WEBVTT 00:00:00.240 --> 00:00:03.357 Sam, you've had an intense week to say the least. So, I really appreciate you 00:00:03.440 --> 00:00:05.517 taking the time to join Decoded. 00:00:05.600 --> 00:00:07.997 >> Thanks for having me. >> Yeah. Yeah. Uh, you were in Washington 00:00:08.080 --> 00:00:12.077 recently for the state dinner and OpenAI President Greg Brockman just signed this 00:00:12.160 --> 00:00:16.157 voluntary accord on AI safety at the White House. Um, I got to ask, do you 00:00:16.240 --> 00:00:19.597 expect this new agreement, this White House brokered agreement to change 00:00:19.680 --> 00:00:23.197 OpenAI safety practices in a meaningful way, or is this essentially just more 00:00:23.280 --> 00:00:28.077 window dressing? >> Well, I don't think it's window dressing, but 00:00:28.160 --> 00:00:31.597 I I do want to be clear. we would have we care like super deeply about safety 00:00:31.680 --> 00:00:35.037 and would have done and will do uh the 00:00:35.120 --> 00:00:39.757 best thing we can for safety security and just sort of like trust and 00:00:39.840 --> 00:00:43.837 robustness in this technology whether or not any you know voluntary agreement is 00:00:43.920 --> 00:00:47.677 signed. I I think it's great to have the industry do this and I think clearly 00:00:47.760 --> 00:00:49.597 we're at a time where people are looking 00:00:49.680 --> 00:00:53.517 for reassurance from the industry uh and 00:00:53.600 --> 00:00:55.677 and the developers of this technology. 00:00:55.760 --> 00:00:57.837 But 00:00:57.920 --> 00:01:02.797 we were founded on a belief that this technology was going to become as 00:01:02.880 --> 00:01:06.397 powerful as it has now and more powerful in the future and that we wanted to make 00:01:06.480 --> 00:01:11.117 sure that people get the tremendous benefits of it and and we will do that, 00:01:11.200 --> 00:01:15.277 you know, with or without such an agreement, but I'm happy to have it. 00:01:15.360 --> 00:01:18.237 >> Yeah. and and you know, how do you respond to those who worry that the 00:01:18.320 --> 00:01:21.517 public is being shut out of these very important debates on AI safety and that 00:01:21.600 --> 00:01:25.197 really these policies are being crafted by the president and just a handful of 00:01:25.280 --> 00:01:27.757 tech CEOs in back rooms at the White House? 00:01:27.840 --> 00:01:30.477 >> I I do share that the spirit of that 00:01:30.560 --> 00:01:35.117 worry. I I I really think there are two ways this technology can go very wrong. 00:01:35.200 --> 00:01:37.997 I mean there's many specifics we could talk about but if we think about the 00:01:38.080 --> 00:01:40.237 kind of general directions that we 00:01:40.320 --> 00:01:43.357 should be worried about um one which has 00:01:43.440 --> 00:01:47.277 gotten a lot of attention recently is that there could be a loss of control to 00:01:47.360 --> 00:01:51.357 AI and that we build something that we don't have sufficiently aligned to human 00:01:51.440 --> 00:01:54.157 values and that allows people to stay in 00:01:54.240 --> 00:01:57.357 control of the future forever. Um and so 00:01:57.440 --> 00:02:01.437 we need to get safety right. But the other way things can go wrong is too 00:02:01.520 --> 00:02:05.837 much concentration of power. And there's been a lot of fear here where okay if we 00:02:05.920 --> 00:02:08.077 do too much to restrict this technology 00:02:08.160 --> 00:02:10.317 in the name of safety and we end up with 00:02:10.400 --> 00:02:14.157 a small number of companies or people or 00:02:14.240 --> 00:02:16.317 perhaps one country that have too much 00:02:16.400 --> 00:02:19.757 power over this. Um that also is a way 00:02:19.840 --> 00:02:21.357 that this can go horribly wrong because 00:02:21.440 --> 00:02:24.477 people are shut out of the kind of power 00:02:24.560 --> 00:02:29.117 and benefits and control and agency over the future they should have. So, our 00:02:29.200 --> 00:02:32.797 goal here is to sort of be the pragmatic centrists between these paths because we 00:02:32.880 --> 00:02:36.077 can see how tempting it is to heir in one direction or the other. 00:02:36.160 --> 00:02:38.877 >> Yeah. Well, I'm glad you mentioned that, you know, the very few people in the 00:02:38.960 --> 00:02:42.077 room here because Politico's actually reported that this White House um 00:02:42.160 --> 00:02:45.117 accorded earlier was the brainchild of 00:02:45.200 --> 00:02:49.277 of Meta CEO Mark Zuckerberg and Nvidia CEO Jensen Hang um with basically 00:02:49.360 --> 00:02:52.717 minimal input from some of the other folks who signed on. Obviously, Greg was 00:02:52.800 --> 00:02:56.077 there, but it was unclear to what extent OpenAI influenced this. Were you guys 00:02:56.160 --> 00:02:59.437 blindsided by this agreement? And are you concerned that, you know, maybe some 00:02:59.520 --> 00:03:02.397 of the CEOs are are back channeling with the White House on this? 00:03:02.480 --> 00:03:05.837 >> No, I I think we've been talking with our colleagues in the industry for quite 00:03:05.920 --> 00:03:08.397 like many many months and more 00:03:08.480 --> 00:03:11.597 intensively the weeks before this. Um, 00:03:11.680 --> 00:03:14.157 and 00:03:14.240 --> 00:03:18.637 I think people had like a lot of shared goals here. I I would welcome something 00:03:18.720 --> 00:03:21.597 more, but I think this is like a great a great start that the industry can get 00:03:21.680 --> 00:03:23.837 behind. >> Sure. I appreciate that. I I got to ask 00:03:23.920 --> 00:03:26.477 about the other news out of the White House this week. There was an executive 00:03:26.560 --> 00:03:30.957 order uh officially changing rebranding artificial intelligence to to super 00:03:31.040 --> 00:03:34.477 intelligence. What do you think of of the attempted rebrand here? 00:03:34.560 --> 00:03:37.597 >> We've been call we've been we use both, but we've been talking about super 00:03:37.680 --> 00:03:41.997 intelligence for a few years now. Um >> but it's it's a different thing, right? 00:03:42.080 --> 00:03:44.077 I mean, super intelligence is like the machine. 00:03:44.160 --> 00:03:48.317 >> I kind of think the artificial intelligence thing happened. I think a 00:03:48.400 --> 00:03:51.117 lot of people would say AGI happened or is close to happening. I I think super 00:03:51.200 --> 00:03:55.837 intelligence does it still sort of understates the 00:03:55.920 --> 00:03:58.957 magnitude of what I think is happening, but I think it's a better word than 00:03:59.040 --> 00:04:01.997 artificial intelligence. Um, 00:04:02.080 --> 00:04:06.557 so yeah, I think like it kind of 00:04:06.640 --> 00:04:09.597 it matched how we've been talking about it, but I think a lot of people continue 00:04:09.680 --> 00:04:12.237 to use AI as a phrase. >> Yeah. Are I was going to ask, are you 00:04:12.320 --> 00:04:17.597 guys going to change the name to open SI? No plans to do that. But we do like 00:04:17.680 --> 00:04:20.477 we have been talking about super intelligence a lot and we will continue 00:04:20.560 --> 00:04:22.477 to talk about it. >> Yeah. And and obviously I think the 00:04:22.560 --> 00:04:26.077 president in part is driven by this desire to kind of rebrand AI so that 00:04:26.160 --> 00:04:30.397 it's less scary to people and I think maybe artificial sounds bad. Everybody 00:04:30.480 --> 00:04:33.197 >> I mean does super intelligence sound obviously less scary to people than 00:04:33.280 --> 00:04:36.957 artificial intelligence? >> Not to me. So that's why I'm I'm curious 00:04:37.040 --> 00:04:39.997 whether you think this rebrand will actually have any impact on on the 00:04:40.080 --> 00:04:41.997 public's perception of this technology. 00:04:42.080 --> 00:04:45.400 I don't 00:04:46.080 --> 00:04:49.437 Yeah, it's not clear to me that super intelligence is a less scary term. I do 00:04:49.520 --> 00:04:51.357 think it's a more accurate term. 00:04:51.440 --> 00:04:54.237 >> Okay. And just >> but you know, I think I'm gonna I think 00:04:54.320 --> 00:04:55.997 people are going to keep calling it AI. 00:04:56.080 --> 00:04:59.197 >> Yeah. Okay. And we won't and we won't look out for the the corporate rebrand 00:04:59.280 --> 00:05:02.317 anytime soon. But uh but good to know that you at least see see the accuracy 00:05:02.400 --> 00:05:03.517 there. um on your relationship. 00:05:03.600 --> 00:05:07.117 >> As a funny little story, uh when we a 00:05:07.200 --> 00:05:11.437 while ago, I wanted to this was like a >> this was a thing I really wanted to do, 00:05:11.520 --> 00:05:12.397 but it didn't happen. I wanted to get 00:05:12.480 --> 00:05:16.557 openi.com, open agi.com, and openi.com. 00:05:16.640 --> 00:05:18.557 >> And as we moved up the ladder from AI to 00:05:18.640 --> 00:05:23.117 AGI to super intelligence, we were going to change the URL, but brands are 00:05:23.200 --> 00:05:25.677 sticky. >> The futures that might have been. Wow. 00:05:25.760 --> 00:05:29.197 Uh so, um turning back to your relationship with the president, um 00:05:29.280 --> 00:05:33.117 you've obviously been pushing for tougher safety rules. kind of a shift a 00:05:33.200 --> 00:05:36.237 little bit for the company that seems increasingly at odds with the 00:05:36.320 --> 00:05:39.837 president's claims that AI safety is a hoax, regulations are a globalist 00:05:39.920 --> 00:05:43.357 scheme. You've had a good relationship with with Trump, but but why can't you 00:05:43.440 --> 00:05:47.277 why isn't he listening to you when when you're asking for stricter rules? 00:05:47.360 --> 00:05:52.237 >> Um, well, 00:05:52.320 --> 00:05:54.157 I think he really does want people to be 00:05:54.240 --> 00:05:58.237 able to use AI and rely on it being safe 00:05:58.320 --> 00:06:02.077 and robust and working the way people expect it to work. 00:06:02.160 --> 00:06:04.717 um he clearly wants the companies to 00:06:04.800 --> 00:06:08.477 just do this themselves. Uh and you 00:06:08.560 --> 00:06:12.797 know, like we're going to, as I mentioned earlier, 00:06:12.880 --> 00:06:16.717 we're going to we're going to like make our own products safe 00:06:16.800 --> 00:06:20.717 no matter what the rules are and no matter what other companies do. Um, I 00:06:20.800 --> 00:06:22.957 continue to think that as this 00:06:23.040 --> 00:06:26.557 technology reaches 00:06:26.640 --> 00:06:30.237 increasing levels of capability, um, and 00:06:30.320 --> 00:06:33.997 the world has to contend with what this means for society as a whole, we 00:06:34.080 --> 00:06:38.877 probably will see more calls for sort of some guard rails. But if I'm wrong about 00:06:38.960 --> 00:06:40.877 that and if nothing goes wrong along the 00:06:40.960 --> 00:06:43.597 way and, you know, we don't need 00:06:43.680 --> 00:06:46.637 anything there, then that's fine, too. 00:06:46.720 --> 00:06:49.597 >> Yeah. And obviously the president is talking to other folks as well. He's got 00:06:49.680 --> 00:06:53.357 venture capitalists in his orbit that think AI should be regulated in a very 00:06:53.440 --> 00:06:57.117 light fashion. Um existing laws they think can clamp down on any safety 00:06:57.200 --> 00:07:00.637 concerns. Um and frankly a lot of those people thought that your company was on 00:07:00.720 --> 00:07:03.917 their side on this question but we've heard from some of these um I think 00:07:04.000 --> 00:07:07.757 people call them AI accelerationists recently and to be to be frank they feel 00:07:07.840 --> 00:07:10.077 betrayed. Uh they feel like open AI is 00:07:10.160 --> 00:07:12.557 basically copying anthropic uh and its 00:07:12.640 --> 00:07:17.357 CEO Dario Emodi in its push for very aggressive regulations on AI. Can I just 00:07:17.440 --> 00:07:20.397 ask, you know, where do you specifically diverge from Anthropic and its 00:07:20.480 --> 00:07:23.437 pro-regulation uh CEO Dario when it 00:07:23.520 --> 00:07:24.877 comes to new AI rules? Um where's 00:07:24.960 --> 00:07:27.837 where's the daylight? 00:07:27.920 --> 00:07:31.277 >> I think there's a lot of daylight. Um we 00:07:31.360 --> 00:07:35.437 have always been a big believer that this technology has 00:07:35.520 --> 00:07:38.957 to be democratized and put into people's hands. Uh I think one of the biggest 00:07:39.040 --> 00:07:42.237 differences between us and some of the 00:07:42.320 --> 00:07:46.557 stricter let's say AI safety people is we believe that the world should accept 00:07:46.640 --> 00:07:48.397 some bad things happening for the 00:07:48.480 --> 00:07:49.917 benefits of this technology and people 00:07:50.000 --> 00:07:54.317 having the agency. So like you know I I 00:07:54.400 --> 00:07:57.277 disagree but I understand the perspective of people who are like this 00:07:57.360 --> 00:08:01.117 technology is going to get so powerful and it's so dangerous that a single lab 00:08:01.200 --> 00:08:04.877 in San Francisco should have it and make sure nothing bad happens and kind of 00:08:04.960 --> 00:08:09.597 figure out how to do out the benefits. I think that is a completely unacceptable 00:08:09.680 --> 00:08:13.277 trade-off from a perspective of liberty and human agency and people 00:08:13.360 --> 00:08:15.357 self-determining the future. But I 00:08:15.440 --> 00:08:18.237 understand where it comes from. And I do 00:08:18.320 --> 00:08:21.437 think the lighter touch regulatory 00:08:21.520 --> 00:08:25.997 stance that we advocate for comes with an accepting of the fact that some bad 00:08:26.080 --> 00:08:29.837 things are going to happen as society figures out the resilience. So, I 00:08:29.920 --> 00:08:32.157 wouldn't take a trade of saying like 00:08:32.240 --> 00:08:37.117 we'll make sure there's no major hacks, there's no kind of like misuse of this 00:08:37.200 --> 00:08:40.717 technology, there's zero scams, there's zero all the other bad things that will 00:08:40.800 --> 00:08:45.037 happen. Um because I think people will do tremendously 00:08:45.120 --> 00:08:46.637 orders of magnitude more good stuff than 00:08:46.720 --> 00:08:50.957 bad stuff. But when it comes to the 00:08:51.040 --> 00:08:54.477 potential of like a serious loss of control to AI, and this is not a today 00:08:54.560 --> 00:08:55.917 worry, but it may not be in the distant 00:08:56.000 --> 00:08:59.437 future. Um this is where I would say to 00:08:59.520 --> 00:09:02.157 the accelerationists like let's be a 00:09:02.240 --> 00:09:04.317 little thoughtful about lurching into 00:09:04.400 --> 00:09:07.677 this future. Um so I would say accept 00:09:07.760 --> 00:09:09.677 bounded risks accept risks that we 00:09:09.760 --> 00:09:11.917 understand in exchange for the benefits 00:09:12.000 --> 00:09:15.677 and um liberty agency all those things I 00:09:15.760 --> 00:09:19.437 was just talking about but don't accept like the really catastrophic risk. 00:09:19.520 --> 00:09:22.237 >> Yeah. And just to be clear you mentioned a single lab in San Francisco 00:09:22.320 --> 00:09:25.197 controlling all of this technology. Um, that sounds a lot like the folks who say 00:09:25.280 --> 00:09:29.357 Anthropic is making a play to basically capture regulators and be the sole uh 00:09:29.440 --> 00:09:32.477 sort of like dominant maybe the only player at the frontier. Um, do you think 00:09:32.560 --> 00:09:35.677 that might be what they're doing? And and obviously you have concerns about that. 00:09:35.760 --> 00:09:37.997 >> You would need to I mean I would have concerns if they actually did that. You 00:09:38.080 --> 00:09:39.837 would need to ask them if that's what they want to do. 00:09:39.920 --> 00:09:41.997 >> And again just on specific policies that 00:09:42.080 --> 00:09:46.157 you guys um do not want to support that anthropic is supporting whether it's the 00:09:46.240 --> 00:09:49.117 federal level at the state level um because again you guys are are now on 00:09:49.200 --> 00:09:53.757 the same page when it comes to uh pacing the frontier with China. same page with 00:09:53.840 --> 00:09:58.797 thirdparty evaluators. Um, you know, what's what's just one differentiator? 00:09:58.880 --> 00:10:00.477 >> Um, 00:10:00.560 --> 00:10:03.037 the last I heard one of the different 00:10:03.120 --> 00:10:06.957 differentiators is we don't want any 00:10:07.040 --> 00:10:10.877 restrictions or testing on anything but the frontier models. We do not want to 00:10:10.960 --> 00:10:12.797 slow down people that make very powerful 00:10:12.880 --> 00:10:14.717 but not the absolute frontier in the 00:10:14.800 --> 00:10:18.157 spirit of um, you know, really focusing 00:10:18.240 --> 00:10:20.397 on the potential catastrophic risks. I 00:10:20.480 --> 00:10:24.477 don't I don't think even though I 00:10:24.560 --> 00:10:28.717 believe that if you don't put any testing or any oversight on models that 00:10:28.800 --> 00:10:32.797 are one or two generations behind the frontier, I accept that bad things will 00:10:32.880 --> 00:10:37.597 happen with those. Um I would not go advocate a licensing regime for those. 00:10:37.680 --> 00:10:40.237 >> Okay. Yeah, I appreciate that. Um one of the other things we hear from your 00:10:40.320 --> 00:10:44.797 accelerationist critics is that um you OpenAI are kind of being held hostage by 00:10:44.880 --> 00:10:48.557 your researchers at some level. So there's I I think a through line through 00:10:48.640 --> 00:10:52.637 a lot of the AI safety community, the research community in San Francisco. Um 00:10:52.720 --> 00:10:55.677 you call them AI doomers, you call them effective altruists. Um you were 00:10:55.760 --> 00:10:58.557 famously a target of an unsuccessful coup attempt by these people. 00:10:58.640 --> 00:10:59.917 >> That worked for a little while. 00:11:00.000 --> 00:11:01.917 >> Sorry. What was that? >> I mean successful [clears throat] and 00:11:02.000 --> 00:11:04.637 then unsuccessful, but yeah. >> So yeah. Yeah. Like a couple days you 00:11:04.720 --> 00:11:08.557 you you were re you regained your throne. So I think that was uh 00:11:08.640 --> 00:11:12.397 unsuccessful ultimately. But I I want to ask you know is is the AI doomer 00:11:12.480 --> 00:11:15.437 mentality among your researchers is that a real thing? Uh, and is it maybe 00:11:15.520 --> 00:11:19.037 shifting Open AI in favor of these new regulations? Are the researchers kind of 00:11:19.120 --> 00:11:24.157 driving the ship here? >> Um, I don't think we're the lab that gets 00:11:24.240 --> 00:11:27.517 accused of being the doomers. Uh, I think we are the like we want people to 00:11:27.600 --> 00:11:30.877 have this. We think and I think we've been proven right. There are tremendous 00:11:30.960 --> 00:11:33.757 benefits. And also society can figure 00:11:33.840 --> 00:11:35.757 out how to have this technology safely. 00:11:35.840 --> 00:11:39.677 I I do think there are other researchers and other labs who said like don't 00:11:39.760 --> 00:11:42.557 deploy this terrible stuff. It's going to happen. People can't be trusted with 00:11:42.640 --> 00:11:45.277 this. And I think our worldview has been 00:11:45.360 --> 00:11:49.757 proven. But part of that centism is also 00:11:49.840 --> 00:11:53.357 we don't want to go all in on like I think blind doomerism is bad. I think 00:11:53.440 --> 00:11:56.717 blind optimism is bad too. Um and I like 00:11:56.800 --> 00:11:59.117 our culture of 00:11:59.200 --> 00:12:01.917 debate and I like our culture of trying 00:12:02.000 --> 00:12:05.037 to like not 00:12:05.120 --> 00:12:09.517 fall into like the mental absolutism in either direction. Uh I think one of the 00:12:09.600 --> 00:12:12.397 strongest things about our culture is that we can hold this complexity in our 00:12:12.480 --> 00:12:16.077 head and we don't fall into the trap that some of the other AI labs do if 00:12:16.160 --> 00:12:20.797 it's all zero or one one way or the other. Um and we can you know kind of 00:12:20.880 --> 00:12:22.317 like figure out how to exist in this 00:12:22.400 --> 00:12:25.677 middle space. Um so do we have 00:12:25.760 --> 00:12:30.397 researchers that are concerned about where this technology could go? Yes. Do 00:12:30.480 --> 00:12:34.397 we have researchers who are like very confident we can mitigate the concerns? 00:12:34.480 --> 00:12:38.317 Also yes. And very often they're the same people. 00:12:38.400 --> 00:12:40.397 >> And I think this is a healthy thing about our culture. 00:12:40.480 --> 00:12:43.357 >> Yeah. And sometimes maybe it goes a little too far. And it was reported 00:12:43.440 --> 00:12:47.277 earlier today that three safety researchers at OpenAI uh parted ways 00:12:47.360 --> 00:12:49.997 with the company. Frankly, it sounds like they were they were fired allegedly 00:12:50.080 --> 00:12:54.077 for sharing confidential information with a third party uh evaluation group. 00:12:54.160 --> 00:12:56.877 Um some people are already comparing these researchers to whistleblowers. 00:12:56.960 --> 00:12:59.837 They're saying opening eyes has been on record supporting these third party 00:12:59.920 --> 00:13:03.277 safety evaluators embedded in the company. So, I mean, do you think firing 00:13:03.360 --> 00:13:06.077 or letting go of these researchers, is that potentially at odds with your 00:13:06.160 --> 00:13:09.517 company's support for whistleblowers, outside evaluators, this sort of AI 00:13:09.600 --> 00:13:12.397 safety structure that's been built up uh around these labs? I 00:13:12.480 --> 00:13:15.517 >> I'm obviously not going to comment on specific 00:13:15.600 --> 00:13:18.317 people. Um, but I will say we continue 00:13:18.400 --> 00:13:22.797 to really believe in the importance of working with 00:13:22.880 --> 00:13:25.117 third party evaluators and external 00:13:25.200 --> 00:13:27.117 safety testers and the kind of broader 00:13:27.200 --> 00:13:30.957 safety community. Um 00:13:31.040 --> 00:13:35.597 but we still expect confidentiality uh 00:13:35.680 --> 00:13:39.117 to be respected. >> Yeah. Um let's turn to the rogue AI 00:13:39.200 --> 00:13:43.037 situation. Uh models emanating from your company went on an unauthorized sort of 00:13:43.120 --> 00:13:47.037 spree across the internet this summer uh accessing non-public information from 00:13:47.120 --> 00:13:49.997 government websites in Australia attempting to infiltrate the US 00:13:50.080 --> 00:13:53.357 Department of Education and meddling with other government sites in the 00:13:53.440 --> 00:13:56.957 United States. Are you aware of any additional instances of rogue behavior 00:13:57.040 --> 00:14:00.557 by OpenAI models that have not yet become public? 00:14:00.640 --> 00:14:03.197 >> Um, we are in the process of disclosing 00:14:03.280 --> 00:14:08.077 more incidents. There's nothing else I'm aware of at that level of severity, but 00:14:08.160 --> 00:14:11.597 we have more things to disclose and because some of them involve security 00:14:11.680 --> 00:14:15.757 vulnerabilities like it'll we give people a long time to address those and 00:14:15.840 --> 00:14:19.437 it's kind of often up to them to disclose it or not. Um so more things 00:14:19.520 --> 00:14:23.997 but nothing else at that level and we're kind of going through a very rigorous 00:14:24.080 --> 00:14:26.157 process. you know to your earlier point 00:14:26.240 --> 00:14:28.077 like 00:14:28.160 --> 00:14:31.197 this is I think an a good example of why 00:14:31.280 --> 00:14:35.837 you don't want like max accelerationism and when we in our context of reality 00:14:35.920 --> 00:14:39.677 and more increasingly powerful models find that like oh the models are now 00:14:39.760 --> 00:14:42.317 capable of a new threat vector like we 00:14:42.400 --> 00:14:43.997 are going to take the time to learn how 00:14:44.080 --> 00:14:47.357 to defend against that and I think you 00:14:47.440 --> 00:14:51.117 should want us to do that and I think I don't really know how many of our 00:14:51.200 --> 00:14:55.117 critics that are like oh open AI is advocating for a slowdown can look at 00:14:55.200 --> 00:14:58.477 what we're doing and say anything other than like open air had something bad 00:14:58.560 --> 00:15:01.437 happen. They're being responsible and they're gonna like you know secure 00:15:01.520 --> 00:15:04.317 against this. >> Yeah. And obviously you guys also paused 00:15:04.400 --> 00:15:09.597 the release of the new um GPT 6.1 Astra model. Uh that was that was sort of a 00:15:09.680 --> 00:15:12.477 surprise. Folks were expecting that to be released. Um I'm curious what your 00:15:12.560 --> 00:15:15.117 researchers saw that led to that pause. 00:15:15.200 --> 00:15:17.837 Um, without getting into specifics, uh, 00:15:17.920 --> 00:15:20.237 we have like a bunch of alignment evals 00:15:20.320 --> 00:15:23.277 and we expect each model that we put out 00:15:23.360 --> 00:15:25.917 as it becomes more capable to be more 00:15:26.000 --> 00:15:28.397 robust, better aligned, more likely to 00:15:28.480 --> 00:15:30.797 do what its user asks and less likely to 00:15:30.880 --> 00:15:35.437 like cause unintended side effects. And 00:15:35.520 --> 00:15:40.557 given where the level of capability is going, I think that's also something 00:15:40.640 --> 00:15:42.397 that most users of models are going to 00:15:42.480 --> 00:15:45.677 want and demand too. like you, like many 00:15:45.760 --> 00:15:49.517 other people, I now have a model running with access to my most sensitive 00:15:49.600 --> 00:15:53.597 information, my email, my texts, messages, like all the stuff on my 00:15:53.680 --> 00:15:56.877 computer, and I really want to know that I can trust that model and it's going to 00:15:56.960 --> 00:15:59.357 behave well. >> Yeah, understood. And, you know, to go 00:15:59.440 --> 00:16:03.117 back to what you said earlier that you don't expect anything more serious than 00:16:03.200 --> 00:16:06.157 what has already been disclosed to come out. Were you referencing the Australia 00:16:06.240 --> 00:16:09.517 hack and the hack of or I guess the tampering with the US um government 00:16:09.600 --> 00:16:12.317 websites or were you referencing something like hugging face? I guess 00:16:12.400 --> 00:16:15.517 what I'm asking is are we should we see are we expecting to see more incidents 00:16:15.600 --> 00:16:18.797 like Australia and like the Department of Education but nothing like like the 00:16:18.880 --> 00:16:20.877 hugging face hack we saw this summer. 00:16:20.960 --> 00:16:24.877 >> I don't want to get into like a live thing here of trying to like say that 00:16:24.960 --> 00:16:27.757 one thing is worse than the other but I'll say of that cluster the other 00:16:27.840 --> 00:16:30.717 things that I know are like not worse than that cluster. 00:16:30.800 --> 00:16:35.197 >> Okay. Yeah, understood. Um uh so >> and by the way I I think what many 00:16:35.280 --> 00:16:38.717 companies would do in this place is just say like you know what if a if something 00:16:38.800 --> 00:16:41.837 logged into a website with a credential that was published on the web or if 00:16:41.920 --> 00:16:46.157 something was using like a minor security vulnerability that was already 00:16:46.240 --> 00:16:49.517 well known and that most people had fixed like you don't need to disclose 00:16:49.600 --> 00:16:51.597 that. We are trying to be very thorough 00:16:51.680 --> 00:16:55.037 because I think this is like 00:16:55.120 --> 00:16:58.797 a sign of things to come. It's a practice run for our company, but it's 00:16:58.880 --> 00:17:01.117 also like I think this is one of the 00:17:01.200 --> 00:17:03.917 times as before the models get truly 00:17:04.000 --> 00:17:08.237 very powerful where the world like the world can understand what these AI 00:17:08.320 --> 00:17:13.517 incidents are going to be like. And so I think we're trying to go way beyond what 00:17:13.600 --> 00:17:16.077 I think other companies might do in this situation. 00:17:16.160 --> 00:17:19.917 >> Sure. But you guys have obviously had the most severe uh incident so far with 00:17:20.000 --> 00:17:23.597 hugging case. Um and and earlier this week, uh Politico actually reported on a 00:17:23.680 --> 00:17:27.517 lawsuit filed by an advocacy group in California against your company for the 00:17:27.600 --> 00:17:31.597 hugging face hack. Do you think that under existing civil law, OpenAI can be 00:17:31.680 --> 00:17:35.677 held legally responsible for that breach or other breaches committed autonomously 00:17:35.760 --> 00:17:39.597 by its models? >> Um 00:17:39.680 --> 00:17:43.357 I mean, I don't know enough about existing law to comment on that one way 00:17:43.440 --> 00:17:47.517 or another. I do think there's going to need to be a liability framework for 00:17:47.600 --> 00:17:50.077 companies that are offering models like 00:17:50.160 --> 00:17:54.077 this and and yes I like I don't not a 00:17:54.160 --> 00:17:57.437 lawyer here can't speak to the legal details but I think if like something 00:17:57.520 --> 00:18:00.877 goes wrong with our models during training like there's going to be some 00:18:00.960 --> 00:18:02.717 version of that we need to be responsible for 00:18:02.800 --> 00:18:06.797 >> perhaps a separate new legal liability model for AI training specifically like 00:18:06.880 --> 00:18:09.997 outside >> I mean this is like the kind of thing that we are hoping that our policy 00:18:10.080 --> 00:18:15.197 makers will all debate Yeah. >> But but in the meantime, like we just 00:18:15.280 --> 00:18:17.837 don't want our models to do this during training, like that this is clearly 00:18:17.920 --> 00:18:19.837 unacceptable way for the models to behave. 00:18:19.920 --> 00:18:22.557 >> Yeah. I mean, I was going to ask irrespective of the law, do you feel any 00:18:22.640 --> 00:18:25.597 like personal responsibility for for what happened or or I guess what might 00:18:25.680 --> 00:18:27.757 happen down the line? Um just as a as a 00:18:27.840 --> 00:18:31.037 as a citizen and a a corporate citizen. 00:18:31.120 --> 00:18:33.757 >> Yeah. I mean like the the this is a very 00:18:33.840 --> 00:18:36.797 stressful job. Like there's incredible upside to these models, but there's like 00:18:36.880 --> 00:18:41.197 real things that can go very wrong. And you know, I hear you characterize it as 00:18:41.280 --> 00:18:44.237 like, oh, you all are just a bunch of doomers and you know, these people are 00:18:44.320 --> 00:18:48.797 mad that you're slowing down progress, but I feel a lot of responsibility to 00:18:48.880 --> 00:18:51.917 get this right. >> You guys are definitely in a push and 00:18:52.000 --> 00:18:55.277 pull. And to be clear, that's not me characterizing. We hear from all sides. 00:18:55.360 --> 00:18:58.157 And I want to talk a little bit about the other side, too. Um, and and about 00:18:58.240 --> 00:19:00.237 political spending by the AI industry. 00:19:00.320 --> 00:19:02.077 Um because your your president, Greg 00:19:02.160 --> 00:19:04.877 Brockman, uh his $25 million donation to 00:19:04.960 --> 00:19:09.197 the ProAI super PAC, Leading the Future, did not go over well inside OpenAI. And 00:19:09.280 --> 00:19:12.317 in fact, there was reporting, new reporting that he apologized internally 00:19:12.400 --> 00:19:15.677 for that donation. He called it a distraction and said he would not be 00:19:15.760 --> 00:19:19.117 donating an additional 25 million to that group that he had initially 00:19:19.200 --> 00:19:22.077 promised. I mean, do you agree that that Greg's donation to LTF was 00:19:22.160 --> 00:19:26.840 counterproductive? Um, 00:19:29.120 --> 00:19:32.237 I'm not familiar with that note you were talking about. 00:19:32.320 --> 00:19:34.797 >> This This came out yesterday. It was in the New York Times. Uh, there was an 00:19:34.880 --> 00:19:38.317 internal I understand. I can't keep up with it 00:19:38.400 --> 00:19:41.197 always either. There was an internal Slack message I think in June where 00:19:41.280 --> 00:19:45.117 Brockman said, um, this was a terrible distraction. Um, I'm sorry I did it and 00:19:45.200 --> 00:19:48.717 and I'm not planning to do the extra 25 million. I mean, you can respond to to 00:19:48.800 --> 00:19:51.517 the Brockman thing specifically. There's also just a broader question about AI 00:19:51.600 --> 00:19:55.677 money and politics which has just been flooding in on both sides. Right. I do I 00:19:55.760 --> 00:19:57.437 want to get your specific answer on Brockman. 00:19:57.520 --> 00:19:59.517 >> I haven't seen the Brockman thing so I don't want to get like I I don't want to 00:19:59.600 --> 00:20:01.837 respond to that but I can respond to the general thing if that's okay. 00:20:01.920 --> 00:20:05.037 >> Yeah. Well, can I ask you first? Were you ever approached by LTF or any other 00:20:05.120 --> 00:20:06.717 politically political organizations? 00:20:06.800 --> 00:20:09.997 Okay. for donations and no >> no I've like supported some candidates 00:20:10.080 --> 00:20:14.317 in the past but now that I think AI is so at the center and you know we do 00:20:14.400 --> 00:20:17.677 business with government I don't I'm not donating to any candidates but I've 00:20:17.760 --> 00:20:20.477 supported individual candidates in the past 00:20:20.560 --> 00:20:22.157 >> yeah but there has been this surge of AI 00:20:22.240 --> 00:20:26.557 money into politics and frankly you know your your your CEO your your rival CEO I 00:20:26.640 --> 00:20:31.437 guess Dario at anthropic has donated to um AI safety groups also to candidates 00:20:31.520 --> 00:20:34.797 promoting AI safety specifically Alex Bores in New York um they've been 00:20:34.880 --> 00:20:38.077 pouring money on the one side the VCs and and your president have been pouring 00:20:38.160 --> 00:20:41.517 money in on the other. How do you think all that money has impacted the 00:20:41.600 --> 00:20:45.517 perception of AI among politicians and the public? 00:20:45.600 --> 00:20:47.037 >> Well, something's clearly not working. 00:20:47.120 --> 00:20:49.837 Uh I don't I don't you know, I don't think the perception of AI is where we'd 00:20:49.920 --> 00:20:51.437 like it to be. So, 00:20:51.520 --> 00:20:56.957 >> um the I get why AI has a really 00:20:57.040 --> 00:21:00.637 negative perception right now. Um 00:21:00.720 --> 00:21:02.957 people actually love using the tools in 00:21:03.040 --> 00:21:07.917 many cases. you know, people talk about all the ways that chatbt um makes their 00:21:08.000 --> 00:21:10.797 lives better or easier or does these sort of useful things and gives them 00:21:10.880 --> 00:21:15.117 time back. But there's like a lot of anxiety about what 00:21:15.200 --> 00:21:18.317 the economic impact of all this is going to be. There's a real fear that I think 00:21:18.400 --> 00:21:21.677 is quite justified about concentration of power. there's this other fear about 00:21:21.760 --> 00:21:26.957 like you know what if there's like you have like oh anthropics head of safety 00:21:27.040 --> 00:21:29.917 research saying there's a 10% chance we're going to die or something which I 00:21:30.000 --> 00:21:31.677 hate because that person should have a 00:21:31.760 --> 00:21:33.197 lot of agency to make that number lower. 00:21:33.280 --> 00:21:37.117 It's not like a static number. Um so 00:21:37.200 --> 00:21:40.557 it's not surprising to me that people feel all of this and I don't think 00:21:40.640 --> 00:21:43.517 spending money on politics is what's going to make people feel better about 00:21:43.600 --> 00:21:48.637 it. Um >> so do you think should Sorry, go ahead. 00:21:48.720 --> 00:21:51.997 No, I think the industry needs to figure out a way to address what the actual 00:21:52.080 --> 00:21:55.517 concerns are and right now I think a lot of people in the industry are being like 00:21:55.600 --> 00:21:58.797 quite tonedeaf. >> So do you think that spending in maybe 00:21:58.880 --> 00:22:03.597 the 2028 race uh should be curtailed on all sides just to try to give that I 00:22:03.680 --> 00:22:06.157 mean to your point that the power concentration I think is what people 00:22:06.240 --> 00:22:08.717 look at in part on that. I mean what what would you say 00:22:08.800 --> 00:22:12.797 >> on on possibly curtailing spending for the next cycle? 00:22:12.880 --> 00:22:17.197 >> Like how how would that work in practice? just just I mean there's 00:22:17.280 --> 00:22:21.037 hundreds of millions of dollars right now going from the AI labs to uh 00:22:21.120 --> 00:22:25.277 candidates to packs um and it's not just on your side it's on it's from the VCs 00:22:25.360 --> 00:22:27.437 it's from anthropics >> you mean like do I think the whole AI 00:22:27.520 --> 00:22:29.517 industry should agree to stop giving money to politics 00:22:29.600 --> 00:22:33.117 >> yeah maybe a slowdown a pacing of political spending 00:22:33.200 --> 00:22:37.357 >> um I mean generally speaking I would love much less money in politics I don't 00:22:37.440 --> 00:22:42.477 think it improves the dynamics of our political system or uh but I don't know 00:22:42.560 --> 00:22:45.837 how I don't think I or the indust have the 00:22:45.920 --> 00:22:49.917 power to like disarm that and I don't think it works for to tell like some 00:22:50.000 --> 00:22:53.117 people they can give money and other people they can't. If you have a way to 00:22:53.200 --> 00:22:56.157 get less money into politics, I would be very thrilled to support it if it could 00:22:56.240 --> 00:23:00.637 be done overall. >> Yeah. Not outside of my job description unfortunately. 00:23:00.720 --> 00:23:03.437 >> Unfortunately, but I do think it'd be good. 00:23:03.520 --> 00:23:05.037 >> Sure. Yeah. Everybody says that. Yeah. 00:23:05.120 --> 00:23:08.477 And then and then the chips come down uh when it's election time. I I do want to 00:23:08.560 --> 00:23:12.237 turn to the states briefly. Um, Politico reported that you texted California 00:23:12.320 --> 00:23:16.077 Governor Gavin Newsome about a kid's chatbot safety bill before it passed the 00:23:16.160 --> 00:23:20.397 legislature this summer. Um, do you see Newsome as a partner on AI policy? Um, 00:23:20.480 --> 00:23:23.197 do you think he can maybe mend the fences between the Democratic party and 00:23:23.280 --> 00:23:25.037 Silicon Valley? 00:23:25.120 --> 00:23:27.437 >> Um, 00:23:27.520 --> 00:23:32.477 I like him. I I think that and I I have always found him someone that is like 00:23:32.560 --> 00:23:35.597 really thoughtful about trying to bring many constituencies in the state 00:23:35.680 --> 00:23:39.917 together. So, yeah, I think he can play a role there. Okay. Yeah. I mean, 00:23:40.000 --> 00:23:41.437 obviously he's a presidential candidate. 00:23:41.520 --> 00:23:45.037 Um, do you see any or, you know, very much a potential presidential candidate? 00:23:45.120 --> 00:23:47.917 I think he probably will be likely on going to be on the ballot or, you know, 00:23:48.000 --> 00:23:51.277 on some kind of ballot at some point. Do you see any other or potential 00:23:51.360 --> 00:23:54.077 presidential candidates that are on your speed dial? I mean, who who else are you 00:23:54.160 --> 00:23:57.997 talking to regularly about AI or just about politics or or anything about when 00:23:58.080 --> 00:23:59.917 it comes to the the race to the White House? 00:24:00.000 --> 00:24:01.757 >> Um, 00:24:01.840 --> 00:24:07.037 I plan to do my best to work with whoever the next president is. Uh, but 00:24:07.120 --> 00:24:11.837 I'm not spending like a lot of time with the likely candidates yet. Uh, I will I 00:24:11.920 --> 00:24:15.197 I will work with whoever the US president is when that happens. 00:24:15.280 --> 00:24:17.677 >> Sure. And you just talked to Newsome because you're in California and 00:24:17.760 --> 00:24:20.397 obviously that's those are live balls. 00:24:20.480 --> 00:24:21.997 >> Yeah. I mean, he's our governor. 00:24:22.080 --> 00:24:24.877 >> Yeah. Yeah. Um, are there any world leaders that you talk to frequently 00:24:24.960 --> 00:24:28.157 about AI or that you think are really sort of like paving a way here uh on 00:24:28.240 --> 00:24:33.037 policy or on on other things? >> Um, 00:24:33.120 --> 00:24:36.157 I mean, kind of all of them are talking about AI. I don't think I've had a 00:24:36.240 --> 00:24:38.877 conversation with a world leader in the last couple of years where AI wasn't 00:24:38.960 --> 00:24:40.557 like a genuinely top of mind thing. 00:24:40.640 --> 00:24:41.917 >> But who impressed you? Who impresses you 00:24:42.000 --> 00:24:45.597 the most in terms of their AI policy or their plans for this technology? 00:24:45.680 --> 00:24:48.680 >> Um, 00:24:49.360 --> 00:24:51.997 again like many good ones, the person that came to mind as you were saying 00:24:52.080 --> 00:24:55.357 that is uh the French president. I think is extremely thoughtful and has been for 00:24:55.440 --> 00:25:00.157 a long time about where this is going and what the shape of it needs to look like. 00:25:00.240 --> 00:25:03.597 >> Okay. Yeah. Uh moving briefly to national security and some of the risks 00:25:03.680 --> 00:25:07.917 uh to frontier companies. Um OpenAI has been very vocal about adversarial 00:25:08.000 --> 00:25:11.437 distillation coming from Chinese companies like Moonshot. And so 00:25:11.520 --> 00:25:14.397 distillation is basically where you know they they use your AI models to train 00:25:14.480 --> 00:25:17.917 theirs at a fraction of the cost um and can obviously undercut you on price as a 00:25:18.000 --> 00:25:21.197 result. Um do you think these distillation attacks are undercutting 00:25:21.280 --> 00:25:24.637 OpenAI's business model in a fundamental way? 00:25:24.720 --> 00:25:29.357 >> Um it's a it's like an interesting thing. we're doing, 00:25:29.440 --> 00:25:34.557 you know, great economically and then on the other hand there's this 00:25:34.640 --> 00:25:37.757 constant worry about ah there's going to be all this pressure and some days it's 00:25:37.840 --> 00:25:42.557 from a competitor some days it's from open source models um but some days it's 00:25:42.640 --> 00:25:46.237 from something else like what I would say is we want to make sure that we have 00:25:46.320 --> 00:25:49.037 a lead that we can protect national 00:25:49.120 --> 00:25:53.997 security and that people get like abundant access to AI and as in many 00:25:54.080 --> 00:25:56.957 other parts of this conversation there's sort of like a a complicated set 00:25:57.040 --> 00:26:00.157 trade-offs there. >> Sure. I I mean, obviously you guys are 00:26:00.240 --> 00:26:02.877 raising the the alarm about these distillation attacks, but it's not 00:26:02.960 --> 00:26:05.837 really clear what folks can do about them. I mean, do you think the US 00:26:05.920 --> 00:26:09.437 government should be doing more to address adversarial distillation from China? 00:26:09.520 --> 00:26:12.717 >> Well, I think there are a lot of things people could do about them. Um, the 00:26:12.800 --> 00:26:15.037 issue is there's just like a lot of trade-offs on all of them. You know, we 00:26:15.120 --> 00:26:16.477 could expose products in different ways. 00:26:16.560 --> 00:26:20.077 They'd be much harder to distill, but that would like take away some of the 00:26:20.160 --> 00:26:23.277 open-ended creativity, and we don't really want to have to do that. We 00:26:23.360 --> 00:26:27.357 certainly don't want to be forced to do that. Um the 00:26:27.440 --> 00:26:31.357 so I think there are a lot of things that people can do here. Uh they just 00:26:31.440 --> 00:26:34.717 all come with trade-offs and you know some of them are like national policy 00:26:34.800 --> 00:26:37.517 some of them are company normal companies competing. 00:26:37.600 --> 00:26:41.197 >> I mean do you guys have a preference for what should be done or are you the bas 00:26:41.280 --> 00:26:43.677 >> under active discussion? I don't think we would say yet like here's the thing 00:26:43.760 --> 00:26:46.237 we really are behind. >> Yeah. Well when you guys figure that out 00:26:46.320 --> 00:26:50.717 you guys got to come to Politico and and let us know. Um that sounds good. Um, so 00:26:50.800 --> 00:26:54.797 OpenAI is reportedly committed to spending around 750 billion on compute 00:26:54.880 --> 00:26:58.317 between now and 2030. I think this was from the Wall Street Journal uh over the 00:26:58.400 --> 00:27:01.917 summer. Um, but you know, credit conditions are tightening. Uh, and your 00:27:02.000 --> 00:27:05.517 firm has been identified as a credit risk to companies like Oracle that are, 00:27:05.600 --> 00:27:07.997 you know, at the forefront of hyperscaling and building out this 00:27:08.080 --> 00:27:12.237 infrastructure. Um, is that dynamic driving up costs for AI or is it expect 00:27:12.320 --> 00:27:16.157 or sorry for OpenAI or is it expected to drive up costs for Open AI? 00:27:16.240 --> 00:27:19.197 I think it's the supply chain that's driving up costs much more than the 00:27:19.280 --> 00:27:23.277 financing markets. Um, financing still seems 00:27:23.360 --> 00:27:27.197 easy to come by, but there's like a lot of it and silicon wafers seem much 00:27:27.280 --> 00:27:31.197 tighter and where much more of the cost expansion is happening. 00:27:31.280 --> 00:27:33.517 >> Okay. Uh, well, OpenAI has delayed its 00:27:33.600 --> 00:27:36.717 its IPO until 2027. Um, are you guys 00:27:36.800 --> 00:27:39.277 considering delaying it further? 00:27:39.360 --> 00:27:41.517 Um, 00:27:41.600 --> 00:27:46.637 I think when we have a few safety cases 00:27:46.720 --> 00:27:50.797 under our belt and we see that we can operate well in this new regime, there 00:27:50.880 --> 00:27:54.637 may still be like market changes that would cause us to have to think about it 00:27:54.720 --> 00:27:59.037 differently like you know unpredictable stuff can happen in the world but from a 00:27:59.120 --> 00:28:02.637 safety perspective and certainly from an financial perspective I would expect us 00:28:02.720 --> 00:28:05.517 to be ready. >> Okay. Yeah. Um uh there's been a lot of 00:28:05.600 --> 00:28:09.437 chatter uh going back to this reg regulation uh effort that I think has 00:28:09.520 --> 00:28:12.797 been largely led by industry. There's been a lot of chatter for a FINRA for 00:28:12.880 --> 00:28:17.197 AI. I know that you and Daario Deabas at Google DeepMind have been talking a lot 00:28:17.280 --> 00:28:20.077 about this. Um basically a self-regulating body that can share 00:28:20.160 --> 00:28:23.917 information maybe coordinate slowdown if things get super scary. Um how do you 00:28:24.000 --> 00:28:27.037 guys all talk about that? Is there like a WhatsApp channel or or how do you guys 00:28:27.120 --> 00:28:30.557 communicate on this? >> There's no like big WhatsApp that 00:28:30.640 --> 00:28:34.717 everybody's in. Uh but there's like lots of you know people are running to treat 00:28:34.800 --> 00:28:35.757 each other at the same conference. 00:28:35.840 --> 00:28:38.317 There's calls occasional meetings stuff like that. 00:28:38.400 --> 00:28:41.917 >> Okay. I do do you think that the government needs to give uh top AI 00:28:42.000 --> 00:28:44.957 companies an antitrust exemption in order to coordinate like this? That 00:28:45.040 --> 00:28:47.117 that's what Dario and Tropic have said. 00:28:47.200 --> 00:28:50.477 >> It's again not a lawyer as I understand it. The law is like fairly clear that 00:28:50.560 --> 00:28:54.157 we're allowed to Yeah. I mean, we can't like say like, "Let's price our models 00:28:54.240 --> 00:28:56.957 here," obviously, and that would not be good or let's not release this or 00:28:57.040 --> 00:29:00.877 whatever. But I think the law is fairly clear that we're like allowed to share 00:29:00.960 --> 00:29:04.477 safety best practices and incident reports and stuff like that. 00:29:04.560 --> 00:29:05.837 >> Why do you think Anthropic is calling 00:29:05.920 --> 00:29:09.597 for an antitrust exemption? 00:29:09.680 --> 00:29:12.157 >> You have to ask them. 00:29:12.240 --> 00:29:15.677 >> Yeah. Um there's a lot of AI uh movies 00:29:15.760 --> 00:29:19.997 coming out these days. Uh there one of them is uh has um Andrew Garfield 00:29:20.080 --> 00:29:22.237 playing you. I think it's called artificial. I guess maybe it should be 00:29:22.320 --> 00:29:26.797 called super. Uh under the new the new framework. Um who who should play you? I 00:29:26.880 --> 00:29:30.557 mean, is Andrew Garfield a good a good character? Uh uh do you have another 00:29:30.640 --> 00:29:33.117 another person in mind? Everybody thinks about this, right? 00:29:33.200 --> 00:29:34.477 >> Who should play them in a movie? 00:29:34.560 --> 00:29:35.757 >> Who should play you in a movie? 00:29:35.840 --> 00:29:41.800 >> Oh, I I never thought about it before this [laughter] happened. Um I 00:29:41.920 --> 00:29:45.037 I thought it's pretty good in Spider-Man. Yeah. 00:29:45.120 --> 00:29:48.717 >> Okay. I mean, >> so you >> I don't know. I think it's like going to 00:29:48.800 --> 00:29:52.477 be a weird thing no matter what. Uh, >> yeah. 00:29:52.560 --> 00:29:56.717 >> But I love people. I love, you know, I hope it's entertaining. I hope it's like 00:29:56.800 --> 00:30:01.117 a funny I'm sure it won't be accurate, but I hope it's funny and enjoyable to 00:30:01.200 --> 00:30:05.997 watch. >> Yeah. Yeah. Um, I I do want to ask just a little bit more about the China 00:30:06.080 --> 00:30:07.437 question while while we have you here. 00:30:07.520 --> 00:30:11.597 Um, the distillation is one thing. Uh, there is also this broader question 00:30:11.680 --> 00:30:16.157 about the race with China. And, um, I don't know if how carefully you guys are 00:30:16.240 --> 00:30:19.437 tracking sort of like who's ahead. I'm not even entirely sure how you track 00:30:19.520 --> 00:30:22.797 that. Um, do you guys track that? You know, who's sort of in the lead on the 00:30:22.880 --> 00:30:26.397 frontier and and what would you gauge the the, you know, open eye, Anthropic, 00:30:26.480 --> 00:30:29.917 sort of the leaders in the space? How far ahead are you guys from from these 00:30:30.000 --> 00:30:32.397 other Chinese companies? 00:30:32.480 --> 00:30:34.877 >> I do think we're ahead. I think it's 00:30:34.960 --> 00:30:38.077 very hard to like put a number on it of 00:30:38.160 --> 00:30:42.237 how far ahead because it is one of like there's many decisions that impact what 00:30:42.320 --> 00:30:44.637 that number is going to be. So I can say 00:30:44.720 --> 00:30:47.357 with some confidence I believe our best 00:30:47.440 --> 00:30:51.277 internal model is well ahead of the best 00:30:51.360 --> 00:30:56.157 internal model that any Chinese company has. But it's a little difficult to say 00:30:56.240 --> 00:30:58.717 exactly how far ahead. >> I I'm curious how you know that. I mean 00:30:58.800 --> 00:31:01.197 it it's because it seems like something maybe like an intelligence analyst would 00:31:01.280 --> 00:31:03.517 know. But but >> you don't that I was just going to say 00:31:03.600 --> 00:31:07.277 like I we have reason to believe this 00:31:07.360 --> 00:31:10.957 but it's not perfect and I wish I knew with like absolute confidence. 00:31:11.040 --> 00:31:12.637 >> Yeah. Um, does the government ever share 00:31:12.720 --> 00:31:15.757 information with you on this? Uh, I gota assume they're looking at the the 00:31:15.840 --> 00:31:19.197 Chinese labs. >> Uh, I mean they might with somebody else 00:31:19.280 --> 00:31:21.917 at OpenAI that like has a security clearance or something. They don't. They 00:31:22.000 --> 00:31:25.357 have not told me you are X months ahead of this other effort and here's the thing. 00:31:25.440 --> 00:31:29.037 >> Maybe that would just add some extra pressure. Not needed. Um, I uh I I do 00:31:29.120 --> 00:31:31.197 want to ask, you know, you were here for the state dinner. Yeah. 00:31:31.280 --> 00:31:35.677 >> Um, there was a lot of pressure for some sort of agreement with the Chinese 00:31:35.760 --> 00:31:39.197 government on pacing. >> The president doesn't seem to want 00:31:39.280 --> 00:31:43.277 anything to do with that. And I'm curious whether you think any kind of 00:31:43.360 --> 00:31:48.237 deal with the Chinese um is possible in the near term with this administration 00:31:48.320 --> 00:31:51.757 even. >> I assume something's possible. I mean, I 00:31:51.840 --> 00:31:56.397 don't know the exact like shape of what can get done, but this president is 00:31:56.480 --> 00:32:00.557 incredible at making deals. >> Yeah. Do you think it needs to ratchet 00:32:00.640 --> 00:32:03.597 up the chain? And I mean one thing people have described to me is you know 00:32:03.680 --> 00:32:07.357 you need to sort of regulate your own house first and then maybe you need to 00:32:07.440 --> 00:32:10.717 go to the democracies and see if we can all get on the same page and then once 00:32:10.800 --> 00:32:12.477 that happens you can go to the Chinese. 00:32:12.560 --> 00:32:16.317 Can you sort of short circuit that process or or does it have to go up that 00:32:16.400 --> 00:32:19.757 value chain in your mind? >> Here you are asking the wrong you you 00:32:19.840 --> 00:32:22.557 probably know a lot of experts on like complex international stuff. You got a 00:32:22.640 --> 00:32:25.517 question about AI tech. I can give you a good answer. Okay. You get the complex 00:32:25.600 --> 00:32:28.477 international thing done. I'm probably not the smartest person you can ask. 00:32:28.560 --> 00:32:32.957 >> Or maybe this is a question for your for your policy staff. Um I uh and and I 00:32:33.040 --> 00:32:35.117 guess just you know when it comes to the 00:32:35.200 --> 00:32:37.677 Chinese uh 00:32:37.760 --> 00:32:42.957 situation I mean do you see them as a major national security threat with AI? 00:32:43.040 --> 00:32:47.037 I mean there's been this effort to impose export controls on uh the flow of 00:32:47.120 --> 00:32:50.877 AI chips to China. Um some of those controls are already in place. Uh 00:32:50.960 --> 00:32:55.117 there's efforts to tighten them in the upcoming um uh lame duck uh regardless 00:32:55.200 --> 00:32:56.797 of who kind of wins the election. Do you 00:32:56.880 --> 00:32:59.117 think those have been effective? 00:32:59.200 --> 00:33:03.117 I simultaneously think that 00:33:03.200 --> 00:33:07.597 it is clearly a huge national security issue about what countries are using 00:33:07.680 --> 00:33:11.037 more powerful AI against each other, which is part of why I'd like there to 00:33:11.120 --> 00:33:15.037 be some sort of deal here. And you know, we've done that for other kind of 00:33:15.120 --> 00:33:17.837 majorly disruptive pieces of technology in our history, even with between 00:33:17.920 --> 00:33:18.797 countries that really don't like each 00:33:18.880 --> 00:33:22.397 other. And I also think that the shape 00:33:22.480 --> 00:33:25.597 of this technology is just so 00:33:25.680 --> 00:33:29.677 unusual that doing the kinds of things that restrict that worked in the last 00:33:29.760 --> 00:33:32.797 you know maybe if we use the example of like 00:33:32.880 --> 00:33:36.797 nuclear technology where you could really focus on raw materials and such 00:33:36.880 --> 00:33:39.597 it's not going to work quite the same way and so I think a lot of the current 00:33:39.680 --> 00:33:42.877 approaches are based in 00:33:42.960 --> 00:33:46.797 sort of the last era of thinking. So you think export 00:33:46.880 --> 00:33:49.437 controls are kind of an outdated uh attempt to 00:33:49.520 --> 00:33:50.797 >> I mean there's probably some version of 00:33:50.880 --> 00:33:54.637 it that could work but 00:33:54.720 --> 00:33:58.957 you you know like you can train a model in some other country and then when it's 00:33:59.040 --> 00:34:01.437 done just send the weights over the internet. It's like a different shape of 00:34:01.520 --> 00:34:03.917 thing. >> Yeah. And Enthropic has pushed heavily 00:34:04.000 --> 00:34:06.557 for for export controls and they're actually real big China hawks over 00:34:06.640 --> 00:34:09.117 there. They think that you know this the way the way to beat the Chinese on this 00:34:09.200 --> 00:34:13.117 is to to clamp down on their on their access to US hardware. Um is that 00:34:13.200 --> 00:34:15.917 something you share? Is that do you think that that's some one way 00:34:16.000 --> 00:34:20.637 >> that's in the category of thing? Well, again I want like I want the whole world 00:34:20.720 --> 00:34:23.357 to get to benefit from this technology first of all. So the whole like only the 00:34:23.440 --> 00:34:25.357 US people should get to benefit and we don't want the Chinese people to have 00:34:25.440 --> 00:34:30.237 it. I don't like I don't like that mindset. I do think there are real 00:34:30.320 --> 00:34:32.157 >> geopolitical power implications though. 00:34:32.240 --> 00:34:34.637 Um but it's it's very unclear to me that 00:34:34.720 --> 00:34:39.597 like chip flow is going to be 00:34:39.680 --> 00:34:41.677 the best way to deal with the problem. 00:34:41.760 --> 00:34:44.637 And you did mention at the top of this conversation that you were worried about 00:34:44.720 --> 00:34:49.357 concentration of power among people, but also among countries, maybe one country. 00:34:49.440 --> 00:34:52.637 Um, it doesn't sound super America first, but it does sound like you're of 00:34:52.720 --> 00:34:54.237 the mind that like this is technology 00:34:54.320 --> 00:34:56.237 that everybody should share. Uh, if I 00:34:56.320 --> 00:35:00.157 could if I could like wave a magic wand, 00:35:00.240 --> 00:35:03.197 I would say that America has like the 00:35:03.280 --> 00:35:05.997 most powerful AI models, the plurality 00:35:06.080 --> 00:35:09.197 of AI compute, that America gets to like 00:35:09.280 --> 00:35:12.157 lead the policy decisions in the world. 00:35:12.240 --> 00:35:14.957 I like I love the American system and the American value framework and 00:35:15.040 --> 00:35:18.157 obviously America. Um, but I don't think 00:35:18.240 --> 00:35:21.997 it should be like only Americans get to benefit from the technology or have any 00:35:22.080 --> 00:35:25.517 voice in the future or have like a super lopsided concentration of power with the 00:35:25.600 --> 00:35:27.597 rest of the world. >> Um, well, Sam, thank you so much. This 00:35:27.680 --> 00:35:29.117 is great. Uh, I'd love to do it again. 00:35:29.200 --> 00:35:32.637 Um, and thanks so much for for being on the inaugural episode. It's great. 00:35:32.720 --> 00:35:35.880 >> Take care.