch of

1675
01:32:20,960 --> 01:32:23,037
AI systems that are going to the first

1676
01:32:23,120 --> 01:32:26,717
step is sensing. So what like let's look

1677
01:32:26,800 --> 01:32:29,437
through all of our sensing capabilities

1678
01:32:29,520 --> 01:32:32,717
and um let's like go reanalyze all of

1679
01:32:32,800 --> 01:32:35,117
the data that we have and figure out how

1680
01:32:35,200 --> 01:32:40,237
much do we know about that ship right so
now a person would like an analyst would

1681
01:32:40,320 --> 01:32:43,357
go through and like do all this you know
all the ped and all this stuff to to be

1682
01:32:43,440 --> 01:32:46,797
able to undergo this work but ideally
you have AI agents that are just going

1683
01:32:46,880 --> 01:32:51,197
they can look through all the historical
sensor data they can figure out um oh

1684
01:32:51,280 --> 01:32:53,757
actually there's like kind of a thing
that showed up on this radar and there's

1685
01:32:53,840 --> 01:32:56,237
kind thing that showed up on this
satellite imagery and we can kind of

1686
01:32:56,320 --> 01:33:00,957
like sketch together this like you know
the trajectory of this of this ship.

1687
01:33:01,040 --> 01:33:03,517
Okay. So you go through that process
you try to understand what's going on and

1688
01:33:03,600 --> 01:33:06,797
then you and then you go through and and

1689
01:33:06,880 --> 01:33:08,957
figure out okay what are the what are

1690
01:33:09,040 --> 01:33:11,997
the possible um courses of actions. So

1691
01:33:12,080 --> 01:33:14,157
once you have situational awareness,

1692
01:33:14,240 --> 01:33:16,317
then what are the courses of actions

1693
01:33:16,400 --> 01:33:19,837
against this particular scenario and you

1694
01:33:19,920 --> 01:33:22,957
can have an AI agent honestly just

1695
01:33:23,040 --> 01:33:27,357
propose courses of actions. Um like hey
in this scenario given this ship is is

1696
01:33:27,440 --> 01:33:30,877
coming here you know we could fire at it.
We could just wait to see what

1697
01:33:30,960 --> 01:33:33,597
happens. We could reposition so that

1698
01:33:33,680 --> 01:33:38,717
we're you know we're able to to um you
know handle the threat better. you know,

1699
01:33:38,800 --> 01:33:41,357
all sorts of we could we could
reposition some satellites so we have

1700
01:33:41,440 --> 01:33:42,557
greater sensing. You know, there's all

1701
01:33:42,640 --> 01:33:44,717
sorts of different courses of actions um

1702
01:33:44,800 --> 01:33:48,877
that we could take. And then uh once the

1703
01:33:48,960 --> 01:33:51,597
AI produces those course of actions,

1704
01:33:51,680 --> 01:33:56,557
it'll run each of those different course
of actions through a simulator. So it'll

1705
01:33:56,640 --> 01:34:00,317
then run uh >> it war games at real time.

1706
01:34:00,400 --> 01:34:01,917
>> Exactly. It'll war game at real time.

1707
01:34:02,000 --> 01:34:04,877
And so then it'll run through
a simulator and say, "Okay, what's going

1708
01:34:04,960 --> 01:34:09,837
to happen if we fire at it?" like,
you know, this is what we know about red

1709
01:34:09,920 --> 01:34:13,757
forces. This is what we know about blue
forces right now. Um, if we fire at it,

1710
01:34:13,840 --> 01:34:18,557
this is like, you know, this is the war
game of how that plays out. If we um

1711
01:34:18,640 --> 01:34:22,237
just increase our sensing, like these
are the things that that the red forces

1712
01:34:22,320 --> 01:34:26,877
could do to [__] us up. And like that's
the risk that we take on. And um and

1713
01:34:26,960 --> 01:34:31,277
then the benefit is because all of this
is automatic, you can run it these war

1714
01:34:31,360 --> 01:34:32,797
games and these simulations a million

1715
01:34:32,880 --> 01:34:36,717
times. So it's not just like one, you

1716
01:34:36,800 --> 01:34:41,437
know, military planners just like trying
to like war game and plan it out like

1717
01:34:41,520 --> 01:34:45,677
you know in human time. It's like you
could run a million simulations cuz you

1718
01:34:45,760 --> 01:34:47,677
don't have perfect information.
You don't have perfect knowledge. So you

1719
01:34:47,760 --> 01:34:50,557
need to kind of figure out based on the

1720
01:34:50,640 --> 01:34:54,797
uncertainties of the situation, what are
all the potential outcomes that that pop

1721
01:34:54,880 --> 01:34:58,317
out of that? >> Wow.
And then so you run like a million

1722
01:34:58,400 --> 01:35:00,397
different simulations of each of these

1723
01:35:00,480 --> 01:35:02,637
different courses of action. And then

1724
01:35:02,720 --> 01:35:06,797
you can give a commander direct like you

1725
01:35:06,880 --> 01:35:11,037
give them this whole like brief
and presentation which is basically these

1726
01:35:11,120 --> 01:35:15,357
are the courses of actions we considered.
This is the this these are

1727
01:35:15,440 --> 01:35:17,197
the likely outcomes in those courses of

1728
01:35:17,280 --> 01:35:21,037
action. We can show you the simulated

1729
01:35:21,120 --> 01:35:25,037
like outcome in each one of these
scenarios. So we can like show you what

1730
01:35:25,120 --> 01:35:28,317
it would look like in every one
of those scenarios if it happened like

1731
01:35:28,400 --> 01:35:31,117
representative um simulations and then

1732
01:35:31,200 --> 01:35:35,997
the commander makes a call. >> Wow.
So it's this is what it is. This is

1733
01:35:36,080 --> 01:35:39,997
what it's doing. These are the possible
courses of action. These are the

1734
01:35:40,080 --> 01:35:43,517
consequences of each action.
This is the percentage.

1735
01:35:43,600 --> 01:35:47,677
>> Yeah. Exactly. >> And and it spits
that out in what? A matter of seconds.

1736
01:35:47,760 --> 01:35:51,277
>> Yeah. Now it takes a you know probably
takes even now it probably takes a few

1737
01:35:51,360 --> 01:35:53,917
hours cuz you know these models are
a lot slower than they will be in the

1738
01:35:54,000 --> 01:35:58,797
future but yeah I mean compare that to I
mean depending on the situation like

1739
01:35:58,880 --> 01:36:02,797
that could take you know that could take
days for humans to do today like it's

1740
01:36:02,880 --> 01:36:07,917
and and it's not from lack of will
or effort or or capability. It's just

1741
01:36:08,000 --> 01:36:11,597
>> it's a really complicated situation.
If a ship pops up out of nowhere like

1742
01:36:11,680 --> 01:36:12,877
>> there's a lot of stuff you have to

1743
01:36:12,960 --> 01:36:16,157
consider. Um, and so, uh, that's really

1744
01:36:16,240 --> 01:36:18,877
the the the step change here is just

1745
01:36:18,960 --> 01:36:22,797
like a, uh, like dramatically

1746
01:36:22,880 --> 01:36:26,557
accelerating situational awareness,
dramatically accelerating like an

1747
01:36:26,640 --> 01:36:28,877
understanding of what the different
course of actions are, what could

1748
01:36:28,960 --> 01:36:32,957
happen, what are the consequences,
um, and surfacing that to commander.

1749
01:36:33,040 --> 01:36:35,357
>> Does it make a recommendation?

1750
01:36:35,440 --> 01:36:37,837
>> Um, this is kind of an interesting

1751
01:36:37,920 --> 01:36:40,157
thing. We

1752
01:36:40,240 --> 01:36:42,557
we go back and forth if we want to make

1753
01:36:42,640 --> 01:36:45,517
a recommendation because ultimately like

1754
01:36:45,600 --> 01:36:49,837
we don't want um to just be like you

1755
01:36:49,920 --> 01:36:53,037
know we don't want to let commanders
kind of like sleepwalk if that makes

1756
01:36:53,120 --> 01:36:55,197
sense. We want them to like, you know,

1757
01:36:55,280 --> 01:36:58,637
our military commanders are the best

1758
01:36:58,720 --> 01:37:02,877
humans in the world like considering all
of the potential consequences of these

1759
01:37:02,960 --> 01:37:04,717
different course of action and also

1760
01:37:04,800 --> 01:37:09,917
considering you know um uh and and

1761
01:37:10,000 --> 01:37:13,197
ultimately making a call based on those
potential consequences. So I think we

1762
01:37:13,280 --> 01:37:16,077
want to ensure that

1763
01:37:16,160 --> 01:37:20,317
commanders are still exercising their
judgment in these decisions versus just,

1764
01:37:20,400 --> 01:37:26,760
you know, making it easy for them to just
say, "Oh, go with what the AI says."

1765
01:37:27,200 --> 01:37:29,997
>> Interesting. Wow.

1766
01:37:30,080 --> 01:37:32,317
But this but then okay, think about what

1767
01:37:32,400 --> 01:37:35,277
happens next. So um and this is where

1768
01:37:35,360 --> 01:37:38,157
stuff gets really freaky. So,

1769
01:37:38,240 --> 01:37:42,397
let's say that um obviously in a world
where just the blue force, just the

1770
01:37:42,480 --> 01:37:45,277
United States has this capability,
that's great. You know, we're going to

1771
01:37:45,360 --> 01:37:46,877
we're going to be running circles around

1772
01:37:46,960 --> 01:37:49,757
everyone else. Um but then what happens

1773
01:37:49,840 --> 01:37:54,557
if the red force, you know, China,
Russia, whomever also has the

1774
01:37:54,640 --> 01:37:56,717
capability? Then you're in this

1775
01:37:56,800 --> 01:38:02,077
situation where I've war
gamed out the whole situation.

1776
01:38:02,160 --> 01:38:03,597
you know, they've instantaneously

1777
01:38:03,680 --> 01:38:06,237
wargamed out the whole situation and

1778
01:38:06,320 --> 01:38:09,677
then it's like then then it I think I

1779
01:38:09,760 --> 01:38:13,037
honestly think so then it's like we know

1780
01:38:13,120 --> 01:38:15,837
and you know like blue forces, red

1781
01:38:15,920 --> 01:38:19,117
forces, we both know that we both have

1782
01:38:19,200 --> 01:38:23,437
like you know this perfectly war game
scenarios. Which avenue do you pick? And

1783
01:38:23,520 --> 01:38:28,077
then it becomes this really
complicated almost like psychological

1784
01:38:28,160 --> 01:38:32,637
you know kind of kind of situation which
is like then it like all comes down to

1785
01:38:32,720 --> 01:38:36,237
how good our intel is. So how good is
our intel about that commander? How good

1786
01:38:36,320 --> 01:38:40,397
is our intel about what their collection
capabilities are? How good is our intel

1787
01:38:40,480 --> 01:38:45,357
about you know what they likely know
about us and vice versa. Um and it gets

1788
01:38:45,440 --> 01:38:46,877
pretty

1789
01:38:46,960 --> 01:38:49,997
so this is actually

1790
01:38:50,080 --> 01:38:53,037
let's just

1791
01:38:53,120 --> 01:38:56,797
so let's say China Russia

1792
01:38:56,880 --> 01:38:59,037
our enemies have this capability we have

1793
01:38:59,120 --> 01:39:05,640
this capability then it
then it kind of becomes

1794
01:39:07,840 --> 01:39:09,837
it's like the same process that we deal

1795
01:39:09,920 --> 01:39:12,077
with now who has the better intel right

1796
01:39:12,160 --> 01:39:15,677
it's just develop flipping and and and

1797
01:39:15,760 --> 01:39:20,397
you're going to a course of action
quicker and the enem is doing the exact

1798
01:39:20,480 --> 01:39:24,477
same thing quicker. So it's essentially
it's the exact same thing that we're

1799
01:39:24,560 --> 01:39:27,197
doing now

1800
01:39:27,280 --> 01:39:30,557
but faster and so if we develop it first

1801
01:39:30,640 --> 01:39:32,797
then

1802
01:39:32,880 --> 01:39:36,637
we achieve basically global domination.

1803
01:39:36,720 --> 01:39:38,237
Am I correct here?

1804
01:39:38,320 --> 01:39:40,797
>> Yeah. I think and I think timing really

1805
01:39:40,880 --> 01:39:43,677
matters here because if we get this

1806
01:39:43,760 --> 01:39:47,917
capability and this will
go for I mean there's like

1807
01:39:48,000 --> 01:39:51,117
there's way more there there's way more
AI we'll be able to do but let's say we

1808
01:39:51,200 --> 01:39:54,397
get this capability you know a year

1809
01:39:54,480 --> 01:39:59,517
ahead of adversaries then
you're then like we're just going

1810
01:39:59,600 --> 01:40:00,877
to be able to respond so much faster.

1811
01:40:00,960 --> 01:40:04,877
the the analogy I often use is like
imagine we were playing chess, but for

1812
01:40:04,960 --> 01:40:07,197
every one move you take, I can take 10

1813
01:40:07,280 --> 01:40:09,437
moves. Like I'm just going to win.

1814
01:40:09,520 --> 01:40:12,637
>> Um uh and that's what that's the

1815
01:40:12,720 --> 01:40:15,757
asymmetric advantage that that comes out

1816
01:40:15,840 --> 01:40:19,117
of this of this capability. Um and then

1817
01:40:19,200 --> 01:40:23,597
once it but then once it equalizes then

1818
01:40:23,680 --> 01:40:27,117
then it's like this very you know it's
like to your point becomes this like

1819
01:40:27,200 --> 01:40:29,597
adversarial intelbased you know

1820
01:40:29,680 --> 01:40:32,537
capability based kind of conflict. How

1821
01:40:32,620 --> 01:40:37,720
[clears throat] how do we

1822
01:40:40,480 --> 01:40:44,397
I mean how do we combat our adversaries

1823
01:40:44,480 --> 01:40:49,517
from having this type of intel
from having this type of AI system?

1824
01:40:49,600 --> 01:40:51,357
So

1825
01:40:51,440 --> 01:40:54,557
I think then then

1826
01:40:54,640 --> 01:40:57,677
I mean China's demonstrated with

1827
01:40:57,760 --> 01:41:01,117
deepseek uh and you know models have

1828
01:41:01,200 --> 01:41:02,797
come out since then they're going to be

1829
01:41:02,880 --> 01:41:06,637
very competitive on AI and in

1830
01:41:06,720 --> 01:41:10,877
uh I think in 2024 so last year there

1831
01:41:10,960 --> 01:41:16,397
were something like 80 contracts between

1832
01:41:16,480 --> 01:41:18,637
uh large language model AI companies in

1833
01:41:18,720 --> 01:41:20,957
China and the People Liberations Army,

1834
01:41:21,040 --> 01:41:25,837
the PLA, um that number
is not 80 in the United

1835
01:41:25,920 --> 01:41:27,037
States. Like the United States is like

1836
01:41:27,120 --> 01:41:30,557
way way less than 80. So they're very

1837
01:41:30,640 --> 01:41:33,357
clearly accelerating the integration of

1838
01:41:33,440 --> 01:41:36,397
AI into their um national security and

1839
01:41:36,480 --> 01:41:41,037
into their military apparatus very
quickly. I don't think at this point

1840
01:41:41,120 --> 01:41:43,277
realistically we can stop them from

1841
01:41:43,360 --> 01:41:46,637
having this this capability I described.

1842
01:41:46,720 --> 01:41:49,277
So then you go to the next layer down.

1843
01:41:49,360 --> 01:41:51,037
So

1844
01:41:51,120 --> 01:41:55,997
uh Intel. So um well the next layer down

1845
01:41:56,080 --> 01:41:58,877
the next two things that you look at is

1846
01:41:58,960 --> 01:42:01,757
okay how does AI impact Intel and how

1847
01:42:01,840 --> 01:42:04,317
does AI how can we what is the

1848
01:42:04,400 --> 01:42:07,437
adversarial AI dynamic? Like can we use

1849
01:42:07,520 --> 01:42:09,517
our AIs to sabotage their AIs? Can they

1850
01:42:09,600 --> 01:42:12,317
use their AIS to sabotage sabotage ours?

1851
01:42:12,400 --> 01:42:15,597
Um and it's like AI on AI warfare

1852
01:42:15,680 --> 01:42:18,477
effectively. Um then when you look at

1853
01:42:18,560 --> 01:42:20,637
that scenario, okay, so the so let's dig

1854
01:42:20,720 --> 01:42:23,197
into that. Um

1855
01:42:23,280 --> 01:42:26,557
the first level analysis here is kind of

1856
01:42:26,640 --> 01:42:27,837
what we were talking about before, which

1857
01:42:27,920 --> 01:42:30,717
is that probably just boils down to how

1858
01:42:30,800 --> 01:42:35,197
many copies of these AI systems do I
have running versus how many copies do

1859
01:42:35,280 --> 01:42:36,557
you have running. So it turns into a

1860
01:42:36,640 --> 01:42:40,957
numbers game. If I have 10,000 AI copies

1861
01:42:41,040 --> 01:42:45,197
running and you only have 100 AI copies
running, then I'm going to run circle.

1862
01:42:45,280 --> 01:42:49,917
I'm still going to run circles around you.
And that boils down to who has

1863
01:42:50,000 --> 01:42:51,357
>> So,

1864
01:42:51,440 --> 01:42:55,277
>> so let's say um so let's say you have

1865
01:42:55,360 --> 01:42:57,997
you have 100 AIs. I have I have 10,000

1866
01:42:58,080 --> 01:43:01,917
AIS. Um I will I will take half of my

1867
01:43:02,000 --> 01:43:05,037
AIs. I will take 5,000 of my AIS and

1868
01:43:05,120 --> 01:43:08,637
just focus them on hacking your AIS. So,

1869
01:43:08,720 --> 01:43:10,237
I'm they're all going to be looking for

1870
01:43:10,320 --> 01:43:14,637
vulnerabilities in your um in your uh in

1871
01:43:14,720 --> 01:43:18,637
your information architecture, in your
data centers. I'm going to look for

1872
01:43:18,720 --> 01:43:21,357
vulner, you know, I'm just like purely

1873
01:43:21,440 --> 01:43:24,317
focused on cyber hacking of your 100 AIS

1874
01:43:24,400 --> 01:43:27,117
and then my other 5,000 copies are going

1875
01:43:27,200 --> 01:43:28,717
to do the military planning process for

1876
01:43:28,800 --> 01:43:32,957
myself. Um then then look at think about

1877
01:43:33,040 --> 01:43:34,717
the adversary. I have this choice. I

1878
01:43:34,800 --> 01:43:38,077
have a 100 AIS. If I have them all focus

1879
01:43:38,160 --> 01:43:41,037
on doing um the military planning

1880
01:43:41,120 --> 01:43:45,117
process, I'm going to get hacked cuz
I'm not doing any cyber defense. And then

1881
01:43:45,200 --> 01:43:48,477
even if I have all of them focus
on cyber defense, even those numbers are

1882
01:43:48,560 --> 01:43:50,797
bad. It's like 100 AIs versus 5,000 AIs

1883
01:43:50,880 --> 01:43:53,037
from you. And so I probably still get

1884
01:43:53,120 --> 01:43:56,317
hacked. So the numbers end up mattering

1885
01:43:56,400 --> 01:44:00,557
a lot. Um uh if even if they had even if

1886
01:44:00,640 --> 01:44:04,157
the other adversary, let's say it's
only a 2x advantage. I have 10,000 copies

1887
01:44:04,240 --> 01:44:07,677
running and the adversary is 5,000
copies running. I can do the same thing.

1888
01:44:07,760 --> 01:44:12,077
5,000 of my copies are just focused
on hacking your AI so that your AI is

1889
01:44:12,160 --> 01:44:17,117
incapacitated or has incorrect
information or um or is poisoned in some

1890
01:44:17,200 --> 01:44:22,317
way like basically is incapable
incapacity for some reason. Um and the

1891
01:44:22,400 --> 01:44:25,517
other half of my eyes are focused on
the military planning process. Again, the

1892
01:44:25,600 --> 01:44:28,797
adversary is screwed cuz to properly

1893
01:44:28,880 --> 01:44:33,437
deal with a cyber attack, I need
probably all 5,000 copies to be focused

1894
01:44:33,520 --> 01:44:37,277
on cyber defense and then I
have no capacity left to do

1895
01:44:37,360 --> 01:44:38,717
the military planning.

1896
01:44:38,800 --> 01:44:42,797
>> Wow. So it really turns into this like

1897
01:44:42,880 --> 01:44:44,797
uh very

1898
01:44:44,880 --> 01:44:47,117
like just in the same way that you would

1899
01:44:47,200 --> 01:44:50,077
you would command your forces um today

1900
01:44:50,160 --> 01:44:51,997
like all of your your you know your

1901
01:44:52,080 --> 01:44:54,797
various your forces across all domains

1902
01:44:54,880 --> 01:44:57,277
to like try to pins or outmaneuver the

1903
01:44:57,360 --> 01:45:01,917
enemy. You'll do the same kind
of planning for your like AI army so to

1904
01:45:02,000 --> 01:45:04,397
speak or your AI >> allocation of assets.

1905
01:45:04,480 --> 01:45:05,757
>> Yeah. Your allocation of assets.

1906
01:45:05,840 --> 01:45:08,397
Exactly. And a lot of it will be okay,

1907
01:45:08,480 --> 01:45:12,157
how many am I dedicating towards um uh

1908
01:45:12,240 --> 01:45:15,277
hacking and sabotaging the opponent? How

1909
01:45:15,360 --> 01:45:17,197
many am I dedicating towards my own

1910
01:45:17,280 --> 01:45:20,637
military planning and wargaming process?

1911
01:45:20,720 --> 01:45:23,037
Um the other thing is how many you

1912
01:45:23,120 --> 01:45:27,837
allocate towards um uh towards you know

1913
01:45:27,920 --> 01:45:29,997
the the other key component here is

1914
01:45:30,080 --> 01:45:33,037
drones and uh how many you're allocating

1915
01:45:33,120 --> 01:45:36,157
towards doing the like very tactical

1916
01:45:36,240 --> 01:45:38,157
mission level autonomy to accomplish you

1917
01:45:38,240 --> 01:45:41,037
know mission level objectives. Um, but

1918
01:45:41,120 --> 01:45:44,237
it'll be it'll be like I think it really

1919
01:45:44,320 --> 01:45:48,317
boils down to ultimately who has
more resources and then what are those

1920
01:45:48,400 --> 01:45:50,797
resources? That's going to be about

1921
01:45:50,880 --> 01:45:53,917
large scale data centers. So who has

1922
01:45:54,000 --> 01:45:56,717
bigger data centers and more power to

1923
01:45:56,800 --> 01:46:00,037
run all these AI agents?

1924
01:46:00,120 --> 01:46:04,077
[clears throat] And who who
makes the determination of

1925
01:46:04,160 --> 01:46:08,317
how many AIs we're going to put
in tactical environment? How many AIs are

1926
01:46:08,400 --> 01:46:12,797
going to go after cyber
security trying to hack into the

1927
01:46:12,880 --> 01:46:15,117
other AIs? Is that a human or is that

1928
01:46:15,200 --> 01:46:20,237
another layer of AI
that that that spits out

1929
01:46:20,320 --> 01:46:24,877
exactly what you just said? This is what
we this is our situation. Here's the

1930
01:46:24,960 --> 01:46:27,117
courses of action.

1931
01:46:27,200 --> 01:46:30,077
Here's the here's the consequences of

1932
01:46:30,160 --> 01:46:35,277
what happened. So is it just AI after
AI after AI that's doing all of this all

1933
01:46:35,360 --> 01:46:38,557
these simulations? >> Yeah,
then yeah. No, you're exactly

1934
01:46:38,640 --> 01:46:42,157
right. Then I Yeah, exactly. You have
another AI that's planning out and

1935
01:46:42,240 --> 01:46:44,397
mapping out, you know, how should I

1936
01:46:44,480 --> 01:46:48,237
allocate my AI resources to properly

1937
01:46:48,320 --> 01:46:51,757
deal with the adversary given what I
know about the adversary and then the so

1938
01:46:51,840 --> 01:46:56,397
then what are the ways in which you
know what are so then what are the key

1939
01:46:56,480 --> 01:46:58,317
dimensions that would give you an edge

1940
01:46:58,400 --> 01:47:01,917
versus your adversary? Well, it's if a

1941
01:47:02,000 --> 01:47:04,957
your AI is different somehow. So, it

1942
01:47:05,040 --> 01:47:07,597
actually is like hard for your adversary

1943
01:47:07,680 --> 01:47:12,557
to know exactly how you're how you would
act like basically strategic surprise in

1944
01:47:12,640 --> 01:47:16,237
some form in the form of like
a different thinking process or a

1945
01:47:16,320 --> 01:47:18,397
different sort of like way of reasoning

1946
01:47:18,480 --> 01:47:20,957
of the AI systems. Um, and then the

1947
01:47:21,040 --> 01:47:24,477
other one is like uh ambiguity of how

1948
01:47:24,560 --> 01:47:26,637
many how much what your resources

1949
01:47:26,720 --> 01:47:29,917
actually are. Like if somehow I can make

1950
01:47:30,000 --> 01:47:34,477
the adversary think that I have way
fewer resources than I actually do or

1951
01:47:34,560 --> 01:47:36,717
way more resources than I actually do,

1952
01:47:36,800 --> 01:47:41,277
that'll be a critical element of of um

1953
01:47:41,360 --> 01:47:45,037
yeah, of strategic surprise
in those kinds of situations as well.

1954
01:47:45,120 --> 01:47:48,237
>> Wow. Would an AI be able to be able to

1955
01:47:48,320 --> 01:47:53,037
would would AI be able to

1956
01:47:53,120 --> 01:47:56,797
alert if it if it [clears
throat] will it know

1957
01:47:56,880 --> 01:47:58,957
it's been hacked?

1958
01:47:59,040 --> 01:48:01,517
So yeah, this is this is a great

1959
01:48:01,600 --> 01:48:06,440
question that you know um

1960
01:48:07,200 --> 01:48:14,200
right now probably yes. Uh but the

1961
01:48:14,560 --> 01:48:16,637
you it's definitely possible in the

1962
01:48:16,720 --> 01:48:19,997
future that you will be able to

1963
01:48:20,080 --> 01:48:22,877
effectively hack into a system or

1964
01:48:22,960 --> 01:48:27,517
somehow poison an AI system and uh have

1965
01:48:27,600 --> 01:48:30,477
that activity be relatively untraceable

1966
01:48:30,560 --> 01:48:34,477
because you would basically um you would

1967
01:48:34,560 --> 01:48:39,437
you would hack into that AI system. So
there's two ways you would do it. One is

1968
01:48:39,520 --> 01:48:41,117
you poison the data that goes into that

1969
01:48:41,200 --> 01:48:44,797
AI. So I'm not hacking into the AI

1970
01:48:44,880 --> 01:48:46,957
itself. I'm just poisoning all the data

1971
01:48:47,040 --> 01:48:50,397
that's feeding into that AI such that at

1972
01:48:50,480 --> 01:48:53,517
any moment in the future I like I can

1973
01:48:53,600 --> 01:48:56,557
activate that AI and basically hack it

1974
01:48:56,640 --> 01:48:59,437
without any sort of active intrusion.

1975
01:48:59,520 --> 01:49:03,277
But I can just do it because I've
poisoned I've like poisoned the AI that

1976
01:49:03,360 --> 01:49:05,277
go the data that goes into the AI such

1977
01:49:05,360 --> 01:49:09,197
that if I like you know

1978
01:49:09,280 --> 01:49:12,317
>> say it alters the decision-m process.

1979
01:49:12,400 --> 01:49:16,397
>> Yeah. Exactly.
>> But the but the the end decision maker

1980
01:49:16,480 --> 01:49:19,037
which would be a human
would not realize that.

1981
01:49:19,120 --> 01:49:23,037
>> Yeah. Exactly. >> Okay.
>> So so data poisoning is going to is but

1982
01:49:23,120 --> 01:49:25,357
this is what's so terrifying about
deepseek. One of the reasons why

1983
01:49:25,440 --> 01:49:29,597
deepseek is really scary is um

1984
01:49:29,680 --> 01:49:31,677
uh you know China chose to open source

1985
01:49:31,760 --> 01:49:35,517
the model right so there's a lot of

1986
01:49:35,600 --> 01:49:37,197
corporates large scale corporates in the

1987
01:49:37,280 --> 01:49:40,717
United States that have chosen to use

1988
01:49:40,800 --> 01:49:42,797
deepseek because they're like oh it's a

1989
01:49:42,880 --> 01:49:45,197
good model and it's a good AI and it's

1990
01:49:45,280 --> 01:49:49,357
free why not use it um but deepseek

1991
01:49:49,440 --> 01:49:53,117
itself as a model could already be
compromised could already be poisoned in

1992
01:49:53,200 --> 01:49:55,597
some way such that you you know, there

1993
01:49:55,680 --> 01:49:58,877
are characteristics or behavior or ways

1994
01:49:58,960 --> 01:50:02,397
to activate deepseek that

1995
01:50:02,480 --> 01:50:06,877
the the CCP and the PLA know about that

1996
01:50:06,960 --> 01:50:10,957
um that we don't. Uh so so that's why

1997
01:50:11,040 --> 01:50:15,117
deepseek is scary and why so so
the first area is just data poisoning. So

1998
01:50:15,200 --> 01:50:17,437
basically, can you poison the data that

1999
01:50:17,520 --> 01:50:21,037
we're using to train the AIS such that

2000
01:50:21,120 --> 01:50:23,197
to your point, I've altered the behavior

2001
01:50:23,280 --> 01:50:28,237
of your AIS in a way that you don't know
about and that's going to affect that's

2002
01:50:28,320 --> 01:50:29,517
going to have cascading effects across

2003
01:50:29,600 --> 01:50:31,597
your whole military operation. That's

2004
01:50:31,680 --> 01:50:36,557
one. And then the second one is um

2005
01:50:36,640 --> 01:50:39,357
uh is basically

2006
01:50:39,440 --> 01:50:43,757
uh you know if if you're
able to do the whole

2007
01:50:43,840 --> 01:50:45,997
operation quickly enough you basically

2008
01:50:46,080 --> 01:50:50,717
hack in and you uh kind of as we were

2009
01:50:50,800 --> 01:50:54,877
talking about before you would like
destroy the traces. You destroy any sort

2010
01:50:54,960 --> 01:50:59,037
of trace that like you had hacked in
and you have an agent that like hacked in

2011
01:50:59,120 --> 01:51:00,797
like removed that trace and the evidence

2012
01:51:00,880 --> 01:51:04,477
of you hacking in. um uh before anybody

2013
01:51:04,560 --> 01:51:06,397
before it was alerted or notified.

2014
01:51:06,480 --> 01:51:09,117
That's maybe a bit more extreme,
but definitely the data poisoning stuff is

2015
01:51:09,200 --> 01:51:11,277
is more concerning in the near term.

2016
01:51:11,360 --> 01:51:14,397
>> Damn. So, how would you how would you

2017
01:51:14,480 --> 01:51:17,197
defeat it? I mean, it's So, if if it

2018
01:51:17,280 --> 01:51:19,597
were to be hacked and you knew it was

2019
01:51:19,680 --> 01:51:24,397
hacked, then AI becomes
completely irrelevant. Correct.

2020
01:51:24,480 --> 01:51:25,917
>> Well, the issue is we're still going to

2021
01:51:26,000 --> 01:51:28,797
rely on it for lots of things. So, um,

2022
01:51:28,880 --> 01:51:31,757
>> it would it would have to come down to

2023
01:51:31,840 --> 01:51:34,237
the human mind again and you would have

2024
01:51:34,320 --> 01:51:37,037
to you would have to let's say it's a

2025
01:51:37,120 --> 01:51:41,400
ship. You would have to

2026
01:51:41,520 --> 01:51:44,877
know everything that you've done in
the history so that it it doesn't detect

2027
01:51:44,960 --> 01:51:47,517
what tactic you're going to use and do

2028
01:51:47,600 --> 01:51:49,597
something

2029
01:51:49,680 --> 01:51:51,917
just something that's never been seen

2030
01:51:52,000 --> 01:51:58,237
before in order to confuse
the adversar's AI. Correct.

2031
01:51:58,320 --> 01:52:00,397
>> Yeah. >> So, you'd have
to make a drastic change

2032
01:52:00,480 --> 01:52:03,677
that you don't know know if it's
actually going to work so that the AI

2033
01:52:03,760 --> 01:52:08,237
doesn't detect, oh [__] we've seen this
before. This is what it's about to do.

2034
01:52:08,320 --> 01:52:10,557
>> Yeah. Yeah. So, so to your point, yeah,

2035
01:52:10,640 --> 01:52:12,237
strategic surprise becomes the name of

2036
01:52:12,320 --> 01:52:16,877
the game very quickly. Um, and and how

2037
01:52:16,960 --> 01:52:20,797
do you create an operation such that you

2038
01:52:20,880 --> 01:52:24,397
maximize the amount of strategic
surprise against an adversarial AI?

2039
01:52:24,480 --> 01:52:27,037
That's one. And then honestly, the

2040
01:52:27,120 --> 01:52:31,437
second thing that's that's really
critical is a lot of this will just

2041
01:52:31,520 --> 01:52:36,157
plain up boil down to like
straight up boil down to how

2042
01:52:36,240 --> 01:52:37,997
many copies you have running and how

2043
01:52:38,080 --> 01:52:41,437
large your data centers are and um how

2044
01:52:41,520 --> 01:52:44,317
much industrial capacity you have to run

2045
01:52:44,400 --> 01:52:47,677
these AIs both centrally and at the edge

2046
01:52:47,760 --> 01:52:50,077
in all the war in all the theaters and

2047
01:52:50,160 --> 01:52:54,157
all the the um in every in every

2048
01:52:54,240 --> 01:52:56,717
environment. um

2049
01:52:56,800 --> 01:52:58,877
>> how fast will it learn new technology?

2050
01:52:58,960 --> 01:53:02,397
So, let's just take for example Seronic.

2051
01:53:02,480 --> 01:53:07,357
They're making autonomous surface
warfare vehicles or Palmer Lucky, you

2052
01:53:07,440 --> 01:53:08,877
know, he's doing the autonomous

2053
01:53:08,960 --> 01:53:11,037
submarines and [sighs]

2054
01:53:11,120 --> 01:53:15,197
and [clears throat] so when when

2055
01:53:15,280 --> 01:53:17,597
am I trying to say here? So, let's say

2056
01:53:17,680 --> 01:53:20,717
we're at war with China. China has all

2057
01:53:20,800 --> 01:53:23,437
the data, all the history back from

2058
01:53:23,520 --> 01:53:25,757
whatever World War II on different

2059
01:53:25,840 --> 01:53:28,237
capabilities that we have. And what

2060
01:53:28,320 --> 01:53:31,597
happens when a new when something new is

2061
01:53:31,680 --> 01:53:34,077
introduced onto the battle space like

2062
01:53:34,160 --> 01:53:37,037
Seronics autonomous vehicles or Eperus

2063
01:53:37,120 --> 01:53:38,637
or

2064
01:53:38,720 --> 01:53:41,917
uh or Palmer's rockets or his

2065
01:53:42,000 --> 01:53:45,437
submarines? How how would the

2066
01:53:45,520 --> 01:53:50,077
how would the AI get the data set

2067
01:53:50,160 --> 01:53:53,757
to make a decision or or not make
decisions but come up with what you're

2068
01:53:53,840 --> 01:53:56,317
talking about courses of actions

2069
01:53:56,400 --> 01:54:00,077
consequences what it's about to do p you

2070
01:54:00,160 --> 01:54:03,997
know probability of what's going
to happen how how fast will it be able to

2071
01:54:04,080 --> 01:54:05,917
learn

2072
01:54:06,000 --> 01:54:07,757
when something new is introduced onto

2073
01:54:07,840 --> 01:54:11,277
the battle space? Yeah, this is this is

2074
01:54:11,360 --> 01:54:13,997
a great question. In general,

2075
01:54:14,080 --> 01:54:17,277
so the so like the first time it sees a

2076
01:54:17,360 --> 01:54:20,957
a totally new, let's say a USV or UUV or

2077
01:54:21,040 --> 01:54:26,157
whatever it might be that that it's
never seen before, um it won't be a, you

2078
01:54:26,240 --> 01:54:29,117
know, it won't be able to predict what's
going to happen like cuz, you know, it

2079
01:54:29,200 --> 01:54:32,797
won't know how fast it's
going to go. It won't know

2080
01:54:32,880 --> 01:54:35,997
what what, you know, what um uh what

2081
01:54:36,080 --> 01:54:38,637
munitions it has. It won't know what its

2082
01:54:38,720 --> 01:54:43,197
range is. It won't it won't know all
the key uh the key facts. Unless, by the

2083
01:54:43,280 --> 01:54:45,437
way, they have really good intel
and they already know all those things

2084
01:54:45,520 --> 01:54:49,117
because they've hacked us. But let's
assume they don't know. So the first few

2085
01:54:49,200 --> 01:54:51,037
conflicts, it's not really going to be

2086
01:54:51,120 --> 01:54:53,597
able to to figure out what's happening.

2087
01:54:53,680 --> 01:54:57,197
And that that's a that's a key component

2088
01:54:57,280 --> 01:54:58,797
of strategic surprise is always having

2089
01:54:58,880 --> 01:55:02,877
new platforms that won't be sort of

2090
01:55:02,960 --> 01:55:04,957
simulatable, let's say, by enemy

2091
01:55:05,040 --> 01:55:08,157
wargaming tech. Um, so that's that's

2092
01:55:08,240 --> 01:55:11,597
definitely part of it. Um, but at a

2093
01:55:11,680 --> 01:55:14,797
certain point it's going to know what

2094
01:55:14,880 --> 01:55:17,757
the hardware are capable of and it's

2095
01:55:17,840 --> 01:55:19,677
going to be able to run the simulations

2096
01:55:19,760 --> 01:55:23,277
to to understand how that changes the

2097
01:55:23,360 --> 01:55:25,677
calculus. Um because ultimately right

2098
01:55:25,760 --> 01:55:28,717
what's going to happen is

2099
01:55:28,800 --> 01:55:33,037
and some of this stuff like
you know this is this is like

2100
01:55:33,120 --> 01:55:35,517
you know some of the stuff is dissonant
because obviously if you look at what

2101
01:55:35,600 --> 01:55:38,557
happens today in the military it looks
nothing like this but let's play the

2102
01:55:38,640 --> 01:55:41,837
play the tape forward and like see
what happens in the future. Ultimately,

2103
01:55:41,920 --> 01:55:42,957
you're going to run large scale

2104
01:55:43,040 --> 01:55:45,837
simulations and it's going to figure

2105
01:55:45,920 --> 01:55:51,757
out, hey, this new, you know, uh, uh,

2106
01:55:51,840 --> 01:55:55,517
unmanned surface vehicle has this much
range. It can go this quickly. It can

2107
01:55:55,600 --> 01:55:56,957
maneuver in this way. It has this kind

2108
01:55:57,040 --> 01:55:59,917
of munitions. Um, it has this kind of

2109
01:56:00,000 --> 01:56:05,117
connectivity. Uh, it is vulnerable
to these kinds of, you know, EW attacks,

2110
01:56:05,200 --> 01:56:08,957
whatever they may be. Um, it can be
jammed in these ways. And those will all

2111
01:56:09,040 --> 01:56:11,917
just be parameters for the simulation um

2112
01:56:12,000 --> 01:56:17,677
to run. So I think >>
but initially it would have no

2113
01:56:17,760 --> 01:56:20,317
recommendations. >> Initially
you'd have strategic surprise.

2114
01:56:20,400 --> 01:56:22,477
>> So opsec when it comes to weapons

2115
01:56:22,560 --> 01:56:25,437
capabilities is still just paramount and

2116
01:56:25,520 --> 01:56:28,637
it will I mean will it always come back

2117
01:56:28,720 --> 01:56:31,757
to the human mind?

2118
01:56:31,840 --> 01:56:35,037
>> Uh yeah I believe so.
I believe that you

2119
01:56:35,120 --> 01:56:37,197
know we have this concept that we talk

2120
01:56:37,280 --> 01:56:40,237
about a lot which is human sovereignty.

2121
01:56:40,320 --> 01:56:43,677
So um AI systems are going to get way

2122
01:56:43,760 --> 01:56:46,157
better but how do we ensure that humans

2123
01:56:46,240 --> 01:56:47,917
remain sovereign? How do we m ensure

2124
01:56:48,000 --> 01:56:52,157
that humans maintain real control over

2125
01:56:52,240 --> 01:56:55,437
what matters? So maintain control over
our political systems, maintain control

2126
01:56:55,520 --> 01:56:59,997
over our militaries, maintain control
over our economic systems, you know uh

2127
01:57:00,080 --> 01:57:02,397
our major industries, all that kind of

2128
01:57:02,480 --> 01:57:05,917
stuff. And so um and I believe it's

2129
01:57:06,000 --> 01:57:10,397
pretty paramount in the military. You're
ne you are not going to want to take

2130
01:57:10,480 --> 01:57:12,637
certainly just as like a as like a

2131
01:57:12,720 --> 01:57:17,677
simplistic thing. We're not going to give
AI the capabilities to unilaterally

2132
01:57:17,760 --> 01:57:19,357
fire nuclear weapons. >> Mhm.

2133
01:57:19,440 --> 01:57:22,077
>> Like we're never going to do that. Um

2134
01:57:22,160 --> 01:57:25,357
and so ultimately so much of what is

2135
01:57:25,440 --> 01:57:28,877
going to become really critical is the

2136
01:57:28,960 --> 01:57:31,037
aggregation of information, simulations,

2137
01:57:31,120 --> 01:57:35,437
wargaming, um planning to humans

2138
01:57:35,520 --> 01:57:38,637
to ultimately make the proper decisions.

2139
01:57:38,720 --> 01:57:40,637
And by the way, so much of this will

2140
01:57:40,720 --> 01:57:44,397
will start bleeding into the diplomatic

2141
01:57:44,480 --> 01:57:46,477
like diplomacy, diplomatic decisions

2142
01:57:46,560 --> 01:57:48,877
that need to be made. Um, it'll bleed

2143
01:57:48,960 --> 01:57:54,077
into like uh into economic warfare. Like

2144
01:57:54,160 --> 01:57:55,437
it'll bleed into

2145
01:57:55,520 --> 01:57:59,197
>> I mean this this goes all the way into

2146
01:57:59,280 --> 01:58:01,197
I could see this going all the way into

2147
01:58:01,280 --> 01:58:04,877
relationship building with with uh in

2148
01:58:04,960 --> 01:58:07,597
between nations. Should we, you know,

2149
01:58:07,680 --> 01:58:09,997
what are the what are the outcomes if we

2150
01:58:10,080 --> 01:58:13,437
become allies with

2151
01:58:13,520 --> 01:58:17,597
Russia? Yeah. >> You know
what what what are the courses

2152
01:58:17,680 --> 01:58:20,157
of action? What are the consequences? I

2153
01:58:20,240 --> 01:58:22,717
mean, is it does it so it bleeds into

2154
01:58:22,800 --> 01:58:25,757
everything? Politics,

2155
01:58:25,840 --> 01:58:30,557
allies, adversaries, warfare, economics,

2156
01:58:30,640 --> 01:58:33,517
all of it. >> Yeah. Totally.
Cuz if you ultimately

2157
01:58:33,600 --> 01:58:35,117
boil it down, what is the capability?

2158
01:58:35,200 --> 01:58:40,077
The capability is sensing
and situational awareness. So,

2159
01:58:40,160 --> 01:58:41,837
I'm I'm going to know I'm going to be

2160
01:58:41,920 --> 01:58:43,277
able to go through troves and troves of

2161
01:58:43,360 --> 01:58:47,197
data. OSENT other forms of um uh like

2162
01:58:47,280 --> 01:58:51,677
open source intel uh different kinds
of of various intel feeds that I have and

2163
01:58:51,760 --> 01:58:55,677
know what is the current status what's
going on what is the what is the current

2164
01:58:55,760 --> 01:58:58,397
situation it'll be able to aggregate all

2165
01:58:58,480 --> 01:59:02,717
that data in to provide
a a comprehensive view as to what those

2166
01:59:02,800 --> 01:59:04,477
behaviors are and then it'll give you

2167
01:59:04,560 --> 01:59:08,317
the ability to predict um and it'll give

2168
01:59:08,400 --> 01:59:12,077
you the ability to effectively play

2169
01:59:12,160 --> 01:59:15,917
forward you know every potential action
you could take, what would happen in

2170
01:59:16,000 --> 01:59:18,317
those scenarios with some probabilistic

2171
01:59:18,400 --> 01:59:21,517
uh view, some some probabilities and

2172
01:59:21,600 --> 01:59:26,477
then yeah, you're going to use that
for every major decision like the the

2173
01:59:26,560 --> 01:59:27,917
military and the government should use

2174
01:59:28,000 --> 01:59:30,877
this for every major decision we make.

2175
01:59:30,960 --> 01:59:33,837
We should do it for trade policies. We

2176
01:59:33,920 --> 01:59:36,237
should do it for diplomatic relations.

2177
01:59:36,320 --> 01:59:39,597
We should do it for um uh we should do

2178
01:59:39,680 --> 01:59:43,677
it you know we're looking outwards
but honestly we should also do it for like

2179
01:59:43,760 --> 01:59:45,997
internal policies like you know what are

2180
01:59:46,080 --> 01:59:48,397
our healthcare policies what are our um

2181
01:59:48,480 --> 01:59:51,357
you know uh all that kind of stuff too

2182
01:59:51,440 --> 01:59:55,357
but um so it will this capability of

2183
01:59:55,440 --> 01:59:59,117
sort of um effectively

2184
01:59:59,200 --> 02:00:01,837
all domain sensing plus planning um is

2185
02:00:01,920 --> 02:00:04,717
going to be paramount.

2186
02:00:04,800 --> 02:00:07,197
Do you

2187
02:00:07,280 --> 02:00:10,077
and I have so many questions.

2188
02:00:10,160 --> 02:00:13,277
Do you see a world where

2189
02:00:13,360 --> 02:00:17,917
AI becomes so powerful

2190
02:00:18,000 --> 02:00:22,600
throughout the world
that it becomes obsolete

2191
02:00:22,720 --> 02:00:25,517
and we're right back to where we we are

2192
02:00:25,600 --> 02:00:28,717
we were I don't know 10 years ago, 20

2193
02:00:28,800 --> 02:00:33,480
years ago where it's all human decisionm.

2194
02:00:34,320 --> 02:00:37,357
Well, >> will it outdo itself?

2195
02:00:37,440 --> 02:00:39,757
>> Um,

2196
02:00:39,840 --> 02:00:44,797
a few thoughts here. I think so,

2197
02:00:44,880 --> 02:00:49,037
one of the thing, so I think the first
stage of what's going to happen is like

2198
02:00:49,120 --> 02:00:53,117
kind of what I'm saying like human
is the loop to human on the loop. We're

2199
02:00:53,200 --> 02:00:55,917
going to right now humans do a lot of

2200
02:00:56,000 --> 02:01:01,757
just like like brute force manpower

2201
02:01:01,840 --> 02:01:05,837
work in all sorts of different pl you
know in the economy and in warfare etc.

2202
02:01:05,920 --> 02:01:10,557
>> Um that'll that's that's like the first
level of of of major automation that's

2203
02:01:10,640 --> 02:01:12,237
going to that's going to take place. So

2204
02:01:12,320 --> 02:01:16,797
then it's like about, you know, your

2205
02:01:16,880 --> 02:01:19,667
um strategic decision- making

2206
02:01:19,750 --> 02:01:23,277
[clears throat] and your ability to um

2207
02:01:23,360 --> 02:01:27,837
and your ability to make high judgment
decisions um that considered long-term,

2208
02:01:27,920 --> 02:01:29,117
short-term, medium-term, all that kind

2209
02:01:29,200 --> 02:01:31,677
of stuff. Um

2210
02:01:31,760 --> 02:01:36,077
at a certain point of of well

2211
02:01:36,160 --> 02:01:37,917
at a certain as the AI continues to

2212
02:01:38,000 --> 02:01:39,357
improve and improve and improve and

2213
02:01:39,440 --> 02:01:43,357
improve um it will operate at a pace

2214
02:01:43,440 --> 02:01:45,917
that is very very difficult for humans

2215
02:01:46,000 --> 02:01:51,117
to keep up with. Um and in you know this

2216
02:01:51,200 --> 02:01:53,277
will start happening in R&D first in re

2217
02:01:53,360 --> 02:01:58,157
research and development like AI will
be able to start doing lots of scientific

2218
02:01:58,240 --> 02:02:01,997
research lots of R&D into new weapon
systems lots of R&D into new mil you

2219
02:02:02,080 --> 02:02:04,637
know military platforms etc um much

2220
02:02:04,720 --> 02:02:09,437
faster than than humans are you know
would be able to do and then humans will

2221
02:02:09,520 --> 02:02:11,037
just check over their work and and

2222
02:02:11,120 --> 02:02:13,597
decide and so it's going to sort of race

2223
02:02:13,680 --> 02:02:18,077
faster and faster and faster and Um and

2224
02:02:18,160 --> 02:02:22,077
the so then what happens I think
it'll what it'll do is it'll create

2225
02:02:22,160 --> 02:02:24,957
dramatically more weight on the few

2226
02:02:25,040 --> 02:02:27,837
decisions that humans make. So any

2227
02:02:27,920 --> 02:02:30,397
decision that like all the way to the

2228
02:02:30,480 --> 02:02:34,237
extreme right is um you know the

2229
02:02:34,320 --> 02:02:37,757
president or or you know whomever making

2230
02:02:37,840 --> 02:02:41,997
decisions about do I let my AI
collaborate with another country's AI

2231
02:02:42,080 --> 02:02:46,957
like that will be like a decision
of just like dramatic consequence. uh much

2232
02:02:47,040 --> 02:02:48,397
higher consequence than like similar

2233
02:02:48,480 --> 02:02:51,677
decisions today. So I think it almost to

2234
02:02:51,760 --> 02:02:55,437
your point it like it will as it

2235
02:02:55,520 --> 02:02:57,917
accelerates we'll end up at a place

2236
02:02:58,000 --> 02:03:00,157
where you're right it all boils down to

2237
02:03:00,240 --> 02:03:03,277
human decision-m but those decisions

2238
02:03:03,360 --> 02:03:05,197
will carry

2239
02:03:05,280 --> 02:03:07,757
like a thousand times more consequence.

2240
02:03:07,840 --> 02:03:11,677
>> Mhm. Mhm. [cough] How do
you decide who you're going to

2241
02:03:11,760 --> 02:03:14,637
work with? I mean it's an international

2242
02:03:14,720 --> 02:03:18,877
company. Yeah. Um, so we've had

2243
02:03:18,960 --> 02:03:20,957
>> Who all are you working with?

2244
02:03:21,040 --> 02:03:25,197
>> Uh, well, so first
thing is we're pretty

2245
02:03:25,280 --> 02:03:29,277
we're pretty picky about who we work
with ultimately just because we have um

2246
02:03:29,360 --> 02:03:32,717
we only have so many resources
and building these systems and building

2247
02:03:32,800 --> 02:03:35,437
these data sets like is pretty involved

2248
02:03:35,520 --> 02:03:38,957
um as as kind of we've discussed. So you

2249
02:03:39,040 --> 02:03:44,237
know our aim generally is how do you
work with the best in every industry?

2250
02:03:44,320 --> 02:03:46,797
you know, how do you how do you
work with, you know, like kind of was

2251
02:03:46,880 --> 02:03:49,437
mentioning, the number one bank, the
number one pharma, the number one telco,

2252
02:03:49,520 --> 02:03:53,357
number one military, etc. Um, the only

2253
02:03:53,440 --> 02:03:55,837
addition to this that I would say we

2254
02:03:55,920 --> 02:04:00,957
viewed as as as important is how are we

2255
02:04:01,040 --> 02:04:04,157
um as you as we play the tape forward

2256
02:04:04,240 --> 02:04:07,677
and everything we're just discussing.

2257
02:04:07,760 --> 02:04:11,117
It's really important that

2258
02:04:11,200 --> 02:04:15,437
um as much of the world runs on an

2259
02:04:15,520 --> 02:04:19,117
American AI stack uh versus a CCP AI

2260
02:04:19,200 --> 02:04:21,037
stack that becomes really really

2261
02:04:21,120 --> 02:04:25,277
important. Um and uh it matters not only

2262
02:04:25,360 --> 02:04:29,437
for ideology and you
know kind of as we were

2263
02:04:29,520 --> 02:04:31,917
talking about before like propaganda
and control and all that kind of stuff but

2264
02:04:32,000 --> 02:04:34,557
it also really matters just for like you

2265
02:04:34,640 --> 02:04:38,477
know at a pure operational level like

2266
02:04:38,560 --> 02:04:40,957
we're going to want to be able to have

2267
02:04:41,040 --> 02:04:45,117
as extended of of of AI capabilities as

2268
02:04:45,200 --> 02:04:48,520
possible. So,

2269
02:04:49,120 --> 02:04:54,040
okay. So, the way I understand this is

2270
02:04:56,240 --> 02:04:58,957
you're working with X country. We'll

2271
02:04:59,040 --> 02:05:03,997
just say, we'll just say country X.

2272
02:05:04,080 --> 02:05:08,397
You give country X the AI model to

2273
02:05:08,480 --> 02:05:10,477
utilize for whatever they're doing.

2274
02:05:10,560 --> 02:05:15,757
Let's just say warfare. we own,
but they they have to tap into a

2275
02:05:15,840 --> 02:05:17,357
US-based

2276
02:05:17,440 --> 02:05:20,957
data center. Am I correct here? And so,

2277
02:05:21,040 --> 02:05:23,757
as long as we control the data center

2278
02:05:23,840 --> 02:05:26,397
that's feeding that AI model, we

2279
02:05:26,480 --> 02:05:30,237
essentially own it and that and country

2280
02:05:30,320 --> 02:05:34,077
X just has to trust that

2281
02:05:34,160 --> 02:05:36,637
scale AI has their best interest.

2282
02:05:36,720 --> 02:05:38,317
>> Yeah. That's like next level.

2283
02:05:38,400 --> 02:05:40,717
>> And if they change, if they change,

2284
02:05:40,800 --> 02:05:45,037
let's say country X now forms an

2285
02:05:45,120 --> 02:05:48,797
alliance with China, they decide

2286
02:05:48,880 --> 02:05:50,397
they don't want to be a part of America,

2287
02:05:50,480 --> 02:05:53,837
then we just yank the AI or the not the

2288
02:05:53,920 --> 02:05:57,037
AI, the the the the data that feeds that

2289
02:05:57,120 --> 02:06:01,117
AI or manipulate that data to where it's

2290
02:06:01,200 --> 02:06:05,517
essentially been hacked.
Am >> I correct? And that's how we keep

2291
02:06:05,600 --> 02:06:07,277
ourselves safe.

2292
02:06:07,360 --> 02:06:10,397
>> Uh yes. And then with the addition like

2293
02:06:10,480 --> 02:06:14,637
I think the way that um at least we
think about it today and I think a lot

2294
02:06:14,720 --> 02:06:18,877
of people think about it today is like
it's okay for the data center to be

2295
02:06:18,960 --> 02:06:23,757
located elsewhere located in the country.
Um as long as it's US owned and

2296
02:06:23,840 --> 02:06:28,717
operated um because then
we still have control in

2297
02:06:28,800 --> 02:06:33,277
you know any sort of scenario that
happens. And um the only other thing I

2298
02:06:33,360 --> 02:06:35,437
would say is we're much more focused

2299
02:06:35,520 --> 02:06:39,677
initially on just um low stakes uses of

2300
02:06:39,760 --> 02:06:43,117
AI. So can you use AI to help

2301
02:06:43,200 --> 02:06:47,117
uh the education uh industry in one
of these countries or can you use it to

2302
02:06:47,200 --> 02:06:49,037
help the healthcare industry or can you

2303
02:06:49,120 --> 02:06:53,357
use it to aid in um in like you know

2304
02:06:53,440 --> 02:06:57,117
permitting processes or you know low I
think low stakes use cases matter a lot

2305
02:06:57,200 --> 02:06:59,997
more initially. Um but I really do think

2306
02:07:00,080 --> 02:07:04,637
like uh you know we have this concept
of geopolitical swing states. There are

2307
02:07:04,720 --> 02:07:05,997
there are a number of countries right

2308
02:07:06,080 --> 02:07:08,797
now in the world where whether they side

2309
02:07:08,880 --> 02:07:13,117
with the US or China over time is going

2310
02:07:13,200 --> 02:07:17,357
to have immense consequences for

2311
02:07:17,440 --> 02:07:21,677
certainly what a what a potential
conflict scenario looks like but also

2312
02:07:21,760 --> 02:07:23,677
even what like the long-term cold war

2313
02:07:23,760 --> 02:07:26,317
scenario looks like. like what happens

2314
02:07:26,400 --> 02:07:29,597
um over time in this as you know our

2315
02:07:29,680 --> 02:07:32,877
countries are interacting. So um so I

2316
02:07:32,960 --> 02:07:35,597
view I view AI as like one of these key

2317
02:07:35,680 --> 02:07:39,357
elements of diplomacy and long-term sort

2318
02:07:39,440 --> 02:07:42,317
of uh like

2319
02:07:42,400 --> 02:07:43,917
long-term

2320
02:07:44,000 --> 02:07:47,117
um strategic impact in the in the

2321
02:07:47,200 --> 02:07:49,357
international war game. [sighs]

2322
02:07:49,440 --> 02:07:52,397
>> How would AI be implemented into our

2323
02:07:52,480 --> 02:07:55,437
government? I mean, I can't remember

2324
02:07:55,520 --> 02:07:57,917
exactly what you said, implemented to

2325
02:07:58,000 --> 02:08:00,637
run, you know, our political sphere.

2326
02:08:00,720 --> 02:08:04,397
What does that look like?
>> Yeah. So, um, uh,

2327
02:08:04,480 --> 02:08:07,437
>> because so much of that is people's

2328
02:08:07,520 --> 02:08:10,477
values and and what people believe in

2329
02:08:10,560 --> 02:08:14,797
and stand for and, you know, I mean, it

2330
02:08:14,880 --> 02:08:18,397
like today for example, I mean, country

2331
02:08:18,480 --> 02:08:20,157
is probably more polarized than it's

2332
02:08:20,240 --> 02:08:23,517
ever been. And so, how do you how do you

2333
02:08:23,600 --> 02:08:26,877
get an AI model to run government when

2334
02:08:26,960 --> 02:08:29,357
it is this polarized and there's so many

2335
02:08:29,440 --> 02:08:32,477
different ideologies and part of the

2336
02:08:32,560 --> 02:08:33,917
country is way over here, the other

2337
02:08:34,000 --> 02:08:36,797
part's way over here. How how would an

2338
02:08:36,880 --> 02:08:40,237
AI model

2339
02:08:40,320 --> 02:08:41,677
run that?

2340
02:08:41,760 --> 02:08:47,197
>> Yeah. So, um the we
have this concept of

2341
02:08:47,280 --> 02:08:49,117
kind of like agentic warfare, agentic

2342
02:08:49,200 --> 02:08:52,637
government. So can you can just like the

2343
02:08:52,720 --> 02:08:54,317
same thing can you take these very

2344
02:08:54,400 --> 02:08:57,437
inefficient processes in government and

2345
02:08:57,520 --> 02:09:01,917
start replacing those with AI related
functions so that you're you're just

2346
02:09:02,000 --> 02:09:04,397
you're just improving efficiency
and improving outcomes.

2347
02:09:04,480 --> 02:09:07,517
>> Give me give me uh a specific example.

2348
02:09:07,600 --> 02:09:09,917
>> Yeah. So what like one super simple one

2349
02:09:10,000 --> 02:09:12,877
right now I think the the average time

2350
02:09:12,960 --> 02:09:18,797
it takes for a veteran to see a doctor
in in the VA is something like 22 days.

2351
02:09:18,880 --> 02:09:21,517
Mhm. >> Um it's way too
long and part of that is

2352
02:09:21,600 --> 02:09:24,957
because of a host of antiquated

2353
02:09:25,040 --> 02:09:30,637
processes and workflows and you know
um just in general that system's not

2354
02:09:30,720 --> 02:09:33,117
working. I think we can all look
at that and say that's not a that's not a

2355
02:09:33,200 --> 02:09:36,317
functional system. And so um can you use

2356
02:09:36,400 --> 02:09:40,237
AI to you know AI agents to automate

2357
02:09:40,320 --> 02:09:43,597
some parts of that process automatically
get whatever approvals need to be gotten

2358
02:09:43,680 --> 02:09:47,117
get whatever information needs to be
gotten such that that that 22 days

2359
02:09:47,200 --> 02:09:49,437
becomes a day or two or something like

2360
02:09:49,520 --> 02:09:51,837
that. Um that I think is like a

2361
02:09:51,920 --> 02:09:55,117
no-brainer just pure win for government

2362
02:09:55,200 --> 02:09:58,877
efficiency overall. Um another one that

2363
02:09:58,960 --> 02:10:04,077
uh other ones that are like big are like
you know permitting processes. So if I

2364
02:10:04,160 --> 02:10:07,597
want to build a new data center
somewhere or even I just want to like

2365
02:10:07,680 --> 02:10:11,517
remodel my home the you know permitting
processes depending where you are could

2366
02:10:11,600 --> 02:10:15,277
take literally take years uh for all
of that to go down. And part of that is

2367
02:10:15,360 --> 02:10:18,637
like there's so many different approvals
that need to happen. There's so many

2368
02:10:18,720 --> 02:10:21,357
like there's all these like different
workflows and things that need to like

2369
02:10:21,440 --> 02:10:25,677
happen. What if instead we just codified
what are the rules of the system and had

2370
02:10:25,760 --> 02:10:29,517
an AI agent just go automatically go
through that permitting process so that

2371
02:10:29,600 --> 02:10:31,437
you could get that permit or or get the

2372
02:10:31,520 --> 02:10:34,717
permit denied within like a day, right?

2373
02:10:34,800 --> 02:10:38,557
Um so and just that times a million like

2374
02:10:38,640 --> 02:10:42,717
like the uh like um like one of the

2375
02:10:42,800 --> 02:10:44,397
things from from Doge that they found

2376
02:10:44,480 --> 02:10:47,037
right is that you know the uh the

2377
02:10:47,120 --> 02:10:49,837
retirements are stored in the mine Iron

2378
02:10:49,920 --> 02:10:52,717
Mountain mine uh literally a literal

2379
02:10:52,800 --> 02:10:56,557
like iron mine um are like the paper

2380
02:10:56,640 --> 02:10:57,997
copies of the retirements for all the

2381
02:10:58,080 --> 02:11:03,597
federal employees. like can we just take
that which is two generations behind um

2382
02:11:03,680 --> 02:11:07,597
in terms of tech like it's like
literally pen and paper um and then use

2383
02:11:07,680 --> 02:11:11,437
AI to go from two generations behind to
two generations forward like can we just

2384
02:11:11,520 --> 02:11:13,197
automate as much of those processes as

2385
02:11:13,280 --> 02:11:17,277
possible so um so I see as just like you

2386
02:11:17,360 --> 02:11:19,517
know all over the there's so much low

2387
02:11:19,600 --> 02:11:22,557
hanging fruit in terms of just making um

2388
02:11:22,640 --> 02:11:25,197
current government services and

2389
02:11:25,280 --> 02:11:27,117
government processes way more efficient

2390
02:11:27,200 --> 02:11:30,477
I think that I I haven't met anybody who

2391
02:11:30,560 --> 02:11:32,877
doesn't think this is the case.

2392
02:11:32,960 --> 02:11:35,117
>> So, um that's just that's just all the

2393
02:11:35,200 --> 02:11:41,677
level one stuff. Um I think uh the

2394
02:11:41,760 --> 02:11:44,637
Yeah, that's just all the level one stuff
in improving how our government operates.

2395
02:11:44,720 --> 02:11:49,400
>> Would it would it
eventually replace politicians?

2396
02:11:50,240 --> 02:11:51,837
>> That's a good question. I think

2397
02:11:51,920 --> 02:11:55,277
ultimately like we

2398
02:11:55,360 --> 02:11:59,357
um so

2399
02:11:59,440 --> 02:12:02,877
first off just like um uh taking a step

2400
02:12:02,960 --> 02:12:05,997
back it's definitely the case that

2401
02:12:06,080 --> 02:12:10,237
policy the speed of policym and the
speed of legislation and the speed at

2402
02:12:10,320 --> 02:12:13,277
which the government reacts to new
technologies like that's going to have

2403
02:12:13,360 --> 02:12:17,117
to speed up. Um, you know, we uh I've

2404
02:12:17,200 --> 02:12:19,837
spent a lot of time in DC trying to make

2405
02:12:19,920 --> 02:12:22,877
sure that, you know, as a country we get

2406
02:12:22,960 --> 02:12:25,997
the right kind of AI legislation and the

2407
02:12:26,080 --> 02:12:27,997
right kind of AI regulation to ensure

2408
02:12:28,080 --> 02:12:31,837
that this all goes well for us. Um,

2409
02:12:31,920 --> 02:12:36,637
it's been years of trying to get that
done. You know, we still haven't really

2410
02:12:36,720 --> 02:12:39,837
figured that out as a country.
What is what is the right AI regulatory

2411
02:12:39,920 --> 02:12:43,357
framework? Like that's still it's
still undecided. I mean, how do you even

2412
02:12:43,440 --> 02:12:45,757
describe this stuff to the dinosaurs

2413
02:12:45,840 --> 02:12:49,597
that are still sitting in DC? I mean,

2414
02:12:49,680 --> 02:12:52,557
we've got people stroking out on camera.

2415
02:12:52,640 --> 02:12:56,797
We've got people literally dying
in office. I mean, we got people up there

2416
02:12:56,880 --> 02:12:58,157
that probably can't even figure out how

2417
02:12:58,240 --> 02:13:01,037
to open a [__] email. And then you

2418
02:13:01,120 --> 02:13:06,600
come in, 28 years old, built scale AI.

2419
02:13:08,000 --> 02:13:10,957
I I I mean I just I mean just going all

2420
02:13:11,040 --> 02:13:13,437
the way back to when you know

2421
02:13:13,520 --> 02:13:18,317
Zuckerberg's sitting there you know
talking to Congress. It's it's I mean

2422
02:13:18,400 --> 02:13:22,397
and I don't agree with everything he did
and whatever. It doesn't matter. But I

2423
02:13:22,480 --> 02:13:24,957
look at that and I'm like,

2424
02:13:25,040 --> 02:13:27,917
you guys have been sitting in DC,

2425
02:13:28,000 --> 02:13:29,437
probably don't even know how to open

2426
02:13:29,520 --> 02:13:32,237
your own email

2427
02:13:32,320 --> 02:13:36,237
and you're talking to a tech genius

2428
02:13:36,320 --> 02:13:38,717
who's trying to dub this down and make

2429
02:13:38,800 --> 02:13:42,717
you understand. I mean, I get one day

2430
02:13:42,800 --> 02:13:46,397
with you, you know what I mean? And to try
to wrap my head around this and they

2431
02:13:46,480 --> 02:13:49,917
have 50 million other things they're
dealing with. They're not up to speed on

2432
02:13:50,000 --> 02:13:55,037
tech. I mean, how how do
you even begin to >> Yeah.

2433
02:13:55,120 --> 02:13:55,917
>> tap in?

2434
02:13:56,000 --> 02:13:59,517
>> I mean, I think a lot of it I think um

2435
02:13:59,600 --> 02:14:03,117
the first thing and I think this is like

2436
02:14:03,200 --> 02:14:08,157
a lot of people in the know understand
this like a lot of the minute decisions

2437
02:14:08,240 --> 02:14:10,717
really end up being made
by staffers, right? Mhm.

2438
02:14:10,800 --> 02:14:14,477
>> And um and

2439
02:14:14,560 --> 02:14:18,477
I think like generally speaking
like staffer you have to be extremely

2440
02:14:18,560 --> 02:14:23,037
competent as a staffer um no matter what
like there's just it's a very chaotic

2441
02:14:23,120 --> 02:14:26,077
job. There's a lot that's there's a lot
that's going on and they have to make

2442
02:14:26,160 --> 02:14:29,117
very fast decisions. Um

2443
02:14:29,200 --> 02:14:31,037
uh the other thing is I think I think

2444
02:14:31,120 --> 02:14:36,157
analogies are are pretty helpful. Like I
think you know everybody alive today has

2445
02:14:36,240 --> 02:14:37,917
seen the pace of technology progress

2446
02:14:38,000 --> 02:14:40,157
just increase and increase and increase

2447
02:14:40,240 --> 02:14:43,277
and increase. Like I think that you know

2448
02:14:43,360 --> 02:14:45,037
you'd be hardressed to find anyone who

2449
02:14:45,120 --> 02:14:49,037
doesn't believe that AI will be this

2450
02:14:49,120 --> 02:14:52,237
worldchanging technology. Now exactly
how it'll change the world I think

2451
02:14:52,320 --> 02:14:54,317
that's where it gets fuzzier but um but

2452
02:14:54,400 --> 02:14:58,477
it will be worldchanging technology. Um,

2453
02:14:58,560 --> 02:15:02,797
but I but the issue is like I mean the

2454
02:15:02,880 --> 02:15:06,157
the political system just doesn't
respond very quickly, right? And and

2455
02:15:06,240 --> 02:15:08,877
that's that's gonna that's going to be

2456
02:15:08,960 --> 02:15:13,357
very harmful. I mean we need to be able
to respond very quickly to these new

2457
02:15:13,440 --> 02:15:17,677
technologies. >> Um, and so

2458
02:15:17,760 --> 02:15:19,757
uh I and I think they'll become more and

2459
02:15:19,840 --> 02:15:24,797
more obvious. Like I think I think as AI
and other technologies accelerate, it'll

2460
02:15:24,880 --> 02:15:26,557
be very obvious that like the world will

2461
02:15:26,640 --> 02:15:31,917
just change so quickly and frankly I
think voters are going to demand faster

2462
02:15:32,000 --> 02:15:34,717
action. >> Um and I so I think I think our

2463
02:15:34,800 --> 02:15:38,877
government is set up to um to accelerate

2464
02:15:38,960 --> 02:15:43,357
but um >> but that's
that's what needs to happen.

2465
02:15:43,440 --> 02:15:45,357
>> How do we power all this? I mean that's

2466
02:15:45,440 --> 02:15:49,197
that's a big discussion you know and

2467
02:15:49,280 --> 02:15:52,477
everybody is seems so apprehensive to go

2468
02:15:52,560 --> 02:15:55,037
nuclear

2469
02:15:55,120 --> 02:15:57,917
the grid is

2470
02:15:58,000 --> 02:16:01,117
extremely outdated. I mean we just saw

2471
02:16:01,200 --> 02:16:06,077
the light flickers here about I don't
know 30 minutes ago. Power outages

2472
02:16:06,160 --> 02:16:07,517
happening all the time. There was just a

2473
02:16:07,600 --> 02:16:09,677
big one all of Spain.

2474
02:16:09,760 --> 02:16:14,407
>> Uh Portugal, Italy. I mean,

2475
02:16:14,490 --> 02:16:17,037
[clears throat] it's happening
all the time in the US.

2476
02:16:17,120 --> 02:16:21,117
Power outages. How are we
going to be able to power all

2477
02:16:21,200 --> 02:16:24,397
this stuff? I What would
you like to see happen?

2478
02:16:24,480 --> 02:16:26,957
>> Yeah. I mean, first of all, if you look

2479
02:16:27,040 --> 02:16:30,317
at if you take a graph of

2480
02:16:30,400 --> 02:16:32,957
Chinese total China's total power

2481
02:16:33,040 --> 02:16:36,557
capacity over the past 20 years versus

2482
02:16:36,640 --> 02:16:38,957
US total power capacity over the past 20

2483
02:16:39,040 --> 02:16:42,637
years, the China graph is like straight

2484
02:16:42,720 --> 02:16:46,237
up and to the right. They're just adding
crazy amounts of power. They've doubled

2485
02:16:46,320 --> 02:16:48,797
it in the last decade,
I think. Double >> doubled

2486
02:16:48,880 --> 02:16:50,077
>> doubled their power
capacity in the last

2487
02:16:50,160 --> 02:16:54,877
decade. Um, and uh, the United States is

2488
02:16:54,960 --> 02:16:58,237
basically flat. Um, it's grown like a

2489
02:16:58,320 --> 02:17:01,517
little bit. Uh, and so

2490
02:17:01,600 --> 02:17:03,837
we're like that. That's what's happening

2491
02:17:03,920 --> 02:17:05,517
right now. Right now, China's doubling

2492
02:17:05,600 --> 02:17:09,357
every decade or so. Um, US is is is

2493
02:17:09,440 --> 02:17:12,957
basically flat. And we're looking at,

2494
02:17:13,040 --> 02:17:16,397
you know, the for to just power the data

2495
02:17:16,480 --> 02:17:19,117
centers that that today AI companies

2496
02:17:19,200 --> 02:17:20,797
know they want to build. we're going to

2497
02:17:20,880 --> 02:17:23,597
need something like a doubling of our

2498
02:17:23,680 --> 02:17:26,237
energy capacity and that needs to happen

2499
02:17:26,320 --> 02:17:28,557
very very quickly like almost you know

2500
02:17:28,640 --> 02:17:30,637
that has to happen almost immediately.

2501
02:17:30,720 --> 02:17:34,157
Um and so you have to believe that our

2502
02:17:34,240 --> 02:17:35,837
graph is going to go from totally flat

2503
02:17:35,920 --> 02:17:38,877
to vertical faster vertical than than

2504
02:17:38,960 --> 02:17:44,077
China's energy um uh growth. And China

2505
02:17:44,160 --> 02:17:47,917
on the in the meantime is just is growing
is is growing perfectly quickly.

2506
02:17:48,000 --> 02:17:51,757
They'll accelerate. they'll add more
power to their grid. Like I think it's

2507
02:17:51,840 --> 02:17:54,877
very hard to imagine realistic scenarios

2508
02:17:54,960 --> 02:17:58,237
where without drastic action, the United

2509
02:17:58,320 --> 02:18:00,557
States is able to grow its energy

2510
02:18:00,640 --> 02:18:03,197
capacity faster than China. Um,

2511
02:18:03,280 --> 02:18:05,917
>> now where are we on the So if China's

2512
02:18:06,000 --> 02:18:10,317
going straight up and we're flatlined,
I mean, does that mean are you saying that

2513
02:18:10,400 --> 02:18:14,317
China has surpassed our power
capabilities or are we still above them

2514
02:18:14,400 --> 02:18:17,277
even though they're on the rise?
Uh they're they're definitely above us

2515
02:18:17,360 --> 02:18:18,317
because they have a bigger population

2516
02:18:18,400 --> 02:18:21,517
and they have way more industrials. Uh

2517
02:18:21,600 --> 02:18:25,357
so they have uh I'll double check. I

2518
02:18:25,440 --> 02:18:26,797
they definitely have more power total

2519
02:18:26,880 --> 02:18:28,957
than us. Um more power generation

2520
02:18:29,040 --> 02:18:33,117
capabilities. And um and by the way,

2521
02:18:33,200 --> 02:18:36,957
like it's actually not rocket science
why that is. It's if you look at if you

2522
02:18:37,040 --> 02:18:41,997
then break that down to sources of that
power in China, it's because coal is

2523
02:18:42,080 --> 02:18:45,277
like 80% of that. >> Yeah.
They're all They're all coal.

2524
02:18:45,360 --> 02:18:47,197
Yeah, correct. It's just tons of coal.

2525
02:18:47,280 --> 02:18:52,317
And then we've actually like if you look
in the US, renewables have grown a lot,

2526
02:18:52,400 --> 02:18:55,517
but a lot of it, the reason the overall
number is flat is because we're using

2527
02:18:55,600 --> 02:18:58,637
renewables to replace coal, natural gas,

2528
02:18:58,720 --> 02:19:01,997
like fossil fuels. Um, and so when you

2529
02:19:02,080 --> 02:19:07,197
net it out in the US, we're flat. And then
in China, it's it's straight up. So

2530
02:19:07,280 --> 02:19:10,637
that's the first thing like we need
we need drastic action. You know, the

2531
02:19:10,720 --> 02:19:14,157
administration has the National Energy
Dominance Council. Um, we've sat down

2532
02:19:14,240 --> 02:19:18,077
with them a few times like that we
we got have to we have to take drastic

2533
02:19:18,160 --> 02:19:20,877
action to enable us to to at least start

2534
02:19:20,960 --> 02:19:25,197
matching their speed of adding energy
to the grid and ideally surpass it. That's

2535
02:19:25,280 --> 02:19:27,837
like that's the first thing. The second

2536
02:19:27,920 --> 02:19:30,557
thing like you're talking about is our

2537
02:19:30,640 --> 02:19:33,037
grid is extremely antiquated and that's

2538
02:19:33,120 --> 02:19:36,717
a major strategic risk. Um, you know, I

2539
02:19:36,800 --> 02:19:39,117
don't know what this what the cause or

2540
02:19:39,200 --> 02:19:42,237
the source of the the um outage across

2541
02:19:42,320 --> 02:19:46,797
Spain was, but you know, some people
think it was a foreign actor um or some

2542
02:19:46,880 --> 02:19:48,797
kind of some kind of cyber attack of

2543
02:19:48,880 --> 02:19:51,197
some sort. Um,

2544
02:19:51,280 --> 02:19:53,917
I guarantee you the US energy grid is

2545
02:19:54,000 --> 02:19:56,397
extremely susceptible to large scale

2546
02:19:56,480 --> 02:20:00,557
cyber attacks. Um it would be uh you

2547
02:20:00,640 --> 02:20:02,237
know and the way that you know the the

2548
02:20:02,320 --> 02:20:03,757
sophistication of these cyber attacks

2549
02:20:03,840 --> 02:20:07,997
sometimes is like so stupid. It's like

2550
02:20:08,080 --> 02:20:12,077
if you find the right like uh like power

2551
02:20:12,160 --> 02:20:15,997
plant login terminal to go into
sometimes people don't change the

2552
02:20:16,080 --> 02:20:20,397
username and password from the default
which is username and password. And so

2553
02:20:20,480 --> 02:20:22,797
you can just find like some power

2554
02:20:22,880 --> 02:20:26,877
station in like Wyoming that still has

2555
02:20:26,960 --> 02:20:29,837
an the username and password's username
and password. You log in and you can

2556
02:20:29,920 --> 02:20:31,997
shut down the entire uh powering the

2557
02:20:32,080 --> 02:20:37,037
entire region. So the like the so so our

2558
02:20:37,120 --> 02:20:38,877
grid just because of how antiquated is

2559
02:20:38,960 --> 02:20:40,397
how decentralized it is every all of

2560
02:20:40,480 --> 02:20:45,277
that is hyper hyper susceptible to uh to

2561
02:20:45,360 --> 02:20:47,597
cyber attacks hyper susceptible to

2562
02:20:47,680 --> 02:20:52,397
foreign action foreign activity and um
that matters now like right now if you

2563
02:20:52,480 --> 02:20:56,317
take the energy grid in a major city
people will die so it's like it's bad

2564
02:20:56,400 --> 02:20:59,837
now but then let's go back to what we
were just talking about with AI like

2565
02:20:59,920 --> 02:21:02,477
let's say we have large scale AI on AI

2566
02:21:02,560 --> 02:21:05,997
warfare with China. They just take out

2567
02:21:06,080 --> 02:21:09,917
the power grid, take out our data
centers and the power fueling those data

2568
02:21:10,000 --> 02:21:12,637
centers and then we're sitting ducks. I

2569
02:21:12,720 --> 02:21:15,117
mean, not only that, but it's my

2570
02:21:15,200 --> 02:21:19,837
understanding that China actually

2571
02:21:19,920 --> 02:21:21,917
produces and manufactures a lot of the

2572
02:21:22,000 --> 02:21:23,757
major components that go into our grid

2573
02:21:23,840 --> 02:21:26,957
like the transformers. If we don't even,

2574
02:21:27,040 --> 02:21:29,277
to my understanding, we don't even check

2575
02:21:29,360 --> 02:21:32,717
those for malware, Trojan horses, [__]

2576
02:21:32,800 --> 02:21:36,957
like that. In fact, DOE actually did an

2577
02:21:37,040 --> 02:21:39,997
inspection on one and never and never

2578
02:21:40,080 --> 02:21:41,837
even released the results of what they

2579
02:21:41,920 --> 02:21:44,637
found, which probably means they found

2580
02:21:44,720 --> 02:21:48,637
some [__] And I mean, I just I don't

2581
02:21:48,720 --> 02:21:51,597
know

2582
02:21:51,680 --> 02:21:54,317
how we combat that. I mean just like the

2583
02:21:54,400 --> 02:21:56,557
like what what is where did that happen

2584
02:21:56,640 --> 02:21:59,517
elsewhere? Like look at um salt typhoon

2585
02:21:59,600 --> 02:22:02,557
like uh this was a recent hack that was

2586
02:22:02,640 --> 02:22:06,317
declassified which is that Chinese

2587
02:22:06,400 --> 02:22:08,717
malware and cyber act activity like

2588
02:22:08,800 --> 02:22:12,957
basically had fully infiltrated our um

2589
02:22:13,040 --> 02:22:15,197
major telecom providers. I think AT&T

2590
02:22:15,280 --> 02:22:20,157
was like entirely uh like um entirely

2591
02:22:20,240 --> 02:22:22,397
compromised by this hack called Salt

2592
02:22:22,480 --> 02:22:26,717
Typhoon um from the CCP and uh and

2593
02:22:26,800 --> 02:22:31,277
that's they did that so that they could
read all the messages like all the SMS

2594
02:22:31,360 --> 02:22:33,677
all the audio um they were able to to

2595
02:22:33,760 --> 02:22:38,637
capture as part of that as part of an
intel gathering operation. Um, but if

2596
02:22:38,720 --> 02:22:42,557
they're able to hack into our telco,
they've sure as hell, you know, they're

2597
02:22:42,640 --> 02:22:45,757
clearly capable of hacking into
our energy grid, clearly h capable of

2598
02:22:45,840 --> 02:22:47,677
hacking to any other any of our other

2599
02:22:47,760 --> 02:22:51,677
critical infrastructure. And um, and it

2600
02:22:51,760 --> 02:22:56,157
just goes back to what we're talking
about, like the energy grid, a if we

2601
02:22:56,240 --> 02:23:00,237
can't produce enough power, we're hosed,
and b, if the adversaries can take out

2602
02:23:00,320 --> 02:23:03,037
our power at will, we're hosed.

2603
02:23:03,120 --> 02:23:06,637
>> Mhm. Um, and so we
have this major major

2604
02:23:06,720 --> 02:23:09,357
vulnerability as a country on just like

2605
02:23:09,440 --> 02:23:11,677
the cyber posture of our energy grid. I

2606
02:23:11,760 --> 02:23:14,397
think it's like I think it's one of the

2607
02:23:14,480 --> 02:23:18,637
the biggest like very obvious like

2608
02:23:18,720 --> 02:23:22,797
flatout um uh like clear vulnerabilities

2609
02:23:22,880 --> 02:23:26,477
of our overall of our entire country. Um

2610
02:23:26,560 --> 02:23:30,477
a just like you create civil unrest.
you can like take, you know, imagine you

2611
02:23:30,560 --> 02:23:33,437
took Houston's power grid out. People

2612
02:23:33,520 --> 02:23:38,797
would die and uh you cause like all
sorts of chaos. But then if you but then

2613
02:23:38,880 --> 02:23:43,037
you take out these data centers, you
take out um military bases, you take out

2614
02:23:43,120 --> 02:23:47,997
radar systems, um you take out,
you know, you name it. You can take out

2615
02:23:48,080 --> 02:23:52,477
>> almost any piece of homeland
infrastructure and that those create

2616
02:23:52,560 --> 02:23:56,920
huge strategic openings
for your adversaries.

2617
02:23:57,280 --> 02:23:59,597
I >> mean, what M you have to run in these

2618
02:23:59,680 --> 02:24:01,757
circles. I mean, you're building massive

2619
02:24:01,840 --> 02:24:06,157
data centers, correct? And so,

2620
02:24:06,240 --> 02:24:10,317
when you go to DC and you're advocating,
hey, we need more power, and you just I

2621
02:24:10,400 --> 02:24:13,357
I didn't What's
the association you met with?

2622
02:24:13,440 --> 02:24:17,597
>> Uh the National Energy Dominance
Council, I mean, what do they say?

2623
02:24:17,680 --> 02:24:21,037
>> They totally agree. I mean, they know
we have to build more power. And then it's

2624
02:24:21,120 --> 02:24:22,957
about So, then you get to the next layer

2625
02:24:23,040 --> 02:24:25,917
of detail. It's like, okay, how can we

2626
02:24:26,000 --> 02:24:30,637
how do we accelerate nuclear? How do we
accelerate the permitting process? Um,

2627
02:24:30,720 --> 02:24:33,597
what are existing power generation
capabilities that we turned off that we

2628
02:24:33,680 --> 02:24:35,917
can turn back on? Um, like you go

2629
02:24:36,000 --> 02:24:37,757
through all the natural things to do.

2630
02:24:37,840 --> 02:24:40,637
Like it's I mean I think I think we know

2631
02:24:40,720 --> 02:24:45,277
what to do. The question is if we can
get out of our own way and if and then

2632
02:24:45,360 --> 02:24:49,917
if our grid is so antiquated that even
that vulnerability like kind of means

2633
02:24:50,000 --> 02:24:51,837
that we can be taken out any time.

2634
02:24:51,920 --> 02:24:53,357
>> I mean I may have made an assumption.

2635
02:24:53,440 --> 02:24:55,277
Are you are you building data centers?

2636
02:24:55,360 --> 02:24:58,397
We we ourselves are not
building data centers.

2637
02:24:58,480 --> 02:25:00,157
>> We partner with
companies that yeah that

2638
02:25:00,240 --> 02:25:02,557
are building you know the largest
data centers in the world.

2639
02:25:02,640 --> 02:25:07,677
>> Okay. And so I've I've also heard
rumors that these major data centers are

2640
02:25:07,760 --> 02:25:11,757
starting to just create their own power
source. Is that is there any validity to

2641
02:25:11,840 --> 02:25:14,957
that? >> Yeah.
So a lot of designs these days

2642
02:25:15,040 --> 02:25:18,717
involve can you just create a SMR a

2643
02:25:18,800 --> 02:25:21,917
small um uh like a like a nuclear

2644
02:25:22,000 --> 02:25:23,917
reactor per data center. Can you

2645
02:25:24,000 --> 02:25:25,997
basically like have a nuclear reactor

2646
02:25:26,080 --> 02:25:29,757
colllocated with the data center um to

2647
02:25:29,840 --> 02:25:34,397
uh to power that that data center's
capacity? Um which I think is a good

2648
02:25:34,480 --> 02:25:37,837
idea. The issue is like I mean China is
going to be way ahead of us on that. The

2649
02:25:37,920 --> 02:25:39,757
largest nuclear power plant in the world

2650
02:25:39,840 --> 02:25:45,117
is in China. So um you know we're you

2651
02:25:45,200 --> 02:25:49,197
obviously we need to lean into nuclear
that needs to happen. Obviously we need

2652
02:25:49,280 --> 02:25:52,797
to to lean into all power generation
sources. when you kind of an all the

2653
02:25:52,880 --> 02:25:55,917
above approach to power generation. Um

2654
02:25:56,000 --> 02:26:00,477
uh but even that doesn't get us
to a posture where you're confidently

2655
02:26:00,560 --> 02:26:01,997
exceeding China. You're just kind of

2656
02:26:02,080 --> 02:26:05,597
catching up to where they are. And so um

2657
02:26:05,680 --> 02:26:07,837
I mean this is a huge a huge issue.

2658
02:26:07,920 --> 02:26:11,677
>> Yeah. Let's take a quick break. When
we come back I want to I want to dive more

2659
02:26:11,760 --> 02:26:17,400
into China's capabilities
and and our capabilities.

2660
02:26:18,320 --> 02:26:20,320
All

2661
02:26:30,000 --> 02:26:31,437
right, Alex, we're back from the break.

2662
02:26:31,520 --> 02:26:34,797
We're getting ready to discuss some
of our capabilities versus China's

2663
02:26:34,880 --> 02:26:36,397
capabilities.

2664
02:26:36,480 --> 02:26:38,957
And, you know, we we we just got done

2665
02:26:39,040 --> 02:26:42,237
kind of talking about power.

2666
02:26:42,320 --> 02:26:46,397
Is China leading the US in any other

2667
02:26:46,480 --> 02:26:51,037
realms when it comes to the AI race?
I mean, Xi Jinping has even has said

2668
02:26:51,120 --> 02:26:55,677
himself, you know, the the the winner
of the AI race will achieve global

2669
02:26:55,760 --> 02:26:59,517
domination. [sighs] Yeah.
I think well, the first thing

2670
02:26:59,600 --> 02:27:01,277
almost as you're mentioning to

2671
02:27:01,360 --> 02:27:03,517
understand is China has been operating

2672
02:27:03,600 --> 02:27:06,637
against an AI master plan since 2018.

2673
02:27:06,720 --> 02:27:11,917
they um the CCP put out a a broad whole

2674
02:27:12,000 --> 02:27:13,997
of government, you know, civil mil

2675
02:27:14,080 --> 02:27:17,997
military fusion plan to win on AI. Uh

2676
02:27:18,080 --> 02:27:19,597
like you're mentioning, Xiinping himself

2677
02:27:19,680 --> 02:27:23,757
has been has spoken about how AI is

2678
02:27:23,840 --> 02:27:26,477
going to define the future winners of

2679
02:27:26,560 --> 02:27:29,277
this global competition. um in military

2680
02:27:29,360 --> 02:27:30,797
from a military standpoint they say

2681
02:27:30,880 --> 02:27:35,517
explicitly hey we believe that AI is a

2682
02:27:35,600 --> 02:27:39,037
leapfrog technology which means even
though our military is worse than

2683
02:27:39,120 --> 02:27:41,197
America's military today if we

2684
02:27:41,280 --> 02:27:44,317
overinvest in AI we we have a more AI

2685
02:27:44,400 --> 02:27:46,317
enabled military than theirs we could

2686
02:27:46,400 --> 02:27:50,077
leapfrog them um so there they've been

2687
02:27:50,160 --> 02:27:53,197
super invested uh right now I think the

2688
02:27:53,280 --> 02:27:55,117
best way to kind of paint the current

2689
02:27:55,200 --> 02:27:58,557
situation is they are way ahead on power

2690
02:27:58,640 --> 02:28:01,117
and power generation. They're behind on

2691
02:28:01,200 --> 02:28:05,117
chips um but catching up on chips. Um

2692
02:28:05,200 --> 02:28:09,437
they uh are ahead of us on data. Um

2693
02:28:09,520 --> 02:28:12,077
China has had again since 2018 a

2694
02:28:12,160 --> 02:28:13,677
largecale

2695
02:28:13,760 --> 02:28:18,877
um operation to dominate on data. Um and

2696
02:28:18,960 --> 02:28:22,557
uh today in 2023 I think there were over

2697
02:28:22,640 --> 02:28:25,437
2 million people in China who were

2698
02:28:25,520 --> 02:28:28,397
working as working inside data factories

2699
02:28:28,480 --> 02:28:31,597
basically as data labelers or annotators

2700
02:28:31,680 --> 02:28:35,757
basically creating data to fuel into
those into AI systems. I think that

2701
02:28:35,840 --> 02:28:37,677
number in the US by comparison is

2702
02:28:37,760 --> 02:28:42,717
something like 100,000. Um uh so they're

2703
02:28:42,800 --> 02:28:44,557
outspending [clears throat] us 12 to1 on

2704
02:28:44,640 --> 02:28:48,077
data. um they have over seven cities,

2705
02:28:48,160 --> 02:28:50,877
full cities in China that are dedicated

2706
02:28:50,960 --> 02:28:54,317
data hubs um that are basically powering

2707
02:28:54,400 --> 02:28:56,957
uh you know this this like broad

2708
02:28:57,040 --> 02:28:59,837
approach to data dominance. Um and then

2709
02:28:59,920 --> 02:29:03,357
on algorithms I think they have they are

2710
02:29:03,440 --> 02:29:07,357
on par with us um because of large scale

2711
02:29:07,440 --> 02:29:11,437
espionage. So, uh, and this is, I think,

2712
02:29:11,520 --> 02:29:13,197
one of these open secrets in the tech

2713
02:29:13,280 --> 02:29:16,557
industry that Chinese intelligence

2714
02:29:16,640 --> 02:29:20,397
basically steals all of the IP and

2715
02:29:20,480 --> 02:29:23,117
technological secrets from um from the

2716
02:29:23,200 --> 02:29:26,317
United States. Uh, there are a bunch of

2717
02:29:26,400 --> 02:29:29,037
very concerning reports here. So one is

2718
02:29:29,120 --> 02:29:33,357
there was um a Google engineer who took

2719
02:29:33,440 --> 02:29:37,597
the designs and and all the IP of how

2720
02:29:37,680 --> 02:29:41,117
Google designed their AI chips and just

2721
02:29:41,200 --> 02:29:43,677
took those and and moved to China and

2722
02:29:43,760 --> 02:29:46,237
then started a company um on top using

2723
02:29:46,320 --> 02:29:49,117
those using those designs. Um, the way

2724
02:29:49,200 --> 02:29:51,517
he got those designs, by the way, it was

2725
02:29:51,600 --> 02:29:55,117
this guy um Leon Leon Ding, I think. Um,

2726
02:29:55,200 --> 02:29:58,797
the way he stole the data out of out of

2727
02:29:58,880 --> 02:30:00,957
um Google's corporate cloud, by the way,

2728
02:30:01,040 --> 02:30:03,837
was that he it was so stupid. He just

2729
02:30:03,920 --> 02:30:06,557
took all the code, he copy pasted it

2730
02:30:06,640 --> 02:30:09,437
into Apple notes into like the notes app

2731
02:30:09,520 --> 02:30:15,197
and then um exported to a PDF and printed
it and just walked walked out with it.

2732
02:30:15,280 --> 02:30:19,917
>> That's it. >> That's it.
Um, so, uh, that was this was

2733
02:30:20,000 --> 02:30:23,437
later discovered. You know, we we found
out this happened, but for months we

2734
02:30:23,520 --> 02:30:28,077
had, you know, we had no idea that they
had stolen all this critical IP. Um,

2735
02:30:28,160 --> 02:30:30,077
Stanford University, this just came out

2736
02:30:30,160 --> 02:30:33,197
last week. Stanford University is uh is

2737
02:30:33,280 --> 02:30:35,997
entirely infiltrated by CCP operatives.

2738
02:30:36,080 --> 02:30:40,477
Um, few crazy facts. So first uh uh it

2739
02:30:40,560 --> 02:30:44,237
is by law in China any Chinese citizen

2740
02:30:44,320 --> 02:30:49,357
must comply with Chinese with CCP
intelligence gathering operations. So if

2741
02:30:49,440 --> 02:30:53,597
you're a Chinese citizen, you're
living in the United States and the um

2742
02:30:53,680 --> 02:30:57,277
intelligence agencies in China reach out
to you, you have to comply with them and

2743
02:30:57,360 --> 02:30:59,917
so you have to give them what you're
seeing, what you're what you're finding,

2744
02:31:00,000 --> 02:31:03,597
etc. Um uh so that and there's tons of

2745
02:31:03,680 --> 02:31:07,597
Chinese nationals,
Chinese citizens in across

2746
02:31:07,680 --> 02:31:11,277
all the major elite universities, across
all the major tech companies, across all

2747
02:31:11,360 --> 02:31:12,797
the major AI labs, like they're

2748
02:31:12,880 --> 02:31:14,797
everywhere. The second thing that's

2749
02:31:14,880 --> 02:31:20,157
crazy is uh you know about a sixth of um

2750
02:31:20,240 --> 02:31:24,077
Chinese students uh so so stu like

2751
02:31:24,160 --> 02:31:25,437
Chinese citizens who are students in

2752
02:31:25,520 --> 02:31:28,797
America are on uh scholarships sponsored

2753
02:31:28,880 --> 02:31:32,717
by the CCP itself and for those on these

2754
02:31:32,800 --> 02:31:36,557
scholarships they have to report back
to a handler basically what are the things

2755
02:31:36,640 --> 02:31:40,717
they find what are the things they
um they're learning otherwise their

2756
02:31:40,800 --> 02:31:43,517
scholarships get revoked so we There's

2757
02:31:43,600 --> 02:31:45,917
there's an incredibly large scale

2758
02:31:46,000 --> 02:31:48,877
intelligence operation running in the

2759
02:31:48,960 --> 02:31:51,757
against the US tech industry which is

2760
02:31:51,840 --> 02:31:53,917
just collecting all the information and

2761
02:31:54,000 --> 02:31:56,557
secrets and technological secrets from

2762
02:31:56,640 --> 02:31:59,277
our greatest research institutions, our

2763
02:31:59,360 --> 02:32:01,597
universities, our lab AI labs, our tech

2764
02:32:01,680 --> 02:32:05,517
companies um at at massive scale. And

2765
02:32:05,600 --> 02:32:08,797
honestly, I think this is a very
underrated element of how China caught

2766
02:32:08,880 --> 02:32:11,837
up so quickly. So, um, you know,

2767
02:32:11,920 --> 02:32:16,477
Deepseek came out of nowhere. Everyone
was so surprised at how capable their

2768
02:32:16,560 --> 02:32:20,717
model was and how they learned all these
tricks. You know, how much of that is

2769
02:32:20,800 --> 02:32:25,357
because they came up with all them on
their own or they managed to have a like

2770
02:32:25,440 --> 02:32:28,957
exquisite high-end espionage operation
to steal all of our trade secrets from

2771
02:32:29,040 --> 02:32:33,647
the United States and then
reimplement them back in China?

2772
02:32:33,730 --> 02:32:34,637
[sighs]

2773
02:32:34,720 --> 02:32:37,277
>> What does our espionage look like?

2774
02:32:37,360 --> 02:32:41,357
Well, there was a uh I think nowhere

2775
02:32:41,440 --> 02:32:43,677
close to as good. I mean, I think um so

2776
02:32:43,760 --> 02:32:47,677
one thing that uh that that the CCP did

2777
02:32:47,760 --> 02:32:51,997
for Deepseek, the Deepseek Lab is um

2778
02:32:52,080 --> 02:32:55,837
after Deepseek blew up and uh and um the

2779
02:32:55,920 --> 02:32:57,677
CEO of DeepSeek met with the Chinese

2780
02:32:57,760 --> 02:33:00,717
premier uh they then locked up all the

2781
02:33:00,800 --> 02:33:05,837
researchers into a um uh inside I

2782
02:33:05,920 --> 02:33:08,637
shouldn't say locked up, but they like
huddled all the researchers together and

2783
02:33:08,720 --> 02:33:12,557
they took all their passports.
So none of the AI researchers who work at

2784
02:33:12,640 --> 02:33:17,277
deepseek are are able to leave the country
at all and they can't they don't

2785
02:33:17,360 --> 02:33:18,957
come into contact with any foreigners.

2786
02:33:19,040 --> 02:33:22,157
So they basically lock down the entire

2787
02:33:22,240 --> 02:33:26,477
you know research effort. Um so that it
you know that makes it very very hard to

2788
02:33:26,560 --> 02:33:31,117
to conduct any sort of espionage into
the into that operation. Um and then

2789
02:33:31,200 --> 02:33:33,197
there's that report uh this is all in

2790
02:33:33,280 --> 02:33:36,077
the news but like you know a decade ago

2791
02:33:36,160 --> 02:33:40,477
15 years ago um all of or many of the

2792
02:33:40,560 --> 02:33:43,037
CIA operatives US CIA operatives in

2793
02:33:43,120 --> 02:33:47,677
China um were all killed because they

2794
02:33:47,760 --> 02:33:51,517
were sort of um compromised because one
of the communication channels they were

2795
02:33:51,600 --> 02:33:55,917
using was compromised by Chinese
intelligence and you know the CCP was

2796
02:33:56,000 --> 02:33:57,837
able to to effectively like round a lot

2797
02:33:57,920 --> 02:34:00,797
of them up and kill them. So our

2798
02:34:00,880 --> 02:34:03,117
comparable their espionage in us is like

2799
02:34:03,200 --> 02:34:07,437
extremely deep you know ex huge risk

2800
02:34:07,520 --> 02:34:09,917
there's incredible amounts of of you

2801
02:34:10,000 --> 02:34:13,277
know we're deeply deeply penetrated by

2802
02:34:13,360 --> 02:34:17,597
uh by Chinese intel um and comparatively

2803
02:34:17,680 --> 02:34:22,477
as far as I know we have like you know
much less capability and I think they've

2804
02:34:22,560 --> 02:34:28,237
designed it such that it's very hard
to infiltrate their AI efforts. Um

2805
02:34:28,320 --> 02:34:31,837
>> jeez. >> So that's how other
so they're they're you know

2806
02:34:31,920 --> 02:34:33,757
>> they're they're ahead of us on data.

2807
02:34:33,840 --> 02:34:36,317
They're they're able to catch up through

2808
02:34:36,400 --> 02:34:38,797
espionage on algorithms pretty easily.

2809
02:34:38,880 --> 02:34:42,317
Um uh they're ahead of us on power. So

2810
02:34:42,400 --> 02:34:46,077
what are we aheaded? Well, right now
we're ahead in chips. Um, and that's

2811
02:34:46,160 --> 02:34:48,317
kind of our saving grace is that uh the

2812
02:34:48,400 --> 02:34:51,677
Nvidia chips and the entire stack there

2813
02:34:51,760 --> 02:34:54,477
are the pride of the world and you know

2814
02:34:54,560 --> 02:34:56,557
we're the most advanced on these chips.

2815
02:34:56,640 --> 02:35:00,397
Chinese chips are also catching up.
Um there's like a bunch of recent reports

2816
02:35:00,480 --> 02:35:04,557
that Huawei chips are are getting to be
they're basically like one generation

2817
02:35:04,640 --> 02:35:07,197
behind the Nvidia chips.
>> So they're close.

2818
02:35:07,280 --> 02:35:11,197
>> They're close. Um so all of this is uh

2819
02:35:11,280 --> 02:35:13,437
is pretty concerning. There was another

2820
02:35:13,520 --> 02:35:17,037
um report that came out of CSIS recently

2821
02:35:17,120 --> 02:35:20,237
that there was a um a Chinese effort

2822
02:35:20,320 --> 02:35:25,517
called it's like the next generation
uh brain understanding project or

2823
02:35:25,600 --> 02:35:27,197
something where they're basically trying

2824
02:35:27,280 --> 02:35:33,757
to use AI to fully um understand human

2825
02:35:33,840 --> 02:35:36,317
human personality effectively and human

2826
02:35:36,400 --> 02:35:40,317
psych psychological behaviors. Um I

2827
02:35:40,400 --> 02:35:44,877
imagine that's ultimately for effectively
like information warfare. Um

2828
02:35:44,960 --> 02:35:49,757
uh as we were talking about at breakfast
like I mean China has largecale

2829
02:35:49,840 --> 02:35:53,117
information operations large scale
information warfare and has been has

2830
02:35:53,200 --> 02:35:58,397
been doing that for decades
and you know literally decades

2831
02:35:58,480 --> 02:35:59,917
um going back all the way to like

2832
02:36:00,000 --> 02:36:02,077
in-person operations in Hong Kong like

2833
02:36:02,160 --> 02:36:07,357
they are so sophisticated all that and AI
is going to enable them to just move

2834
02:36:07,440 --> 02:36:10,717
much faster as well.
How do we combat that?

2835
02:36:10,800 --> 02:36:13,677
>> Uh well, I mean,
I think we need our own

2836
02:36:13,760 --> 02:36:18,397
information operations efforts. Like,
I think that's pretty critical. Um that's

2837
02:36:18,480 --> 02:36:20,157
that's specifically on that thread. And

2838
02:36:20,240 --> 02:36:22,877
then I think we we need to

2839
02:36:22,960 --> 02:36:27,837
uh we need to acknowledge that at the

2840
02:36:27,920 --> 02:36:32,717
end of the day um you know we are
a more innovative country but we have to

2841
02:36:32,800 --> 02:36:34,557
dramatically

2842
02:36:34,640 --> 02:36:39,837
you know get our [__] together if we
want to win longterm in AI. We need to

2843
02:36:39,920 --> 02:36:43,197
um >> we need to onore
ship manufactur chip

2844
02:36:43,280 --> 02:36:47,437
manufacturing like we need to be
manufacturing huge numbers of chips. We

2845
02:36:47,520 --> 02:36:50,557
can't be dependent on Taiwan
to manufacture our high-end chips.

2846
02:36:50,640 --> 02:36:53,117
>> Are we doing that yet? At any capacity?

2847
02:36:53,200 --> 02:36:55,597
>> Uh extremely small capacity. Like there

2848
02:36:55,680 --> 02:37:00,317
there are a few fabs in Arizona that can
produce some chips. Um but the vast

2849
02:37:00,400 --> 02:37:01,437
majority of the volume still comes out

2850
02:37:01,520 --> 02:37:05,197
of Taiwan. Uh we need to tighten up

2851
02:37:05,280 --> 02:37:08,957
security in our in our AI companies

2852
02:37:09,040 --> 02:37:11,117
dramatically. like we need to we need to

2853
02:37:11,200 --> 02:37:14,397
have proper counter intel on you know

2854
02:37:14,480 --> 02:37:18,477
what is the espionage risk in within
these companies. Um we need to solve the

2855
02:37:18,560 --> 02:37:20,957
power problem that we talked about. Um

2856
02:37:21,040 --> 02:37:25,837
we need to have uh we need to be
investing into you know the cyber

2857
02:37:25,920 --> 02:37:30,557
threats like investing into large scale
cyber defense. Um we need to invest into

2858
02:37:30,640 --> 02:37:34,557
data. we need our own programs around
data dominance to ensure that you know

2859
02:37:34,640 --> 02:37:37,197
China doesn't just run away with uh with

2860
02:37:37,280 --> 02:37:39,197
higher quality and greater AI data sets

2861
02:37:39,280 --> 02:37:42,157
than us. So you can go through each of

2862
02:37:42,240 --> 02:37:47,917
the elements and build like the proper
plan for the United States to win. Um

2863
02:37:48,000 --> 02:37:48,957
but uh

2864
02:37:49,040 --> 02:37:52,477
>> have we started any
of that? Um I mean I

2865
02:37:52,560 --> 02:37:56,957
think some things are underway but uh

2866
02:37:57,040 --> 02:37:59,997
not I mean not enough nowhere close to

2867
02:38:00,080 --> 02:38:02,397
enough for for to to be sure that the US

2868
02:38:02,480 --> 02:38:07,197
will win. Definitely not. And they also
have a fundamental advantage. You know,

2869
02:38:07,280 --> 02:38:11,437
uh, one of the things that that people
say a lot now is like, oh, like what we

2870
02:38:11,520 --> 02:38:14,957
need in the United States is an AI
Manhattan project where we like, you

2871
02:38:15,040 --> 02:38:18,637
know, we collect all the brilliant minds
together, we collect our resources, and

2872
02:38:18,720 --> 02:38:21,277
we have one large um, effort in in the

2873
02:38:21,360 --> 02:38:26,157
United States. Well, it turns out like
it's actually really hard to pull that

2874
02:38:26,240 --> 02:38:30,077
off in the United States, but China can
pull it off super easily. China can just

2875
02:38:30,160 --> 02:38:34,557
say, "Hey, all the best AI people, you
now work in one company. You we're going

2876
02:38:34,640 --> 02:38:36,637
to pull together all of your resources.

2877
02:38:36,720 --> 02:38:38,317
You are you all are we're going to put

2878
02:38:38,400 --> 02:38:43,677
you right next to the largest nuclear
power plant in the in the world. Like

2879
02:38:43,760 --> 02:38:47,037
we're going to build the largest data
center in the world here. All the chips

2880
02:38:47,120 --> 02:38:48,717
that China has are going to go towards

2881
02:38:48,800 --> 02:38:51,757
building this this like large scale AI

2882
02:38:51,840 --> 02:38:54,477
project." and they just have the ability

2883
02:38:54,560 --> 02:38:56,957
to collect all of their resources

2884
02:38:57,040 --> 02:39:00,317
together and throw it at at winning on

2885
02:39:00,400 --> 02:39:02,397
the AI race. Um whereas in the United

2886
02:39:02,480 --> 02:39:05,517
States, we have all these companies. Um

2887
02:39:05,600 --> 02:39:08,077
and you know, the United States

2888
02:39:08,160 --> 02:39:12,557
government as of yet like it's not going
to force all these companies to combine

2889
02:39:12,640 --> 02:39:16,317
and merge. Like that's that's like such
an that today would be viewed as such an

2890
02:39:16,400 --> 02:39:19,277
overreach of government power. Um, but

2891
02:39:19,360 --> 02:39:24,077
because of that, we're going to have
like, you know, five fragmented AI

2892
02:39:24,160 --> 02:39:27,437
efforts. And maybe in aggregate we'll
have way more chips and in aggregate

2893
02:39:27,520 --> 02:39:31,037
we'll have more power and in aggregate
we'll have, you know, more great

2894
02:39:31,120 --> 02:39:34,157
researchers, but we're not going to be
able to focus those efforts whereas

2895
02:39:34,240 --> 02:39:37,037
China is easily going to be
able to focus all their efforts.

2896
02:39:37,120 --> 02:39:42,157
>> Wow. You had mentioned something
downstairs about uh nuclear weapons.

2897
02:39:42,240 --> 02:39:43,917
>> Yeah, >> I believe.

2898
02:39:44,000 --> 02:39:46,957
>> Yeah. So this is this is where stuff

2899
02:39:47,040 --> 02:39:51,357
gets um stuff gets really weird for for

2900
02:39:51,440 --> 02:39:56,877
um national security which is uh you

2901
02:39:56,960 --> 02:39:59,757
you could you could clearly imagine

2902
02:39:59,840 --> 02:40:02,157
scenarios where

2903
02:40:02,240 --> 02:40:06,797
advanced very advanced cyber AI um

2904
02:40:06,880 --> 02:40:09,997
invalidates nuclear deterrence. What do

2905
02:40:10,080 --> 02:40:13,037
I mean by this? right now um you know

2906
02:40:13,120 --> 02:40:16,157
nobody fires nukes because we have MAD

2907
02:40:16,240 --> 02:40:20,957
we have mutually assured destruction
and if I do a first strike against another

2908
02:40:21,040 --> 02:40:24,877
country they're going to be able
to while that nuke is in the air do a

2909
02:40:24,960 --> 02:40:29,197
second strike and um we'll both you know
there'll be destruction on both sides

2910
02:40:29,280 --> 02:40:31,837
it'll it'll be really bad. So because of

2911
02:40:31,920 --> 02:40:34,557
this second strike capability

2912
02:40:34,640 --> 02:40:39,837
um luckily we have a proper you know
we have real deterrence. Well, what if

2913
02:40:39,920 --> 02:40:41,517
instead

2914
02:40:41,600 --> 02:40:45,437
um let's say uh let's say I'm, you know,

2915
02:40:45,520 --> 02:40:48,317
the United States and I have the most

2916
02:40:48,400 --> 02:40:51,917
advanced AI cyber hacking capabilities

2917
02:40:52,000 --> 02:40:54,557
in the world. So, I can build AI agents

2918
02:40:54,640 --> 02:40:59,677
that uh hack into um that can hack into
any other country, can like turn off

2919
02:40:59,760 --> 02:41:03,037
their energy grid, can disable their
weapon systems, can disable everything.

2920
02:41:03,120 --> 02:41:06,477
So, what do I do instead? I launch the

2921
02:41:06,560 --> 02:41:09,277
first strike and I immediat and or like

2922
02:41:09,360 --> 02:41:12,477
first I send in my my cyber AI agent

2923
02:41:12,560 --> 02:41:16,557
capabilities. I send my cyber AI

2924
02:41:16,640 --> 02:41:19,677
uh you know force effectively to disable

2925
02:41:19,760 --> 02:41:23,037
all the weapon systems of

2926
02:41:23,120 --> 02:41:26,077
of the of the enemy country. And because

2927
02:41:26,160 --> 02:41:29,917
it's uh my I have like such so much AI

2928
02:41:30,000 --> 02:41:33,197
capacity, I can take out all of your I
can like disable all of your weapon

2929
02:41:33,280 --> 02:41:35,117
systems. and then I send my first strike

2930
02:41:35,200 --> 02:41:36,557
and then you don't have a second strike

2931
02:41:36,640 --> 02:41:40,797
capability. So if that happens basically

2932
02:41:40,880 --> 02:41:42,637
the combination

2933
02:41:42,720 --> 02:41:46,397
of AI and nuclear be you know you you

2934
02:41:46,480 --> 02:41:49,117
cannot deter AI plus nuclear with just

2935
02:41:49,200 --> 02:41:53,917
nuclear. So then it forces this um
that's what will force this like

2936
02:41:54,000 --> 02:41:57,517
proliferation of AI capabilities and so
even small countries are going to need

2937
02:41:57,600 --> 02:41:59,117
to invest in lots of AI capabilities

2938
02:41:59,200 --> 02:42:00,717
because their nuclear weapons are no

2939
02:42:00,800 --> 02:42:04,557
longer a sufficient deterrent. Jeez.

2940
02:42:04,640 --> 02:42:06,797
What about boweapons?

2941
02:42:06,880 --> 02:42:09,517
>> Yeah, I this is

2942
02:42:09,600 --> 02:42:14,637
this is the the um element that is

2943
02:42:14,720 --> 02:42:19,437
uh really underrated right now. So, CO

2944
02:42:19,520 --> 02:42:23,997
leaked out of a viology lab in uh Wuhan

2945
02:42:24,080 --> 02:42:25,997
and basically shut the world down for

2946
02:42:26,080 --> 02:42:29,277
two years. And that's like le that's

2947
02:42:29,360 --> 02:42:33,357
like the the level one you know biorisk

2948
02:42:33,440 --> 02:42:35,837
kind of stuff like this was relatively

2949
02:42:35,920 --> 02:42:38,157
uh a relatively

2950
02:42:38,240 --> 02:42:41,677
uh you know innocuous let's say um

2951
02:42:41,760 --> 02:42:46,397
pathogen uh but it still killed you
know probably at least 10 million people

2952
02:42:46,480 --> 02:42:48,317
globally and it was still you know shut

2953
02:42:48,400 --> 02:42:52,237
the whole world down for 2 years um well

2954
02:42:52,320 --> 02:42:56,797
recent models new models the new AI I

2955
02:42:56,880 --> 02:43:01,997
models are able to uh outperform 95% of

2956
02:43:02,080 --> 02:43:04,797
MIT viologists. So the newest models

2957
02:43:04,880 --> 02:43:07,117
from OpenI and Google are smarter than

2958
02:43:07,200 --> 02:43:12,797
literally 95% of viologists at MIT uh

2959
02:43:12,880 --> 02:43:15,517
based on a recent study by um the center

2960
02:43:15,600 --> 02:43:20,477
for safety. So um so now you now whether

2961
02:43:20,560 --> 02:43:22,557
it's right now or whether it's in a few

2962
02:43:22,640 --> 02:43:26,797
years um it will be feasible to use AI

2963
02:43:26,880 --> 02:43:30,077
based capabilities to help you design

2964
02:43:30,160 --> 02:43:34,237
powerful pathogens. And what's more than
that you're going to be able to design

2965
02:43:34,320 --> 02:43:36,237
in certain characteristics of these

2966
02:43:36,320 --> 02:43:38,077
pathogens. You know you'll be able to

2967
02:43:38,160 --> 02:43:41,437
tune the virality tune the um lethality

2968
02:43:41,520 --> 02:43:43,837
of them. You know, there's also due to

2969
02:43:43,920 --> 02:43:45,197
recent advancements in synthetic

2970
02:43:45,280 --> 02:43:49,757
biology, you now can create viruses that

2971
02:43:49,840 --> 02:43:52,797
specifically target certain segments of

2972
02:43:52,880 --> 02:43:57,357
DNA. So, um I could create a bioweapon

2973
02:43:57,440 --> 02:44:02,077
that just targeted, you know, um any
individual with a certain segment of

2974
02:44:02,160 --> 02:44:06,157
DNA, which means I can target
to basically like any population or any

2975
02:44:06,240 --> 02:44:08,077
group or any subsegment of the

2976
02:44:08,160 --> 02:44:11,757
population in the world. um which is

2977
02:44:11,840 --> 02:44:15,757
>> uh which is really
really bad. And so um

2978
02:44:15,840 --> 02:44:21,197
the the ability so first even without AI

2979
02:44:21,280 --> 02:44:23,117
like biology synthetic biology is making

2980
02:44:23,200 --> 02:44:25,197
so much progress and that there's just

2981
02:44:25,280 --> 02:44:29,037
like all sorts of inherent risk of uh

2982
02:44:29,120 --> 02:44:31,357
like all sorts of inherent risk of

2983
02:44:31,440 --> 02:44:34,397
bioweaponry or you know leaks of of

2984
02:44:34,480 --> 02:44:37,117
pathogens and and viruses and whatnot.

2985
02:44:37,200 --> 02:44:40,477
And then with AI all of a sudden you

2986
02:44:40,560 --> 02:44:45,597
this is you know not not literally
today's models but a few models a few

2987
02:44:45,680 --> 02:44:47,117
generations down you're going to be able

2988
02:44:47,200 --> 02:44:49,997
to use these AI systems to design or

2989
02:44:50,080 --> 02:44:53,357
build you know uh next generation

2990
02:44:53,440 --> 02:44:58,237
pathogens. Um so that's that's an entire

2991
02:44:58,320 --> 02:45:01,117
I mean for good reason biological

2992
02:45:01,200 --> 02:45:05,037
warfare is not you know one of the um is

2993
02:45:05,120 --> 02:45:08,637
not you know there international
treaties such that we don't engage in

2994
02:45:08,720 --> 02:45:11,357
biological warfare but if you imagine

2995
02:45:11,440 --> 02:45:16,477
these scenarios where countries you
know nuclear deterrence doesn't work they

2996
02:45:16,560 --> 02:45:19,997
don't have the resources to get to use
to utilize to have large scale AI data

2997
02:45:20,080 --> 02:45:23,437
centers um you know can you know I'm

2998
02:45:23,520 --> 02:45:26,157
worried that countries will will

2999
02:45:26,240 --> 02:45:28,957
turn to biological weaponry bioweapons

3000
02:45:29,040 --> 02:45:35,117
as their deterrence mechanism which
is highly destabilizing for you know the

3001
02:45:35,200 --> 02:45:35,677
world.

3002
02:45:35,760 --> 02:45:39,277
>> Wow, that's some scary [__]

3003
02:45:39,360 --> 02:45:42,877
>> The flip side
is there is new technology

3004
02:45:42,960 --> 02:45:45,677
that can um

3005
02:45:45,760 --> 02:45:48,077
that can also prevent this stuff. So

3006
02:45:48,160 --> 02:45:51,517
there's um there's this research coming

3007
02:45:51,600 --> 02:45:53,917
out of uh this lab in Seattle, David

3008
02:45:54,000 --> 02:45:55,917
Baker's lab, this guy who just won a

3009
02:45:56,000 --> 02:45:59,917
Nobel Prize on uh biological noses

3010
02:46:00,000 --> 02:46:03,277
uh or uh digital noses, sorry. Um which

3011
02:46:03,360 --> 02:46:06,317
is basically you have these devices that

3012
02:46:06,400 --> 02:46:08,077
can detect

3013
02:46:08,160 --> 02:46:11,037
chem detect proteins or chemicals or

3014
02:46:11,120 --> 02:46:14,717
pathogens in the air um automatically.

3015
02:46:14,800 --> 02:46:17,597
And so I think what this will like, you

3016
02:46:17,680 --> 02:46:22,477
know, the real sort of like offense
defense of of bio and bioweaponry will

3017
02:46:22,560 --> 02:46:26,077
end up looking like we're just going
to have large scale deployment of digital

3018
02:46:26,160 --> 02:46:29,197
noses effectively that in every space on

3019
02:46:29,280 --> 02:46:31,917
every like shipping container on every

3020
02:46:32,000 --> 02:46:34,717
plane. um you know they're just

3021
02:46:34,800 --> 02:46:37,757
constantly sensing for all existing

3022
02:46:37,840 --> 02:46:40,637
known pathogens, any new pathogens um

3023
02:46:40,720 --> 02:46:42,637
that might exist and are constantly just

3024
02:46:42,720 --> 02:46:45,757
like you know containing effect or like

3025
02:46:45,840 --> 02:46:47,757
detecting and ultimately containing.

3026
02:46:47,840 --> 02:46:52,157
>> Interesting. It's sniffing
real time for all of that [__]

3027
02:46:52,240 --> 02:46:54,237
>> Yeah, exactly. I mean on also on the

3028
02:46:54,320 --> 02:47:00,520
flip side I mean I
guess if AI is developing

3029
02:47:00,960 --> 02:47:02,877
a new bioweapon

3030
02:47:02,960 --> 02:47:05,917
CO comes out again CO too we'll just

3031
02:47:06,000 --> 02:47:10,717
call it then RAI

3032
02:47:10,800 --> 02:47:14,957
should also be able to figure out the the

3033
02:47:15,040 --> 02:47:18,397
>> vaccines or >> the vaccine
the antidote to it correct

3034
02:47:18,480 --> 02:47:20,317
>> yeah totally so
there will be there will

3035
02:47:20,400 --> 02:47:25,357
be an offense defense um element to

3036
02:47:25,440 --> 02:47:29,037
just as just as in kind as we were
walking through like AI applied to

3037
02:47:29,120 --> 02:47:32,797
command and control there's an offense
defense element AI applied to cyber

3038
02:47:32,880 --> 02:47:37,837
there's an offense defense element AI
applied to bio and bioweaponry there

3039
02:47:37,920 --> 02:47:39,757
will be an offense defense element so

3040
02:47:39,840 --> 02:47:42,637
all these thankfully there's like you

3041
02:47:42,720 --> 02:47:47,197
know the hope is that we end up in a in

3042
02:47:47,280 --> 02:47:51,357
a in a global world you know the the the

3043
02:47:51,440 --> 02:47:55,917
world agree agrees that basically we're
not going to go down any of these paths

3044
02:47:56,000 --> 02:47:59,597
like cuz there's mutual deterrence
and we just you know it's not worth it for

3045
02:47:59,680 --> 02:48:04,397
anybody in the world to destabilize
you know and risk humanity like that.

3046
02:48:04,480 --> 02:48:06,557
>> That's that's basically
where we need to land.

3047
02:48:06,640 --> 02:48:08,637
>> Wow. How concerned are you about China

3048
02:48:08,720 --> 02:48:10,717
Taiwan? I mean we were talking about

3049
02:48:10,800 --> 02:48:14,077
this a little bit at breakfast and I I I

3050
02:48:14,160 --> 02:48:18,717
can't believe they have not made a move
yet. I mean, I thought for sure it would

3051
02:48:18,800 --> 02:48:20,157
happen towards the end of the last

3052
02:48:20,240 --> 02:48:23,517
administration, but [sighs]

3053
02:48:23,600 --> 02:48:25,997
I mean, with their chip production

3054
02:48:26,080 --> 02:48:27,917
capabilities, I mean, how how concerned

3055
02:48:28,000 --> 02:48:32,157
are you about China taking Taiwan?

3056
02:48:32,240 --> 02:48:36,637
>> I think if it's going to happen,
it's going to happen this decade and it's

3057
02:48:36,720 --> 02:48:40,637
probably going to happen
this administration. And um

3058
02:48:40,720 --> 02:48:44,317
>> why do you say that? Uh

3059
02:48:44,400 --> 02:48:47,517
I mean China at a at a macro sense they

3060
02:48:47,600 --> 02:48:51,997
have huge demographic issues. Those are

3061
02:48:52,080 --> 02:48:56,397
I mean there's not like that's just
like the of the force of gravity in their

3062
02:48:56,480 --> 02:48:59,837
country. They have this huge aging
population. They made the wrong bet you

3063
02:48:59,920 --> 02:49:04,397
know many decades ago to have a one
child policy. Um and so they are going

3064
02:49:04,480 --> 02:49:06,797
to have this like huge aging population.

3065
02:49:06,880 --> 02:49:10,077
Um over then that that plays that plays

3066
02:49:10,160 --> 02:49:14,237
out really like quite soon like over
the next like a decade from now it's going

3067
02:49:14,320 --> 02:49:17,597
to be um over time they're going to look
more and more like Japan in that way

3068
02:49:17,680 --> 02:49:21,277
where they have this like large aging
population and it'll paralyze a lot of

3069
02:49:21,360 --> 02:49:22,797
ability to make any sort of aggressive

3070
02:49:22,880 --> 02:49:25,517
moves. So particularly when it comes to

3071
02:49:25,600 --> 02:49:28,397
military industrial capacity etc. Um, so

3072
02:49:28,480 --> 02:49:31,037
that's like one force of gravity uh that

3073
02:49:31,120 --> 02:49:34,477
they have to contend with. And then um

3074
02:49:34,560 --> 02:49:38,717
and so I think I think they're they're
they're going to want to move faster

3075
02:49:38,800 --> 02:49:41,277
sooner rather than later. And then

3076
02:49:41,360 --> 02:49:43,597
they've I mean they've had such an

3077
02:49:43,680 --> 02:49:46,557
insane military buildup um over the

3078
02:49:46,640 --> 02:49:49,517
course of the past few decades. Um, you

3079
02:49:49,600 --> 02:49:53,037
know, I don't think it's and I think,

3080
02:49:53,120 --> 02:49:57,277
you know, we're we're currently
in a situation where China has far more

3081
02:49:57,360 --> 02:50:01,277
industrial capacity, far more
manufacturing capacity than we do in the

3082
02:50:01,360 --> 02:50:02,317
United States.

3083
02:50:02,400 --> 02:50:05,277
>> And so, um,

3084
02:50:05,360 --> 02:50:09,757
that is set, you know,
that's a window for them. Um,

3085
02:50:09,840 --> 02:50:13,837
>> so do you think they'll do that they're
pressed to do it because of the aging

3086
02:50:13,920 --> 02:50:16,957
population? >> I think
a lot of factors. I think I

3087
02:50:17,040 --> 02:50:20,797
think Xi is aging right. Um this will be

3088
02:50:20,880 --> 02:50:23,997
an important component of his legacy uh

3089
02:50:24,080 --> 02:50:28,717
as as he would view it. I think um
they have an aging population which will

3090
02:50:28,800 --> 02:50:30,957
minimize their political latitude over

3091
02:50:31,040 --> 02:50:34,957
time um naturally and then they have um

3092
02:50:35,040 --> 02:50:36,877
I mean they are they're in this in

3093
02:50:36,960 --> 02:50:39,997
insane window where they have just

3094
02:50:40,080 --> 02:50:42,717
incredible uh industrial manufacturing

3095
02:50:42,800 --> 02:50:45,037
capabilities um compared to anywhere

3096
02:50:45,120 --> 02:50:47,757
else in the world. you know, in 2023,

3097
02:50:47,840 --> 02:50:51,037
uh, China deployed more industrial

3098
02:50:51,120 --> 02:50:56,557
robots than the rest of the world
combined. Um, that's like I mean, we

3099
02:50:56,640 --> 02:51:00,157
were talking a little bit about like
automated factories and automated

3100
02:51:00,240 --> 02:51:02,637
industrials, like they're racing to that

3101
02:51:02,720 --> 02:51:07,677
faster than any other country in the
world. And so um so I think that like

3102
02:51:07,760 --> 02:51:09,597
you can look at all these dimensions and

3103
02:51:09,680 --> 02:51:14,237
this window um you know there's if

3104
02:51:14,320 --> 02:51:16,797
they're if they're going to do
it they're going to do it soon.

3105
02:51:16,880 --> 02:51:21,677
>> Yeah. Yeah. I mean what what percentage
of the chips that we use come from

3106
02:51:21,760 --> 02:51:26,557
Taiwan? >> I mean 95%

3107
02:51:26,640 --> 02:51:29,677
of the high-end chips um
are manufactured in Taiwan.

3108
02:51:29,760 --> 02:51:33,997
>> And so what happens
if if China takes Taiwan?

3109
02:51:34,080 --> 02:51:36,317
So yeah, war game it out. So we were

3110
02:51:36,400 --> 02:51:38,957
talking a little bit about this. So um

3111
02:51:39,040 --> 02:51:42,317
let's say China blockades or or invades

3112
02:51:42,400 --> 02:51:46,717
Taiwan um then then there's a qu So

3113
02:51:46,800 --> 02:51:51,357
these fabs are incredibly
incredibly valuable because

3114
02:51:51,440 --> 02:51:55,277
>> as we were just describing if you
believe in the pace of AI progress and

3115
02:51:55,360 --> 02:51:59,437
AI technology then >> everything
boils down to how much power

3116
02:51:59,520 --> 02:52:00,957
you got, how many chips you've got. And

3117
02:52:01,040 --> 02:52:04,237
if they own 95% of the world's

3118
02:52:04,320 --> 02:52:08,957
ship manufacturing capability,
I mean, they're going to run away with

3119
02:52:09,040 --> 02:52:10,557
it. So then you look at that and you

3120
02:52:10,640 --> 02:52:13,677
say, will the Taiwanese people bomb the

3121
02:52:13,760 --> 02:52:17,277
TSMC data centers? Um, and andor will

3122
02:52:17,360 --> 02:52:21,197
the US bomb the TSMC data centers and
or will some other country bomb the the

3123
02:52:21,280 --> 02:52:22,797
data centers? Or sorry, not the the

3124
02:52:22,880 --> 02:52:28,317
fabs, um, the TSMC chip fabs. Um I think

3125
02:52:28,400 --> 02:52:31,677
my personal belief I don't think uh the

3126
02:52:31,760 --> 02:52:34,317
Taiwanese do it because even if they get

3127
02:52:34,400 --> 02:52:36,557
blockaded or invaded that those FABs are

3128
02:52:36,640 --> 02:52:40,877
still a huge uh component of Taiwan

3129
02:52:40,960 --> 02:52:44,077
survivability and um Taiwan's relevance

3130
02:52:44,160 --> 02:52:47,677
as a as a as an entity um even if they

3131
02:52:47,760 --> 02:52:51,677
get blockade or invaded by Taiwan.
So I don't think they do it. Um, China

3132
02:52:51,760 --> 02:52:55,677
definitely doesn't do it cuz they
obviously invading partially to get, you

3133
02:52:55,760 --> 02:52:57,997
know, um, to gain those capabilities.

3134
02:52:58,080 --> 02:53:02,237
Um, and so then, uh, does the US bomb

3135
02:53:02,320 --> 02:53:07,117
them? If the US bombs them, that's
probably World War II. I, it's hard to

3136
02:53:07,200 --> 02:53:08,877
imagine that not just resulting in

3137
02:53:08,960 --> 02:53:12,877
massive escalation. Um, and so you're

3138
02:53:12,960 --> 02:53:15,597
looking at it and there's kind of no

3139
02:53:15,680 --> 02:53:18,877
good options. Um,

3140
02:53:18,960 --> 02:53:23,437
so I think it's I mean everyone's very

3141
02:53:23,520 --> 02:53:25,437
focused on it obviously, but it is it is

3142
02:53:25,520 --> 02:53:29,677
like a real powder keg of a uh

3143
02:53:29,760 --> 02:53:33,677
>> damn >> of a region.

3144
02:53:33,760 --> 02:53:36,477
>> How do you think this all ends?

3145
02:53:36,560 --> 02:53:41,117
>> Um, we had a little
discussion about this at

3146
02:53:41,200 --> 02:53:41,837
breakfast.

3147
02:53:41,920 --> 02:53:45,997
>> Yeah. Yeah. Um I mean

3148
02:53:46,080 --> 02:53:48,557
I think

3149
02:53:48,640 --> 02:53:52,157
I think if so let's assume that in the

3150
02:53:52,240 --> 02:53:54,477
next handful of years next like 3 four

3151
02:53:54,560 --> 02:53:57,597
years um there's an invasion or blockade

3152
02:53:57,680 --> 02:53:59,357
of Taiwan

3153
02:53:59,440 --> 02:54:01,677
and

3154
02:54:01,760 --> 02:54:04,877
uh you know I think it's I think given

3155
02:54:04,960 --> 02:54:07,757
how important AI is um it's hard for the

3156
02:54:07,840 --> 02:54:09,997
US to to not take any sort of action in

3157
02:54:10,080 --> 02:54:14,157
that scenario and then you

3158
02:54:14,240 --> 02:54:16,237
almost all the actions you would see

3159
02:54:16,320 --> 02:54:19,677
escalating into a major major conflict.

3160
02:54:19,760 --> 02:54:23,800
So um

3161
02:54:25,120 --> 02:54:28,397
best case scenario is we deter the

3162
02:54:28,480 --> 02:54:33,197
invasion or blockade altogether and um

3163
02:54:33,280 --> 02:54:37,400
and I think you know

3164
02:54:37,680 --> 02:54:41,437
I think it certainly is in everyone's
interest to not get into a large scale

3165
02:54:41,520 --> 02:54:45,597
world war that's a hugely destructive
and and kills lots of people. So I think

3166
02:54:45,680 --> 02:54:47,357
like fundamentally we should be able to

3167
02:54:47,440 --> 02:54:51,677
deter that conflict. Um, but that's uh

3168
02:54:51,760 --> 02:54:55,197
that's why all this matters so much. We
need to make sure our AI capabilities as

3169
02:54:55,280 --> 02:54:58,477
a country are the best in the world.
We need to make sure that our military AI

3170
02:54:58,560 --> 02:55:00,157
capabilities are the best in the world.

3171
02:55:00,240 --> 02:55:03,437
We need to make sure that you know um uh

3172
02:55:03,520 --> 02:55:06,797
the there's clear uh economic deterrence

3173
02:55:06,880 --> 02:55:09,437
of this kind of scenario like we need to

3174
02:55:09,520 --> 02:55:12,157
um we need to be investing in in every

3175
02:55:12,240 --> 02:55:16,237
way to deter this conflict such that um

3176
02:55:16,320 --> 02:55:17,597
you know where this really will break

3177
02:55:17,680 --> 02:55:20,157
down is if the Chinese if the CCP

3178
02:55:20,240 --> 02:55:25,277
calculus uh uh you know diverges from

3179
02:55:25,360 --> 02:55:28,237
our own if their calculus becomes

3180
02:55:28,320 --> 02:55:32,717
oh no this is going to work out you we
we can take this and then you know we're

3181
02:55:32,800 --> 02:55:36,397
strong enough so they'll work out for us
and then our calculus is the opposite.

3182
02:55:36,480 --> 02:55:38,877
That's where that's where the world war

3183
02:55:38,960 --> 02:55:44,237
scenario happens. So um so I think it's
possible to deter and I think we have to

3184
02:55:44,320 --> 02:55:46,877
you know there's a lot of things we have
to do to make sure that we deter that

3185
02:55:46,960 --> 02:55:49,677
conflict and that should be I mean

3186
02:55:49,760 --> 02:55:53,277
certainly I think it already is like 80%

3187
02:55:53,360 --> 02:55:55,837
of the focus of the entire DoD. So, I

3188
02:55:55,920 --> 02:56:01,277
mean, it's it's just we can deter, but I
mean, when you're talking about an aging

3189
02:56:01,360 --> 02:56:02,717
population, I mean, they're getting

3190
02:56:02,800 --> 02:56:06,157
desperate, and it sounds like in order

3191
02:56:06,240 --> 02:56:08,797
for them to to legitimately win, they

3192
02:56:08,880 --> 02:56:11,837
have to acquire those chip fabs,

3193
02:56:11,920 --> 02:56:16,040
correct? And so,

3194
02:56:16,240 --> 02:56:19,677
they already have 250 times the ship
building capacity. They have way more

3195
02:56:19,760 --> 02:56:21,517
people. They have they have more power

3196
02:56:21,600 --> 02:56:25,437
than we do. I mean,

3197
02:56:25,520 --> 02:56:27,757
military recruitment in the US, you

3198
02:56:27,840 --> 02:56:29,437
know, was at an all-time low. I don't

3199
02:56:29,520 --> 02:56:32,957
know what it is today, but I mean, even

3200
02:56:33,040 --> 02:56:37,917
if it So, I guess what I'm saying is

3201
02:56:38,000 --> 02:56:41,677
we can you can only deter a desperate

3202
02:56:41,760 --> 02:56:43,837
entity for so long before they throw a

3203
02:56:43,920 --> 02:56:47,037
Hail Mary play, right? Would you agree

3204
02:56:47,120 --> 02:56:50,877
with that? >> Yeah.
And then it just depends on the

3205
02:56:50,960 --> 02:56:53,277
>> you would have to dedicate an entire

3206
02:56:53,360 --> 02:56:57,837
military to surround Taiwan

3207
02:56:57,920 --> 02:57:01,677
to effectively do that in my opinion.

3208
02:57:01,760 --> 02:57:04,477
>> Yeah. I mean, I think that the if if

3209
02:57:04,560 --> 02:57:07,357
they assess if the CCP and the PLA

3210
02:57:07,440 --> 02:57:11,677
assess that Taiwan is all
they're like they they

3211
02:57:11,760 --> 02:57:13,277
will focus their entire military

3212
02:57:13,360 --> 02:57:17,757
capacity on seizing Taiwan, then

3213
02:57:17,840 --> 02:57:20,877
that becomes a really that becomes a

3214
02:57:20,960 --> 02:57:21,997
really tricky calculus.

3215
02:57:22,080 --> 02:57:26,157
>> I mean, why wouldn't they? If if if if

3216
02:57:26,240 --> 02:57:28,317
Xi believes that the winner of the AI

3217
02:57:28,400 --> 02:57:31,837
race achieves global domination,

3218
02:57:31,920 --> 02:57:33,837
he's getting older. You just talked

3219
02:57:33,920 --> 02:57:36,557
about how important his legacy is to

3220
02:57:36,640 --> 02:57:41,080
him, which I'm sure you're right.

3221
02:57:41,280 --> 02:57:43,837
I don't know how you deter that.

3222
02:57:43,920 --> 02:57:45,917
And then they win the AR race.

3223
02:57:46,000 --> 02:57:49,117
>> Yeah. The only thing that we can do,

3224
02:57:49,200 --> 02:57:50,397
I think this is a long shot, but I think

3225
02:57:50,480 --> 02:57:53,517
it's important, is if

3226
02:57:53,600 --> 02:57:57,837
um if ultimately we actually end up

3227
02:57:57,920 --> 02:58:00,157
collaborating on AI. And I know that

3228
02:58:00,240 --> 02:58:03,517
sounds kind of crazy, but um

3229
02:58:03,600 --> 02:58:07,037
but if we're able as a country to

3230
02:58:07,120 --> 02:58:09,677
demonstrate

3231
02:58:09,760 --> 02:58:13,437
just we're so far ahead and there's

3232
02:58:13,520 --> 02:58:16,237
like, you know, the one one key element

3233
02:58:16,320 --> 02:58:19,277
of of how the whole AI thing plays out

3234
02:58:19,360 --> 02:58:22,557
um is this idea of um AI

3235
02:58:22,640 --> 02:58:26,717
self-improvement or uh intelligence
recursion sometimes people call it.

3236
02:58:26,800 --> 02:58:31,277
Basically, um, once AIS
get sufficiently good, then

3237
02:58:31,360 --> 02:58:36,237
you can start utilizing the AIS to help
you build the next AI. You, as sci-fi as

3238
02:58:36,320 --> 02:58:40,317
that sounds, you utilize your current
generation AI to build the next

3239
02:58:40,400 --> 02:58:41,837
generation AI faster and faster and

3240
02:58:41,920 --> 02:58:43,517
faster and faster.

3241
02:58:43,600 --> 02:58:47,437
>> And so, at some point, um, your AI

3242
02:58:47,520 --> 02:58:50,797
capabilities enable you like, you know,
there's some form of like, you know,

3243
02:58:50,880 --> 02:58:53,677
just exponential takeoff.
They just, they just, you know, your AI

3244
02:58:53,760 --> 02:58:55,517
capabilities get good really, really

3245
02:58:55,600 --> 02:58:58,957
quickly. And if somebody's even 3 to 6

3246
02:58:59,040 --> 02:59:03,517
months behind you, then they're they're
never going to catch up to you because

3247
02:59:03,600 --> 02:59:05,917
you're running
the self-improvement loop >> got

3248
02:59:06,000 --> 02:59:10,157
>> faster than anybody else.
And so this is

3249
02:59:10,240 --> 02:59:14,797
a this is a key idea. I mean,
it's I think it's um it's a little bit

3250
02:59:14,880 --> 02:59:19,197
theoretical right now. Like it's not
clear whether or not this intelligence

3251
02:59:19,280 --> 02:59:23,277
recursion um is going to be how it
plays out, but but a lot of people in AI

3252
02:59:23,360 --> 02:59:27,357
believe it. Um, and I probably I
probably believe it too that that we

3253
02:59:27,440 --> 02:59:30,877
will be able to use AIS to help us
continue training the next AIS and

3254
02:59:30,960 --> 02:59:32,957
improve things more quickly. And if you

3255
02:59:33,040 --> 02:59:36,797
believe that, then if we're let's say

3256
02:59:36,880 --> 02:59:41,197
three 3 to 6 months ahead of China um,

3257
02:59:41,280 --> 02:59:43,597
and we maintain that advantage and we

3258
02:59:43,680 --> 02:59:46,317
take off faster, then they're going to

3259
02:59:46,400 --> 02:59:51,117
be way behind. And then ultimately we're
going to be in a great position to say,

3260
02:59:51,200 --> 02:59:52,877
"Hey,

3261
02:59:52,960 --> 02:59:57,117
actually, like we're way ahead and we

3262
02:59:57,200 --> 02:59:58,957
should just, you know, you guys should

3263
02:59:59,040 --> 03:00:02,637
quit your efforts. Um we'll give you AI

3264
03:00:02,720 --> 03:00:07,437
for all of your economic and uh and um

3265
03:00:07,520 --> 03:00:09,677
humanitarian uses throughout your

3266
03:00:09,760 --> 03:00:12,237
society. Uh and we agree we're not going

3267
03:00:12,320 --> 03:00:16,157
to battle on military AI."

3268
03:00:16,240 --> 03:00:18,317
What would it take

3269
03:00:18,400 --> 03:00:21,357
to take the chip building capabilities

3270
03:00:21,440 --> 03:00:23,757
that Taiwan has as implement that here

3271
03:00:23,840 --> 03:00:27,517
in the US to protect it?

3272
03:00:27,600 --> 03:00:29,197
So

3273
03:00:29,280 --> 03:00:33,357
yeah um so the first thing is

3274
03:00:33,440 --> 03:00:35,917
uh there's been hundreds of billions of

3275
03:00:36,000 --> 03:00:38,477
dollars invested

3276
03:00:38,560 --> 03:00:42,077
just into like the buildout of those

3277
03:00:42,160 --> 03:00:45,757
fabs and the the the the call foundaries

3278
03:00:45,840 --> 03:00:47,437
but the buildup of these of these large

3279
03:00:47,520 --> 03:00:51,037
scale chip factories effectively and the

3280
03:00:51,120 --> 03:00:53,597
um and all the high-end equipment and

3281
03:00:53,680 --> 03:00:58,877
tooling inside of them. hundreds
of billions of dollars of investment. So,

3282
03:00:58,960 --> 03:01:01,357
first off, there needs to be hundreds
of billions of dollars investment in the

3283
03:01:01,440 --> 03:01:03,837
US. That's not the hard part. The second

3284
03:01:03,920 --> 03:01:06,557
part that's that's really the hard part

3285
03:01:06,640 --> 03:01:10,157
is um all it's basically a large scale

3286
03:01:10,240 --> 03:01:13,517
factory operated by highly highly

3287
03:01:13,600 --> 03:01:20,477
skilled um uh uh uh workers who

3288
03:01:20,560 --> 03:01:23,437
are very experienced in those processes

3289
03:01:23,520 --> 03:01:25,357
and the whole thing operates like a you

3290
03:01:25,440 --> 03:01:28,637
know like clockwork. Um, and unless you

3291
03:01:28,720 --> 03:01:33,517
can get those people to the US,
you know, you're going to have to like

3292
03:01:33,600 --> 03:01:36,877
rebuild all that knowhow and all
that technical capability.

3293
03:01:36,960 --> 03:01:40,317
>> And that's what takes a really long
time. And that's one of the things, you

3294
03:01:40,400 --> 03:01:43,117
know, >> why do you think
we haven't done that?

3295
03:01:43,200 --> 03:01:45,997
Why do you think we have not incentivized

3296
03:01:46,080 --> 03:01:48,557
these brilliant minds to come here and

3297
03:01:48,640 --> 03:01:52,317
do it for us? So TSMC, the Taiwan

3298
03:01:52,400 --> 03:01:54,877
semiconductor, um the company that you

3299
03:01:54,960 --> 03:01:58,077
know builds these fabs, they have stood

3300
03:01:58,160 --> 03:02:02,237
up a few fabs in Arizona. Um but they

3301
03:02:02,320 --> 03:02:06,797
cited issues like first there were
issues around um permitting and getting

3302
03:02:06,880 --> 03:02:08,237
enough power and they dealt with some

3303
03:02:08,320 --> 03:02:12,397
EPA issues and then um and then they

3304
03:02:12,480 --> 03:02:15,437
just have issues where the like uh you

3305
03:02:15,520 --> 03:02:17,837
know the technicians working in Arizona

3306
03:02:17,920 --> 03:02:20,157
don't aren't as skilled or don't work as

3307
03:02:20,240 --> 03:02:23,597
hard as those working in Taiwan. Um

3308
03:02:23,680 --> 03:02:26,157
so they've built a few fabs in the

3309
03:02:26,240 --> 03:02:27,437
United States. So, they've tried to do

3310
03:02:27,520 --> 03:02:31,917
it, but our our red tape and our our

3311
03:02:32,000 --> 03:02:35,197
power is not what it needs to be to be

3312
03:02:35,280 --> 03:02:38,477
able to do this red tape, power, um,

3313
03:02:38,560 --> 03:02:42,877
workforce. And then there's
another key thing, which is

3314
03:02:42,960 --> 03:02:46,717
if you look at it from Taiwan
Semiconductor, from from TSMC's

3315
03:02:46,800 --> 03:02:48,797
perspective, they're not all that

3316
03:02:48,880 --> 03:02:51,597
incentivized to stand up all these

3317
03:02:51,680 --> 03:02:54,077
capabilities in the United States. like

3318
03:02:54,160 --> 03:02:57,517
if as soon as they start standing up all

3319
03:02:57,600 --> 03:03:01,757
these capabilities in the United States,
the United States is not incentivized to

3320
03:03:01,840 --> 03:03:03,677
defend Taiwan. >> Yeah.

3321
03:03:03,760 --> 03:03:08,717
>> And it's a Taiwanese company. Um so and

3322
03:03:08,800 --> 03:03:10,317
it's a critical part of their survival

3323
03:03:10,400 --> 03:03:14,557
strategy. Um, so, so that's that's

3324
03:03:14,640 --> 03:03:18,397
really where the rubber hits the road
is are they actually incentivized to do a

3325
03:03:18,480 --> 03:03:22,477
large scale buildout of of chip
manufacturing capacity in the United

3326
03:03:22,560 --> 03:03:26,157
States? Um, I think the answer is like no.

3327
03:03:26,240 --> 03:03:28,717
>> Makes sense.
I mean, there would have to

3328
03:03:28,800 --> 03:03:30,637
be some type of a some type of a deal

3329
03:03:30,720 --> 03:03:34,397
struck where they fall under our wing.

3330
03:03:34,480 --> 03:03:36,157
>> Yeah. Yeah, I mean you could imagine

3331
03:03:36,240 --> 03:03:39,997
some kind of deal with with China um

3332
03:03:40,080 --> 03:03:43,197
between the US and China. It'd have to be
like a diplomatic deal at the highest

3333
03:03:43,280 --> 03:03:45,277
levels, which is something along the

3334
03:03:45,360 --> 03:03:48,317
lines of, you know,

3335
03:03:48,400 --> 03:03:50,637
hey, you guys can have Taiwan, but we

3336
03:03:50,720 --> 03:03:55,517
need large scale fabs in, you know,
we need large scale chip manufacturing in

3337
03:03:55,600 --> 03:03:59,357
the United States or something like that.
And like, you know, maybe there's

3338
03:03:59,440 --> 03:04:01,197
worlds where that kind of deal could get

3339
03:04:01,280 --> 03:04:05,437
could get drawn up. I don't know. Um

3340
03:04:05,520 --> 03:04:08,157
uh but that would I mean that would also

3341
03:04:08,240 --> 03:04:12,637
mean that the United States would
just have to say hey all we care about

3342
03:04:12,720 --> 03:04:16,157
actually at this point is is chip
manufacturing and that we don't care

3343
03:04:16,240 --> 03:04:19,037
actually about the Chinese people and

3344
03:04:19,120 --> 03:04:23,197
the the country and all that stuff >> man.

3345
03:04:23,280 --> 03:04:28,717
Man [clears throat] and are
they working with China at all

3346
03:04:28,800 --> 03:04:30,877
>> capacity >> the TSMC?

3347
03:04:30,960 --> 03:04:35,437
>> Yeah. So, they're um I think they're

3348
03:04:35,520 --> 03:04:38,557
technically not supposed to, but a lot

3349
03:04:38,640 --> 03:04:42,557
of the the um

3350
03:04:42,640 --> 03:04:44,717
Huawei, one of the leading companies in

3351
03:04:44,800 --> 03:04:48,797
China, has been able to get um

3352
03:04:48,880 --> 03:04:52,717
tons of chips from uh tons of dyes, it's

3353
03:04:52,800 --> 03:04:54,797
called, but basically tons of chips or

3354
03:04:54,880 --> 03:05:00,717
chip um uh uh prerequisites from Taiwan.

3355
03:05:00,800 --> 03:05:03,117
And they usually do it through like they

3356
03:05:03,200 --> 03:05:08,077
like start some cutout company that
doesn't seem associated with them in

3357
03:05:08,160 --> 03:05:13,117
like Singapore and then that Singaporean
company buys a bunch of um uh or

3358
03:05:13,200 --> 03:05:16,397
Malaysia and that or the Singaporean
Malaysian companies buy a bunch of chips

3359
03:05:16,480 --> 03:05:18,397
from TSMC and then they mail it back or

3360
03:05:18,480 --> 03:05:21,277
something. But there's clearly been uh

3361
03:05:21,360 --> 03:05:25,597
there's been a lot of TSMC high-end

3362
03:05:25,680 --> 03:05:28,717
um outputs that have gone
to to the Chinese companies.

3363
03:05:28,800 --> 03:05:33,870
>> Wow. Wow. [sighs and gasps]

3364
03:05:35,120 --> 03:05:38,237
Scary [__] man. It get it gets I mean I

3365
03:05:38,320 --> 03:05:42,717
think this is where um

3366
03:05:42,800 --> 03:05:44,797
you have to believe like right now if

3367
03:05:44,880 --> 03:05:47,677
you look at the you know just as we were

3368
03:05:47,760 --> 03:05:49,837
right now like if you look at the

3369
03:05:49,920 --> 03:05:53,517
situation and all of the

3370
03:05:53,600 --> 03:05:57,677
um all the dynamics at play right now

3371
03:05:57,760 --> 03:05:59,917
it's it's like it's a powder cake. It's

3372
03:06:00,000 --> 03:06:04,397
like very very very volatile. Um, highly

3373
03:06:04,480 --> 03:06:06,477
problematic in many ways. And this is

3374
03:06:06,560 --> 03:06:08,477
where I mean you just ultimately have to

3375
03:06:08,560 --> 03:06:14,477
believe that there's there's got
to be some effort towards diplomatic

3376
03:06:14,560 --> 03:06:15,917
solutions. >> Yeah.

3377
03:06:16,000 --> 03:06:21,597
>> Because it is definitely true like
war will be really bad for both sides.

3378
03:06:21,680 --> 03:06:24,717
>> Yeah. >> Yeah.
How do we coordinate with China

3379
03:06:24,800 --> 03:06:29,597
with the AI? >> Yeah. So, um,

3380
03:06:29,680 --> 03:06:31,277
>> what does that look like?

3381
03:06:31,360 --> 03:06:33,757
>> So, yeah, right now, right now, we're

3382
03:06:33,840 --> 03:06:37,517
definitely, um, US and China, um, we're

3383
03:06:37,600 --> 03:06:41,517
definitely in an allout race dynamic.

3384
03:06:41,600 --> 03:06:44,637
And, you know, we're going to race,
and I think this correct, we're going to

3385
03:06:44,720 --> 03:06:46,397
race to build the best AI systems.

3386
03:06:46,480 --> 03:06:50,237
They're going to race to build
the best AI systems. Um

3387
03:06:50,320 --> 03:06:55,437
uh and we're both all in on this approach
and um we're both all in on on

3388
03:06:55,520 --> 03:06:58,797
racing towards building the most
advanced AI capabilities, the largest

3389
03:06:58,880 --> 03:07:00,877
data centers, largest capacity, etc.,

3390
03:07:00,960 --> 03:07:07,277
etc. Um the uh and this is if you know

3391
03:07:07,360 --> 03:07:10,237
if you recall kind of how um how nuclear

3392
03:07:10,320 --> 03:07:13,837
was um like you know in nuclear uh

3393
03:07:13,920 --> 03:07:15,517
nuclear war as well as application of

3394
03:07:15,600 --> 03:07:19,997
nuclear towards um uh towards a power

3395
03:07:20,080 --> 03:07:24,957
production. It was kind of you know
all systems go like everyone racing um

3396
03:07:25,040 --> 03:07:26,637
towards building capacity building

3397
03:07:26,720 --> 03:07:30,477
capability and then uh Chernobyl and

3398
03:07:30,560 --> 03:07:35,117
ThreeM island happen um and it creates

3399
03:07:35,200 --> 03:07:37,757
large scale constrnation around the

3400
03:07:37,840 --> 03:07:40,317
technology um and the risks of those

3401
03:07:40,400 --> 03:07:44,237
technologies and um there were uh a

3402
03:07:44,320 --> 03:07:48,157
bunch of international treaties
and there's a large international response

3403
03:07:48,240 --> 03:07:50,557
towards coordinating on nuclear

3404
03:07:50,640 --> 03:07:53,517
technology. Now all said and done if you

3405
03:07:53,600 --> 03:07:58,717
really you know if you look at nuclear
like uh that set our country back set

3406
03:07:58,800 --> 03:08:01,357
many countries back you know
many generations in terms of power

3407
03:08:01,440 --> 03:08:03,837
generation. But what it took was

3408
03:08:03,920 --> 03:08:07,037
effectively these like smallcale

3409
03:08:07,120 --> 03:08:11,997
disasters um to take
place that effectively uh

3410
03:08:12,080 --> 03:08:13,917
that effectively were the forcing

3411
03:08:14,000 --> 03:08:16,957
function for international cooperation.

3412
03:08:17,040 --> 03:08:21,277
Um you can you can imagine a scenario

3413
03:08:21,360 --> 03:08:24,877
with AI where because of all the things

3414
03:08:24,960 --> 03:08:28,237
that we've been talking about um uh

3415
03:08:28,320 --> 03:08:31,277
there's some scenario where um maybe

3416
03:08:31,360 --> 03:08:33,677
some terrorist group or some Nazi actor

3417
03:08:33,760 --> 03:08:36,797
or some you know North Korea or whomever

3418
03:08:36,880 --> 03:08:41,117
somebody decides to use it for um in a

3419
03:08:41,200 --> 03:08:44,317
particularly adversarial or you know

3420
03:08:44,400 --> 03:08:47,437
inhumane way and create and that

3421
03:08:47,520 --> 03:08:51,117
disaster has some large scale fallout.

3422
03:08:51,200 --> 03:08:53,997
So uh it create you know you take out

3423
03:08:54,080 --> 03:08:59,757
the the you take out power in uh like

3424
03:08:59,840 --> 03:09:04,077
one of the largest cities in the world
and tons of people die or you take out

3425
03:09:04,160 --> 03:09:07,677
or there's some pathogen that gets
released and like tens of millions of

3426
03:09:07,760 --> 03:09:11,357
people die or you know some one
of these things happens that causes the

3427
03:09:11,440 --> 03:09:14,557
international community and everyone in
the world to realize oh shoot we have to

3428
03:09:14,640 --> 03:09:17,277
be coordinating on this and you know we

3429
03:09:17,360 --> 03:09:19,597
should be collaborating for AI to

3430
03:09:19,680 --> 03:09:22,637
improve our societies and improve our

3431
03:09:22,720 --> 03:09:27,197
economies and improve the lives of our
people. But we shouldn't it, you know,

3432
03:09:27,280 --> 03:09:30,797
we need to we need
to coordinate on its use towards,

3433
03:09:30,880 --> 03:09:32,317
for lack of a better term, scary things

3434
03:09:32,400 --> 03:09:35,037
like bio or cyber warfare or, you know,

3435
03:09:35,120 --> 03:09:38,717
the list goes on. Um, so

3436
03:09:38,800 --> 03:09:40,477
long story short, I think the path

3437
03:09:40,560 --> 03:09:44,717
really is um some kind of, you know, we

3438
03:09:44,800 --> 03:09:46,317
sometimes we talk about like an AI oil

3439
03:09:46,400 --> 03:09:49,757
spill or some kind of of incident that

3440
03:09:49,840 --> 03:09:53,917
really causes the international
community to realize like, hey, we we

3441
03:09:54,000 --> 03:09:55,597
have to we have to start coordinating on

3442
03:09:55,680 --> 03:09:58,397
this. I mean, it's you say

3443
03:09:58,480 --> 03:10:01,677
China's all out, you know, gone all in

3444
03:10:01,760 --> 03:10:06,557
on the race day ice and the US has
gone all out on the race day, but we're

3445
03:10:06,640 --> 03:10:08,557
kneecapping ourselves. I mean, you just

3446
03:10:08,640 --> 03:10:12,157
mentioned the red tape, the EPA,

3447
03:10:12,240 --> 03:10:16,717
the permitting, and the power
and we're not producing

3448
03:10:16,800 --> 03:10:20,957
more power. We're flatlined.
We've established that,

3449
03:10:21,040 --> 03:10:23,037
as far as I know, we're not getting rid

3450
03:10:23,120 --> 03:10:25,997
of the red tape, you know, to to to jet

3451
03:10:26,080 --> 03:10:33,080
launch this. And I mean,
it just seems like

3452
03:10:34,640 --> 03:10:36,237
we're cutting ourselves off at the knees

3453
03:10:36,320 --> 03:10:38,637
here,

3454
03:10:38,720 --> 03:10:42,077
right? Right now, I mean, we have a lot

3455
03:10:42,160 --> 03:10:43,917
of work to do for sure. We have to we

3456
03:10:44,000 --> 03:10:46,717
have to build strategies to win to have

3457
03:10:46,800 --> 03:10:49,117
energy dominance to have data dominance.

3458
03:10:49,200 --> 03:10:53,437
Um to on the algorithms I think we'll
be okay. They're gonna espionage but I

3459
03:10:53,520 --> 03:10:57,437
think we'll be okay on algorithms. Um
we need to ensure we have chip dominance

3460
03:10:57,520 --> 03:11:01,837
long term. Uh we need to make sure all
this lends itself to military dominance.

3461
03:11:01,920 --> 03:11:03,197
I totally agree with you. I mean we need

3462
03:11:03,280 --> 03:11:05,517
to

3463
03:11:05,600 --> 03:11:10,077
we need to today ensure that we have the

3464
03:11:10,160 --> 03:11:12,477
proper strategies in place so that we

3465
03:11:12,560 --> 03:11:14,637
stay ahead on all these areas. The worst

3466
03:11:14,720 --> 03:11:17,677
case scenario for the United States is

3467
03:11:17,760 --> 03:11:20,557
the following which is

3468
03:11:20,640 --> 03:11:23,197
um CCP

3469
03:11:23,280 --> 03:11:25,677
uh does a large scale Manhattan style

3470
03:11:25,760 --> 03:11:30,797
project inside their country um
realizes they can start because of

3471
03:11:30,880 --> 03:11:33,597
all the factors that we've talked
about they they realize they can start

3472
03:11:33,680 --> 03:11:36,557
overtaking the US on AI that lends

3473
03:11:36,640 --> 03:11:39,757
itself to extreme hyper military

3474
03:11:39,840 --> 03:11:44,637
advantage and they use that to take over

3475
03:11:44,720 --> 03:11:46,637
the world. That's like that's like worst

3476
03:11:46,720 --> 03:11:50,317
case scenario for the US. If US and AI

3477
03:11:50,400 --> 03:11:53,517
AI US and China AI capabilities are even

3478
03:11:53,600 --> 03:11:57,677
just roughly on par, I think you have
deterrence. I don't think either country

3479
03:11:57,760 --> 03:12:00,397
will take the risk. I think if US is way

3480
03:12:00,480 --> 03:12:03,517
ahead of China, I think you maintain US

3481
03:12:03,600 --> 03:12:07,837
leadership and that's a pretty safe world.
So the the the worst case

3482
03:12:07,920 --> 03:12:10,317
scenario is they get ahead of us.

3483
03:12:10,400 --> 03:12:15,757
Are there any other players other
than the US and China involved in this?

3484
03:12:15,840 --> 03:12:18,957
Who else do we need
to be watching out for?

3485
03:12:19,040 --> 03:12:21,837
>> So yeah, right now definitely US and

3486
03:12:21,920 --> 03:12:26,477
China. Um the a lot of other countries

3487
03:12:26,560 --> 03:12:31,037
will matter. Um but not
all of them have enough

3488
03:12:31,120 --> 03:12:32,797
ingredients to really properly be AI

3489
03:12:32,880 --> 03:12:35,597
superpowers. So um but other countries

3490
03:12:35,680 --> 03:12:39,117
are going to they have they have key

3491
03:12:39,200 --> 03:12:46,200
ingredients. So um to to name a few a uh

3492
03:12:46,800 --> 03:12:50,957
everything we've talked about with with
cyber warfare and information warfare,

3493
03:12:51,040 --> 03:12:52,957
information operations,

3494
03:12:53,040 --> 03:12:55,117
Russia has very advanced operations in

3495
03:12:55,200 --> 03:12:59,437
in those areas. Um and that could end up

3496
03:12:59,520 --> 03:13:01,757
mattering a lot if they ally with the

3497
03:13:01,840 --> 03:13:04,637
with the CCP. Um there's a lot of ways

3498
03:13:04,720 --> 03:13:07,437
they can team up and and have uh and

3499
03:13:07,520 --> 03:13:11,037
that could be pretty bad. Um

3500
03:13:11,120 --> 03:13:14,877
there's uh you know the the countries in

3501
03:13:14,960 --> 03:13:17,197
the Middle East will be very important

3502
03:13:17,280 --> 03:13:20,477
because they have um incredible amounts

3503
03:13:20,560 --> 03:13:23,597
of capital and they have lots of energy.

3504
03:13:23,680 --> 03:13:26,717
Uh and so

3505
03:13:26,800 --> 03:13:28,637
that's these are you know they're

3506
03:13:28,720 --> 03:13:31,357
critical um players in how all this

3507
03:13:31,440 --> 03:13:34,717
plays out. India matters a lot. India

3508
03:13:34,800 --> 03:13:37,037
has a lot of high-end technical talent.

3509
03:13:37,120 --> 03:13:41,197
Um uh I don't know if I think right now

3510
03:13:41,280 --> 03:13:44,557
I don't know if between India and China
which has more high-end technical talent

3511
03:13:44,640 --> 03:13:47,437
but there's a lot in India for sure. Um

3512
03:13:47,520 --> 03:13:50,237
massive population um also starting to

3513
03:13:50,320 --> 03:13:53,757
industrialize in a real way. Um and

3514
03:13:53,840 --> 03:13:55,757
right next to right next to China so

3515
03:13:55,840 --> 03:14:00,877
India will matter a lot. And then um you
know there's a lot of there's a lot of

3516
03:14:00,960 --> 03:14:04,077
technical talent in Europe as well.
I think it's unclear exactly how this

3517
03:14:04,160 --> 03:14:07,197
plays out um with the European

3518
03:14:07,280 --> 03:14:09,997
capabilities. I mean they have to

3519
03:14:10,080 --> 03:14:12,637
um it seems like there's some efforts

3520
03:14:12,720 --> 03:14:16,237
now for Europe to try to uh build up

3521
03:14:16,320 --> 03:14:17,917
large scale power, build up large data

3522
03:14:18,000 --> 03:14:21,677
centers, you know, um

3523
03:14:21,760 --> 03:14:25,517
uh make a play. I think yet to be seen
how effective those efforts are going to

3524
03:14:25,600 --> 03:14:27,837
be, but um you can clearly see some

3525
03:14:27,920 --> 03:14:31,357
scenarios where if they make a hard a

3526
03:14:31,440 --> 03:14:33,597
hard turn and and go all in, they could

3527
03:14:33,680 --> 03:14:35,837
be relevant as well.

3528
03:14:35,920 --> 03:14:38,717
Is there a world where AI takes on a

3529
03:14:38,800 --> 03:14:43,517
mind of its own? So,

3530
03:14:43,600 --> 03:14:47,997
uh, you know, obviously you can
hypothetically paint the scenario where

3531
03:14:48,080 --> 03:14:49,917
like, you know, you have super

3532
03:14:50,000 --> 03:14:51,597
intelligence or you have really powerful

3533
03:14:51,680 --> 03:14:55,917
AI and then, um, you know, it realizes

3534
03:14:56,000 --> 03:14:57,917
at some point that humans are kind of

3535
03:14:58,000 --> 03:15:01,357
annoying and takes us all out. But uh

3536
03:15:01,440 --> 03:15:03,517
but I think I think it's a very like

3537
03:15:03,600 --> 03:15:06,717
that's so preventable um uh as an

3538
03:15:06,800 --> 03:15:09,597
outcome because

3539
03:15:09,680 --> 03:15:11,917
first of all all the things we just

3540
03:15:12,000 --> 03:15:16,877
talked about are like the very real
things that happen long before you have

3541
03:15:16,960 --> 03:15:20,637
you know this hyper advanced AI that
takes everyone out. That's first that's

3542
03:15:20,720 --> 03:15:22,397
first thing. So we have lots of things

3543
03:15:22,480 --> 03:15:24,717
we have to get right before then. And

3544
03:15:24,800 --> 03:15:31,197
then second is um you know for AI to

3545
03:15:31,280 --> 03:15:35,357
actually um be capable of you know

3546
03:15:35,440 --> 03:15:38,717
having a mind of its own and taking
all humans out like we'd have to give it

3547
03:15:38,800 --> 03:15:41,757
just incredible amounts of control. Like

3548
03:15:41,840 --> 03:15:46,077
it would have to just basically be
running everything and we're just sort

3549
03:15:46,160 --> 03:15:48,077
of like along for the ride. >> Mhm.

3550
03:15:48,160 --> 03:15:51,757
>> And that's a choice.
We have this choice of

3551
03:15:51,840 --> 03:15:56,557
whether or not to like give all
of our control to AI systems. And as I was

3552
03:15:56,640 --> 03:15:57,757
talking about before with like human

3553
03:15:57,840 --> 03:16:01,677
sovereignty, I my belief is we should

3554
03:16:01,760 --> 03:16:06,157
not seed control of our most critical
systems. Like we should we should design

3555
03:16:06,240 --> 03:16:10,717
all the systems such that human
decision-m human control is really

3556
03:16:10,800 --> 03:16:12,477
really important. Human oversight is

3557
03:16:12,560 --> 03:16:15,277
really important. Um, this is one of the

3558
03:16:15,360 --> 03:16:18,957
things that I actually think is is um,

3559
03:16:19,040 --> 03:16:22,717
one of the things that we're working
on as a company. So, honestly, one of like

3560
03:16:22,800 --> 03:16:25,037
as I think about like long-term
missions, one of the most important

3561
03:16:25,120 --> 03:16:28,397
things is creating human sovereignty. So

3562
03:16:28,480 --> 03:16:30,557
first is how do we make sure all the

3563
03:16:30,640 --> 03:16:33,597
data that goes into these AI models um

3564
03:16:33,680 --> 03:16:35,597
increases human sovereignty such that

3565
03:16:35,680 --> 03:16:37,757
the models are going to do what we tell

3566
03:16:37,840 --> 03:16:41,197
them are aligned with humans and aligned

3567
03:16:41,280 --> 03:16:45,117
with um uh our objectives and two is

3568
03:16:45,200 --> 03:16:48,797
that we create oversight. So as AI

3569
03:16:48,880 --> 03:16:53,677
starts doing more and more actions,
doing more planning, you know, taking

3570
03:16:53,760 --> 03:16:57,837
out, you know, carrying out more things
in in the in the world, in the economy,

3571
03:16:57,920 --> 03:16:59,997
in military, etc. that humans are

3572
03:17:00,080 --> 03:17:01,517
watching and supervising every one of

3573
03:17:01,600 --> 03:17:05,437
those actions. So that's that's how we

3574
03:17:05,520 --> 03:17:07,517
maintain control and that's how we

3575
03:17:07,600 --> 03:17:09,757
prevent, you know, the Terminator

3576
03:17:09,840 --> 03:17:14,637
scenarios or the, you know,
AI takes us out kind of scenarios.

3577
03:17:14,720 --> 03:17:18,797
>> Interesting. Well, Alex,
wrapping up the interview

3578
03:17:18,880 --> 03:17:20,797
here, but man, what a fascinating

3579
03:17:20,880 --> 03:17:25,997
discussion. Thank you. Thank you
for being here. One last question. If you

3580
03:17:26,080 --> 03:17:27,517
had three guests you'd like to see on

3581
03:17:27,600 --> 03:17:30,077
the show, who would it be?

3582
03:17:30,160 --> 03:17:34,237
Oh, it's a good question. Um,

3583
03:17:34,320 --> 03:17:37,357
who would I like to see?

3584
03:17:37,440 --> 03:17:40,157
Uh, well, I really like what you've been

3585
03:17:40,240 --> 03:17:41,997
doing recently, which is getting more

3586
03:17:42,080 --> 03:17:46,637
tech folks on the on the pod. Um, so,

3587
03:17:46,720 --> 03:17:49,037
uh, so I go in that direction. I mean, I

3588
03:17:49,120 --> 03:17:50,397
think Elon would be great to see on the

3589
03:17:50,480 --> 03:17:55,197
show. I think, uh, I think,

3590
03:17:55,280 --> 03:17:58,477
um, we were talking about this.
Zach would be would be cool to see on the

3591
03:17:58,560 --> 03:18:01,517
show. I think, uh, Sam Alman would be

3592
03:18:01,600 --> 03:18:03,117
cool to see on the show. So, definitely

3593
03:18:03,200 --> 03:18:06,397
like, um, more people in tech. Outside

3594
03:18:06,480 --> 03:18:09,997
of that, um

3595
03:18:10,080 --> 03:18:13,517
I think uh and we were talking about

3596
03:18:13,600 --> 03:18:17,197
some of this like um

3597
03:18:17,280 --> 03:18:20,957
international leadership
like international like

3598
03:18:21,040 --> 03:18:25,997
leaders of other countries is super
important because um we talk about all

3599
03:18:26,080 --> 03:18:29,997
these scenarios like international
cooperation is going to matter so much.

3600
03:18:30,080 --> 03:18:32,957
>> Right on. we'll we'll reach out to them

3601
03:18:33,040 --> 03:18:36,237
and uh you know as far as world leaders

3602
03:18:36,320 --> 03:18:39,517
is concerned we're we're on it but um

3603
03:18:39,600 --> 03:18:42,397
well Alex thanks again for coming man

3604
03:18:42,480 --> 03:18:45,677
fascinating discussion I'm just super

3605
03:18:45,760 --> 03:18:47,917
happy to see all the success that you've

3606
03:18:48,000 --> 03:18:51,357
amassed throughout your 28 years it's it

3607
03:18:51,440 --> 03:18:55,677
is I love seeing it.
So thank you for being

3608
03:18:55,760 --> 03:18:59,757
here. I know you're a busy guy. So >>
yeah, thanks for having me. It was fun.

3609
03:18:59,840 --> 03:19:03,460
Heat. Heat. [music]

3610
03:19:08,650 --> 03:19:10,670
[music]