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I think AI may exceed the sum of human

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intelligence in about in around 5 years.

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>> In 5 years?
>> Roughly 5 years is my guess.

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Um So there really
won't be anything that AI

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can can't do better than humans
apart from being human perhaps.

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>> In a more prosaic level
what will life be like?

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>> The most likely outcome

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is an age of amazing abundance

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uh where anyone can have
anything they can think

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of. This is this is this may sound

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preposterous but well here we are in 2026.

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Let's see where we stand in 2036. Now of

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course there are things that could
uh derail this like a a massive global

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thermonuclear war or something like that.
Um but assuming that there's not World War

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III uh I think I think
we're headed for an age of

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amazing abundance.
So this is I guess a message of

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of optimism and uh
excitement about the future.

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>> You're sure that humans will no longer

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be in control in 10 years time?

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>> I think it is unlikely
um in the same way that

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if you had a vastly more like a a

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you know the

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like like if if if the difference in the

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intelligence between AI and humans is

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vastly greater than the difference
in intelligence between AI and chimpanzees

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it's hard to imagine that the

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chimpanzees would be in charge.

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>> I'm really stuck by this. >> um

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an evolved form of chimpanzee.
So it wasn't that long ago that we were

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swinging through the trees eating
bananas um in the jungle. And we still

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eat bananas. >> You said
there was a 10 to 20% chance of

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killer robots wiping out humanity. So,

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>> you sounded worried then. Now you seem
very relaxed about it. Have you changed

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your view? >> I still think there's risk
associated with AI and robots. It's not

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zero.

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Um I I guess I've come to

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my my I sort of philosophical
conclusion is to look on the bright side.

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Um I like I I can't see any way to really

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stop this incredible
momentum of AI and robots.

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Um and and at times I sort of think, well,

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perhaps, you know, we're even if there
was a stop button, we probably shouldn't

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press it uh because

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I cuz the most likely
outcome is incredible

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abundance for for all.
>> That's what I thought, actually. It

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struck me that now you seem
to have decided it's inevitable.

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Let's hope for the best
and go for the ride.

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>> Yeah. I mean yes, pretty much.

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Let's uh let's enjoy the ride as as I
think my philosophy at this point. Cuz

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I mean, honestly, this this it's
it's there seems to be just an

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inexorable uh progress
here in in AI and and in

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robots that um >> But you

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>> you know, even if I wanted
to stop it, I I don't I couldn't.

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>> Do you think there's still a 10 to 20%

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chance that killer robots

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mean the end of humanity?

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That's a high bar to as they say.

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>> Well, in long run
we're all dead, of course.

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Um you know, um So, I mean,
I I I so >> I mean >> the let let's

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according to the standard
model of physics, the end

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of the universe is um

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a long, boring

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sort of thin, gray soup of

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uh gradual cooling.

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Um I mean, it is sort of the heat death
of the universe is called. So, now if if

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the heat death of the universe is in
fact the outcome for our reality, then

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it really is all about the journey.

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Because the destination is terrible.

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>> years is not [laughter] very Yeah,
yeah, I get that, but that could

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be a long way ahead.
>> long very very very very long way.

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>> If it's 10 to 20%
in 10 years, you would

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you go into one of your rockets if you
thought there was a 10 to 20% chance of

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it blowing up and killing you?

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>> Yes, but I I would >> [laughter]
>> But let's say there's you can't do

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anything about it. >> Okay. >> But I
guess the only thing we can try to

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do is minimize the probability
of the bad outcome.

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Um but trying to stop the intelligence in

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robots

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um

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I mean, for the longest time I

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declined to participate
in AI or was, you know,

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you know, created OpenAI as essentially
a counterweight to to Google

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cuz at the time they were had
more or less a monopoly on AI. In

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creating OpenAI and then having
Anthropic spin out of that and now

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currently Anthropic's leader in AI.

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Um I mean, these

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these actions have actually resulted in

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knock-on effects that accelerated AI

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which wasn't really my intention.

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So, it just seems like all roads lead to

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acceleration of AI.

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So, then I'm like, okay, well,
you can just sort of be sad about it or

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join the club, I suppose. >> Well,
you've certainly joined the club.

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>> Yeah. >> I mean, you've >> [laughter]
>> you've definitely joined the club.

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>> If you can't beat them,
join them, you know.

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>> A number of the other leaders of of

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model makers have been pushing
for different ways to try and minimize the

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risks. Um you know, just last week Demis

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Hassabis came out with a proposal for a

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private public regulator. Do you think

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you guys should be working more actively

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to get something in place to control the
risk, or do you think that's impossible,

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too? >> Yeah. My recommendation
to Demis cuz we I talked to him for

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a few hours before he published
his his piece was that um

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the most immediate thing that we could
do is to have the leading AI companies

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um at least just meet uh
or have a some sort of call

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once every few weeks um and just

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uh discuss say any safety
and security issues.

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>> But why why haven't you done that yet?
I mean, you don't all like each other very

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much. Yeah, but you don't you're not
all I mean, you're also all competing,

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right? You all want to be first.

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>> but that's that's where I think um good

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the competitors can keep each
keep each other honest. So, meaning

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meaning like if um like I think it's
quite difficult for someone in the

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government who doesn't have a deep
technical understanding and isn't

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driving the frontier of of AI to know
whether something should be released or

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not. Um however, the competitors

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I think what can, you know, if given

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sort of a week or two to review a new

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model um can highlight issues and uh

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and have an incentive to keep the all
all the competitors have an incentive to

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keep the others honest. >> So,
you'd have a system where the model

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makers would check each other's work.
If there was something that worried them,

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you'd tell the government. >> Yeah.

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>> The government would then take
>> If if there's something else was

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worrying them and that company was not
doing anything to address that risk,

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then that would be the the moment
for government to step in

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and take action, which is literally
what just what occurred with my model.

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>> this all have to happen?

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>> Well, I think it'd be good to do that.

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I think immediately, really.
>> Yeah, that's what people keep telling

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me. We we have to get this some kind
of system in the next 6 months because of

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the pace at which
the models are improving.

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>> Yeah, 6 months is a long time.

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Um >> So, you think shorter than that?

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>> Well, I mean there's there's so many AI

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breakthrough announcements.
Sometimes multiple per day.

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I mean, how many were there last week?

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>> A lot. >> I lost track, you know.

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>> Yeah, a lot. >> Um

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>> So, so you you basically, you know,
whether it's Demis's proposal or others,

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you need to get together and get
this set up kind of now. It sounds like

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you're telling me.

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>> Yeah, I I I would recommend that we at

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least have some sort
of informal um you know,

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weekly or bi-weekly um call and

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and and that like so just
that that there's that that

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um there's maybe

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a week or 2 weeks of of early access by

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competitors. And and this is why I think
the incentives work is because if if,

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you know, competing companies
I think are likely to

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understand if something is a security
risk. And they're they're not going to

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be shy about highlighting that that
their their competitors' models should

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be delayed in release.
>> You guys don't much like each other and

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you don't much trust each other. You're
insulting each other on on social media

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constantly. So, do you do you think you
can do that with people that you dislike

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that that where there seems to be such
kind of personal vitriol between some of

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these leaders? >> Um Yes, well,
I'm not I'm not a fan of Sam

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Altman because if you started
a nonprofit that was meant to be an

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open-source AI company and um

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you know, owned by the
world and it somehow got

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turned into an $800
billion for-profit company

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with closed source, I think you'd
be like, "Well, wait a second. That's

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the exact opposite of what I donated
the money for." That that's my issue. I

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think it's a legitimate one. Um

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And then Dario I think also is not a fan
of Sam Altman because he felt in fact

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the reason the Anthropic team left OpenAI
is because they didn't trust Sam Altman.

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Otherwise Anthropic wouldn't exist.
They would still be at OpenAI.

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Um I I think Dario is a very principled
person and he and he cares about things

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a lot. Uh he cares about
the future of of the

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world and I I think everyone I've
met at Anthropic so far has been

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I'm on Like no one set off my evil
detector. You know, they always seem

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seem like they're well-intentioned.

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Um and uh and the road
to hell is I think mostly

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paved with bad intentions. There are
a few well-intentioned paving stones in

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there, so we we don't
want to be complacent.

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Um but uh you know, at the end of the day
if we have to talk, we'll talk. I mean

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set aside our personal differences
for the good of the world type of thing.